The origin of the Institute goes back to the Institut des Études balkaniques founded in Belgrade in 1934 as the only of the kind in the Balkans. The initiative came from King Alexander I Karadjordjević, while the Institute’s scholarly profile was created by Ratko Parežanin and Svetozar Spanačević. The Institute published Revue internationale des Études balkaniques, which assembled most prominent European experts on the Balkans in various disciplines. Its work was banned by the Nazi occupation authorities in 1941. The Institute was not re-established until 1969, under its present-day name and under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It assembled a team of scholars to cover the Balkans from prehistory to the modern age and in a range of different fields of study, such as archaeology, ethnography, anthropology, history, culture, art, literature, law. This multidisciplinary approach remains its long-term orientation.
CONTENTS

ARTICLES

ANTHROPOLOGY. LINGUISTICS

Annemarie Sorescu Marinković, Serbian Language Acquisition in Communist Romania ........................................... 7

Marija Ilić, Coping with Socially Sensitive Topics: Discourse on Interethnic Marriages among Elderly Members of the Serbian Minority in Hungary .................................................. 33

MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

Miloš Ković, The Beginning of the 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina: The British Perspective ........................................... 55

Petar V. Krestić, Political and Social Rivalries in Nineteenth-century Serbia: Švabe or Nemačkari ........................................... 73

Dušan T. Bataković, French Influence in Serbia 1835–1914: Four Generations of “Parisians” .................................................. 93

Boris Milosavljević, Liberal and Conservative Political Thought in Nineteenth-century Serbia: Vladimir Jovanović and Slobodan Jovanović .......................................................... 131

Predrag Palavestra, Young Bosnia: Literary Action 1908–1914 .................................................. 155

Sofija Božić, Serbs in Croatia (1918–1929): Between the Myth of “Greater-Serbian Hegemony” and Social Reality .................................................. 185

Loukianos Hassiotis, The Ideal of Balkan Unity from a European Perspective (1789–1945) .................................................. 209

Boško Božović, Eglise – société – Etat: L’Église orthodoxe serbe à la fin du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle .................................................. 231
REVIEWS

Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković: Ştefan Lemny, Cantemireştii. Aventura europeană a unei familii princiare din secolul al XVIII-lea ............................ 267

Veljko Stanić: Jean-Christophe Buisson, Mihailović (1893–1946) Héros trahi par les Alliés ................................................................. 268

Miroslav Svirčević: Darko Tanasković, Neoosmanizam. Povratak Turske na Balkan ................................................................. 271

IN MEMORIAM

Alex N. Dragnich (1912–2009) by Miroslav Svirčević ........................................... 277

Aleksandar Jovanović (1947–2009): Per aspera ad astra
  by Vladimir P. Petrović and Sanja Pilipović ........................................... 278
Serbian Language Acquisition in Communist Romania

Abstract: The paper analyzes a unique linguistic phenomenon characterizing Romania’s western border areas for almost a decade, in the 1980s: the acquisition of the Serbian language by Romanians in Timișoara under the communist regime, primarily through exposure to Yugoslav television programmes. It gives a necessarily sketchy overview of private life under communism, notably the situation in the Banat province, whose privileged position as a result of being closest to the West both geographically and culturally was reflected in the acceptance of pluralism and a critical attitude towards authoritarianism. Taking into account the literature on foreign language acquisition through exposure to television programmes, the study is based on a research involving Romanian natives of Timișoara who, although lacking any formal instruction in Serbian, intensively and regularly watched Yugoslav television programmes in the period in question, and on evaluating their competence and proficiency in Serbian, through language tests, narrative interviews in Romanian and free conversations in Serbian. The conclusion is that most respondents, despite the varying degree of proficiency in Serbian depending on their active use of the language before and after 1989, showed a strong pragmatic competence, which appears to contradict the author’s initial hypothesis.

Keywords: TV foreign language acquisition, Serbian language, Romania, Timișoara, communism

Introduction

To explore, today, the way in which the Serbian language was acquired, to a varying degree of competence, by the Romanians of Timișoara in the 1980s requires an interdisciplinary empirical and theoretical approach. It is only such an approach that, in my view, is apt to shed light on all elements and processes involved in language acquisition in such a specific historical context and region. Accordingly, the material used — the interviews with Romanians from Timișoara and the results of a Serbian language test — was placed in the theoretical frame of anthropology, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, language acquisition and, to a certain extent, pragmalinguistics and communicology. It is my contention that only such an interdisciplinary research has the potential to look into the issue in question in all its complexity, and to trace directions for further research.

1. Everyday life under communism

The instauration of a communist regime in Romania, in March 1945, when the first communist government came to power, marked the beginning of a
new period in the contemporary history of the country, characterized both by a nation-wide political, economic and social transformation, and even more by profound changes experienced by each and every individual. In the second half of the twentieth century, communism became the “overwhelming fact of life for Romanians” (Hitchins 1992, 1080), functioning for over forty years as an ideological cover for a political and economical system turning Romania away from Western Europe and towards the East. The 1980s were a period of extreme deprivation for the vast majority of Romanians. The generalized economic crisis was amplified by the painful process of debt repayment and by the implementation of gigantic projects of Stalinist inspiration, all of them at the expense of living standard: rationalization, electricity and food shortages, lack of proper medical care and drugs were new socialist realities.

Towards the end of Ceaușescu’s rule, the country’s deep economic crisis was accompanied by a widespread popular discontent: “A widespread atmosphere of fin-de-règne was imbued with hopelessness, corruption and universal fear. Discontent was rampant but in general, however, it seemed that Ceaușescu managed to keep a strict control over the country, nipping in the bud any form of dissent and resistance. His cult was unique in its absurdity and pompousness” (Tismăneanu 1999, 159). Everyday life was marked by fear, intimidation, corruption, suspicion that the person next to you might be an informer; political repression became extremely violent; professional promotion was not based on the merit principle. As in most communist states, propaganda was seen as the most far-reaching and most effective ideological tool; in the last decades of communist rule, it became a naturalized part of everyday life: simultaneously serving to legitimize the regime and for mass instruction, the propaganda apparatus resembled the military in its organization (Kligman 2000, 108–112). Workplace stealing was widespread, as people sought to develop strategies of supplying their households in response to the generalized privation and shortage of consumer goods.

Part of this privation was also a drastic reduction in television programme. Due to the “energy saving project” initiated by Ceaușescu, between 1985 and 1989 Romanian Television limited broadcasting time to mere two hours a day, from 8 to 10 p.m., most of the time being devoted to the personality cult of Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife Elena. On top of this severe

---

1 As the history of the Romanian communist regime is not our main concern here, an interested reader may find more in Cioroianu 2005, Deletant 1997, Tismăneanu 2005, Verdery 1991.

2 For more on everyday life in communist Romania, see Budeancă and Olteanu 2010, Dragomir 2008, Neculau 2004.
restriction, radio and TV programmes but also the cinema, the theatre and other fields of artistic creativity were to follow the guidelines laid down in the *July Theses*, so that their educational and ideological role should prevail over their aesthetic value in order that they should become accessible to the masses, especially the workers and peasants, thus stopping the inflow of “decadent” Western products.

As a legitimate reaction to the drastic reduction of television programmes and ubiquitous communist propaganda, more and more people began to look for alternative ways to satiate their need for information and entertainment. As the televisions of the neighbouring states had a strong signal in the border regions, and even beyond, watching the programmes of Bulgarian, Hungarian and Yugoslav televisions became a way of escaping from the seclusion, isolation and insularity imposed by Ceauşescu’s policies, thus making a breach in the imaginary iron curtain which separated communist Romania not only from the West but even from the other, more lenient communist regimes in the region. Of all the aforementioned televisions, Yugoslav was by far the most liberal and offered the most diverse and interesting programmes. Furthermore, its signal was quite strong and covered the entire Banat, and a part of Muntenia and Oltenia, where it overlapped with that of Bulgarian television. The latter, however, was not as appreciated because of the poorer quality of its programmes and dubbed foreign language films.

2. The Romanian Banat Province and Timişoara

As for the Banat Province, it enjoyed a privileged position, both geographically and culturally, which was reflected even under the communist regime in an acceptance of pluralism and a critical attitude towards authoritarianism. Owing to its proximity to central Europe, its unhindered access to the mass media of both Hungary and Yugoslavia, intense contacts between the local Romanians and Serbs, and economic contacts with the Serbs from

---

3 The *July Theses* is the popular name of Nicolae Ceauşescu’s speech delivered at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) held on 6 July 1971. Its official title was *Proposals of measures for the improvement of politico-ideological activity, of Marxist-Leninist education of party members and of all working people*. The *Theses* contained 17 “proposals” to be discussed by the PCR Central Committee in the autumn of 1971. The speech marked the beginning of a “cultural mini-revolution” (Verdery 1991, 107) in communist Romania: competence and aesthetics were to be replaced by ideology, professionals in different domains by agitators, while culture was to become a mere instrument of political-ideological propaganda (Bozóki 1991, 57). The *Theses* marked the end of a period of a somewhat “softer” attitude towards culture and the beginning of severe prohibitions and totalitarian measures.
Serbia, the Banat opened up to the outside world. Seeking to identify the reasons for the redefinition of the Banat Romanians’ relations with other ethnic groups in the communist period, Chelcea (1999) argues that one of them had to do with the economic crisis and the shortage of consumer goods that began in the 1980s. Chelcea goes on to say that it was advantageous for the Romanians to establish closer individual interaction with the Germans, for example, because in that way they could gain access to the goods that were in short supply. Also, the shortages led to a redefinition of ethnic relations with the Hungarians and Serbs as well: “From the 1960s on, neighbouring Hungary and Serbia had much more liberal and consumer oriented policies, compared with the heavy industrialization path of Romania. The local Diasporas, but also the population from the border regions of the two countries was also helpful in the circulation of goods and images of the West” (Chelcea 1999). Victor Neumann also suggests that the communication and contact of the Germans, Hungarians and Serbs of the Banat with people in Germany, Hungary and Serbia respectively, helped maintain the flow of information between these countries and Romania. During the economic crisis, “the proximity of the former Yugoslavia and Hungary constituted an opening for diversity. Until 1989 the world could be watched through TV channels broadcast from Budapest, Belgrade and Novi Sad” (Neumann 2000, 122).

Furthermore, the Banat region has had a strong tradition of multiculturalism and interethnic tolerance, and the phenomenon of unfocused language acquisition is frequent there, if reduced to a basic variety of the language acquired. In comparison with other cities of central and southeastern Europe, where the majority culture has linguistically assimilated that of any minority, Timișoara stands out by its cultural diversity and the shared history of its mixed population. Multilingualism and multi-confessionalism has been the city’s dominant feature for three centuries, influencing the shaping of the mentality of its inhabitants and the functioning of society. Although the official languages have varied over time (German in the eighteenth century, Hungarian in the nineteenth, and Romanian since 1919), there has always been in Timișoara a propensity for learning several languages (Neumann 2008, 160). Remarkably good relations among the minorities of the Banat have always been facilitated by the region’s widespread multilingualism. The Hungarians speak Romanian and German; the Serbs and Bulgarians have been bilingual, the Romanian language being adopted as a second language in families. The Jews have largely been multilingual, and the Slovak minority has been speaking both Romanian and Hungarian. As Neumann (2000, 123) puts it, “the social relations among minorities have been multifarious and have taken the form of cultural cooperation, of recognition and respect for the traditions of other regions. Their extensive
linguistic resources have enabled the local cultural minorities to acquire a thorough understanding of the particular inheritance of the Banat region”.

3. *The Romanian and Serbian languages*

One can often hear from the ordinary people of Timișoara that they have learnt Serbian through watching Yugoslav TV. The same thing can also be heard from writers who are natives of the Banat. Talking about their childhood and adolescence, they say that they were greatly influenced by the proximity of Yugoslavia and by Yugoslav TV, which helped them learn the Serbian language (see e.g. Gheo 2006). In spite of its presumed extent and possible importance in studying the motivation for and patterns of language learning, this phenomenon has never been looked at from a linguistic point of view. This exploratory study seeks to evaluate the linguistic competence of the Romanians who acquired the Serbian language during the last years of communism.

Before proceeding any further, we should warn that one cannot speak of semicommunication in the case of Romanian and Serbian. Nevertheless, it is a fact that one of the specific features of the Romanian language, which sets it apart from the other Romance languages, is a relatively large number of elements of Slavic origin, mainly at the level of vocabulary. As far as the Serbian influence on the Romanian language is concerned, dialectologists have concluded that it has a regional character, being restricted only to the Banat dialect (Gămulescu 1974, 226). However, these regionalisms can only account for the acquisition — or better said, recognition — of a small part of Serbian vocabulary, and cannot be considered as playing a decisive role in learning the Serbian language.

4. *Foreign language acquisition through exposure to television programmes*

The conventional view of developmental psychologists, psycholinguists and linguists is that television viewing does not contribute significantly to

---

The term *semicommunication* was coined by Einar Haugen (1966, 281) with reference to the linguistic situation in Scandinavia, defined as “the trickle of messages through a rather high level of ‘code noise’” (by “code noise” he meant differences in the linguistic codes hampering communication without positively barring it). Communication does not require that the participants have the same language. Despite the growing loss of efficiency in the communication processes as language codes diverge from one another, it is often astonishing how great a difference can be overcome by speakers if there is a will to understand. The concept of semicommunication can be applied, for example, to Czech and Slovak, Serbian and Bulgarian, Serbian and Russian, Romanian and Italian etc.
the viewer’s language acquisition. Very few studies to date have demonstrated incidental foreign language acquisition, to some degree, through watching subtitled television programmes in a foreign language, during short-term experiments (d’Ydewalle and Van de Poel 1999; d’Ydewalle 2002), but a longitudinal study to assess cumulative effects on all aspects of language acquisition by watching television programmes at home is still lacking.

Most studies addressing this subject focus on the effect of subtitling on the acquisition of elements of a foreign language, in educational and non-educational settings, as compared to dubbing. It has been demonstrated that switching attention from visual images to reading the subtitles is effortless and almost automatic; thus reading the subtitle at its onset presentation is more or less obligatory and remains unaffected by major contextual factors, such as the availability of the soundtrack and the pace of action (d’Ydewalle 2002, 60). It has also been shown that, with adults, the reverse subtitling mode (with foreign language in the subtitles and native language in the soundtrack) results in more extensive vocabulary acquisition than does the normal subtitling mode (foreign language in the soundtrack and native language in the subtitles): more new words are acquired when they are presented visually than auditorily. However, unlike adults, children tend to acquire more when the foreign language is in the soundtrack rather than in the subtitles (d’Ydewalle and Van de Poel 1999, 241–242).

Also, it is widely accepted that language acquisition following exposure to television programmes is largely limited to vocabulary (Koolstra and Beentjes 1999, 58; d’Ydewalle 2002, 64), while the acquisition of foreign language morphology and syntax can occur only after some formal instruction in the foreign language. Jovanović and Matić (2008, 333–335), in a contrastive study on adolescents conducted in Serbia, which assessed Spanish language acquisition by instructed learners as compared to Spanish tele-novela viewers, have also concluded that even though language acquisition in the latter group occurred mostly at the lexical level, simple grammatical structures have also been acquired.

There are also a few studies which analyze the impact of watching foreign language television programmes (with no subtitles) on the language skills of immigrants (Buss 1995; Franceschini 2003). Finding themselves in a new language environment, immigrants can passively acquire the new language by watching television programmes over the years: the experience of “being exposed” to a foreign language can lead to unfocused language acquisition. However, many research findings on immigration indicate that language acquisition quite often comes to a standstill at the level of a basic variety, sufficient for a simple, practical communication, but not for expressing more sophisticated notions (Franceschini 2003, [50]).
5. **Hypothesis**

The case of foreign language acquisition we shall discuss here is quite specific, and no consistent research on similar situations has so far been conducted. From the early 1980s until the beginning of the 90s, the Romanians of Timişoara, without being immigrants, “found” themselves in a foreign language environment by watching Yugoslav television programmes. For many, Serbian became a third language. Thus, they watched foreign movies (American, French etc.) with foreign subtitles (Serbian) — a situation which has not so far been registered in the literature; various programmes (documentaries, shows, music, sports) in a foreign language (Serbian) with no subtitles; and cartoons dubbed in Serbian. D’Ydewalle concluded one of his studies on foreign language acquisition by saying that “possibly, a sequence of several movies, spread over a longer period of time, could [...] provide conclusive evidence that vocabulary acquisition due to subtitled television programs is supplemented with grammar acquisition” (d’Ydewalle 2002, 74). The aim of this research is to explore how this intense and extended exposure of Romanian-language speakers to Serbian television influenced their acquisition of the Serbian language. I have tried to investigate both vocabulary and grammar (morphology and syntax), together with communicative and productive skills. While expecting that intense exposure to different TV programmes should offer a rich context for vocabulary acquisition, I assumed that grammatical rules cannot be learnt without some previous formal instruction. Also, I expected that the level of Serbian language knowledge would be much lower today than it had been twenty years ago, and I was anxious that the time interval between the exposure to the Serbian language and the present research might affect its results considerably, leading to its ending in failure.

6. **The present study**

Based on the earlier experimental studies on children’s incidental learning of foreign words through watching subtitled television programmes (d’Ydewalle and Van de Poel 1999; Koolstra and Beentjes 1999), on adults’ language acquisition through exposure to foreign subtitled movies (Jovanović and Matić 2008) and on unfocused language acquisition by immigrants in a new foreign language context (Franceschini 2003), I conducted my research in order to determine whether, and to what degree, the native Romanian speakers of Timişoara in the communist period acquired Serbian language elements through exposure to Yugoslav TV programmes. Unlike these previous studies, mine was not performed immediately after the subjects’ exposure to TV material, but almost two decades after they had
stopped watching Yugoslav television.\textsuperscript{5} It is not a longitudinal study, but presents the synchronic, present-day situation of the respondents who used to watch Yugoslav television throughout the 1980s, and who claim either that they have learnt Serbian “from TV” or at least that they understood most of the spoken or written language on TV.

7.1. Research method and participants

The research was conducted in 2010 in Timișoara, the largest city in the Romanian Banat, using a sample of ten participants (eight men and two women), aged between 32 and 42, which means that they were between 11 and 21 years old at the end of the target period (1982–89).\textsuperscript{6} All were born and grew up in Timișoara, with the single exception of a person born in Turnu Severin,\textsuperscript{7} but presently living in Timișoara. All of them now hold a higher education degree and had no previous formal instruction in Serbian. Some were selected from among the author’s circle of friends and acquaintances, others by snowball sampling.

To assess the participants’ language skills, I have employed:

1) A semi-structured narrative interview in Romanian, about the period when they began watching Yugoslav TV channels, their favourite programmes, ways of dealing with the foreign language, other contacts with the Serbian language, both before, during and after the period in question.

2) A language test, consisting of a multiple-choice test, translation of words from Romanian into Serbian and vice versa, translation of two short texts from Romanian to Serbian and vice versa, and a reading task.\textsuperscript{8}

3) Free conversation in Serbian with the most proficient participants.

7.2. Procedure and results

7.2.1. The narrative interview in Romanian

The narrative interviews have proved valuable in reconstructing the actual circumstances under which the respondents acquired the Serbian language,

\textsuperscript{5} For most participants in the study, that moment is roughly coincident with the Romanian Revolution of 1989, which overthrew the communist regime. Since that date, the Romanians have been free to watch foreign television programmes by means of cable television, and local television programmes have also been increasingly diverse.

\textsuperscript{6} As some of them were children, some adolescents and adults at the time of language acquisition, different respondents activated different psychological patterns of language learning.

\textsuperscript{7} Turnu Severin is a port on the Danube, in Western Oltenia, on the border with Serbia, so it is comparable to Timișoara as regards the exposure to the Serbian language through watching Yugoslav TV.

\textsuperscript{8} The language test is added as an appendix at the end of the paper.
since slices of memory contained in them provide clues to the experience of “being exposed” that can lead to unfocused language acquisition (see also Franceschini 2003, [48]). Despite their initial emphasis on their passive reception of oral language through exposure to television, the participants revealed a multitude of learning strategies as well as persons involved in their language acquisition. Thus they described many other interactions, which point to a multitude of situations in which spontaneous language acquisition can take place in general, such as their interaction with Serbian schoolmates, or with Serbs from Serbia who used to come to the flee markets in Timișoara to sell consumer goods that were much sought for during the harsh economic crisis (jeans, chocolate, sweets, T-shirts, *Vegeta* food condiment, music cassettes etc.), or later — during the embargo against Serbia, when the movement took the reverse direction and Romanians started going to the neighbouring country to sell various goods — the communication with people in Serbia.9 One should also keep in mind that there is in Timișoara a large Serbian community,10 and that relations between the two countries have always been quite strong, at least at a regional level.

What our respondents recalled while talking about the circumstances surrounding their acquisition of Serbian from TV was, in fact, part of their childhood and adolescence: all of them spoke with great pleasure and emotion about what can be termed the process of maturing. As emotional evaluations are important for cognitive achievements, the stronger the emotional involvement of a person, the stronger his or her memories and knowledge.

At the beginning of the interviews, the respondents were asked to tell something about preference given to Yugoslav TV over Hungarian. They all had the same explanation: except for those who spoke Hungarian, everybody else watched Yugoslav TV, because movies were not dubbed, as they were in Hungary, the programmes were more diverse as opposed to “pretty flat” Hungarian ones, the music was quite good and, in general, Serbian was easier to pronounce and understand. Industrial workers manufactured special receivers for “the Serbs” and for “the Hungarians”, for Yugoslav and Hungarian TVs respectively; initially, three channels were available with the Serbian receiver – Belgrade 1, Belgrade 2 and Novi Sad, and later on *Treći kanal* (Third Channel) as well. The receivers, as some respondents recall, even had special names: *Yagi 1* and *Yagi 2*.

---

9 A distinctive variant of spontaneous language acquisition is the level known as “unfocused language learning” (Franchescini 2003, [51]): learning a language “in passing” by being exposed to it and without paying much attention. Although such forms are not amenable to direct observation, one cannot help but agree that they provide a sufficient foundation or, at least, an opportunity for further acquisition.

10 For the ethnic identity of the Serbs in Timișoara, see Pavlović 2005 and 2006.
Because of their young age at the time, at first almost all respondents watched cartoons on Yugoslav TV. Interestingly, all of them, without exception, used the term *crtani film* (cartoon) without ever translating it into Romanian. The same goes for *vesti* (news) and *filmski maraton* (movie marathon). They practically grew up with Yugoslav TV, watching everything: from cartoons and music shows, through sports, documentaries, news, educational programmes, to movie marathons and even porn movies.\(^{11}\) Thus, the respondents have been exposed to different registers of the language: from formal (the news) to casual and intimate ones (movies, interviews, live shows etc.). They listened to the literary language, but also to dialogues taking place in real-life situations, often dialectal, or to the simplified language of sports programmes, and they also learnt lyrics by heart.

Many of the participants had the visual memory of the opening sequence of various TV shows: “I used to watch *crtani film*. There was a big TV and a small TV [on the screen]. This announced the programme to follow. When the small TV showed up and started to dance, I knew cartoons were about to begin,” one participant explained, recalling a well-known children’s programme. The same participant spoke about the news programme: “Serbian TV was our only source of information. We also used to watch the news. *Vesti*. There were some dots and tick-tick-tick-tick-tick, like this, and the *vesti* would appear. It was incredibly great. There you could find out what was really happening in the world.” Others remembered different commercials (*Kiki* caramels, *Lee Cooper* jeans, *Eurokrem* chocolate cream, *Cipiripi* chocolate bars, juices, *C-market* products, drugs, etc.), visually and orally, adding that they did not learn what some of the commercials had promoted until long after they stopped watching Yugoslav TV.

Some of them recalled that, in the early 1980s, the Serbian Consulate in Timișoara used to receive Serbian newspapers and magazines with the Yugoslav TV schedule included, and that the secretaries used to produce

\(^{11}\) For this generation, mainly in preadolescence and adolescence in the 1980s, learning Serbian and watching Yugoslav TV programmes was the only way to find out what was going on in the rest of the world. For their parents, as for most Romanians in other regions of the country, listening to Radio Free Europe was the only connection with the world. However, as one respondent put it, “we were quite young and our parents wouldn’t let us do it [listen to Radio Free Europe], because it was not good. Later on, when we grew up, we did listen, but couldn’t understand half of it. It was different with TV, though.” It should be noted that this phenomenon was in fact a continuation of listening to Yugoslav radio stations: before TV sets began to enter average homes (roughly after 1960), most of the respondents had used to listen to Yugoslav radio stations. This might have helped them to become familiar with the Serbian language, at least at a phonetic level; we believe, however, that the visual input played the most important role in their acquisition of Serbian.
several copies on their typewriters to disseminate them about the city. On Fridays no one would leave work before buying a typed copy of the TV schedule. After 1986, the Consulate started receiving more copies of the TV schedule, so people could get a real, printed one. The respondents, children or adolescents at the time, used to cut out pictures of celebrities from the programme, glue them in their notebooks and make highly valued collections of the cuttings.

All watched sport competitions and championships, both national and international, on Yugoslav TV. European or world football championships were the occasion for people to gather together, at first in the homes of those in possession of better receivers, then of those who had colour TVs. One of the respondents even admitted that he had taken up basketball “because of the Serbs”, having watched their championships and being impressed by their passion for the sport.

As for movies, American films were among their favourites. As I have already said, all movies were subtitled, and so people, relying on their English, made associations and learnt Serbian words, “a lot of them, step by step”, as a respondent put it. As for TV serials, they remembered watching the *Dinasty, Shogun, Alo, alo, MASH*. Some of them remembered watching the first erotic movies; others claimed that they watched even Yugoslav movies because these, unlike Romanian, contained a lot of erotic scenes (“We knew that there’d be at least one erotic scene in every Serbian film, while in Romanian ones — never”). In 1986, *filmski maraton* (movie marathon) was launched on the Third Channel. Different movies ran one after another Friday to Sunday. People would spend all night long watching TV and recording movies on videotapes, so on Saturday the children were sleepy at school, and their parents at work.

The respondents also recall watching music shows on Yugoslav TV. Zdravko Čolić, Oliver Mandić, Lepa Brena, Bijelo Dugme, Riblja Ćorba, Bajaga i instruktori, Magazin, are among the Yugoslav entertainers the participants most frequently mentioned and whose lyrics they knew by heart. One participant recalled: “We knew all the lyrics. Even now, when I sing Bajaga’s songs, I don’t understand half the words, but they come to my mind. And my pronunciation is bad.”

---

12 Records or cassettes with foreign music were also brought from Serbia and everybody was familiar with the international music top lists presented on Yugoslav TV. Also, most of the participants remembered Lepa Brena’s concert in Timișoara in 1984, a unique event in a period when no foreign entertainers could obtain permission to perform in communist Romania.

13 Even today, in Timișoara, this generation still play “oldies” of the Yugoslav popular music at their parties.
After the Romanian Revolution of 1989 overthrew the communist regime and cable networks began expansion, Yugoslav TV was not watched as much as before. Some of the participants remained at that level of Serbian language knowledge, which was mostly acquired passively and has never been really activated. As already noted, many immigration studies have shown that language acquisition can reach a basic level without making any further progress. Whether initially learning the language spontaneously or in school contexts, all learners pass through this basic variety and remain there for some time before moving on. Some, however, may remain at this level for the rest of their lives (Franceschini 2003, [50]). Some of our respondents, on the other hand, continued or began to use Serbian actively: some of them became engaged in the non-government sector and started collaborating with Serbian NGOs, others worked in different regions of Serbia for a while, interacting with the local population; one worked in Russia for some time, where he had ex-Yugoslav workmates. Another respondent, having graduating from the Medical School in Timişoara, even thought of going to Belgrade to do his specialization, relying mainly on the Serbian he had acquired from TV. Also, when incidentally meeting Serbian speakers, in informal contexts, either in Romania or abroad, my respondents were willing to try to reactivate their knowledge of Serbian.

7.2.2. The language test

Only six out of a total of ten respondents took the language test. The rest were reluctant, claiming that their Serbian was not good enough. Of these six, two believed that their Serbian was quite good, but claimed that they had no experience in writing and proposed to do the test orally. Given that they had never used Serbian in its written form, the proposal was understandable and legitimate. Those who did the test in writing showed a high level of orthographic inaccuracy. Apart from this, as the test was sent to most of the respondents in electronic format and they completed it on their computers and sent it back, the omission of diacritics is acceptable.

7.2.2.1. Morphology

The multiple choice test — comprising ten questions in Serbian (in Latin script), each with a choice of five possible answers — was aimed at evaluating the use of instrumental and locative cases, which do not exist in Ro-

---

14 The issue of the prestige the Serbian language enjoyed in the Banat under communism will not be discussed here, as the subject is broad and deserves a separate study.

15 See Jovanović and Matić 2008, 330, 331 for similar observations concerning the poor orthographic competence of Spanish telenovela viewers as opposed to instructed learners.
Serbian Language Acquisition

A. Sorescu Marinković, Serbian Language Acquisition

It is not surprising that the preferred choice in most cases was the instrumental case as the object of the preposition *sa* (with) — *sa vozom* (travel with train) — instead of the standard one, where the instrumental is the object of the verb — *Putovao sam vozom* (I travelled by train). It should be stressed that such a construction in Serbian usage is a trait of spoken language, to which they were intensively exposed. Moreover, the construction with the instrumental perfectly matches the Romanian grammatical pattern, where the preposition *cu* is used (*cu trenul: “by train”). Therefore, this preference may be seen as mother tongue interference on the level of morphological structures.

The respondents showed an increased proficiency as far as the use of personal pronouns and degrees of comparison of adjectives was concerned. Some were even able to use the partitive genitive *vremena* (time): *Moja drugarica želi da idemo zajedno u grad, ali ja nemam vremena* (My friend wants us to go to town together, but I don’t have time), but this may be explained by the fact that *nemam vremena* (I don’t have time) has become a fixed expression in Serbian and is acquired as such.

Even though the respondents were not always able to choose the correct answer, it is important to note that they understood the context and were able to translate all sentences, which indicates their high language comprehension capacity.

7.2.2.2. Vocabulary

*a) Word translation from Serbian into Romanian*

The word translation part of the test was designed to assess the respondents’ vocabulary competences. It consisted of seventeen words (adjectives, adverbs, verbs, nouns, pronouns and prepositions) and all participants succeeded in scoring more than fifty percent. The most commonly mistranslated words were abstract nouns (Ser. *olakšanje*: “relief”) and false friends (Ser. *tavan*: “attic”, Rom. *tavan*: “ceiling”; Ser. *pod*: “floor” and “under”, Rom. *pod*: “bridge”), to which they mostly attributed the meanings those words have in Romanian, along with the family of words sharing the same root (*večera*: “dinner”; *veče*: “evening”; *večeras*: “tonight”; *uveče*: “in the evening”), which proved to be quite confusing and led the respondents to give up and leave the last one or two words untranslated.

*b) Word translation from Romanian into Serbian*

The translation of words from Romanian into Serbian comprised thirty-five words of all types, as in the previous task. The participants’ knowledge of
Serbian was noticeably characterized by the forms usually used in informal speech. As far as verbs are concerned, two infinitives offered in the test, *a cânta* (Ser. *pevati*: “to sing”) and *a merge* (Ser. *ići*: “to walk”), were translated using a wide range of verbal forms — first person plural present indicative (*idemo*); conjunction *da +* third person singular present (*da boda, da pjeva*); second person singular imperative (*bodaj, pjevaj*); third person plural present indicative (*idu, pjevaju*) — probably those best known to, or most frequently used by, the participants. Their use of these forms indicates direct oral contact with native speakers, whether in “real” life or “just” through watching television. Nouns denoting concrete or usual things — *carte* (book), *noapte* (night), *alune* (hazelnuts; peanuts), *pâine* (bread), *mâine* (tomorrow) — were perfectly translated by the participants. However, they had difficulty translating one concrete noun — *desen* (Ser. *crtež*: a “drawing”). The syntagm *crtani film* (Rom. *desene animate*: “cartoon”) was learnt and remembered as such by all the participants; apart from the adjective *crtani*, they had no need to acquire the noun (*crtež*) or the verb (*crtati*) from the same word family; some of the respondents tried to derive it (*crtan, crtov*); one translated it as the diminutive of *cartoon* (*crtal*); another translated it as the adjective from the syntagm: *crtani* (drawn); while one added, in brackets, the word *film* to *crtani*. The latter respondent also offered the “context” from which he “extracted” the adjectives *albastru* (blue) and *roșu* (red): *plavi* (*maj safiru*) (“my blue sapphire” — a line of Bajaga’s lyrics) and *crvena* (*zvezda*) (“Red Star” — one of Belgrade’s best-known football clubs). This would certainly not happen to instructed learners, as they do not tend to connect words strictly with the context of their occurrence. Apart from two respondents, most were unable to translate the adjective *desculț* (barefoot), but they came up with ingenious solutions: *bez cipele* (without a shoe) and *bez čarapi* (without socks), which also points to a powerful influence of the oral register. Most were unable to translate three days of the week: *vineri* (Friday), *sâmbată* (Saturday), and *duminică* (Sunday); they could not remember exactly the name of the other days and generally confused them. As for the conjugation of the verb *mânca* (eat) in the present tense, the first and third person, singular and plural, were usually translated correctly, while the second person was simply skipped. It was also interesting to see how the respondents would translate nouns with a definite article (nonexistent in Serbian), by offering the following series: *copil* (child), *copii* (children), *copiii* (the children), *acești copii* (these children). As expected, they succeeded in translating the words

---

16 This dialectal form is easily explainable, as it can be frequently encountered in the lyrics of Bosnian or Croatian singers of the time.

17 This translation was made on the Romanian model: *fără ciorapi*. 
from the series, but, probably sensing the inappropriateness, skipped the noun with the definite article.

It should also be noted that the most proficient participant in Serbian translated pâine (bread) as kruh, a predominantly Croatian term, and not as he was expected to, as hleb, the term used in Serbia. When asked if he had acquired this term through watching TV, he admitted that it was just an attempt to test my own knowledge of Serbian and Croatian, and that he learnt the word subsequently, in a Croatian-speaking environment. The same participant was the only one who drew my attention to the distinction between the Serbian words kikiriki (peanut) and lešnik (hazelnut), alune being wrongly used in spoken Romanian for both; the other respondents translated alune as kikiriki, while in fact the proper translation should be lešnik.

7.2.2.3. Syntax

a) Text translation from Serbian into Romanian

Out of the four tasks of text translation from Serbian into Romanian, the respondents scored very well on a short nine-sentence text, which confirms a general tendency in language acquisition for comprehension to precede production (see Clark 2003, 127–130, Hendriks and Koster 2010), both in the mother tongue and in a foreign language.

Minor errors mainly occurred in translating times of day. In Serbian, half hours are expressed as relative to the next hour, so “half past six” is expressed as “half to seven” (pola sedam), while Romanian uses virtually the same formula as English: şase jumătate: “half past six”. As a result, with one notable exception, all translated pola sedam (half past six) as şapte jumate (half past seven) instead of şase jumate, which obviously indicates mother tongue interference.

b) Text translation from Romanian into Serbian

The translation of an eight-sentence text from Romanian into Serbian seemed to pose the greatest difficulty, as only three respondents were willing to give it a try at all; one of those who abstained said that translating into Serbian “gives him a headache”. The three respondents who did the translation showed a quite creative, if not always accurate, use of language: the levels of fluency (or, better said, intelligibility) were quite high, even though the translations could hardly be described as grammatically correct. The occurrence was observable of the same mistakes as those made in the first tasks of the language test — the use of accusatives instead of locatives, the incorrect translation of time resulting from the use of the Romanian model, the erroneous use of instrumentals. In addition, a series
of other, different kinds of errors was also observed, such as the omission of the reflexive pronoun in reflexive verbal constructions in the first person singular: *dusirao sam* instead of *tuširao sam se* (I took a shower), *probudio sam* instead of *probudio sam se* (I woke up). This can be easily explained by the fact that, in the Romanian verbal system, the reflexive verbs are conjugated with personal pronouns in the first and second person, and with the reflexive one only in the third. Also, one respondent’s persistent mistake was the incorrect word order in constructions with the unstressed form of the verb *biti* (to be) where the personal pronoun is omitted: *Juče bio sam vrlo umoran* instead of *Juče sam bio vrlo umoran* (Yesterday I was very tired) and *Spavao sam vrlo dobro zašto je toplo u sobu* instead of *Spavao sam vrlo dobro zato što je bilo toplo u sobi* (I slept tight because it was warm in the room). In the last sentence we can also notice the incorrect use of *zašto* (why) instead of *zato što* (because), as well as the use of the locative case instead of the accusative (*u sobu* instead of *u sobi*).

Generally, the respondents were unable to form the future tense in Serbian, which is another feature of the spoken language, where the present is often used instead, with a time determinant. As far as the conditional is concerned, it was translated correctly by one respondent (*želio bi* “I’d like”), another used the present tense instead (*hoću da* “I want to”), while a third used a corrupted form of the conditional – *hoće če*, instead of *hteć bih*, probably because the infinitive (*hteti*) does not resemble the third person singular present, *hoće*, the form most frequently used, as is the case with the verb *želeti*, for example. None of the respondents was able to use the correct literary form of iterative time adverbs: *în fiecare vineri* (every Friday) was translated as *svakom petku* or *svaka petaka*, but also as *svaki petak* (which is quite frequent at a dialectal level). Additionally, one of the respondents accommodated phonetically the neologism *vikend* (weekend) to the Romanian model — *ujkend*.

7.2.2.4. Reading in Cyrillic

The last task of the language test was a reading task: the participants were asked to read a short text written in Cyrillic. Interestingly enough most were able to do that. They remarked that they recognized some of the words visually, and added that, unlike commercials, movies on Yugoslav TV had never been subtitled in Cyrillic. The fact that many of them had studied

---

18 This is another dialectal variant frequently encountered in the songs they were listening to.

19 The switch from Latin to Cyrillic script took place in 1991, and therefore could not be remembered by our respondents, as they had stopped watching Yugoslav TV after 1990.
Russian in school, however, may be a possible explanation for the increased proficiency. Those who did the test on their computers just retyped the text in Latin script, underlying the words they did not understand. As expected, there was much confusion between ђ and ћ, and incorrect transcription of љ and њ.

7.2.3. Conversation in Serbian

This task was not originally included in the research plan, as I did not expect the participants to be able to perform a series of communicative functions in a realistic-like situation. However, the last two participants, who were also the most proficient in Serbian, suggested that we should speak in Serbian. Each conversation lasted for about ten minutes; the participants mainly talked about their past and present experiences, and about their interaction with native speakers of Serbian, a qualitative assessment of the audio-recording being made in the end (see also Jovanović and Matić 2008, 331–334 for a similar language assessment). The vocabulary used was not too rich, but one can notice a skilful use of the acquired words: very few lexemes were used to cover a wide range of concepts. The respondents were mainly able to use simple language structures to express much of what they wanted:

*Ja sam isto radio tu. I kad sam bio tu uvek sam pričao srpski. I kad pričaš srpski si Ser. I u Rusiju isto je bilo. Kad oni su... Dobro, na početku su mislili... Oni nisu znali da smo Rumuni. I dobili smo pivo besplatno.*

(I also worked there. And when I was there I always spoke Serbian. And when you speak Serbian you are Serb. In Russia it was the same. When they... Ok, at first they thought... They didn’t know we were Romanians. And we got beer for free.)

The less proficient participant performed quite poorly on grammatical accuracy, frequently switching back to his first language when lacking the Serbian equivalent: *Bagz Bani ima ženski comportament* (Bugs Bunny has a feminine *behaviour*). Also, he frequently used loan constructions from Romanian, not only on the lexical level, but also on the syntactical one: *Moj brat ima pet godina starije nego meni* (Rom. *Fratele meu este cu cinci ani mai mare decât mine*: “My brother is five years older than I”). Both participants used various strategic devices, such as repeating the question in order to buy more time to think of an answer, or using the expression *Kako se kaže?* (What’s the word?) to ask for the lacking vocabulary item,

---

20 Romanian influence on the Serbian language will not be discussed here. For more, see Bošnjaković and Varenika 2008, Ivić 1990, Simić and Caran 2006.
or requesting clarification. On the other hand, grammatical accuracy of the more proficient respondent was quite high; he even used both Serbian and Croatian word variants to demonstrate that he was perfectly aware even of such subtle lexical differences. Both had quite good pronunciation and no difficulty pronouncing Serbian phonemes; one of them was even capable of differentiating between the affricates č and čk.

Interestingly, the last, and most proficient, respondent slipped Serbian words and phrases into our conversation in Romanian, which may be interpreted as a proof of high proficiency in Serbian:21 lacking the term that would perfectly express his thought, he resorted to code switching. Namely, he picked up lexemes from the other language register he mastered very well, from Serbian, those which he thought to be more appropriate in the given context:

Da, ne uitam la Treći kanal... Āla era mai mult umetnički, zabavniji.
(Yes, we watched the Third Channel… It was more artistic, entertaining.)

Aicea la noi în Banat se spune că nu găsești cal verde și sârb cuminte. Îs ei mai nărozi așa și mai tvergodlavi. Da’ în rest is ei ok.
(Here, with us, in the Banat, there is a saying that there is no such a thing as a green horse and a good Serb. They can be pretty silly and stubborn. But, apart from that, they’re ok.)

In our conversation in Romanian, the same respondent, when using fragments of direct speech from his own conversations with Serbian speakers in the past, rendered them in Serbian:

Şi i-am zis: “Ma nemoj! Misliš da danas sam došao iz şume?”
(And I told him: “Come on! Do you think I’ve only just come out of the backwoods?”)22

It may be said in conclusion that the respondents showed very high pragmatic competences. Even though they were unable to produce longer descriptive or explanatory passages, and requested “help of the sympathetic interlocutor” (Jovanović and Matić 2008, 333), the researcher, they were not inhibited by the fear of making mistakes, as is usually the case with instructed learners. Lacking a normative system to standardize their utterances in Serbian, they felt free to use the language following their intuition,

---

21 A similar code switching phenomenon can be encountered in bilingual individuals. For more on the Serbian-Romanian bilingualism of the Vlachs of northeast central Serbia and the Bayash of Croatia, see Sorescu-Marinković 2007b, 2008.

22 This is a frequently observed phenomenon in bilingual persons (for more details, see, for example, Petrović 2005, who analyzes the ideological functions of direct speech in the process of language switching with the Serbs in Bela krajina).
and thus showed a great creativity in employing the Serbian they acquired by watching TV.

8. Conclusions

In view of the twenty-year gap between the exposure to the Serbian language and the realization of the research, the obtained results were quite surprising and permitted me to draw relevant conclusions concerning the Serbian language acquisition in communist-period Timișoara. Even though the respondents showed a varying degree of proficiency, depending on their active use of Serbian before and after 1989, and although some of them had not enough confidence in their knowledge to take the language test, others showed a very high communicative competence. This contradicts my initial hypothesis insofar as it shows that intensive exposure to Serbian-language TV programmes over a longer period of time resulted in the acquisition of a quite large vocabulary, supplemented with grammar acquisition as well.

As expected, the most conspicuous was the lexical level of the Serbian language acquisition. When translating from Serbian into Romanian, the respondents generally encountered difficulties only with abstract concepts and false friends. When translating from Romanian into Serbian, they made use mainly of forms detectable in informal contexts. Some of them even offered the whole construction from which they had “extracted” the given words, which suggests that they learnt many expressions by heart, either from TV or from lyrics. When they lacked the exact Serbian equivalent for a Romanian word, many respondents used their limited vocabulary resourcefully and came up with ingenious solutions.

At the morphological level, the respondents showed an increased proficiency as far as the use of personal pronouns and degrees of comparison of adjectives is concerned. Traits of spoken language were observable at this level as well, such as a preference for the instrumental case as the object of the preposition sa (with) instead of the standard one, where the instrumental is the object of the verb. Also, they were unable to translate the infinitive and the future tense of verbs, but used a wide range of verbal forms instead. However, the fact that morphology was also acquired is undeniable.

As for Serbian syntax, that it was the most difficult aspect of the language to master is evidenced by the fact that only three respondents agreed to try to translate a text from Romanian into Serbian, and two to engage in a conversation in Serbian. Even though they were not able to translate the text perfectly or to produce longer portions of description or explanation in

---

33 According to Canale and Swain 1980, communicative competence includes grammatical, sociolinguistic and strategic competence.
Serbian, and requested the researcher’s assistance, the presence of basic syntactic structures was evident. Furthermore, they were not inhibited by the fear of making mistakes and used the Serbian language creatively.

8.1. Limitations of the study

There are a few limitations to this study that should be acknowledged and addressed. The first one resides in the fact that the group of respondents was not uniform enough, given that experimental studies on language acquisition are usually conducted with levelled groups (the same number of men and women, the same number of participants in each age group etc.). I believed it important to do the research anyway, as any delay could have led to the complete failure of the study. The second limitation is due to the fact that not all participants were willing to take the language test. The third limitation concerns the extent to which the findings are amenable to generalization. As the number of respondents was too small for broader generalizations, further evaluations are needed in order to be able to replicate the present findings.

8.2. Future research

This exploratory study may be seen as an invitation to further and similar research. It would be interesting, for instance, to compare the nature of communicative competence of Serbian-language learners at difference competence levels with that of persons who acquired Serbian only through watching Yugoslav television programmes.\textsuperscript{24} Also, similar research might be conducted on the acquisition of Bulgarian in southern Romania, or of Serbian in Albania, through exposure to TV programmes in roughly the same period as the one studied here.

8.3. Concluding remarks

The fact that the respondents were highly educated facilitated the research greatly.\textsuperscript{25} All of them instantly understood the purpose of the research and were willing to help. Indeed, they hailed it as an important and needed initiative. They came up with innovative suggestions as to its methodology, such as the inclusion of a conversation in Serbian, and were able to theorize and even to interpret the research results. They were familiar with the language categories we were trying to evaluate by the language test, and re-

\textsuperscript{24} See Jovanović and Matić 2008 for a similar study on Spanish language.

\textsuperscript{25} See Sorescu 2007a for a detailed analysis of the obstacles and problems encountered in the field while interviewing persons from traditional rural communities.
gardless of whether they fulfilled the tasks or not, they drew many pertinent
cclusions and offered their own observations on what had enabled and
helped them to fulfill them. All were very anxious to see the finalization of
the research, and eager to read the study once it is published. For all that, I
am greatly indebted to all of them.

Appendix: LANGUAGE TEST

1. Letos sam išao na more. Putovao sam _____
   a) sa voz
   b) vozom
   c) sa vozom
   d) voz
   e) na vozu

2. Danas je sunčano i deca se igraju __
   a) napolju
   b) naploje
   c) u napolju
   d) u naploje
   e) napolji

3. _____ sam, ne mogu sad da pričam!
   a) Na posao
   b) U posao
   c) U poslu
   d) U posli
   e) Na poslu

4. Darko je u kolima. Kaži _____ da
dođe da priča sa nama.
   a) ga
   b) joj
   c) mu
   d) mi
   e) vam

5. Ja sam doktorka. A ti, _____ se ti
baviš?
   a) kome
   b) čime
   c) sa kim
   d) čemu
   e) na čemu

6. Moja drugarica želi da idemo za-
 jedno u grad, ali ja nemam _____
   a) vreme
   b) vremena
   c) vremenom
   d) vremenu
   e) na vreme

7. Kad smo bili mladi izlazili smo
često, a sada izlazimo _____
   a) veliko
   b) dugo
   c) retko
   d) malo
   e) brzo

8. Austrija je mala zemlja, a Malta je
još _____
   a) manja
   b) veća
   c) mala
   d) malka
   e) male

9. Studenti imaju dva raspusta tokom
godine: zimski raspust u januaru, a
____ u julu i avgustu.
   a) prolećni
   b) letnji
   c) leto
   d) u leto
   e) na leti

10. – Danas mi je rođendan.
   – _____ ti rođendan!
     a) Zdravi
     b) Veliki
     c) Srećno
     d) Nazdravi
     e) Srećan
II. Translate from Romanian into Serbian:

desen ___________; carte ___________; noapte ___________; alune _______
; pâine ___________; mâine ___________; deseară ___________; a merge
_________; a cânta ___________; gol ___________; descult ___________; frumos
__________;
pe ___________; în ___________; lui ___________; roșu ___________; albastru
_________; galben ___________; verde ___________; negru __________;
marți ___________; portocaliu ___________; luni ___________; miercuri
__________; duminică ___________; mănânc ___________; mânânci
__________; (el) mânâncă ___________; mâncați ___________; (ei)
mânăncă ___________; copil ___________; copii ___________; copiii
__________; acești copii ____________.

III. Translate from Serbian into Romanian:

odlično ___________; zdravo ___________; trčim ___________; gurati __________;
sutradan ___________; neodoljivo ___________; zajedno ___________; svi
__________; nama ___________; lako ___________; olakšanje __________
_; tavan ___________; pod ___________; večera ___________; veče
__________; večeras ___________; uveče ___________.

IV. Translate from Serbian into Romanian:

Nada je kod kuće, čeka Nikolu. Trebalo je da dođe oko pola sedam iz grada. Sada
ej već osam sati.
Nikola: Stigao sam.
Nada: Gde si bio tako dugo, brinula sam se.
Nikola: Znaš kakav je saobraćaj u Beogradu. Pre bih došao peške nego autom.
Rado bih otišao na neko pusto ostrvo. Potrebni su mi mir i tišina, čist vazduh.

V. Translate from Romanian into Serbian:

Ieri am fost foarte obosit, aşa că aseară m-am culcat devreme. Am dormit foarte
bine, pentru că a fost cald în cameră. De dimineaţă m-am trezit la şapte şi jumătate,
am făcut un duş, mi-am băut cafeaua şi am plecat la serviciu, cu autobuzul. Azi e
vineri şi noi în fiecare vineri mergem la bere. O bere bună e bine venită la sfârşit de
săptămână. Aş vrea ca weekendul să țină toată săptămâna! Luni voi merge fericit la
lucru. Am de lucru, dar nu mai am probleme.

VI. Read the following text:

Познато је да су животиње верни човекови пријатељи. Међутим, људи понекад
изгубе кућног љубимца или га оставе. Има много прича о животињама које су
прешиле дуг пут да поново нађу свог газду.
References


This paper results from the project of the Institute for Balkan Studies Language, folklore, migrations (no. 178010), funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.
Coping with Socially Sensitive Topics
Discourse on Interethnic Marriages among Elderly Members of the
Serbian Minority in Hungary

Abstract: Drawing on the field research conducted in the Serbian community in Szigetcsép, Hungary, the paper examines interlocutors' oral discourse on interethnic marriages. Until the Second World War, the Serbs in Hungary, rural communities in particular, mainly practised endogamy. In the post-war era, however, they tended to be among the minority groups with the highest rate of exogamic marriages. Consequently, the interviewees established discourse links between “interethnic marriages”, “loss of native language” and “fear of identity loss”. The analytical focus is on the interlocutors' internal dialogism between the authoritative word of the ancestors and autobiographical assertions.

Keywords: anthropological linguistics, minority, authoritative discourse, ethnic identity, interethnic marriages, Serbs in Hungary

Introduction

The Ottoman conquests in the Balkans caused a continuous migration of Christians to the north, into the Hungarian, later Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian lands. Thus Serb migrations began in the fourteenth century and lasted until the end of the eighteenth century. The Serbs founded their settlements mainly in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, and subsequently organized themselves into a political community whose identity was based upon Serbian language maintenance and Orthodox Christianity. After the “Great Migration of the Serbs” in 1690 — when at least 37,000 families led by Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević moved to the Habsburg lands to escape Ottoman reprisals amidst the Holy League War — Emperor Leopold I granted some privileges to the Serbian people and their Church, including a limited cultural autonomy, in return for their service as border guards. The Metropolitanate of the Serbian Orthodox Church was thus established in the Habsburg Monarchy between 1691 and 1848, when it was proclaimed the Serbian Patriarchate of Karlovci.1 Hence, the

1 Initially, the seat of the Metropolitanate was in Szentendre (1691–1706), and later was moved to Krušedol (1708–1713) and eventually to Karlovci (1713–1848). In 1848, the Metropolitanate of Karlovci (Ser. Karlovačka mitropolija) was elevated to the rank of
migrants who came between the fourteenth and eighteenth century formed the core of what we call today the Serbian national minority in Hungary (cf. Forišković 1994).

Census data for the area of present-day Hungary show that the number of Serbian native speakers decreased throughout the twentieth century. Since 1980 the number of persons whose native language is Serbian and that of persons of Serbian nationality have been approximately the same and estimated at 5,000 to 10,000, which indicates a tight small minority (see Vékás 2005, 129). According to the last Hungarian census, conducted in 2001, the number of those who affiliated themselves with the Serbian minority in at least one of the four questions regarding ethnic identity — nationality, native language, cultural affiliation, and language spoken within family and with friends — was 7,350; yet, the number of persons who marked Serbian as their native language was 3,816 (Population Census 2001; Vékás, 2005). In addition to being small in number, the Serbs in Hungary are widely distributed throughout the country, notably in Budapest and its surroundings (along the Danube), along the Maros River, and in the County of Baranya. However scattered, these communities form a sort of socio-cultural and kinship network. Moreover, the Serbs in Hungary are officially recognized as a national minority and protected under the Hungarian Minority Laws.\(^2\) Due to the Serbian community’s long-standing presence in Hungary, its members consider themselves a historic, almost autochthonous, minority. There is in Hungary a notable architectural heritage created by the Serbs at the time of their rise in the eighteenth and even in the nineteenth century; moreover, they were a driving force for modern Serbian culture, which is still the foundation of the Serbian minority group’s positive identity and feeling of pride (Prelić 2002; Davidov 1990; Vujičić 1997). Yet, the traditional sense of community belonging among the Serbs in Hungary has for centuries been based upon the following criteria: Orthodox Christianity,

patriarchate at the Serbian May Assembly in Karlovci, which was recognized by Emperor Franz Joseph II. The Patriarchate of Karlovci existed until 1920, when it merged with the Metropolitanate of Belgrade to form the Patriarchate of Serbia (cf. EP 2002, s.v. Karlovačka mitropolija).

\(^2\) The cornerstone of minority rights protection in Hungary is the 1993 Law on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, which recognizes thirteen minorities: Armenian, Bulgarian, Croat, German, Greek, Polish, Romani, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serb, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian. A prerequisite for recognition was the presence of a minority in Hungary for at least a century. All recognized minorities are entitled to establish their respective minority self-governments, which ensure a broad cultural autonomy and primarily deal with cultural and educational affairs (cf. Dobos 2007). For Hungarian Minority Act LXXVII of 1993 see http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/bulletins/49-18.htm.
Serbian language maintenance, Serbian personal name, and ethno-confessional endogamy (Prelić 1999, 106).

After the Second World War the Hungarian minority groups faced tremendous changes in their social networks, which in turn spurred a shift in their attitude towards identity. The process was set in motion and boosted by the profound social changes which transformed Hungary, i.e. the establishment of a communist regime, forced industrialization, village-to-town migrations, etc. The changes opened the way to upward social mobility, which resulted in intensified population movement and interethnic communication. Magyar, as the official state language, became prerequisite for upward social mobility and social integration. As a result, ethnic minority communities experienced a rapid decline in the use of native vernaculars and an increase in interethnic marriages. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the Serbs in Hungary no longer base their ethnic identity solely upon traditional symbolic values. According to a recent sociolinguistic survey on the Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities, most interviewed Serbs expressed their identity through their association with Serbian cultural, social and biological ancestry (73.2 percent), and only a small number, through their connection to the Serbian language (26.9 percent) (cf. Bartha & Borbély 2006).

Furthermore, an anthropological survey demonstrated that the majority of Serbian respondents preferably chose a traditional custom called slava as the most significant identity marker; those considered as less important were Orthodox Christianity, other traditional customs, and the Serbian language.

Yet, the biggest “surprise” of the latest 2001 Census concerns religious denomination: of 7,350 persons self-declared as belonging to the Serbian minority only 26 percent declared themselves as Orthodox Christian, and 36 percent...

---

1 The survey of Bartha and Borbély explores the role that language and ancestry play in ethnic identity construction among six Hungarian ethnic minorities: Germans, Slovaks, Serbs, Romanians, Roma, and Boyash (the ethnonym Boyash refers to the Romanian-speaking groups living for at least two centuries across South-East Europe; they share many cultural characteristics with the Roma, but usually refuse to be identified as such, and self-identifying instead as Boyash, Romanians, Rudari, Koritari, Romanian/Valachian Gypsies, etc. For more see Sikimić 2005).

4 The slava is the festivity honouring the patron saint of a family, a village or a church. Slava is a widespread tradition among the Serbs, but the custom can also be found among other Balkan Slavs, cf. SM, s.v. slava.

5 The respondents were asked the following: “When does a person cease being a Serb?” Almost 36 percent of the interviewed Serbs believed that “one would cease being a Serb” by abandoning slava, followed by the belief that “one would cease being a Serb” by not being baptized in an Orthodox church and by failing to observe Serbian and/or Orthodox Christian customs (22 percent each), and, finally, by losing the Serbian language (21 percent) (Prelić 2008, 195).
percent as Roman Catholic (cf. Tóth & Vékás 2005, 143; *Population Census 2001*). All things considered, it appears that, alongside other social changes, identity negotiations are taking place among the Serbs in Hungary.

This contribution, drawing upon the fieldwork carried out in the Serbian community of Szigetscép near Budapest, will analyze the interlocutors’ discourse on interethnic marriages, that is ideological constructions made in relation to interethnic marriages.

1. Interethnic marriages within the Serbian minority community

Marriage patterns among the Serbian rural population in Hungary have changed over the centuries. Orthodox Christian endogamy has been embraced and practised since the nineteenth century (e.g. marriages with Orthodox Bulgarians and Tzintzars). Marriages with Serbo-Croatian speaking Catholics in Hungary (e.g. Ratz, Bunjevac ethnic communities) have been practised since the mid-twentieth century. However, interethnic marriages with Magyars and Germans, either Catholic or Protestant, were generally rejected until the end of the Second World War (cf. Ilić 2008).

Nevertheless, since the Second World War the Serbs in Hungary have had one of the highest exogamy rates of all minority groups (cf. Tóth & Vékás 2006; *Population Census 2001*), mostly due to their small number, language barrier collapse, and intensified interethnic contacts. The Serbian Orthodox Church records show that the rate of interethnic marriages in Lórév (Ser. Lovra), a Serb-inhabited village on the Csepel Island, rose from 17.2 percent in the first half of the twentieth century to more than 45 percent in its second half (Prelić 1995, 99). The Serbian Orthodox Metropolitanate of Karlovec records show that only 2 percent of all Serbian marriages in 1905 were interethnic in Pomáz (Ser. Pomaz), a town in the environs of Budapest; by 1974 the percent rose to 36.7 percent, and by 1996 to more than 45 percent. In Csobánka (Ser. Čobanac), a village near Budapest, there were no interethnic marriages within the Serbian community in 1905, and by 1996 almost 70 percent were interethnic. The same trend is observable in other Serbian communities in Hungary (cf. Prelić 1999, 106–107). Besides, according to a sociological survey conducted in 2003, more than 80 percent

---

6 These figures may be accounted for by possible Serbian minority sympathizers coming from Croatian, Ratz or Bunjevac Roman Catholic communities as well as from interethnic marriages, who could have declared an affiliation with the Serbian minority. Namely, the 2001 Census allowed respondents to give three responses to each of the four questions concerning aspects of ethnic identity (cf. Vékás 2005; Lastić 2005).

7 A sociological survey of interethnic marriages in the former Yugoslavia found that the smaller the group the higher the exogamy rate (Petrović 1985: 12).
of the children affiliated with the Serbian ethnic community in Hungary participate in some kind of minority education, but more than half of them come from interethnic marriages (Lastić 2005, 214). On the whole, interethnic marriages among the Serbs in Hungary are now a commonplace — an issue to cope with in everyday life.

An anthropological survey exploring the relationship between Serbian ethnic identity and attitudes has found a generational gap when it comes to marriage issues. Elderly Serbs in Hungary generally have a negative attitude towards interethnic marriages and reject the possibility of one’s double ethnic identity (cf. Prelić 2008, 200–212). Furthermore, the respondents claim that exogamic marriages contributed to language shift and doubt the possibility of egalitarian bilingualism within an exogamic, especially Magyar-Serb, family (ibid.). On the other hand, Serbs tend to marry Magyars — 66.6 percent of all interethnic marriages are those with Magyars (cf. Tóth & Vékás 2006; Population Census 2001). Middle-aged Serbs still value ethnic endogamy more than exogamy, but generally have a tolerant attitude towards interethnic marriages (cf. Prelić 2008, 200–212). A tolerant attitude towards interethnic marriages prevails among the youngest generation of Serbs in Hungary. A striking result of the ideology of endogamy is voluntary celibacy, which is widespread among the elderly Serbs in Hungary, and can still be found even among younger generations. Still, nowadays even the oldest Serbs prefer ethnic exogamy to celibacy and to the prospect of having no offspring at all (ibid.).

2. Szigetcsép: history and demography

The village of Szigetcsép, where the fieldwork took place, is situated on the Csepel Island some thirty kilometres south of Budapest. The Serbs of Szigetcsép claim descent from the fourteenth–fifteenth century migrants, referred to in the origin narratives as the beginning of the community (cf. Ilić 2010). The historical sources support the oral tradition, according to which a small Serbian colony was established in the environs of Szigetcsép during the reign of King Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387–1437) (cf. Pesty [1864] 1984, 80–83). Moreover, the settlement ranks among the first documented cases of Serbian group migration to Hungary. The oral tradition is consistent with the historical records reporting that the Serbs had settled in the deserted village of Szigetcsép by the beginning of the eighteenth century, having abandoned their previous settlement flooded by the Danube (cf. Pesty [1864] 1984, 80–83; Ilić 2010). In the middle of the same century Szigetcsép was colonized by the Germans from Nuremberg and Wurtemberg (Pesty [1864] 1984, 80–83). Thus, apart from a few Magyar families, Germans and Serbs were two major ethnic groups in Szigetcsép until the
Second World War. However, in the 1920s the Szigetcsép Serbian community declined by 18 percent due to the Serbs’ voluntary migration to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The migration came as a result of the Population Exchange Agreement between Hungary and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes — known under the term “optacija” in Serbian historiography (cf. Malović 2001 and 2010). The Serbs from Szigetcsép mainly settled in the village of Bački Brestovac in Serbia’s northern province of Vojvodina (ibid.). Furthermore, as a result of the Potsdam Conference of 1945, almost half the German population was expelled from Hungary to Germany, which was occupied by the Allied powers (Apor 2004, 36); it is estimated that almost 500 Germans were driven out of Szigetcsép, and that more than 500 Magyars from different parts of Hungary and Slovakia were resettled instead (Ilić 2008). Consequently, the ethnic makeup of the village entirely changed.

Nowadays the village is inhabited by Magyars, Germans, and Serbs, alongside a few families of Orthodox Bulgarian origin who had for the most part become assimilated into the Serb population. Hence, Szigetcsép fully deserves to be called a “multicultural” village. In the post-WWII period, Magyars made up the majority of the village population, followed by the Germans; the Serbian community has seen a constant demographic decline, accounting for less than 5 percent of the total population since 1980 (cf. Table 1 below; Population Census 2001).

Table 1: Serbian minority in Szigetcsép according to the Hungarian State Censuses 1980–2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Serbian affiliation</th>
<th>Proportion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,317</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Serbian community of Szigetcsép has been living for centuries within a dense and closed social network fostered by the common native language, common confession — Orthodox Christianity in contrast to neighbouring Catholicism and Protestantism — rural (agricultural) way of life,  

---

8 The Bulgarians in Hungary are mainly descended from the so-called “Bulgarian gardeners”, i.e. labour migrants who migrated from Bulgaria to European countries in the late nineteenth and during the twentieth century (Ganeva-Račeva 2004). Many of them settled in the already existing Serbian communities in Hungary, and for the most part became assimilated (Prelić 1995; Sikimić 2007).
traditional customs, endogamy, and kinship. Such a tight-knit social network system, as Milroy (1987, 136) suggests, has the capacity to impose a normative consensus on its members. The main consensuses enduring over time have been: Serbian language maintenance and ethno-confessional endogamy.

The Serbian community of Szigetscép is nowadays divided along generational lines as regards language maintenance and traditional endogamy. The present sociolinguistic situation may be described as the result of the language shift process that has begun after the Second World War following a period of nearly five centuries of language retention. The language shift encompasses three generations: from bilingualism with the obvious predominance of Serbian (generations born before the war), through bilingualism with the predominance of Magyar (generations born after the war), to Magyar monolingualism with terminal knowledge of Serbian (generations born after the 1980s). The native vernacular has thus lost the privilege, enjoyed for centuries, of being the only idiom spoken within the family.

The other important community issue concerns the traditional rule of endogamy, which has also changed over time. According to the Szigetscép Serbian Orthodox church records, ethno-confessional endogamy predominated in 1896–1952 with 70 percent of all marriages being concluded between Serbian spouses born in Szigetscép. This means that third cousin marriages were considered legal and widely practised. Besides, until the early 1950s, 83.1 percent of all marriages were concluded within the Serbian community in Hungary, and 97.6 percent between Orthodox Christians (cf. *Matica venčanih*). From the 1950s to the present, 55 percent of all marriages concluded in the Szigetscép Serbian Orthodox church involve non-Orthodox spouses (cf. *Matica venčanih*). Given that many interethnic marriages were not concluded in the Szigetscép Orthodox church, the exogamy rate may be presumed to be considerably higher. Accordingly, every single Serbian family in Szigetscép is nowadays faced with interethnic marriages and a predomination of the Magyar language within its nuclear family setting.

3. *Fieldwork*

The fieldwork in Szigetscép was conducted on two separate occasions, in 2001 and 2008, by a research team of the Institute for Balkan Studies. The age of the interviewees ranged from 19 (born in 1989) to 90 (born in 1911); still, 80 percent of all interviewees belonged to generations born between the two world wars (1919–1940). The interwar generations are marked by

---

9 The team led by Biljana Sikimić comprised Marija Vučković and myself.
10 During the fieldwork, twenty-eight individuals were interviewed, resulting in about 60 hours of audio and video material recorded. It encompassed more than 30 percent
several significant features: almost all completed the pre-war Serbian confessional primary school whose main language of instruction was Serbian; all of them are more or less balanced Magyar-Serbian bilinguals, whereas their children and grandchildren are terminal speakers of Serbian; almost 95 percent entered endogamous marriage, whereas most of their descendants concluded exogamous marriages. Accordingly, the interwar generations experienced a sharp change in their social network: their childhood and early youth was characterized by an ethnically closed, multiple and dense network; on the other hand, in their mature and senior years they have found themselves living in a constantly changing community marked by a high degree of language shift from native Serbian to predominant Magyar, as well as a predominance of exogamy.

The research began as an ethno-linguistic fieldwork using an ethno-linguistic questionnaire as a guideline for interviews. Nonetheless, the interviewees’ free comments and digressions were also recorded, which set the interviews in the context of everyday flow of narration (cf. Sikimić 2005a). At some point our research came closer to the American school of anthropological linguistics, which is “concerned with the place of language in its wider social and cultural context, its role in forging and sustaining cultural practices and social structures“ (Foley 1997, 3). As the interview questions concerned the distinctive linguistic, societal and cultural features of the local community, the discourse of both interviewers and interviewees may be described as ethnocentric. It is a manifestation of identity discourse, which, as Mladenova (2004, 107) argues, provides answers to questions such as: Who are we? What are we known for? What makes us proud to be...?

The approach may be criticized for focusing on the past and elderly interlocutors, and thus for inclining towards the so-called “pastoral tradition” which always “looks back, often nostalgically, and for moral guidance, to a lost but supposedly more pristine, rural, homogeneous, and authentic past” (Williams 1973 cit. Gal 1998, 317). The choice of elderly interlocutors, however, can be defended on the grounds that they were the only who displayed full and “stable” Serbian language competence. On the other hand, it may be criticized for an implicit assumption that only those Serbs who

of the Szigetcép population who had declared Serbian ethnicity and native language in the 2001 Census. The distribution of the interviewees by gender was: 68 percent (19) female, and 32 percent (9) male. The fieldwork was financially supported by the Serb Self-Government Budapest.

11 Russian ethnolinguistics, established by Nikita Tolstoy in the second half of the twentieth century, is mostly concerned with local vernaculars, dialect vocabulary, and narratives on the traditional way of life (cf. Tolstoj 1989). The ethnolinguistic questionnaire for the Balkan Slavic-language area is provided in Plotnikova [1996] 2009.
are fully competent in Serbian can claim authenticity. Then again, linguists and other humanities scholars cannot and should not discard the concept of “authenticity” precisely because interviewees themselves construct and perpetuate this concept. Instead of discarding it, they should acknowledge that authenticity does not exist prior to the authenticating practices that create it. Namely, according to Bucholtz (2003, 400), we need to separate authenticity as an ideology from authentication as a social practice. Besides, questions concerning the past and past lifestyles may be criticized for clearly attempting to trigger nostalgic discourse. According to Boym (2001, 41–49), “restorative nostalgia” proposes to rebuild a lost home and to patch up memory gaps; it characterizes national and nationalist revivals all over the world, which engage in the anti-modern mythmaking of history by means of a return to national symbols and myths theories. Like Buholtz (2003, 411), I also believe that instead of nostalgic approaches in modern humanities, we might have reflexive approaches which attend to the ways that language, history, and culture are mobilized via ideology to create structures of unequal power.

The field material therefore offers a perspective of one or two generations sharing the same historical memory, cultural concepts, and value system. The generation-based approach, as argued by many social theorists (e.g. Olick & Robinson 1998, 123), turns out to be exceptionally suitable for analyzing the points of intersection between individual and collective identities. In the transcription process, the “broad transcription” has been applied which is focused mainly on the spoken text, includes minimal contextual information, and for the most part omits paralingual characteristics of the speech act (cf. Lapadat 2000). Transcription conventions used in the text that follows are:

- **R** researcher
- **IL** interlocutor
- **IL₁**, **IL₂** several interlocutors
- **...** short pause 3–5 sec.
- **---** part of the utterance is omitted in the transcription
- **()** signals that words are not fully verbalized, e.g. *to- told me*
- **( )** paralinguistic information, e.g. (laughter), (sigh), (sobbing), etc.

4. Discourse on interethnic marriages

In the following analysis I shall apply the Bakhtinian concept of heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1981, 342). The ideological becoming of a human being is, in Bakhtin’s words, the process of selectively assimilating the words of others. Accordingly, there are two basic types of discourse that determine the very bases of one’s ideological interrelations with the world — “authoritative” and “internally persuasive”. The authoritative discourse is organically con-
nected with the past and backed up by an authority, e.g. religious, political, traditional, etc.; it is, so to speak, the word of the fathers whose authority was already acknowledged in the past. The authoritative word cannot be negotiated; it can be either fully accepted or rejected (ibid.). By contrast, internally persuasive discourse is open to all kinds of revisions and negotiations; it is not backed up by any authority at all, and frequently lacks even acknowledgement by society. Thus, the struggle and dialogic interrelationships of authoritative and internally persuasive discourses are what usually determine the history of individual ideological consciousness (ibid.). The communicative genre to be analyzed here is termed dialogical utterance, being made up of utterances by different speaking subjects (Bahtin [1953] 1980).12 Retracing discursive links within dialogical utterances of the interlocutors from Szigtcsép, I shall focus on elements of the discursive arguments relating to the emergence of interethnic marriages.

4.1 Native language loss and interethnic marriages

As the dialogical utterance [1] demonstrates, the discursive link between native language loss and interethnic marriages seems to be a very straightforward one. After I praised the interlocutor’s (IL) command of Serbian, IL spontaneously established a relationship between language maintenance and ethnic makeup of families (R: How come that you speak Serbian so well!? IL: Well, now, my parents were Serbs; my husband was a Serb, my children too [1.2]) Following this line of argument, IL introduced a reference to her son’s ethnically mixed family (My daughter-in-law is half-Serbian; her father was a Serb, her mother a Swab, and she doesn’t speak Serbian [1.2]). The argument proceeded as IL referred to her daughter’s endogamous family (The daughters of my daughter, they are big now, L. is 19, I. is 16. They knew Serbian very well [1.2]) Albeit IL used autobiographical references and propositions (e.g. my grandson, my daughter-in-law, etc.), the utterance in fact stems from an authoritative ideology, leading to a causal construction — “loss of native language due to interethnic marriage”.

Simultaneously, IL developed an internally persuasive discourse which undermined the dominant traditional ideology. IL asserted that her daughter-in-law (of mixed Serbian and Swab origin) encouraged her to speak Serbian to the grandchildren, but IL was explicit that she had not pursued it, justifying her choice by her feeling that her grandsons were confused between two languages (e.g. I saw it confused the children [1.2]). Also, IL uttered that her granddaughters — even though they came from an endoga-

12 The utterance is defined as a unit of speech interaction whose boundaries are marked by a change of speaking subject (Bahtin [1953] 1980).
mous Serbian marriage and learnt Serbian in their childhood — nowadays mostly switched to Magyar [1.2]. So the authoritative standpoint turns out to be contradicted by the autobiographical evidence. The whole utterance is marked by expressive evaluations (e.g. It’s sad, yes, it’s a very sad thing for us. What can you do?! I should’ve pushed it, and now I regret), falling and rising intonation expressing her sadness and desolation. However, contrary to the claims of IL, the reasons for abandoning the native language seem to be the lack of strategies for handling bilingualism within the nuclear family setting and within a society where a non-native language (Magyar) predominates and enjoys full legal status and prestige.

[1] (CS13, IL, female, born 1940 in Szigetcsép, secondary school, worked as a Magyar kindergarten teacher; the interview took place in her home in Szigetcsép)

[1.1] R.: How come that you speak Serbian so well?!
[1.2] IL: Well, now, my parents were Serbs, my husband was a Serb, my children too. My children nowadays unfortunately, and my small grandchildren. My daughter-in-law is half Serb; her father is a Serb, her mother a Swab, and she doesn’t speak Serbian, nor do the children, but they attend lessons. P. recently recited a poem on Christmas; he walked with vertep.13 I taught him everything, but he doesn’t understand what he’s saying, it’s sad, yes. He knows a hundred, two hundred words in Serbian, but I don’t think that’s enough. He doesn’t know how to connect them, to put them in a sentence. It’s a very sad thing for us. What can you do?! I thought, when they were born and started talking, that I would be able to talk with them in Serbian. And my daughter-in-law says: “Well, mother, now.” But I saw it confused the children. I should’ve pushed it, and now I regret. The youngest is 4 now, the older is 8, and the middle one is 5. Boys. And daughters, the daughters of my daughter, they’re big now, L. is 19, I. is 16. They knew Serbian very well, they attended the Serbian school until fourth

---

13 The children ritual procession on Christmas Day.
grade. (Sadly:) Now even they mostly speak Magyar. Unfortunately, there are no Serbian children in their classroom --- They speak Magyar even with me! It’s a very sad thing for us, the elderly, because not many of us are left. And my son-in-law and my daughter are Serbs, and both of them used to speak Serbian well. But it’s over now (laughter), I’m the last who speaks Serbian. My son used to know, he speaks even now, but it’s not easy for him. And I need to be careful with my words.

(sme)h), poslednja što ja sad govorim. I sin mi vrlo lepo znal da govor, još i sad govori, ali mi većina ne ide tako. I ja treba da pazim da kako ću se izraziti.

4.2. The loss of slava and interethnic marriages

I shall now focus upon dialogical utterance [2]. After a long conversation about the slava — the celebration of the family patron saint’s day which is popularly held to be one of the most distinctive Serbian identity features — I asked the interlocutor (IL) if she knew of any Serb who had abandoned slava [2.1]. IL spontaneously associated the loss of slava with interethnic marriages and exemplified it by impersonal sentences and generic references (e.g. There are so many mixed marriages; If a woman married a Magyar, then she didn’t observe slava. If a Serb took a Magyar woman, then maybe they’d observe slava, maybe).14 “Null” or generic subjects were put in the conditional “if / then” clauses, thus indicating a close interdependence between the loss of slava and interethnic marriages. This conditional construction approximates a causal relationship based on the authority of tradition. In utterance [2], an echo is observable of the patriarchal view that in an interethnic marriage women are more likely than men to give up their ethnic identity.15

Subsequently, I asked if there was a belief that abandoning slava could bring misfortune upon the family [2.3], [2.5], [2.7]. IL strongly denied [2.4], [2.6], [2.8]. Thus, this dialogical utterance led me to the con-

14 Generic sentences as well as other generics refer to an entire class of entities (Mladenova 2003, 17); that is to say, they make statements about prototypic members of a category (Eckardt 2000, 237).

15 A sociological survey on interethnic marriages in the former Yugoslavia revealed a higher proportion of exogamy among men than among women within the conservative traditional ethnic communities, such as Serbian, Turkish, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Romanian, and Albanian, with the exception of the Italian group (Petrović 1985, 80). Also, an ethnological survey on interethnic marriages in Bulgaria demonstrated that women from minority groups hardly ever marry outside their ethnic group, see Pašova 2004: 183. Vučković (2004) argues that, in a traditional environment, women are more likely than men to abandon their native language within an interethnic marriage.
clusion that the fear of losing slava had nothing to do anymore with the ancient, pagan, fear of damnation, but rather with the fear of identity loss; as shown above, this is confirmed by the recent anthropological survey (see Prelić 2008, esp. n. 4). Hence utterance [2] indicates that negative attitudes to interethnic marriages among elderly Serbs in Hungary are grounded in the fear of identity loss.

[2] (CS7, IL, female, born 1937 in Szigetcsép, lives in Budapest; secondary school; the interview took place at her work place in Budapest)

[2.1] R: Was there anyone in Szigetcsép who abandoned slava? Who stopped observing it?

[2.2] IL: Now, listen ... there are so many mixed marriages. Look, where there are mixed marriages, then there (quietly:) it’s not certain that everyone observes their own slava. Most of all when a woman married a Magyar, she [by definition] did not observe slava. If a Serb took a Magyar woman, then maybe they observed slava, maybe. As people were mixing with one another there, and mixed marriages, it so happened that they didn’t observe slava. There are families that don’t observe slava, and not just one!

[2.3] R: Have you perhaps heard it said that when one abandoned slava, that it’s not good for one’s family?

[2.4] IL: If you ask me, no.

[2.5] R: That things went wrong for one’s own family when one abandoned slava?

[2.6] IL: Well, I don’t believe that such a thing happened there. If you ask me, it’s just a story.

[2.7] R: Well, we’re interested in old stories. So, it doesn’t matter if you don’t believe it yourself, if you have just heard that someone.

[2.8] IL: I haven’t heard of it. I have to tell you that I haven’t heard of it.

[2.1] R: A je l’bilo kod vas u Čipu da je neko ostavio slavu? Da je prekinuo da slavi?

[2.2] IL: Sad, slušajte ... jako mlogo ima mešani brakova. Pazte, tamo gde su mešani brakovi, tamo (tiho) nije sigurno da svaki drži svoju slavu. Ponajviše ako se ženska udala za Mađara, ondak ona već nije tako držala slavu. Ako je Srbin uzeo Mađaricu, možda su držali slavu, možda. A pošto se mešo tamo narod i mešovite brakovi, dogodilo se da nisu držali slavu. Ima take porodice koje ne drže slavu, ne jedna!

[2.3] R: A je l’ se pričalo možda da kad neko ostavi slavu, da to ne valja za nje-govu porodicu?

[2.4] IL: Po meni se ne.

[2.5] R: Da je nekome krenulo nešto loše kad je ostavio slavu?


4.3. Demographic decline and interethnic marriages

My analysis will now proceed to dialogical utterance [3], which also favours the traditional endogamy rule by using yet another causal construction — “demographic decline due to interethnic marriages”. As the previous examples illustrate, the contradiction between traditionalist authoritative
and internally persuasive (autobiographic) discourses generated a specific internal dialogicity. Utterance [3] was preceded by a dialogue on competence in Serbian which prompted the interlocutors to construct a deictic “then/now” opposition. The deictics *then* and *now* proved to be very productive in generating a discourse of nostalgia for the “good, old days” among the traditional communities facing a language shift (cf. Tsitsipis 1998 and 2004; Hill 1998; Petrović 2009). This memory management foregrounds the word of tradition and, as argued by Tsitsipis (2004, 578), allows the traditionalist authoritative discourse to surface. Hence, the past culture is represented as a totality, in which socio-cultural activities and language index each other, whereas the present culture is portrayed as corrupted and fragmented (cf. Tsitsipis 2003, 550). Furthermore, the past is looked at with nostalgia, while the present deserves criticism and scepticism. In this discursive order, orientation towards the future is absent.

Considering the Szigetcsép Serbs’ discourse, the deictic term *then* is related to the set of propositions, such as “there were much more Serbs in the village”, “the Serbs spoke a much purer Serbian language”, “there were no marriages with Magyars and Germans”, etc. By contrast, the deictic term *now* is related to the following propositions: “there are not many Serbs left in the village”, “the Serbs speak either corrupted Serbian or they do not speak the language at all”, “there are too many mixed marriages”, “Serbs are dying out”, etc. These two sets of propositions are often juxtaposed so as to correspond (all *then* propositions or all *now* propositions) or contrast one another (any combination of *then* and *now* propositions).

In utterance [3], the reference to the community’s demographic decline was introduced by constructing a deictic frame of temporal reference “then/now” in which the past is sharply contrasted to the present (*Back then, at least we were quite a few. We were 365 souls [3.1]; And now, 60, if as many [3.3]). The reference to the demographic decline is associated with interethnic marriages and a notion of authenticity. Consequently, the interlocutors employed an authentication strategy to value endogamy and a depreciation strategy to denigrate exogamy. Thus, only descendants from endogamous marriages or those born of such marriages were granted authenticity, whereas persons engaged in interethnic marriages were depreciated and denied authenticity. This was achieved by using a pair of opposing adjectives with strong evaluative connotations — *pure* and *mixed* — to refer to endogamous and exogamous marriages respectively, and by using generic sentences with indefinite, generic subjects. (IL₂: *Pure, pure! Those who are not Magyar women or men. IL₁: Mixed. R: But those of you who are pure. IL₂: 90 percent is all … mixed [3.5–8]). In that way, the interlocutors backed up the traditional rule of endogamy and developed an authoritative discourse.
The expressive high point was reached in an exclamatory utterance with autobiographic reference — *Even my son took a Magyar woman!* [3.8]. With this utterance IL₂ switched to internally persuasive discourse. Also, it was only then that the interlocutor used an autobiographic reference (*my son*), while maintaining generic semantics when referring to his daughter-in-law (*a Magyar woman*). This utterance is related to the preceding section by the adverb *even* (Ser. *još*) — used as an intensive to indicate an unexpected occurrence. Threatened by this sudden autobiographical reference, the traditionalist authoritative discourse was eventually “saved” by a self-depreciating utterance (*So, who am I to judge others* [3.11]). Hence, the authoritative ideology was, on the one hand, supported [3.1–8], and, on the other hand, it was subverted within internally persuasive discourse (e.g. *Even my son ...* [3.8]).

[3] (CS31, IL₁, male, born 1924 in Szigetcsép; IL₂, male, born 1933 in Szigetcsép; both completed primary education and are engaged in agriculture; the interview took place at the local Serb cultural centre)

[3.1] IL₂: Back then, at least there were quite a few of us. We were 365 souls.

[3.2] R: And now, how many of you are left?

[3.3] IL₂: And now, 60, if as many.

[3.4] R: Are you sure?

[3.5] IL₂: Pure, pure! Those who are not Magyar women or men.


[3.8] IL₂: Ninety percent is all .. mixed.

[3.9] R: Ah.

[3.10] IL₂: *Even my .. son took a Magyar woman!*


[3.12] IL₂: Well, all.

[3.13] IL₂: *So, who am I to judge others!*


[3.2] R: A koliko vas sad ima?

[3.3] IL₁: A sad, šezdeset, ako ima.

[3.4] R: Jeste sigurni?

[3.5] IL₂: Čisto, čisto! Samo ne onaj što je Mađarica il Mađar.


[3.8] IL₂: Devedeset procenata je sve .. mešano.


[3.10] IL₂: Još i moj .. sin uzeo Mađaricu!


[3.13] IL₂: Onda ja ne znam kazati na drugoga!


4.4. Endogamy vs. personal experiences

Finally, I shall analyze utterance [4], made by a woman married to a Magyar. The utterance was preceded by a conversation between myself, as a researcher, and IL, an interlocutor, about the traditional Szigetcsép wedding, where
IL gave an explicitly negative evaluation of exogamy.\(^{16}\) This was surprising, given that I had learnt at the beginning of the interview that her own marriage with a Magyar man was a good one. Towards the end of our interview I posed a personal question concerning her marriage, expecting her to resolve the contradiction between what she had said and her autobiographic experience [4.1].

Her reply was structured as a “list of excuses”. I can think of two possible explanations for that: firstly, IL may have viewed me not just as a collocutor, but rather as a representative of a broader Serbian audience in the “motherland”, and thus she felt compelled to explain why she had “failed” to maintain the traditional practice of endogamy; and secondly, she entertained this internal dialogue in the attempt to resolve the obvious contradiction between the authoritative word of ancestors she was raised with and her personal life story. The utterance was structured around two narratives of personal experience,\(^{17}\) one relating to her first love, the other to her mother’s marriage. Both narratives topicalized unhappy endogamous relationships and served the same strategy, which is justifying her choice to marry a Magyar.

The complicating action in the first narrative retraced the following set of events: “she was in love with a Serb”, “the Serb deceived her”, “she decided not to marry a person she would not love”, “she married a Magyar”. The evaluative section referred to her decision (I said I would never marry anyone. Because the man I loved deceived me. Also, the same happened to my mother, she married, well, I said, I won’t marry a man I don’t love. I’d rather not marry, I won’t marry [4.6]). Heightened expressiveness was achieved by repetition. The first narrative already introduced a reference to her mother’s unhappy marriage. The resolution section — which generally answers the question “How did it all end?” — referred to communist factories which intensified interethnic contacts [4.8]. However, the resolution came with reluctance and it was articulated only after I intervened with a question (And? Then…? [4.7]). Hence, her interethnic marriage, which was the point of the whole narrative, was only implied. In this case, reluctance and implication are indicators of the interlocutor’s embarrassment and possible trauma.

\(^{16}\) A detailed description of the traditional Serbian wedding in Szigetcsép based upon the narratives of IL is given in Ilić 2003.

\(^{17}\) Narrative, as defined by Labov & Waletzky ([1967] 2003, 74), is a method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) occurred. The structure of a fully developed narrative, according to Labov and Waletzky, contains six components: abstract (What is the story about?); orientation (Who, where, when and why?); complicating action (What happened?); evaluation (Why is this story worth telling?); resolution (How did it all end?) and coda (That’s it?).
The second part of the utterance was triggered by my question about the reactions of her family and friends to her interethnic marriage. This section was constructed as a form of direct speech — a citation from her mother’s speech. This direct speech served to justify her choice. It also included a personal experience narrative relating to her mother’s marriage with a Serb — the interlocutor’s father — which turned out to be unhappy.

Albeit primarily autobiographical, utterance [4] was actually based on an interplay between authoritative discourse, which only acknowledged endogamy, and internally persuasive discourse, embodied in two personal experience narratives that involved an implicit criticism of the traditional rule of endogamy.

[4] (CS2, IL, female, born 1936 in Szigetcsép, lives in Szigetcsép; primary school; the interview took place at the local Serb cultural centre)

[4.1] R.: And how come that you married a Magyar if it was forbidden?
[4.2] IL: Well, like that, it was forbidden, because I was deceived by a Serb.

[4.3] R: How come?
[4.4] IL: Well, I fell so deeply in love with him, and he found (quietly:) a Magyar woman besides me.
[4.5] R.: He did?
[4.6] IL: He did, he did. And I found out and I said ... that's enough. So, I was still young, about 18, 19, I said I would never marry anyone. Because the one I loved deceived me. Also, you see, the same happened to my mum, she married, and so I said, I won't marry a man I don't love. I'd rather not marry. I won't marry. And then, somehow, I always, in every boy, looked for something I'd found and loved in my first love, and, I don't know. I said (quietly), I won't marry a man I don't love.

[4.7] R: And? Then?
[4.8] IL: And then, you see, those factories were built, and, I don't know, we mixed with Magyars. And then, you see.
[4.9] R.: Were your friends, mother, and father against it?
[4.10] IL: No, they weren't. Indeed, my mum said, My daughter, she says, I'll give you, she says, not to another vil-

[4.1] R: A kako ste se vi udali za Mađara kad je to bilo zabranjeno?
[4.2] IL: Pa tako, što je ovaj zabranjeno bilo, jer sam se ja u jednog Srbina varala.
[4.3] R: Kako to?
[4.5] R: On je našao?
[4.9] R: Jesu vam se bunili drugovi, drugarice, majka, otac?
[4.10] IL: Ne, nisu. Jeste, moja mama kazala, Ćeri moja, kaže, ne, kaže, u drugo selo, nego u drugu državu ću tebe dati,
lage, but to another country, she says, and you’ll just write to me, she says, that you’re very well. Then, I’ll be well too. I married in my own village, and I went to my mother every day to cry alone, she says. I wouldn’t like to live to see that. So I won’t, she says, meddle in your life. You’ll manage everything yourself, and I won’t press you, she says.


**Conclusion**

The aim of this paper has been twofold: firstly, it presents some basic information about interethnic marriages among the Serbs in Hungary, which is a relatively recent social phenomenon in the Serbian rural communities; secondly, it attempts to understand how authoritative discourse operates within a small tight-knit traditional community faced with radical social changes. It seeks to shed some light on the strategies employed to reinforce the authoritative discourse of tradition threatened by social change. Hence, my focus is on elements of discursive arguments, notably causal constructions and evaluations, generated with reference to the emergence of interethnic marriages.

The paper is based on the fieldwork carried out in the small Serbian community of Szigetcsép in the environs of Budapest, whose social network has been undergoing a thorough change since the Second World War and who have faced an increase in interethnic marriages. As the ties binding a traditional community together have weakened, the authoritative traditional ideology and its discourse persist in a somewhat disaggregated form among the elder members of the community. The elderly Serbs have therefore produced a discourse which juxtaposes different (ideological) perspectives, that of authoritative tradition and that of individual choices. Consequently, they have created causal constructions connecting interethnic marriages with the community’s loss of Serbian identity and demographic decline. In that way, the elderly community members express, implicitly or explicitly, a negative evaluation of interethnic marriages. Nonetheless, all autobiographical references indicate that not even the oldest Serbs of Szigetcsép — although self-declared proponents of the authoritative endogamous tradition — fully follow the traditional rules in their personal lives.

In view of the currently very high exogamic rate among the Serbs in Hungary, it is likely that the community members can no longer claim authenticity on the basis of endogamy. Therefore, learning how to cope with interethnic marriages in everyday life is a matter of the community’s surviv-
al. It means, above all, developing strategies to deal with bilingualism within the nuclear family, and discarding illusions about “pure” identities.

Bibliography


Those were all Serbian villages by the Danube: The concept of space in collective narratives of the Serbs in Hungary. In *Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies in the Balkans: Language and religion to the North and to the South of the Danube*, ed. C. Voss, 265–289. Verlag Otto Sagner.


— 2008. “(N)i ovde (n)i tamo”: konceptualizacija i simbolizacija etničkog identiteta Srba u Mađarskoj na kraju XX veka. Belgrade. (in Serbian Cyrillic)


The Beginning of the 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina
The British Perspective

Abstract: The main goal of this article is to scrutinize the contemporary British sources, in order to establish what they say about the causes of the insurrection in Herzegovina which marked the beginning of the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878. The official reports of British diplomats, the observations of newspaper correspondents, and the instructions of London policy makers support the conclusion that the immediate cause of the insurrection was agrarian discontent, especially tithe collecting. In considering the “external influences” on the outbreak of the insurrection, the British emphasized the role of Austria-Hungary and Montenegro. Behind these countries, they saw the shadow of the Three Emperors’ League, which was perceived as the main threat to the Ottoman Empire and, consequently, to the balance of power in Europe. Serbia was not seen as directly involved in the events in Herzegovina. Later on, at the time of Prince Milan’s visit to Vienna, and as volunteers from Serbia began to be despatched to Herzegovina, the British diplomats increasingly perceived Serbia, in addition to Montenegro, as another tool of the Three Emperors’ League.

Keywords: Great Britain, Foreign Office, uprising in Herzegovina, Eastern Question, Austria-Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Russia

It is a well known fact that the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 was sparked by an uprising of unruly highlanders in Herzegovina. But there is no definitive explanation as to why and how the Herzegovinian uprising began. That means that we do not know exactly why one of the most dangerous European crises of the nineteenth century broke out.

All authors consider the causes of the Herzegovinian uprising to be the result of a specific mix of domestic and foreign influences. Most of them see the immediate cause in agrarian discontent. However, all unanimity of opinion disappears when it comes to explaining the “external” factor. Both Milošrad Ekmečić and Vasa Ćubrilović suggest that it was a national revolt of the Serbs, but they also emphasize the importance of the 1858 Ottoman land law and land reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after Omar Pasha Latas finally crushed the resistance of the local Muslim nobility. The state-owned timars were turned into beg's private property, which bitterly disappointed the Christian serfs, shattering their last hopes of regaining their former bashtinas from the Sultan's state property. Both Ekmečić and Ćubrilović lay emphasis on the peasants’ being enraged at the Ottoman tax system, and especially at merciless tithe collectors. There were also influences from Montenegro, Serbia,
Austria-Hungary and Russia, but rather than being the cause of the insurrection, they gained real importance only during its course. However, Ekmečić also stresses the Balkan aspirations of the Three Emperors’ League, notably Austria-Hungary which exerted influence on the movement in Herzegovina through the local Catholic population; there even are indications of the Dual Monarchy’s cooperation with the Prince of Montenegro, Nikola I Petrović. David Harris likewise argues that the immediate cause of the insurrection is to be found in “rental obligations and more especially in the ruthless taxation suffered by the Christian population.” Moreover, he emphasizes that it was a national revolt, rooted in the tradition of the “ballads lamenting ‘the damned day of Kossovo’.” Also, the peasants of Herzegovina were perfectly aware of their relatives’ much better living conditions in the neighbouring Habsburg Empire, in Serbia or in Montenegro. David Mackenzie contends that the revolt was a “spontaneous protest by the Christian merchants and peasants against heavy taxation and oppressive rule” and that “there is no evidence that insurrection was organised by an outside power.” Humphrey Sumner agrees with Arthur Evans, the Manchester Guardian correspondent at the time, that the “insurrection was in its origin Agrarian rather than Political”, but adds that it “became a weapon in the hands of Austrian, Russian, and Serbian Slav societies, of Montenegrin captains, and of the pandours of the border district.”


2 Ekmečić, Dugo kretanje, 278–279; Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije II, 283–284; see also Čubrilović, Bosanski ustanak, 52–57.

3 D. Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875–1878: The First Year (Stanford University Press and Oxford University Press, 1936), 17.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.


7 B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870–1880 (Hamden, CT and London: Archon Books, 1962), 141; A. J. Evans, Through Bosnia and Herzegovina on Foot, During the
George Hoover Rupp, on the other hand, tends to lay emphasis on foreign influences, particularly “the intrigues and propaganda of both the Pan-Slavs and the agents of the Bosnian minded Military Group in Austria”, arguing that “of these the Pan-Slavs were much more active”. Pan-Slav intrigues were the main cause of the insurrection according to Wertheimer’s biography of Andrássy as well, which in fact was a view shared by a large part of European public opinion at the time of the insurrection. According to the recently published documents from Russian archives, however, the Russian consuls in Mostar, Sarajevo and Dubrovnik believed that the uprising was caused by heavy taxation and Ottoman incompetence. Moreover, they suspected that there was secret Austrian influence among the insurgents.

Robert William Seton-Watson, although describing the situation in the Ottoman Empire, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as “untenable”, put emphasis on the ambitions of the military party in Vienna, especially one of its leaders, the governor of Dalmatia, General Gavrilo Rodić, who was “in secret contact with the Bosnian leaders”. Seton-Watson also remarked that the Russian consul in Dubrovnik, Alexander Yonin, was “in direct contact with the insurgent chiefs”. According to Mihailo D. Stojanović, the insurrection “was the result of the propaganda and preparations which Serbia carried out with the view of organising a general rising of the Christians”.

More than agrarian conditions, influences from Serbia, Montenegro, Austrian Dalmatia and Croatia are stressed in Richard Millman’s work.

The main goal of this article is to scrutinize the contemporary British sources in order to establish what they say about the causes of the 1875 insurrection in Herzegovina. The main source of information will be the re-

---


10 Yonin to Jomini, Ragusa, 5/7 July 1875, published in *Rossiya i vosstanie v Bosni i Gercegovine 1875–1878: Dokumenty*, eds. V. I. Kosik et al. (Moscow: Indrik, 2008), 17–24.


12 Ibid., 19.


ports produced in July and August 1875 by the British diplomats serving in the region, being closest to the events. The opinions of London policy makers and British newspaper correspondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina will be analyzed as well.

In June and July 1875, when the uprising broke out, most diplomats were on vacation in European spas and capitals. By contrast, the British consuls in Sarajevo and Dubrovnik, as well as the ambassador in Constantinople, were at their offices, busy gathering information and sending reports to Lord Derby, foreign secretary in the Conservative cabinet of Benjamin Disraeli.

A pronounced Turkophile, as the contemporary British diplomats serving in the Balkans tended to be, the British consul in Sarajevo, William Holmes, relied almost exclusively on information supplied by Dervish Pasha, governor general of Bosnia, and by other Ottoman officials. Holmes knew about Austria-Hungary’s aspirations regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, but his reports of June 1875 described Montenegro as the main troublemaker in Herzegovina. He was aware of the policies of Prince Nikola, who was using his influence in this troubled region to extract territorial gains from the Porte. Holmes supported the Ottoman effort to settle the border question with Montenegro through Constant Effendi’s diplomatic mission to Cetinje. He shrewdly analyzed the position of Montenegro in relation to the Ottoman Empire: “The possession of Montenegro for Turkey would simply be a large and useless expense, and quarrels with her have the same result without any possible advantage. It is therefore interest of Turkey that Montenegro should be friendly, peaceful and contented.” Nonetheless, he reported that Prince Nikola, whom he described as a man of “bad faith” who did not “carry out his engagements”, “has hopes that some time or other Bosnia and the Herzegovina will come under his government, but in the case of complications arising which give these provinces to Austria, he knows that his aspirations will be unattainable.”

---


16 The National Archives (NA), Foreign Office (FO), 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 1 July 1875.

17 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 18 June 1875.

18 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 1 July 1875.

19 Ibid.
Holmes expressed suspicion about Montenegro in the very first report on the disturbances he sent on 2 July 1875. He claimed that everything was organized by a group of 164 refugees from Herzegovina, who had wintered in Montenegro, and then reappeared in Herzegovina in revolt, killing everyone who tried to negotiate with the Ottoman authorities. Dervish Pasha told Holmes that Prince Nikola was not involved in the events, but he was not so sure that his Montenegrins were “equally blameless”. Constant Effendi informed Holmes about his mission to Cetinje, claiming that the Prince assured him that the disturbances were the result of “the Servian intrigue”: “He spoke bitterly of Servia, and said she was always endeavouring to put him in a false position, and make the Turks to think he was ‘incorrible’.” The Prince allegedly expressed his belief that “at the bottom of the present disturbance” was “the priest called Nikifor”, who was “the constant instrument of the Servian intrigue”. He was obviously trying to divert attention towards Serbia and put the blame for all the troubles on Nićifor Dućić, a monk, historian and guerrilla leader from Herzegovina, his close collaborator in the past, who was now living in Belgrade. As we shall see, however, the reports of the British consuls were not to refer to Serbia as the probable instigator of the disturbances in Herzegovina until August 1875, while Dućić’s name had never resurfaced.

On the other hand, Holmes was perfectly aware of the everyday hardships that the Herzegovinian peasants faced: “There is no doubt that these people feel oppressed and overtaxed. The Government is always urging the sale of the taxes at yearly increasing and really exorbitant prices, and in all complaint invariably side with the purchasers, being interested to secure them a profit to ensure still higher bidding the ensuing year.” He also knew that the small town of Nevesinje, where the uprising was to be ignited, was not included in a more lenient taxation system established in the neighbouring districts after their rebellion of 1861.

The attack on a Turkish caravan at Cvetna Poljana (Flowery Field) near Nevesinje carried out on 5th July was reported by Holmes four days

---

20 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 2 July 1875. On these refugees, see V. Čubrilović, Bosanski ustanak, 55–57. On the role of Montenegro in the outbreak of the uprising see also V. Ćorović, “Hercegovački ustanak 1875. godine”, in Spomenica o Hercegovačkom ustaniku 1875. godine (Belgrade: Odbor za podizanje Nevesinjskog spomenika, 1928), v–xix.

21 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 2 July 1875.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.
later. According to his account, “the disaffected peasants robbed the caravan and decapitated five innocent Turkish merchants”. Holmes also reported that another “band” of rebels had seized the bridge over the Krupa river, cutting the road between Mostar and Metković.

Holmes failed to mention that this “band” was made up of Catholics, which was a trail that could lead to Vienna and nourish old suspicions, rekindled in April and May 1875 by the Emperor Franz Joseph’s long visit to Dalmatia, where he received the Catholics from Herzegovina and listened compassionately to their grievances. In Kotor he met the Prince of Montenegro. Some historians believe that the Montenegrin Prince and the Habsburg Emperor came to an understanding, and that Prince Nikola might have had Russian support in that. It is known that the Crown Council convened in Vienna on 29 January 1875 had already made the decision to send Habsburg troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina should a conflict arise between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire. In May 1875, shortly after Franz Joseph left Dalmatia, the Montenegrin Prince asked the Three Emperors’ League to countenance Montenegro’s territorial expansion.

A day after Holmes sent his report, the British chargé d’affaires in Vienna, R. Percy Ffrench, forwarded to Derby the telegram he had just received from Dubrovnik, where consul Taylor informed him about fighting on the Krupa, but also noted that the insurgents “have hoisted Austrian flag at two places”. In Taylor’s view, “Montenegro seemingly directs the revolt underhand”. A few days later, Percy Ffrench sent a more detailed report about the clashes on the Krupa and at Rasno, describing the flight of refugees from the lower Neretva to Metković in Austrian territory. As he also remarked, “the suspicion exists that the whole thing may have been fomented by the southern Pan-Slavists in order to disturb and to create confusion in the relations between Austria and Turkey”. Percy Ffrench did not specify who those “southern Pan-Slavists” were — pro-Russian Pan-Slavs or South-Slav agitators from Dalmatia.

---


27 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 9 July 1875.


29 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Ffrench to Derby, Vienna, 10 July 1875.


31 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Ffrench to Derby, Vienna, 15 July 1875.
When Holmes eventually learnt from Dervish Pasha that both Catholics and Orthodox took part in the revolt, he worriedly described the situation as “a circumstance which has never before occurred in troubled times”. He pointed to the fact that the Austrian Vice-Consul in Trebinje and a number of Roman Catholic priests had left Herzegovina for Dalmatia in fear of Muslim retribution. Although Dervish Pasha claimed “that their departure has been made with the sole intention of increasing the agitation”, a few days later Holmes reported that, thanks to the influence of the bishop of Mostar and some Christian and Muslim “notables”, the Catholics “retired to their homes”.

The correspondent for the *Times* in Herzegovina, William James Stillman, a Pre-Raphaelite painter and photographer, who had supported the Cretan uprising of 1866–1869 while serving as U.S. consul in Crete, maintained that the immediate cause of the insurrection in Herzegovina was the injustice and violence which were chronic and endemic in the Ottoman Empire. He also believed, however, that it was inspired by Franz Joseph’s visit to Dalmatia. In his view, it started as a revolt of “the Catholic population between Popovo and Gabela”, who “anticipated an Austrian intervention”. While travelling to Herzegovina in late August 1875, he found in Trieste “a committee for aiding the movement”, whose “political tone” was “distinctly Austrian, and the members of the committee were all Dalmatians, with whom, as with the Dalmatian patriots generally, the best end of the affair would be the union of Bosnia and part, at least, of Herzegovina to Dalmatia. There was no Russian leaning or influence”. Consequently, at the very beginning the insurrection was “entirely in the hands of the Austrian Slavs, the committees of Zara and Ragusa being the chief”. Stillman observed that at that time the Catholics were “the most enthusiastic in the revolt” and that “the Austrian authorities showed an ex-

---

32 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 24 July 1875.
33 Ibid.
34 NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 29 July 1875.
37 Ibid., 2–3.
38 Ibid., 8.
39 Ibid., 12.
traordinary amount of complaisance to the insurgents”.  
40 “But the Catholics were tinderbox fuel, quickly kindled and quickly spent.”  
41 As the help they hoped for did not come, they gave up the fight. Stillman even claimed that the uprising was dying out at the time, and that it was only the Great Powers’ Consular Commission of August 1875 that rekindled it, giving the insurgents international encouragement and importance.  
42 Another reason for the revolt of the Herzegovinian Catholics, apart from the Emperor’s visit to Dalmatia, in the opinion of the Manchester Guardian’s correspondent and future famous archaeologist, Arthur Evans, was the dissatisfaction of the local Franciscans with infringement of some of their privileges and the Sultan’s delay in confirming their fermans. According to Evans, by pushing their congregation into the revolt, the Franciscans wanted to demonstrate the extent and value of their influence among the “Latin” population.  
43 He also observed, however, that “many of the Roman Catholics have deserted the national cause”, and claimed that the uprising did not really begin until the Orthodox in the Nevesinje district rose up. Moreover, he shared Stillman’s view that the real cause of the uprising was not “external agitation”, but “the oppression of the tithe-farmers”,  
44 arguing that “it is mainly an agrarian war”.  
45 To the extreme poverty of the local population and the bad harvest of 1874, he added that the Herzegovinian rebel “simply wanted to obtain a fair share of what he earned with the sweat of his brow, to gain security of life and limb and the honour of his wife and children, to be allowed at least to live”.  
46 Both Stillman and Evans harshly criticized the Turcophile attitude of William Holmes and the Foreign Office. Stillman described Holmes’s reports as “Arabian Nights”, while Evans’s public debate with Holmes continued in the Manchester Guardian and Parliament.  
47 However, Stillman and Evans were not essentially opposed to

---

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 12–14.
43 Evans, Through Bosnia and Herzegovina, 337.
44 Ibid., 331.
46 Ibid., 336.
47 Stillman, Herzegovina, 60. In vol. II of his Autobiography, 532–533, published almost thirty years later, Stillman claims that Elliot forced Holmes into writing Turkophile reports.
48 See A. J. Evans, Illyrian Letters: A Revised Selection of Correspondence From the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the Manchester Guardian During the Year 1877 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1878), 45–49, 84–91.
Britain’s official policy in the East. They both believed that the solution lay in an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; moreover, Stillman suggested that a “part” of Herzegovina “may be wisely united to Montenegro”.⁴⁹

Long after the revolt of the Catholics had reached its peak in June 1875, Taylor reported that in Dubrovnik “all sympathize deeply with the insurgents and, through a local Committee, afford them every help and assistance”.⁵⁰ He even claimed that Austria’s “local official action with the respect to them [insurgents] is neither neutral, assuring, nor loyal towards the Sultan”.⁵¹ Taylor blamed not only Austrian local authorities, but Montenegro as well. Arguing that “their parade of non-intervention seems an absurd fiction”, he believed it obvious that considering the strict press laws of both countries neither the Crnogorac of Cetinje nor the Narodni list and Nazionale of Zadar could have been able to publish their belligerent articles about the uprising in Herzegovina without official backing.⁵² Even Holmes noted that Austria was doing nothing to stop the agitation, that “the greatest excitement prevails in Dalmatia and Croatia”, and that “the committees have been formed in Agram, Ragusa and Trieste”.⁵³

While reports from Dalmatia were going to Vienna, where Percy Ffrench was still in charge of affairs, in the absence of the ambassador, Sir Andrew Buchanan, the reports from the Ottoman Empire were being sent to Constantinople, where ambassador Henry Elliot was struggling to piece together a broader picture. Elliot embraced Holmes’s interpretation of the beginning of the uprising, with the refugees returning from Montenegro as instigators of the revolt, and the taxation as its immediate cause.⁵⁴ However, he was sure that Russia, through the Three Emperors’ League, was directing the events, using Montenegro as her tool and pushing Austria-Hungary into the Sultan’s lands. Safvet Pasha, Ottoman foreign minister, only deepened Elliot’s suspicion by stating that the Austrian chargé d’affaires had supported the idea of sending more Ottoman troops to Herzegovina to help crush the revolt, in contrast to the Russian chargé d’affaires, who had remarked that “it would be better not to be precipitate”. Elliot also observed

⁵⁰ NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Taylor to Elliot, Ragusa, 4 August 1875.
⁵¹ Ibid.
⁵² Ibid.
⁵³ NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 6 August 1875.
⁵⁴ NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 13 July 1875. According to Evans, Through Bosnia and Herzegovina, 338–339, and Stillman, Herzegovina, 9–11, some of those refugees, upon returning from Montenegro, were killed by the Turks, which was one of the causes of the revolt.
that the Herzegovinian refugees who started the revolt had been able to return from Montenegro owing to the special concern and help of the Russian embassy in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{55} He advised Safvet Pasha and the Porte not to fear Austria-Hungary or Russia, but to send more troops to Herzegovina and to “adopt such measures as might seem necessary to prevent an extension of the spirit of insubordination”.\textsuperscript{56} In the subsequent weeks, Elliot and Holmes kept on encouraging the Ottomans to send troops “to these semi-barbarous districts” against the rebels who, in Elliot’s words, “carried on an extensive system of plunder and murder, exercising terrorism over the inhabitants of the different villages”.\textsuperscript{57} The insurrection was to be crushed without delay in order to preclude the involvement of the Three Emperors’ League. “That the movement is due to the policy followed by the three northern Powers during the last six months scarcely admits of a reasonable doubt, although it is not to be supposed that Austria intended or desired it to be followed by any such result. Practically, but unconsciously, that Power has been acting as a cat’s-paw to Russia,” Elliot wrote.\textsuperscript{58} Lord Derby approved all steps taken by Elliot.\textsuperscript{59}

Elliot’s suspicion that the Three Emperors’ League was secretly encouraging the insurrection was strengthened by the reports of the British diplomats from Paris and Berlin. The French foreign minister, Duc de Decazes, maintained that the Three Emperors’ League was paving the way for an Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{60} Unlike Elliot, the French official believed that Austria-Hungary was exploiting the events in order to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. The president of the Republic, Marshal Mac-Mahon, told the British ambassador, Lord Lyons, that the insurrection occurred at a “very inopportune moment” for “the Western Powers”, France and Britain, and expressed his fear that the members of the League, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, could “do pretty much as they pleased in the East”. He even suspected that Bismarck’s Germany might take advantage of the reopening of the Eastern Question to settle old scores with France.\textsuperscript{61} At the same time, the chargé d’affaires in Berlin,

\textsuperscript{55} NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 14 July 1875.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 20 July 1875; see also NA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Bosna Serai, 24 July 1875, 29 July 1875, and 6 August 1875; NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 10 August 1875, 11 August 1875, 17 August 1875 and 18 August 1875.
\textsuperscript{58} NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 14 July 1875.
\textsuperscript{59} NA, FO, 1875, Derby to Elliot, London, 30 July 1875 and 19 August 1875.
\textsuperscript{60} NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Duc Decazes to Marquis d’Harcourt, Paris, 6 August 1875 (Marquis d’Harcourt’s communication to the Earl of Derby of 7 August 1875).
\textsuperscript{61} NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Lord Lyons to Lord Derby, Paris, 13 August 1875.
Macdonnell, reported that the German secretary of state for foreign affairs, Von Bülow, had told him that in the case of the Sultan’s failure to pacify Herzegovina, “the ‘entente parfaitement cordiale’ which exists between the three Emperors might certainly induce His Imperial Majesty to tender his good offices towards the re-establishment and the maintenance of peace.”

On 20th August, Macdonnell sent an even more disturbing telegram: “The Prince [Bismarck] is of opinion that Austrian Government are not acting discreetly. Reports are current of an Austrian armed intervention. The Bourse for the first time has been affected by reports on this account.”

What was the reaction of the decision-makers in London to all those reports and news? Like Mac-Mahon, Disraeli suspected that the three Emperors were preparing the ground to settle the Eastern Question on their own, to the exclusion of Britain. He believed that Russia and the Habsburg Monarchy would try to divide the Sultan’s Balkan possessions between them, while Germany would seek to prevent France from restoring her strength. In that way both Britain’s prestige and the European balance of power would suffer.

When the insurrection broke out, Disraeli first focused suspicion on Vienna. The first action he took as soon as he heard the news was to telegraph the instructions to the ambassador in Vienna to find out what the “real wishes” of the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Count Gyula Andrásy, were. As the reply from Vienna was reassuring, Disraeli concluded that, should Austria-Hungary really remain neutral as Andrásy had promised, the rebellion would be quashed quickly.

Lord Derby too, in the first diary entry concerning the uprising, claimed that “unless the insurgents are backed up by Austria or Russia, or both, there is no serious danger”. By 30th August, Derby still believed that Austria-Hungary was responsible for the outbreak of the revolt.
Serbia, in contrast to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro and Russia, was not seen by the British as the instigator of the insurrection. However, from the beginning of August 1875, she was increasingly perceived as yet another tool in the hands of Russia and the Three Emperors’ League in the East. On 24th July 1875, the British consul general in Belgrade, William White, was still reporting about the Serbian government’s loyal attitude towards the Porte.\(^{68}\) However, Prince Milan Obrenović’s visit to Vienna gave rise to suspicion. On 3rd August, White passed on the official explanation that the young Prince was travelling “on the private ground”, noting that “it has been hinted” that “there is a matrimonial project on foot”.\(^{69}\) But White also reported that Milan planned to meet the Emperor Franz Joseph and Andrassy, suspecting that the Prince might use “the ultimate special protection of the three military Empires, for defying the authority of the Porte and assuming a hostile attitude”.\(^{70}\) White pointed to the possibility that Prince Milan, in view of the approaching election, might try to use the events in Herzegovina to revitalize his popularity in response to pressure from Serbian patriotic public opinion. White also reported that one of his ministers “was heard” say that “a little bloodletting would only do good to Servia”, and that Prince Nikola was enquiring in Belgrade about Serbia’s intentions, and had proposed a joint plan of action.\(^{71}\)

Suspicious about Serbia’s connection with the Three Emperors’ League, the Foreign Office was trying to gather information in St Petersburg and Vienna as well. Baron Alexander Jomini, an advisor in the Russian foreign ministry, told the British chargé d’affaires, Sir William Doria, that Prince Milan “had gone there solely in search for a wife”. However, Doria noticed “a sort of complacency” in the attitude of Jomini and especially of the Austrian ambassador in St Petersburg, Baron Langenau, towards the troubles of the Porte in Herzegovina.\(^{72}\) The French ambassador in St Petersburg, General Le Flo, shared Doria’s suspicion about the future plans of the Three Emperors’ League in the East.\(^{73}\)

On the other hand, Percy Ffrench sent calming news from Vienna. According to him, the Serbian Prince was arranging a marriage with “a Roumanian lady”.\(^{74}\) Apart from that, the young Paris-educated Prince was

---

\(^{68}\) NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, White to Derby, Belgrade, 24 July 1875.

\(^{69}\) NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, White to Derby, Belgrade, 3 August 1875.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.

\(^{71}\) Ibid.

\(^{72}\) NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Doria to Lord Derby, St Petersburg, 4 August 1875.

\(^{73}\) NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Doria to Lord Derby, St Petersburg, 9 August 1875.

\(^{74}\) NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Ffrench to Lord Derby, Vienna, 4 August 1875.
looking for “a few days distraction from the monotonous solitude of his life in his own country”. From the perspective of Percy Ffrench, the Prince, in his country of peasants which “possesses neither proprietors nor a middle class”, was “entirely cut off from any civilized intercourse, in hourly dread of assassination”, surrounded only by his ministers and his aides-de-camp, half-civilized themselves. The British diplomat concluded this “Balkanist discourse” with words that now appear strangely ironical and prophetic at the same time: “Yet this is a State which aspires to be the ‘Piedmont’ of the Principalities, which has raised the nucleus of an army destined, according to the Servian creed, to march one day against Turkey and overthrow her, and found and become the head of a Southern Slavonia, which is to absorb all the other Danubian and Austro-Turkish provinces of that race.”

The reports from Belgrade, however, were much more alarming. According to White, only one day after Prince Milan’s departure for Vienna, a committee for Herzegovina was set up openly in Belgrade. The Serbian authorities, which ten days earlier had put a ban on setting up the committee, now did nothing to prevent it. Moreover, White was informed that about one hundred volunteers had left Serbia to join the insurrection in Herzegovina. Without waiting for either Elliot’s or Derby’s approval, White asked the Serbian foreign minister, Milan Bogićević, for an explanation. Bogićević assured him that Serbian officials were not involved in any way in the despatching of volunteers, “but he admitted departure of a few volunteers”, and confirmed that aid was being raised for the people of Herzegovina.

Within the next few days Serbia indeed became the source of troubling news. In addition to Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, the Porte was now accusing Serbia too of providing help to the rebels in Herzegovina. According to the news from Constantinople, and even from Paris, as volunteers were pouring in from Dalmatia and Montenegro, Serbia kept sending her volunteers, and the Serbian army was on manoeuvres in the border areas opposite Višegrad. At the request of the Porte, Lord Derby took official steps to dissuade the governments in Vienna, Cetinje and Belgrade from carrying on with their actions.

75 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Ffrench to Derby, Vienna, 4 August 1875.
76 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, White to Elliot, Belgrade, 3 August 1875.
77 Ibid.
78 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Elliot to Derby, 11 August 1875.
80 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Derby to Ffrench, London, 12 August 1875; and Derby to Elliot, London, 12 August 1875.
In reality, both Percy Ffrench and White were well informed about the position of both Prince Milan and the Serbian government. The fact that the cabinet of Danilo Stevanović was indeed secretly raising aid and sending volunteers to Herzegovina led to its conflict with Prince Milan. Upon his return from Vienna, the Prince dismissed the cabinet, but this proved to be an unwise move from the standpoint of his own interests, because the election brought the openly belligerent Liberals to power. White reported that, at the reception for the Consular body held on 22 August 1875, the Prince “required moral support from the foreign Powers for the preservation of peace”. The Prince said that he had to face the war-minded Assembly, and that he could not obtain support from any man of influence in Serbia with the exception of Jovan Marinović, who favoured negotiations over war, but was not a popular politician. The new course of Stevča Mihailović’s government was obvious from the fact that Serbia’s military preparations were now made quite overtly.

That things were getting worse was also clear from White’s report that “the Revolutionary Committee” in Belgrade “held several hundreds natives of Bosnia ready to proceed there” even under the previous Serbian government. On 18 August 1875, Elliot reported that the Ottoman officials had no information about the insurrection spreading from Herzegovina to Bosnia. Yet, a day later, Buchanan learnt from the Austrian foreign ministry that the insurrection had indeed spread to Bosnia, and that the Habsburg authorities accused Prince Milan of forgetting the promise of neutrality he had made in Vienna.

The scene was now rapidly changing. On the very same day Buchanan informed the Foreign Office about the outbreak of the insurrection in Bosnia (19 August), and the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Count Ignatiev, proposed to the Porte on behalf of the Three Emperors’ League to accept mediation by the Consuls of the Great Powers, who would meet up with the rebel leaders and persuade them to agree to the administrative and tax reforms. This was exactly what the British had feared the most. The Three Emperors’ League was seizing the initiative in the East. Disraeli suspected

82 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, White to Derby, Belgrade, 23 August 1875.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, White to Derby, Belgrade, 17 August 1875.
86 NA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Buchanan to Derby, 19 August 1875.
that it was the beginning of the partitioning of the Ottoman Balkan possessions. In fact, the Consular Commission was the first clear sign that the Great Powers were openly taking the leading role in the events in the East. Thus, the change of government in Serbia, the spread of the uprising to Bosnia and the setting up of the Consular Commission marked the beginning of a new phase in the course of the Eastern Crisis.

***

A clear and comprehensive explanation of the causes of such a complex phenomenon as the outbreak of the insurrection in Herzegovina can only be given by analyzing all the relevant sources of different provenance. The British sources tell only part of the story, but the importance of the British perspective became obvious in the continuation of the Eastern Crisis, when Britain snatched the leading role in the events.

The British sources support the conclusion of most historians that the immediate cause of the insurrection was agrarian discontent, especially tithe collecting. Considering “external influences” in the outbreak of the insurrection, the British emphasized the role of Austria-Hungary and Montenegro. They saw behind these countries the shadow of the Three Emperors’ League, which was perceived as the main threat to the Ottoman Empire and to British interests in Europe. It was suspected that the uprising might be used as a pretext for dividing the Sultan’s European possessions between Austria-Hungary and Russia, in which case Austria-Hungary would enter Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro was seen as a tool of the Three Emperors’ League, while Serbia was not perceived as directly involved in the events in Herzegovina. Later on, at the time of Prince Milan’s visit to Vienna and with the beginning of the despatching of volunteers from Serbia to Herzegovina, the British diplomats came to think of Serbia as another tool of the Three Emperors’ League. As the crisis evolved and Russia’s involvement grew deeper and more obvious, the British shifted their suspicion from Vienna to St Petersburg. Nonetheless, the Three Emperors’ League remained the main focus of their attention until the end of the Eastern Crisis.

Bibliography and published sources


87 Ković, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, 90.

Ćorović, V. “Hercegovački ustanak 1875. godine”. In *Spomenica o Hercegovačkom ustaniku 1875. godine*. Belgrade: Odbor za podizanje Nevesinjskog spomenika, 1928.


— *Illyrian Letters: A Revised Selection of Correspondence From the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the 'Manchester Guardian' During the Year 1877*. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1878.


Unpublished sources

The National Archives, London: Foreign Office, 195, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Foreign Office, 424, Correspondence Respecting Affairs in Herzegovina.

This paper results from the project of the Institute for Balkan Studies History of political ideas and institutions in the Balkans in the 19th and 20th centuries (no 177011) funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.
Political and Social Rivalries in Nineteenth-century Serbia
Švabe or Nemačkari

Abstract: The nature of the relationship between the Serbs from Serbia and the Serbs from the Habsburg Monarchy in the nineteenth century is important for understanding the process of national development of the Serbian people as a whole. Therefore the paper analyzes the controversy over Švabe or Nemačkari, as the Serbs from Austria were called, which was one of the factors responsible for internal instability of the Principality of Serbia in the nineteenth century.

Keywords: Serbs from the Habsburg Monarchy, Principality of Serbia, Prince Michael (Mihailo) Obrenović, Constitutionalists, Serbske narodne novine, Vuk Karadžić

Understanding the nature of the relationship between the Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy in the nineteenth century is vital for understanding the national development process of the Serbian people as a whole. The controversy over the Švabe or Nemačkari, which was how the Serbs from the Monarchy were nicknamed in Serbia, was a contributing factor of Serbia’s internal instability.

Relations between the Serbs in the Principality of Serbia and the Serbs in the Monarchy have not received due attention in Serbian historiography. They have only been touched upon in the context of discussing individual and rather narrow periods of time, and even then as a subsidiary topic within more general studies.

1 The word “Nemačkar” (Nemachkar; pl. Nemačkari) was derived from the Serbian word for Germany (Nemačka), and denoted an ethnic Serb born or educated in a German-language country, notably the Habsburg Monarchy. The word “Švaba” (Shvaba; pl. Švabe), originally referring to Swab settlers in the region, came to be used for any person of German origin. Both terms could be used as neutral or derogatory, depending on the context.

2 Undoubtedly the most important among them is Slavko Gavrilović, Vojvodina i Srbija u vreme Prvog ustanka [Vojvodina and Serbia at the time of the First Serbian Uprising] (Novi Sad 1974), which provides a very clear picture of the national, political, military and economic aspects of the cooperation among the Serbs during the First Serbian Uprising.
Slobodan Jovanović, in his text “Nemačkari” (1936),3 recognized the distinctive character and importance of the relations between the Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs in Austria. According to him, the term Nemačkari was used in the first half of the nineteenth century for the Serbs who crossed over from Austria into Serbia, where they mostly pursued a career in state administration. They saw their golden days in the reign of Prince Alexander Karadjordjević (1842–58), under the regime of the Constitutionalists or Constitution Defenders (ustavobranitelji).4 Jovanović’s statement finds corroboration in a relevant source of information for the topic, the newspaper Serbske narodne novine,5 which kept track of the developments almost on a daily basis for as long as it was published.

There had never been a break in relations between the Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs “across the border”. On the contrary, after Serbia achieved autonomy within the Ottoman Empire (1833), they grew in intensity and diversity, as a result of the country’s pressing need for internal structuring and development in all fields. Although after the Second Serbian Uprising (1815) the eyes of the entire Serbian people were turned towards Serbia as a political centre, the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy remained the pivotal force in cultural, educational, economic and social terms for the next half century. Serbia needed to provide for a constitutional government and civil rights, to abolish unpaid forced labour (kuluk), to encourage the development of trade and commerce, to carry out reforms in education in order to increase literacy and improve the general educational level of the population. Determined to address these issues, the country’s leadership, embodied in the Prince, had to cope with a number of difficulties from the very outset.

---

the most pressing of all being the lack of well-trained and qualified people.\textsuperscript{6} In the first half of the nineteenth century, in a Serbia exhausted by her long struggle for independence and isolated from European cultural developments, educated people were scarce, and her nascent administration needed them badly.\textsuperscript{7}

Under the circumstances, it was quite natural that the Serbian government should count on educated Serbs from Austria. It therefore made requests to the Austrian government for facilitating the issuance of the necessary permits to its citizens of Serbian origin willing to accept employment in Serbia.\textsuperscript{8} In most cases the Habsburg government granted such requests, assuming that through the Serbs from the Monarchy it would be able to influence Serbia’s policies, at least indirectly, swaying them towards a position favourable to its own interests.

Some of the Serbs from the Monarchy only stayed in Serbia until their employment contracts expired, or for so long as it took to get a particular job done. This was the case with Jovan Hadžić,\textsuperscript{9} modern Serbia’s first law code author, Jovan Stejić,\textsuperscript{10} founder of the Serbian Health Service,

\textsuperscript{6} That the shortage of qualified staff was huge is suggested by the fact that even uneducated young men were appointed as trainees and scribes in state administration. Cf. a decree of the Regency of the Principality to the minister of finance: Ukaz Knjaževskog namesništva popečitelju finansija No. 32, 9 June 1839, Belgrade, Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia (hereafter AS)], PO, XXIII, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{7} This statement finds corroboration in the data provided by Radoš Ljušić, Kneževina Srbija (1830–1839) [The Principality of Serbia 1830–1839] (Belgrade 1986), 243: “In 1815, after the end of the Second Uprising, Serbia had 24 state employees. By 1830 their number increased to 169, and by 1833 to 245. Between the issuance of the Second and the Third Hatti-sherif the Principality considerably enlarged its territory and, consequently, the number of state employees constantly grew, notably in the nascent judicial system, army and highest state bodies, and particularly after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1838 [...] In 1836 there were 412 state employees, and the following year the figure rapidly rose to 546.”

\textsuperscript{8} Since educated Serbs from Hungary were in great demand in Serbia, the incoming physicians, teachers, engineers and the like were not required to renounce Austrian citizenship and take Serbian instead. Serbian citizenship was only required for “political service” posts. Cf. AS, MID-V, 1939, II, No. 1202, Rešenje Saveta [Council Decision], 1 Aug. 1839, 28.

\textsuperscript{9} Dr. Jovan Hadžić (alias Milos Svetić) (1799–1869), a jurist, writer, founding member of Matica Srpska and editor of its Letopis.

\textsuperscript{10} Dr. Jovan Stejić (1803–1853), personal physician of Prince Miloš Obrenović, head of the Health Service, secretary of the State Council, writer, promoter of culture, member of the Serbian Learned Society (Društvo srpske slovesnosti) and creator of Serbian medical terminology. He was a harsh opponent of Vuk Karadžić’s language and orthography reform.
and Jovan Sterija Popović, founder of the Serbian Learned Society, architect of the school system and first modern Serbian comedy playwright. The same goes for many artists, such as the painters Georgije Lacković, Georgije Bakalović, Jovan Isailović, Katarina Ivanović, or Dimitrije Avramović, painter of the icons for the iconostasis of Belgrade Orthodox Cathedral (Saborna crkva), and the sculptor Dimitrije Petrović. Having completed their commissions, almost all of them left Serbia. The usual reason for the newcomers’ leaving so soon was their inability to adjust themselves to very different conditions from those in the Monarchy. Some came to Serbia inspired by the patriotic ideal, but their disillusioning encounter with what they saw as an uncouth environment and despotic rule led to their decision not to prolong their stay, convinced that their individual effort would not be enough to spur any change for the better. Others, on

11 Jovan Sterija Popović (1806–1856), a playwright and professor.
12 Georgije Lacković (late 18th century).
13 Georgije Bakalović (1786–1843), a painter of icons, frescoes and portraits.
14 Jovan Isailović (mid 18th century–1807).
15 Katarina Ivanović (1819–1882), the first Serbian woman painter, painted portraits, historical compositions and still-lifes.
16 Dimitrije Avramović (1815–1855), a painter and writer, one of the promoters of Romanticism in Serbian painting.
17 Dimitrije Petrović (1799–1852).
18 Justin Mihailović, describing in his Diary the arrival of the philologist and pedagogue Adam Dragosavljević in Serbia and his prompt departure, reveals how Serbs from the Monarchy saw the situation in Serbia in the first half of the nineteenth century. On 6 September 1831, Mihailović writes: “Adam went to Serbia and came back [...] I eagerly wished him to go there where he could put his experience and knowledge to good use, immeasurably good use indeed, and I was expecting his letter from the Promised Land to come any day, but instead he came back determined to stay here [...] So, now I see that everything is not as it should be over there, it is not yet a place for a man who has grand plans and the intention to carry them out. What then would be the point of our kind-hearted friend’s staying there? If people are unable to recognize and understand his intentions and goals, what he can do with his high altruistic, cosmopolitan ideas people know nothing about, ideas which are still bitterly struggling for recognition even in enlightened and civilized Europe, in Germany, in England, in France; what he can do with them amidst that uncouthness, in that country freshly reclaimed from barbarism and violence where the Russian master is intent on flying his despotic flag and on grooming an ally for the future. Nothing can be done there, they won’t let you raise your head and look at the wide world, but instead: ‘Help me fight against our tyrant, and become one instead of him. Change the master, and you, you’re a slave anyway.’ That’s the Losungsnswort of all national activists.” Cf. Borivoje Marinković, “Dnevnik Justin Mihailovića (1831–1844)” [Diary of Justin Mihailović (1831–1844)], Zbornik za društvene nauke 26 (1960), 103–128.
the other hand, especially in a later period, adjusted themselves to the new environment. They took Serbian citizenship and brought their families with them or started one in Serbia. This was the case with Dimitrije Davidović, author of the first Serbian Constitution and editor of the first newspaper in Serbia, *Novine srbske* (Serbian Newspaper); Dimitrije Isailović, professor at the Lyceum (institution of higher learning); the engineer Atanasije Nikolić, designer of Serbia’s first landscaped park, in Topčider. The artists Djura Jakšić, Stevan Todorović, Djordje Krstić, and many others joined them a little later. It was through their effort and influence that a fossilized patriarchal society such as Serbia was at the beginning of the century began to change and to accustom itself to a different code of behaviour, to a different dress style, to luxury, gradually abandoning the traditional system of values. In other words, they contributed to a faster pace of the Europeanization process of a largely Orientalized Serbia.

The Serbs “from across the border” held almost all important positions in the Principality. They served as the Prince’s diplomats, councillors, first secretaries of the princely chancery, senior secretaries of the State Council, heads of ministry departments, as headmasters, professors, teachers, priests, engineers, physicians and state administration employees. Petar Jovanović, Archbishop of Belgrade and Metropolitan of Serbia (1833–1859), was one

---

19 Dimitrije Davidović (1789–1838), a politician and diplomat, secretary to Prince Miloš, state secretary, minister, author of the first constitution of the Principality of Serbia, the so-called Sretenjski (Presentation Day) Constitution of 1835, journalist and publicist.

20 Dimitrije Isailović (1783–1853), an education promoter, professor, and editor of *Srpske novine* (Serbian Newspaper).

21 Atanasije Nikolić (1803–1882), a professor, writer of mathematics textbooks, assistant minister of interior.

22 Djura Jakšić (1832–1878), a Romantic poet and painter.

23 Stevan Todorović (1832–1925), a painter and enthusiastic promoter of sports, theatre and music.

24 Djordje Krstić (1851–1907), one of the first proponents of Realism in Serbian painting.

25 The Serbs newly arrived from Austria described living conditions in Serbia as virtually unbearable. For more, see Radoš Ljušić, “Dimitrije Davidović, sekretar kneza Miloša Obrenovića” [D. Davidović, Secretary to Prince Miloš Obrenović], Zbornik *Matice srpske za istoriju* 32 (1985), 66–68.

26 “...Serbs born outside Serbia are among the members of the State Council, the ministers and the judges of the Court of Appeals; lesser officials are countless and their number is growing daily.” Vuk to Struve, published in vol. XXV of *Sabrana dela Vuka Stef. Karadžica* [Collected Works of V. St. Karadžić], *Prepiska* [Correspondence] VI (1837–1842) (Belgrade 1993), 840.
of them. They have tremendously contributed to the development of legislation, economy, education, culture and arts in nineteenth-century Serbia. A few characteristic examples from the area of education may illustrate how valuable the Serbs from the Monarchy were to Serbia.

According to the official census of July 1836, Serbia had a total of sixty-eight teachers, of whom twenty-five from Srem (Syrmia), twelve from Banat, seven from Bačka, three from Slavonia, two from Croatia, and two “from the [Austrian] Empire in general”, while the rest, or only seventeen, were native-born. Also, the lists of professors teaching at the Lyceum in the first twenty years since its founding in 1838 clearly show that the education system in Serbia almost completely depended on Serbs from Austria. Thus, in the first academic year (1838/39), all Lyceum professors were Serbs “from across the border”. In 1849, seven out of its eleven professors were from the Monarchy. A more balanced ratio was not established until 1860, when half of the fourteen professors in the faculty list were Austrian-born Serbs. On the other hand, only four of the other seven were Serbs born in the Principality of Serbia. Elementary schools showed almost the same ratios.

The Serbske narodne novine made it a routine practice to report on virtually every important example of cooperation between the Serbs from the two sides of the Sava and Danube rivers. By way of illustration, let me mention a few reports involving some of the most prominent figures originally from the Habsburg Monarchy.

For instance, the newspaper reported that the engineer Atanasije Nikolić had arrived in Serbia to take up a professorship at the Lyceum.

---


30 Ibid., 586–591.

31 Stojančević, “Škole”, 82–93. The fact is both interesting and significant that the first full members of the Serbian Learned Society (Društvo srpske slovesnosti) appointed by Prince Milan at the proposal of the Ministry of Education were not Serbs from Serbia. Apart from one from Bosnia, they all were Serbs from Hungary. Cf. Vasilije Đ. Krestić, “Društvo srpske slovesnosti” [The Serbian Learned Society], Danica for 2006 (2005), 184.

that Dimitrije Isailović had been transferred from a ministry to the position of rector of the Lyceum, or that Metropolitan Petar Jovanović had been appointed chairman, and Jovan Hadžić, Novi Sad senator, a member of the education committee. The newspaper also reported about the work of sculptor Dimitrije Petrović and icon painter Dimitrije Avramović on the iconostasis of Belgrade Cathedral, about the theatrical success of Jovan Sterija Popović’s plays, about the circular of the Ministry of Education to all schools in Belgrade and Kragujevac, instructing them to work on improving the quality and purity of the Serbian language, and recommending public reading of Jovan Stejić’s texts to that end. Strongly spurring the awareness of spiritual unity and of the need for coordinated efforts among the Serbs, Teodor Pavlović in all these and similar reports promoted the idea of the nation’s political, economic and cultural revival, consistently emulating the model set by Count Széchenyi’s paper Jelenkor. Serbske narodne novine provided this kind of information for as long as it was published, though most prominently in 1838–1842 or, more precisely, until the end of Prince Michael’s reign.

The first signs that the presence and role of Švabe in Serbia might become a controversial issue — which was to preoccupy the domestic public even after the fall of the Constitutionalists’ regime in 1858 — had appeared at the moment the Constitutionalists forcefully stepped into the Serbian

33 SNN No. 33, 26 Oct. 1838, 127.
34 SNN No. 13, 18 Feb. 1840, 50.
35 SNN No. 103, 26 Dec. 1840, 414.
36 SNN No. 101, 21 Dec. 1841, 401; No. 7, 30 Jan. 1842, 27; No. 9, 5 Feb. 1842, 35.
38 A text in SNN No. 65, 17 Aug. 1841, 258–259, is illustrative enough: “No sooner had a feud among brothers ended in Prince Miloš’s expulsion than another feud led to their expulsion too: and even then, there is no peace and concord [in the country]; and, trust me, there will be none until the Serbs change radically, until they become enlightened in the true sense of the word and turn to that as a source of remedy...”
39 Count István Széchenyi (1791–1860), a wealthy Hungarian aristocrat and landowner, one of the main protagonists of the reform movement in Hungary.
political scene. In 1839 the Constitutionalists forced Prince Miloš to abdicate. Three of their political leaders — Toma Vučić Perišić, Avram Petronijević and Jevrem Obrenović — became regents on behalf of Milan Obrenović, Prince Miloš’s ailing underage son. Serbske narodne novine did not fail to report on the developments: “These days almost all newspapers describe the situation in Serbia as one of shameful quarrel, discord and mayhem. Among other things, they bring this report from the Serbian border, noting that it comes from a Serb. After Prince Miloš’s expulsion from Serbia, it was hoped that all beneficial effects of the new Constitution would be fully enjoyed, rights secured, peace and order established in the country. But all those well-meant hopes were nothing but delusions, mere wishful thinking. The present government is composed mostly of men either dull-witted or eager for money. Their catchword is: ‘We won’t have Švabe in this country.’ This unpolitical parade of theirs is meant to elicit support from plain people. There is widespread loathing of Germans...”

---

41 Frequent harassment of Austrian citizens by common people and state officials compelled even Prince Miloš, towards the very end of his reign, to issue (5 Feb. 1839) an order to the Belgrade Police Head Office aimed at preventing such incidents: AS, PO, CXLVII, 35. On the origin of the Švabe controversy, see also Bartolomeo Kunibert, Srpski ustanak i prva vladavina Miloša Obrenovića 1808–1850 [Serbian Uprising and the first reign of Miloš Obrenović, 1808–1850] (Belgrade 1988), vol. II, 63–64.

42 A pasquinade against Prince Miloš from early 1839 says: “To remove everything that stood in his way, he — instructed by the venomous švaba fugitives, whom he, like a snake, gathered around himself to poison our happiness — devised to pull us from under the wing and protection of the Russian Emperor and our Russian brothers...” Cf. Arhiv srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti [Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (hereafter ASANU)], Istorijska zbirka [Historical Collection], No. 14556.

43 Toma Vučić Perišić (1788–1859), leader of the so-called Constitution Defenders or Constitutionalists (ustavobranitelji), minister, president of the State Council.

44 Avram Petronijević (1790–1856), Prince Miloš’s official, member of the State Council, one of the regents, prime minister, and minister of foreign affairs.

45 Jevrem Obrenović (1790–1856), the youngest brother of Miloš Obrenović, for many years obor-knez (governor) of the Šabacka Nahija (District of Šabac), governor of the City of Belgrade and the Belgrade District, benefactor, supervisor of public buildings, head of the Military Police Office, president of the State Council and member of the Regency government. As a Constitutionalist, he bitterly opposed the rule of his brother, Prince Miloš.

46 Milan Obrenović (1819–1839), the elder son of Prince Miloš, became Prince of Serbia in 1839, but died soon afterward and was succeeded by his younger brother Michael (Mihailo) Obrenović.

47 SNV No. 23, 14 Mar. 1840, 90–91.
With time the attacks on the Švabe gained impetus. Demands that all Austrian subjects be expelled from Serbia and replaced with "native-born sons" followed one another.\textsuperscript{48} They continued throughout the first reign of Prince Michael, whom Pavlović’s newspaper repeatedly, and often unjustly, accused of being prejudiced against the “Serbs from across the border”.\textsuperscript{49} Such accusations, however, cannot be conclusively substantiated. Upon acceding to the throne after his brother’s death, Prince Michael changed almost nothing in the government structure established by his father.\textsuperscript{50} His cabinet members had mostly been Serbs from the Monarchy who, with few exceptions, continued to serve the new Prince loyally.\textsuperscript{51} The young Prince even acted as their protector on more than one occasion.\textsuperscript{52} Campaigning against the Nemačkari was for the most part instigated by the Constitution-


\textsuperscript{49} E.g., an article published in \textit{SNN} No. 65, 17 Aug. 1841, 259, describes the attitude of Prince Michael and his government towards the Serbs from Austria in the following way: “But Serbs loathe foreigners, even their own Serbs [from Austria]; and they are already seeking to prevent the employment of all foreigners, which is also the fruit of envy and belief that a more worthy person should not enjoy that which otherwise would necessarily fall to the lot of the native, even an unworthy one. It is true that they did not prohibit it explicitly, but they insist that every foreigner should start from the lowest position, because the employed foreigners already hold high posts and cannot be made accountable to others. It is a great pity that the young Prince does not realize that this practice is more harmful to the fatherland than an explicit and definitive removal of foreigners; because, which educated and respectable man would be willing to go over there under such conditions? Only deplorable sons, who already are many there...”

\textsuperscript{50} E.g., Nil Popov, \textit{Srbija i Rusija od Kočine krajine do Sv. Andrejevske Skupštine} [Serbia and Russia from Koča Rebellion to St Andrew’s Day Assembly] (Belgrade 1870), vol. I, 343, claimed that even Prince Miloš had been surrounded by Serbs “from across the border”: “After Dolgoruky left, Miloš’s first concern was to make it up with Simić, Protić, Vučić and Jefrem. He allowed the first three to return to Serbia. They chose Hodges to act as a mediator between themselves and Miloš; but none of them was willing to admit his own mistakes; all justified their actions by referring to their good intentions and claimed that they had not fought against Miloš, but against those around him, notably the newcomers who had stood in the way of the genuine citizens of Serbia...”

\textsuperscript{51} The statement finds substantiation in a letter of Prince Miloš to Prince Michael of 3 January 1841 (AS, PO, XCIV, p. 6): “Dear son, if Radičević is as loyal and attached to you as he was to me...”

\textsuperscript{52} As reported by \textit{SNN} No. 25, 12 Apr. 1842, 103: “A special commission has been appointed to examine the case of a member of the Court of Appeal solely on the grounds of his being denounced for grumbling about the intention of the Ministry of Justice to appoint more Austrians to some posts. It is believed that, should the grumbling be proven, the said member will be dismissed because such behaviour is categorized as pitting one side against the other, causing discord and tension...”
alist circles, and for many reasons. The first, and in the eyes of the Constitutionalists certainly the foremost, was their intention to weaken their main political rivals, the Obrenović dynasty and their supporters, by sowing discord among them. The presence of Habsburg Serbs provided the perfect pretext for destabilizing Serbia using verbal means. Namely, the Constitutionalists generally accused them of a lack of patriotism, corruption and arrogance, while blaming Prince Michael for alienating all prominent figures and popular representatives, and for surrounding himself with foreigners instead. The Constitutionalists exploited even the slightest opportunity to score a point in their struggle for power, which they obviously did in the Švabe or Nemačkari case as well; that does not mean, however, that all of their accusations against the Serbs from the Monarchy were unfounded. Apart from the Constitutionalists, and Vučić as the loudest of

53 SNN No. 94, 27 Nov. 1841, 373, brings the following piece of information in a rather long text devoted to the issue of “Švabe”: “It is known that Vučić has been a great loather and critic of the Serbs from the Austrian side even before. And now the press reports that he was offered a passport for a foreign country to await better days there, and he stated that he would like to cross over into the Austrian Empire and become an Austrian citizen...”

54 SNN No. 24, 29 March 1842, 98, published the following observation of “a Serbian-born Serb”: “But you cannot find in this newspaper a single case of a Serb from across the border following this positive example. I know almost all state employees in Serbia and none of them, except for three or four, have ever made a contribution to a hospital or a school fund, although they are more numerous in the administration than Serbian-born Serbs. Many of them earn thousands of thalers a year, but wouldn't donate one or two to the institutions the benefits of which they know better than anyone...”

55 See SNN No. 91, 14 Nov. 1843, 362–363; SNN No. 8, 30 Jan. 1847, 31–32; SNN No. 16, 27 Feb. 1847, 62–63; and Stojan Simić to Teodor Pavlović, 9 Mar. 1848, Rukopisno odeljenje Matice srpske [Manuscript Department of Matica srpska (hereafter ROMS)], No. 12854.

56 As reported by SNN No. 79, 7 Oct. 1845, 315: “Thus, e.g., a few days ago, an important official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, born in the [Austrian] Empire, lost his temper over a trifle and, swearing at them, drove all lesser employees out of the office, and then, blinded by rage, hit the son of a deceased worthy father in the arm with a chair [...] then he pushed him towards the stairs in the hall and threw him down the stairs, so that the poor fellow [...] ended half-dead at the bottom [...] So you can see how the behaviour of some people from the other side [of the border] sometimes puts all of us Serbs from across the border in a position to be blasted by our good brothers from around here...”

them, Prince Alexander did not hide his lack of sympathies for the Švabe either.

One of the reasons for the Constitutionalists’ antagonistic attitude towards the Švabe lay in the fact that most Serbs from the Habsburg Monarchy supported the Obrenović dynasty. Moreover, after the dynasty’s fall, some of them had been involved in plots to support its return to power, which Serbia’s new leaders held bitterly against them. So, after Vučić’s Rebellion (Vučićeva buna) overthrew Prince Mihailo, sending him

---

58 “He did not care much for educated people and therefore greatly loathed the Serbs from Vojvodina who came over to Serbia. He could not put up with the fact that the Serbs from Vojvodina, being more literate and better educated than the Serbs from Serbia, held all important positions in state administration. So, he had a grudge against them almost all his life, looked askance at them, considered them uninvited guests, and insisted whenever he could upon their being dismissed from state administration.” Cf. Dragoslav Stranjaković, Vučićeva buna 1842 [Vučić’s Rebellion of 1842] (Belgrade 1936), 106. Vučić was consistent in his resentment towards the Švabe. During the revolutionary ferment of 1848/49, he was vehemently opposed to sending volunteers or extending any assistance to the movement in Vojvodina. As a result, the peasants in his native locale (Kragujevac District) massively boycotted the government’s campaign to enlist volunteers. Cf. Stranjaković, Vlada ustavobranitelja, 283; and Grgur Jakšić and Dragoslav Stranjaković, Srbija od 1813 do 1858 godine [Serbia from 1813 to 1858] (Belgrade n.d.), 121–122.

59 That Serbs from Austria were not in favour with Prince Alexander is readable from Austrian General Maximilian Ungerhoffer’s report to the Court in Vienna. Namely, in reply to an Austrian citizen’s request for employment in Serbia, the Prince expressed his opinion rather bluntly: “I like native Serbs much better than you, Švabe, because you’ve got into the habit of running to your Consul to complain about every little thing, causing our government problems and unpleasant paperwork.” Cf. Djuro Šurmin, “Dokumenti o Srbiji 1842–1848” [Documents on Serbia 1842–1848], Spomenik SKA LXIX, 2nd class, 54 (1929), 40. Nor was Vuk Karadžić any more inclined to the Švabe. Vuk to Struve, Prepiska VI, 840: “The increasing number of Austrian Serbs in Serbia, particularly those from the so-called educated class, can be considered to be Serbia’s great misfortune. Their number is increasing so rapidly that now that the quarantine is no longer compulsory and thanks to the Serbian government, Belgrade has almost become an Austrian city [...] True, one must admit that these Austrian Serbs are better educated than those born in Serbia; but one must also admit that, having been raised amidst Germans and Hungarians, they do not even know the common Serbian people they were born into, let alone those in Serbia. They come to Serbia without being put through a sieve (mostly adventurers) and, since the Serbian government does not know how to tell them apart and make a selection, they may be said to be self-selected and granting grades to one another, thereby making mischief and trouble. On top of it, there is no doubt that, at this point, common Serbian men from Serbia are abler and more reliable in governing this people than Hungarian lawyers.”

60 Among the most prominent Hungarian-born plotters in favour of the Obrenović dynasty were Cvetko Rajović, minister of interior under Prince Michael; Stojan Jovanović
into exile in Austria in September 1842, the Constitutionalists began to settle the score with their open or suspected political opponents who had come from the “Empire”. This included a massive purge of state administration, at first of the Serbs “from across the border” who, amidst the general chaos, had left the country together with Prince Michael, and then those of them who stayed in Serbia, regardless of whether they were politically active or not. Their banishment from the country was prompt and brutal. Moreover, the new Serbian authorities disregarded all state’s obligations as regards their salaries, pensions and other forms of compensation. The Vienna government reacted, at first through its consul, Dimitrije Atanacković, and then through its provisional representative, Colonel Filipović, by presenting a protest note which demanded the setting up of a joint Austrian-Serbian commission to ensure that the rights

---

61 In most cases, the banishment of Austrian subjects from Serbia only encompassed the Serbs employed in state administration. Other subjects of the Habsburg Empire, such as craftsmen, merchants and peasants, who were not involved in the political turmoil in Serbia, were left in peace. See Stranjaković, Vučićeva buna, 147.

62 As reported by ŠNV No. 71, 13 Sep. 1842, 289: “Apart from those who had fled to Austria, thus giving up their jobs, many of those (more than 80) who stayed were dismissed, mostly those born in the Austrian Empire. Only few from Serbia were also dismissed, and only few of those who came from Austria still hold their positions [...] Today, 96 state employees crossed over here from Belgrade, including the illustrious Messrs. Isailović, both Gavrilo vič, Bogdanović and Raić. Many schools are closed. Steić has also been dismissed.” Princess Ljubica (to Prince Miloš, 5 Sep. 1842, ASANU, Istorijska zbirka [Historical Collection], No. 14556) claimed that, by order of Vučić, initially ninety Austrian-born state employees were to leave Belgrade alone within twenty-four hours. According to her, Vučić’s supporters kept repeating: “We want to drive Swabs to Swabia, Greeks to Greece, Tsintsars to Tsintsaria, Bosniaks to Bosnia, etc., so as to see if we, pure and genuine Serbs, will be able to work well for Serbia.”

63 How strong and irrational animosity towards the Nemačkari was is also shown by the fact that apart from the state employees appointed under the previous government, dismissals were also inflicted on those whom underdeveloped Serbia needed badly, such as physicians, teachers and the like. See Lazar Čelap, “Postupak sa austrijskim podanicima u Srbiji u vreme Kneza Miloša i Ustavobranitelja” [Treatment of Austrian subjects in Serbia under Prince Miloš and the Constitutionalists), Godišnjak grada Beograda XIV (1967), 362–368.

64 Georgije Petrović to Vuk Karadžić, Zemun (Semlin), 7 Sept. 1843, vol. XXVI of Sabrana dela, Prepiska VII (1843–47), 75, describes the difficult situation of the expelled Serbs: “There are many expellees here in Zemun. Some have not eaten for three days.” See also ŠNV No. 95, 28 Nov. 1843, 300; and ŠNV No. 35, 4 May 1844, 138.
of Austrian citizens were protected, but the situation of the expelled saw little improvement. Instead, as reported by Šerbske narodne novine: “The Prince and the Council (Sovjet) in Serbia issued a new decree for non-natives, which reads: that from now on no foreigner, either with or without [citizenship] release, is to be employed in state administration; should any [foreigner] be indispensable, he can be hired only with permission from the Prince and the Council; and those currently employed in state administration are all, without exception, to submit a release from their [present] citizenship and take Serbian citizenship not later than six months from now; those who fail to meet this requirement before the set deadline will instantly cease being a Serbian state employee, and ministries will be able to dismiss them at will…” Because of Serbia’s poor finances, the problem of compensating the expelled employees was only partly resolved, and mostly in favour of the former highest-ranking state officials.

65 Georgije Petrović to Vuk Karadžić, 28 Sep. 1843, Prepiska VII, 88: “Filipović has already arrived, but it is known that he is not here as a consul, but as a commissioner of some sort. Some say he’s here because of our subjects in Serbia…” See also Vojislav Vučković, Srpska kriza u Istočnom pitanju 1842–1843 [Serbian crisis within the Eastern Question] (Belgrade 1957), 48; Jovan Milićević, “Istorija Katanske bune” [History of the Katanas’ Rebellion], Zhornik Filozofskog fakulteta V-1 (1960), 273. That relations between Serbia and Austria reached a critical point over the Nemačkari issue after this rebellion was crushed may be seen from SNN No. 87, Nov. 1844, 346: “The request the Serbian Government submitted to the Austrian Government contains the following items: 1) to implement strict control in order to preclude any further attempt to cause unrest in Serbia; 2) to move the fugitives from Serbia away from the Serbian border; 3) to implement the same measure against all those who are known to have connived against the Serbian government; 4) to recall all Austrian subjects still residing in Serbia who served under Prince Miloš; and 5) to bind them all to sell out the real property they possess in Serbia. If this request is not met, the Serbian government contends that good relations will be impossible to maintain…”

66 SNN No. 41, 25 May 1844, 162. It may be interesting to note that at some point Vuk Karadžić, although unsympathetic for the Constitutionalists, sent the Russian diplomatic representative to Vienna a letter containing an almost identical suggestion as regards the Serbs from Hungary (Vuk to Struve, Prepiska VI, 841): “For all this, I hold it necessary for our Constitution to be amended as soon as possible by stipulating that under no conditions can government and judicial posts be filled by any person other than those born in Serbia, so that the only posts left for foreigners would be those of scribes, teachers, physicians, engineers and the like; but even then, they should be hired under specified conditions without enjoying the rights of a permanent state employee. The Serbian people in Serbia would welcome such an amendment to the Constitution and it would protect them against many abuses and the premature and detrimental European or, to be more precise, undergraduates’ and lawyers’ statutes.”

67 According to SNN No. 35, 4 May 1844, 138: “Those born in the [Austrian] Empire who were employed and dismissed from state service following the changes in 1842, are
Pavlović's *Serbske narodne novine* kept close track of the ongoing friction between the Serbs from the two sides of the Sava and Danube rivers. Every issue of his paper ran polemical articles debating about who had started the scrimmage, and about the motivations of the Habsburg Serbs to migrate to Serbia: was it patriotism or the wish to get rich? The questions were answered in a roundabout manner, by enumerating everything that had been achieved owing to the Prečani (Serbs “from the other side”, “othersiders”), with the conclusion that the core of the problem lay in the ungratefulness of the Serbs in Serbia.68

In the mid 1850s, the nature of the antagonism over the Nemačkari took on new forms. In the 1820s and 1830s, Serbia had been in urgent need of “imported brains”, which had created a welcoming atmosphere for the Serbs from the Monarchy. Round the middle of the century, however, the situation changed considerably. There was a growing ill feeling towards the Serbs “from across the border”, particularly among the younger generation of educated natives. Most of them, having returned home from their studies abroad,69 believed that they, as “sons of the fatherland”, should be accorded priority in employment, particularly in state services. Also, most were sons of prominent figures who had played a significant role in the struggle for national liberation, and they felt frustrated with having to work their way to the posts and salaries they thought they deserved from the lowest-ranking position, whereas some “foreigners” who had not done that much for Serbia held the highest state offices and enjoyed many attractive privileges. A text published in *Serbske narodne novine* in 1846 clearly reveals the crux of the problem: “I suggest to Mr Reporter to find out how many Serbian sons qualified for higher grades and better in all respects, even in horse riding and weapons handling, have nonetheless remained at lower-grade positions than foreigners, who have mostly acquired experience only through working in Serbian administration, and all that in spite of the Decree of 1842 […] stipulating that an equally able native should be given a promotional priority over a foreigner; which the foreigner should not be frustrated about, because he should know where such a right comes from. If, however, our Mr Reporter wish the Serbian government to disregard all patriotic consider-
ations and, for the sake of the Austrian Serbs employed in the administration alone, pass over true sons of the fatherland and so many deserving men (who, while the Austrian Serbs were able to pursue their studies in peace, shed their blood and selflessly exposed their lives and property to peril for the liberation of their native land), there is nothing else we can wish Mr Reporter in this case than to be wiser.”

It is interesting to note the stance of Teodor Pavlović in the controversy over the Nemačkari. A supporter of the Constitutionalists and a close friend of the Simić brothers, but also a Serb from Austria deeply upset by the developments in Serbia, Pavlović was torn by contradictory feelings. Believing that all Serbs should hold together no matter where they came from and where they were, he simply could not understand the reason for this friction. Struggling to work out a solution acceptable to both sides, he wrote: “There is no doubt whatsoever that in considering employment applications, the Serbian government should first take into account those submitted by the qualified and deserving sons of the fatherland or natives; it is as justified and just as it is wise to separate the wheat from the chaff among...

---

70 SNN No. 25, 28 Mar. 1846, 100. It appears that even Vuk Karadžić was thinking of writing an article to help identify the real cause of the conflict between the Serbs from Serbia and the Serbs from Hungary. This may be inferred from a letter he received from Georgije Petrović (1 July 1844, Prepiska VII, 188): “Yet, I don’t think you should give up your intention to describe why Švabe are being blasted, because the truth, however unpleasant, should come out. Wise people will always cherish it and welcome it, and it will also show both to the Švabe and to the Serbs [from Serbia] how they should treat one another.”


72 SNN No. 92, 26 Nov. 1842, 377: “And now, every pure-hearted Serb is at liberty to harbour sweet hopes that Serbia will flourish, and that Serbdom will achieve good repute. From now on Serbs will kiss and embrace their fellow Serbs, without caring whether they are separated by the Drina or the Danube or the Sava. From now on a Serb will call another Serb a Serb, not a Švaba, even if the latter is a loyal subject of the Austrian emperor; after all, he is called a Serb by his own emperor.”

73 SNN No. 94, 6 Dec. 1842, 385: “To the Serbs from the other side [of the border], a French is a French, a Magyar is a Magyar, a German is a German. Only a Serb from here is a thorn in their side, he is a Švaba to them. And why? [...] [Monastery] Ravanica in Fruška Gora, is it a Švaba monastery? Račić, Dositej, Muščić, Stojković, Terlaić, and many other figures so highly respected in foreign empires, were they Švabe? Are the laws for Serbia being written by Švabe? Was the song ‘I’m a young Serbian girl’ that every citizen of Belgrade sang on the day Prince Alexander’s was anointed, was it composed by a Švaba? It is not at all at odds with the duties of an Austrian subject to be fond of Serbian nationality...”
those employed by the previous government, and to reinstate those possibly wrongfully afflicted, and otherwise quiet and peaceful men […] and harmless for the future. However, to exclude from consideration all Serbs born outside Serbia is something we do not expect from the justice-loving and perceptive new government […] because that would be neither productive, nor just; it would not be productive because it is well-known that Serbia still does not have enough qualified native sons of her own, and it would not be just because there were before and there are now many Serbian sons born on this side of the border who have done much good for Serbia…”

At the same time, seeking to avoid adding fuel to the fire, Pavlović reworded and softened the tone of the texts published in his Novine. For instance, the passage he omitted from the published riposte of Aleksa Simić sent from Temesvar (modern Timișoara) in 1846 reads: “Let me be allowed to ask the author of the abovementioned article to suggest to some of our brothers called švabe, whom he represents, to give up acting and judging upon bribery, and they’ll have their goal achieved faster; otherwise, I fear for what they have now, because what one [claims to] know, one must prove, and then there’ll be no getting away. I beg the honest and diligent ones to forgive me; this discussion is of no concern to them. Natives are also prone to bribery, it is true, but in their case the alarm bell doesn’t ring as loudly, supposedly because [the bribes] are not as big as in [the case of] those others, or perhaps because people tend to fail to see the log in their own eye, while the speck in somebody else’s eye seems like a log to them.”

Pavlović, however, took a diametrically opposite attitude towards Jovan Hadžić. At the time of the dynastic change in Serbia in 1842, Hadžić was considered a fervent supporter of the Karadjordjević dynasty and a friend and adviser of the leaders of the Constitutionalists’ regime. Being a distinguished lawyer, he came to Serbia with the primary task to draw up a civil law code. In the volatile political situation after Vučić and Petronijević had been banished from Serbia, Hadžić, being one of the most eminent figures in the Serbian community in Austria, acted as a pillar of strength, so to speak, of the as yet unconsolidated regime. Although useful both to Serbia and to the Constitutionalists in more than one way, Hadžić was frequently

74 SNN No. 86, 5 Nov. 1842, 346.
75 Aleksa Simić to Teodor Pavlović, 9 Mar. 1846, ROMS, No. 12854. Compare with the text published in SNN No. 22, 17 March 1846, 86.
76 The fact that all of the most influential members of the Austrian government were inclined to Hadžić made Russia highly suspicious. (See Andra Gavrilović, “Beć kao zaštitnik M. Svetića i početak rada Dj. Daničića” [Vienna as protector of M. Svetić and the beginning of the work of Dj. Daničić], Godisnjica Nikole Ćupića XXXIII (1914), 77–90). The Constitutionalists must have been aware of that. Hadžić’s influence on the
and harshly criticized for having secured an exorbitant salary\textsuperscript{77} and for his condescending demeanour, while his work was often denigrated.\textsuperscript{78} When he entered into an open conflict with Vučić over the Civil Code and found himself abandoned by Simić and other friends, the disappointment led him to leave Serbia for good.

Pavlović's \textit{Novine} kept track of all these attacks against Hadžić with poorly concealed malice. The reason may be found in the history of the two men's mutual relations. The conflict between Hadžić and Pavlović had started in 1832, when Hadžić was dismissed from the position of President of the \textit{Matica Srpska},\textsuperscript{79} resumed over Hadžić's \textit{Sitnice jezikoslovne} (Linguistic technicalities) published in 1839,\textsuperscript{80} and culminated in July 1860, as a result of Hadžić's intention to start a new paper with a literary supplement in Novi Sad.\textsuperscript{81} The start of a new Serbian paper at the moment that \textit{Serbske narodne novine} were barely surviving due to the small number of subscribers must have seemed to Pavlović like pouring salt on the open wounds. This succession of events may explain his harsh and uncompromising attitude towards Hadžić.

Finally, it may be interesting to quote an excerpt from the letter of 15 March 1851 which Jovan Stejić sent from Belgrade in reply to Teodor

---

\textsuperscript{77} According to \textit{SNN} No. 60, 31 July 1841, 238, and No. 88, 4 Nov. 1843, 350, while a Serbian minister's annual salary was 2500 thalers, Hadžić's was more than 3000, and his fee for the authorship of the Code was 1000 imperial gold ducats. The hue and cry against Hadžić was instigated by the Russian representatives to Serbia and their local supporters, who frowned on his close relations with Vienna. The Russian Consul in Serbia at the time was particularly active in that respect, as may be seen from Ilija Garašanin to A. Petronijević and T. Vučić Perišić, 5 Dec. 1843, published in \textit{Gradja SANI} (Belgrade 1950), 6: "I had a meeting with Daniliyevsky the day before yesterday [...] Among other things, he suggested that it was not wise to give Hadžić so high a salary and that we might sustain many more state employees with that money."

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{SNN} No. 33, 29 Apr. 1839, 128; No. 88, 14 Nov. 1843, 350; No. 95, 28 Nov. 1843, 380; and No. 100, 16 Nov. 1843, 399.


\textsuperscript{80} Miraš Kićović, \textit{Jovan Hadžić ( Miloš Svetić)} (Novi Sad 1930), 93–106.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Obite novine srbske i literarni dodatak Književnij sad} [General Serbian Newspaper with Literary Supplement "Literary Garden"]. For more, see Krestić, \textit{Istorija srpske štampe}, 56–60.
Pavlović. It perfectly reflects the situation in Belgrade in the 1850s as regards the Nemačkari issue and requires no additional explanation: “You write me about considering the possibility of moving permanently over here to the P[rincedom of] Serbia, and you ask me to tell you what I think about it. Here is my answer, and rest assured that it is a sincere and brotherly one. There is no good place for us anywhere: that’s our lot, you should know, even Dositej said that; our fate hasn’t changed since. You speak about your love and all that you’ve done for us here; strangely enough, you believe that we are better and smarter than you over there are. Love and merit are rewarded and acknowledged among us here as they are among you there, in the Empire; we are following the example of your civilization, not the other way round. In a word: brothers’ embrace is quite cold, particularly if we don’t think you’re our sibling. Sapienti sat! You are where you are. Toil through life as God teaches you to; but be wise not to lose the little you say you can get over there hoping for what, as far as the situation is known to me, you’ll not be able to get. I’m surprised that you still don’t know what ‘švaba’ means! It means neither a German or of German origin, but a Vojvodjanin [a Vojvodina Serb], an othersider. His old mother has disowned him! There is no Serbdom for you other than that one, in the Vojvodstvo, for better or for worse, God’s will [...] Take my advice as it is, and not as you and I would like it to be [...] But then, I know what hope’s going to say; you’re hoping and so you’re thinking: if my application is approved and I get a job in Serbia, what then, Stejić? May it be so, with God’s help! I’m not writing you on behalf of the ruler or his ministers, whose names I’ve mentioned, but only on my own behalf and about what I see and know. Indeed, Mr Stojan Simić shares my opinion about you and your intention...”

***

After the Second Serbian Uprising (1815–17) ended and peace was restored, a considerable number of Habsburg Serbs accepted employment in Serbia at the invitation of the Serbian authorities. In that way Serbia ensured, to the extent possible at the time, the functioning of her state apparatus. According to Teodor Pavlović’s Serbske narodne novine, a conjuncture of circumstance made it possible for the Constitutionalists to use the incomers for their own political ends, the struggle against and eventual deposition of

---

82 ROMS, No. 3418.

83 Dositej Obradović (1742–1811), an Enlightenment philosopher, linguist and writer, modern Serbia’s first minister of education.

84 This is a reference to the Serbian community in southern Hungary (modern-day Vojvodina), on the other, left, side of the Sava and Danube rivers, north of the Principality of Serbia.
the Obrenović dynasty. Soon after the 1848/49 revolution, the newcomers began to lose the status and role they had played in Serbia, being slowly but surely replaced by young educated native-born men. The antagonism towards the Śvabe, essentially socially and politically motivated, took the form of opposition to the kulturträgerism of the “othersiders”, of a regional rivalry, occasionally assuming features of a conflict between two opposing mentalities and two different cultures. It had a detrimental effect on the relationship between the Serbs from the two sides of the Sava and Danube rivers, as it encouraged particularism and eroded the sense of unity among the Serbs as a whole.

Bibliography and sources


Stanjanković, Vučićeva buna, 85, puts forward his view: “Apart from the peasants, the Constitutionallists wanted to win over as many state employees and merchants as possible [...] They used to tell Serbian-born state employees that they were in most cases neglected and even at risk of losing their state jobs, because the Prince and the government had hired too many foreigners, ‘Nemačkari’, for state services.” See also M. Popović, Traganje za trajnim [In Search for Permanence] (Belgrade 1959), 33. Ljušić, Kneževina Srbija, 244, looks at the issue in the following way: “After the promulgation of the Second Hatti-sherif, ‘an entire cloud of Serbs from Hungary rushed to Serbia in search for state jobs’ [...] Because of their conduct and poor education, and also because the Prince favoured all those who happened to be in his chancery, they soon grew very unpopular among the natives, and began to be labelled ‘foreigners’, ‘Nemačkari’ and ‘Śvaburija’. There were two reasons for that: 1) they were perceived, particularly by young native-born Serbs, as an obstacle to getting a job faster; and 2) the Prince relied on them in his struggle against the Opposition. As a result, the Opposition demanded their dismissal from all state services, except those which could not be filled up with natives.”
Matica Srpska, Manuscript Department, Novi Sad. Nos. 3418 and 12854.

This paper results from the project From universal empires to nation states. Social and political change in Serbia and the Balkans (no 177030) funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.
French Influence in Serbia 1835–1914
Four Generations of “Parisians”

Abstract: The members of four generations of the national elite known as “Parisians” played a prominent role in the political development of modern Serbia. Liberals, Progressives, Radicals and Independent Radicals profoundly shaped the process of espousing and pursuing modern political principles and values in nineteenth-century Serbia. Implementing and creatively adapting French models and doctrines, the “Parisians” largely contributed to the democratization and Europeanization of Serbia and the eminent place the French influence had in her politics and culture before the First World War.

Keywords: 19th-century Serbia, political elite, Parisians, French political doctrines, liberalism, radicalism, democracy, parliamentary system

France as a political ideal

A prestigious synonym for civilization and culture, but also a desirable model for the processes of achieving political and civil liberties, France undoubtedly played a distinctive role in the development of Serbian society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Serbian Revolution of 1804 and the French Revolution of 1789 evolved along similar lines — dependent, of course, upon their respective local situations — from initial social and political demands to the eventual profound societal transformation, and had consequences that suggest a simultaneous unfolding of both social and national revolution. The doctrine of popular sovereignty — according to which sovereign power is vested in the people — had a strong appeal in Serbia, in accordance with her political traditions and social situation: the principle was to be built into the very foundations of her developing political life. Revolutionary France, with the 1830 and 1848 Revolutions, and the Second and Third Republic, was a constant inspiration for all political reformers in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Serbia.1

The nationality principle, derived from French doctrines of the Enlightenment, and tied with the principle of political liberty and civic equality, fitted perfectly into the egalitarian aspirations of an agrarian society such as Serbia was throughout the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century. Therefore, the Serbian Revolution, especially during its initial phase under Karageorge (1804–1813), was for the other Balkan nations, from Greeks to other South Slavs, a Balkan-size French revolution suited to local conditions: the principle of the sovereignty of nations was opposed to the principle of legitimism; feudal obligations were abolished and a new society gradually formed. In the absence of the aristocracy and a full-fledged middle class, agrarian egalitarianism of Serbian free peasants, who became owners of the land they tilled, was combined with the emerging aspirations of a modern nation. For its long-term effects on both the political and the social landscape of the entire Balkans, the eminent German historian Leopold von Ranke described the 1804–1813 Serbian insurrection as Die Serbische Revolution, by analogy with the French paradigm.

For the Serbian elites, the revolutionary culture of French democracy came to be the object of long-term devotion, as it symbolized a major European dimension of the Serbian political experience acquired in the state- and institution-building process. Within a political landscape considerably different from the one characterizing France as a rich, developed and structured parlementaire en Serbie”, Revue d’Europe Centrale VII/1 (1999), Strasbourg 2000, 17–44; “Le modèle français en Serbie avant 1914”, in La Serbie et la France. Une alliance atypique, ed. D. T. Bataković (Belgrade: Institut des Etudes balkaniques de l’Académie serbe des sciences et des arts, 2010), 13–99.


tured society, undeveloped post-Ottoman Serbia travelled a comparatively similar, cyclic, road to independence, striving for a genuine democratic system: from a national and social revolution (1804–1835) involving a series of insurrections, wars and victories to defeats, occupation and restoration, to a series of internal revolts marked by an eruption of democratic aspirations and demands which Serbia’s autocratic nineteenth-century rulers, from Prince Miloš Obrenović to King Alexander Obrenović, tended to suppress by all manner of non-democratic means.

In spite of the differences in historical experience, economic development and social structure, what the two countries, France and Serbia, shared in common was the continuous effort to make the political system conform to the fundamental provisions of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the modern Magna Carta of civil and political liberties in nineteenth-century Europe. On Serbia’s winding journey to democracy, France was perceived as a political or ideological model against which her own values and level of achieved political liberties should be measured. In that sense, Guizot’s famous remark, that “there is almost no great idea, no great principle of civilization which has not passed through France before it spread everywhere”,\(^5\) appears to be applicable to Serbia as well.

In Serbia, with her markedly egalitarian traditions, the state was understood primarily in Jacobin terms. In a country lacking strong religious and aristocratic classes, the tenets of the French Revolution were strongly present among the Serbian elite as a model, before being gradually disseminated among the literate portion of the population, rural as well as urban, especially after the introduction of a system of compulsory schooling. Even the earliest application of a French constitutional model in Serbia — the revised Chart of 1830 inspired the short-lived Sretenjski Ustav (Presentation Day Constitution) of 1835 — showed a considerable receptiveness of Serbian society to the ideas originating in the French constitutional and political experience. The particular appeal of the tenets of the French Revolution, as a set of values shaping the notion of governance among the Serbian elites, went hand in hand with the increasing importance of political and economic ties between France and Serbia.\(^6\)

As the French doctrines were taking root among the Serbian political elite, they assumed, under the Radical governments (1889–92 and 1903–14), some elements of a small social revolution. Furthermore, the Franco-

---


Russian alliance highlighted the growing compatibility of political interests between France and Serbia. The geopolitical determinants shaping Serbia's position on the international scene in the nineteenth century led her political class to turn to France for diplomatic support in a bid to counter the political and economic pressure exerted by the neighbouring Habsburg Monarchy. After the failed attempts of Serbia under Karageorge and Prince Miloš Obrenović to obtain support from France, at first from Napoleon, and then from the Restoration regime, Serbia — apart from her special ties with imperial Russia — sought to avoid being directly and permanently tied to any major European power.

The famous *Načertanije* of Ilija Garašanin (1844) — a foreign policy programme of Serbia inspired by the cooperation with the French-supported Polish émigré Adam Czartoryski — articulated the policy of equi-distance from the major powers as Serbia's long-term strategy for the times to come. In the context of constant political pressure by the Habsburg Empire and imperial Russia, political support for Serbia's long-term political goals of national unification had been sought, within the strategy defined by *Načertanije*, primarily from France and Great Britain:

A new Serbian state in the south could give Europe every guarantee that it would be distinguished and vital, capable of maintaining itself between Austria and Russia. The geographic position of the country, its topography, abundance of natural resources, the combative spirit of its inhabitants, their sublime and ardent national feeling, their common origin and language — all indicate its stability and promising future.7

After the Paris Treaty of 1856, under which Russia lost her role as the sole guarantor of Serbia's autonomy within the Ottoman Empire to the Concert of Europe, France was continually, and most of the time successfully, present in the central Balkans: at first as a cautious but precious diplomatic intermediary in the conflicts confronting Serbia with the suzerain Court at Constantinople and the Cabinet in Vienna, and subsequently as an active factor in resolving a number of crises arising from the Eastern Question.8

The complex interdependence of foreign and domestic policies is particularly relevant to understanding the spread of foreign influence in Serbia, French in particular. Throughout the nineteenth century, French influence was present in two different spheres. As far as the sphere of Serbia's domestic policy and national aspirations is concerned, France was particu-

8 Ćedomir Popov, *Francuska i Srbija 1871–1878* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1974).
larly sympathetic to Serbian interests during the reign of Prince Alexander Karadjordjević and the Defenders of the Constitution (1842–58), a period when foreign influences on Serbia’s decision making process had already gone far beyond usual diplomatic mediation. In that period, France played an important role in containing Austria’s growing ambition to establish full control over the autonomous Principality of Serbia. During the reign of Napoleon III, relations between Serbia and France fluctuated, but assumed a new dimension after the French emperor, in 1852, received in his Paris palace the most influential Serbian minister, Ilija Garašanin, a Francophile and protector of the Serbian “Parisians”: the question of strategic cooperation between Belgrade and Paris was afterwards closely tied to the policy of active pursuit of the nationality principle (le principe de nationalité), the French emperor’s important political creed, which in the wake of the wars of Italian unification tended to be applied as an ideological innovation in his foreign policy, with varying success and significant tactical modifications, especially in Southeast Europe.\(^9\)

If, however, one takes a look beyond general ideological emulations and borrowings, and endeavours to identify the exact foothold of French influence in Serbia, what emerges most clearly is the espousal and creative adaptation of the doctrine of French radicalism in the early 1880s. In the sphere of foreign policy, French influence was consolidated through the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1891–93, which changed the balance of power within the Concert of Europe and announced its further polarization into two rival blocs. In Belgrade, the Franco-Russian Alliance was seen, somewhat idealistically, as directly buttressing Serbia’s national aspirations.\(^10\) The ideological model was underpinned by a consistently associated cultural meaning, and rounded off with foreign policy cooperation. It ultimately led to the Serbian elites’ increasing receptivity to French institutions and the French understanding of political liberties as a desirable model which, duly modified to suit the local situation, became the measure of their overall political and national aspirations.

The number of French political institutions cloned or, more frequently, modified to suit Serbia’s specific political needs, was not insignificant. In addition to the presence of other foreign influences (e.g. Austrian in the bureaucratic system, and British in the type of parliamentarianism), the distinctive role that French models played in Serbian society owed much to


\(^10\) M.A.E., Correspondance politique, vol. 13, n°22, Belgrade, le 17 février 1892.
the fact that the social makeup of the Serbian political mentality, imbued with egalitarian ideals, was closest to French political culture. The affinity was recognizable in the Serbian elites’ appreciation for the French political and government system, and most of all for the French notion of nation and democracy, that is, for the significant level of popular participation in political decision making.

A number of doctrinal influences coupled with the process of strengthening political ties bore some institutional fruit, as a result of the twofold affinity, ideological and political. Even though French influence was not always immediate, nor were French institutional models adopted literally, it was a consistent and recognizable presence precisely because of the closeness in the understanding of the state institutions and political principles that drew their origin from the French Revolution. The Serbian constitutional solutions of 1888 and 1903, which relied on the Belgian Constitution of 1831, came out as a mixture of the French parliamentary tradition (especially as regards the powers of the National Assembly) and that of the British parliamentary monarchy. At the same time, the constitution laws, the laws on the press and political association, as well as the election laws, bore a strong imprint of the solutions built into the legislative foundations of the French Third Republic. 11

The Third Republic exemplified a state whose political life, unlike that of other major European countries, was not dominated by the aristocracy. Its multiparty system, frequent coalition governments, directly elected Assembly, proportional electoral system, ideologies of radicalism and socialism, were appealing models to the leading ideologists of Serbian democracy even though not all of them shared the same political views. There was also a similarity in the manner of effecting change of the political system. Dynastic changes in Serbia (1842, 1858 and 1903), similarly to France, often had the magnitude of a revolution, the change of monarch (or dynasty, the Obrenović and the Karadjordjević) entailing the change of the whole political system. Despite considerable differences between the two countries in economic development, social structure and overall political landscape, Serbia’s creative adjustments of French doctrines and constitutional and legislative projects were invaluable in the process of her transformation, within the span of a mere century, from a peripheral Ottoman province at the beginning of the nineteenth century into a modern European state in the

decade preceding the First World War. Compared with France, where the struggle for a parliamentary system and democracy lasted from the Revolution in 1789 until the establishment of the Third Republic in 1875, the same process in Serbia lasted from the outbreak of the Serbian Revolution in 1804 until the coup d’état in 1903.

Four generations of Serbian Parisians

The tendency towards embracing French political ideas became a tradition after 1839–40, with the first Serbian government scholarship holders (blagodejanci) being sent to study at foreign universities, Paris included. The obvious disproportion between the relatively small number of scholarship holders (five to fifteen a year) and their subsequent tremendous influence on Serbia’s political life, on the shaping of her political doctrines as well as her national aspirations, reveals how French influence was conveyed and where it made the deepest imprint: in Belgrade, the Law School of Paris was informally described as the main school for training ministers for the Serbian government. A relatively even distribution and participation level of the French-educated Serbs, popularly known as “Parisians”, and other Francophiles in all political parties in Serbia was a good indicator of the extent of French influence — in terms of both the presence of French ideas and their direct or indirect espousal by Serbian society at different periods marked by the predominance of different political parties.

In Serbia, as elsewhere in Europe, ideas spread faster than they were, or could be, absorbed into the existing social fabric or projected political institutions. An important, if not major, role in the process was played by the Serbian “Parisians” in all four generations of political figures who led the nineteenth-century struggle for a constitutional system, later on for a parliamentary government, ministerial responsibility and, eventually, for a profound democratic transformation of Serbia. The term “Parisians” referred not only to persons

---

educated in France but also to those who had spent a certain amount of time in Paris and were visibly influenced by political doctrines of French provenance (liberalism, socialism and radicalism) or by solutions stemming from French political practice, and included even the few conservative politicians more loyal to the Crown than to the idea of democracy.

Incipient even in the 1835 Serbian Constitution, French influence becomes readily traceable as of the Saint Andrew’s Day Assembly in 1858 (the Serbian version of the Three Glorious Days of the July Revolution of 1830), if we take it that it was in 1858 that agrarian masses led by Parisian-educated Serbian Liberals — the first ideologists in the modern sense — firmly stepped onto Serbia’s political stage. In contrast to “Germans” (*Nemačkari*), mostly autocratically minded Austrian-educated Serb bureaucrats from the Habsburg Empire that flooded Serbia after 1842 in response to the demand for trained civil servants in the modernized state apparatus, the “Parisians”, at least their first generation, were considered a genuine domestic intelligentsia sensitive to the numerous problems of the agrarian population.

Prior to its independence in 1878, the Principality of Serbia had an area of no more than 37,841 sq. km, and a population of 1.2 million (1869). The urban population accounted for slightly more than ten percent distributed in forty-eight towns (*varoši*) and small towns (*varošice*), with Belgrade as the capital with roughly 26,000 inhabitants. Half of the nearly ninety percent of rural population were owners of medium-sized holdings (5–20 ha). At the time of the formation of political parties in 1880, Serbia had an enlarged area of 48,303 sq. km with 1.9 million inhabitants. Only three years later, in 1884, the population increased by 200 thousand, and the number of towns and small towns rose to over seventy. The modest middle class kept growing: to 15.89 percent after Serbia built her first railway line (Belgrade–Niš) and established her National (Central) Bank. According to the reliable data collected by Vladimir Karić, in 1884 Serbia had about 15,800 persons engaged in various businesses, from entrepreneurs to manufacturers. In 1885, 51,979 students enrolled in the Serbian primary and secondary schools were taught by 1,270 teachers. Within ten years, or by 1895, the urban population grew to 319,375 (13.8 percent). In 1910, 382,881 people (13.1 percent) lived in urban areas and 2,528,819 (86.9 percent) in the countryside. The population of Belgrade, the base of all main political parties, rose from 54,249 in 1890 to 89,876 in 1910.16

---


Liberals: education, democracy, liberty

In each of the four generations of the Serbian political elite which were to crystallize into modern political parties, the “Parisians” played a preponderant role, if not in the final shaping and implementation of their party programmes, then certainly in defining the underlying political tenets. To the first modern Serbian generation of political activists, the young Liberals of 1858, France undoubtedly was the political ideal in the sense in which the Second Republic, conceived in the Revolution of 1848, impacted most Balkan elites. This political orientation was heralded by the reaction of the Serbian youth — from whom the first generation of liberal youth arose — to the news of the revolt in Paris in February 1848. It was condensed in the slogan: “France is fighting for all of us!”

At the 1858 St Andrew’s Day Assembly (Svetoandrejska skupština), a bloodless revolution against the oligarchy embodied in the Defenders of the Constitution, a National Assembly, as the “oldest, most significant, and most sacred Serbian institution” exercised, at least for a little while, real legislative power. Therefore, the long-term goal of two young liberal “Parisians”, Jevrem Grujić and Milovan Janković, as secretaries of the St Andrew’s Day Assembly, was to combine two mutually remote political models: the French National Convention, as a basis of popular sovereignty, and a general model of Western-type democracy on the one hand, and on the other, the egalitarian tradition of “instinctive democratism”, thought of as being inherent in the patriarchal Serbian countryside with its zadruga (extended family household) as the core of that democratism, still undeveloped in the modern sense. By combining the two models, the Liberals became the first organized political force to bring the fundamental European principles of constitutionality and representative government into harmony with the demands of the Serbian peasantry, who still lacked mod-

17 Yovan Skerlić, “Une société de la Jeunesse serbe en 1848”, La Révolution de 1848 XIV (1906), 73–78. See also Milan Subotić, Sricanje slobode (Niš: Gradina, 1992). For an overview which includes the Serb Liberals in the Habsburg Empire as well see Branko Bešlin, “Srpski liberalizam u XIX veku”, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju 67/68 (2003), 59–104; idem, Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku (Sremski Karlovci–Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, 2005).

ern political culture, and to create a third model that was to have an appeal to the subsequent generations of political leaders, and not only Liberal.\(^{19}\) Although for the most part ardent patriots and Russophiles, the Serbian Liberals were able to set the struggle for national unification — fought with Russia’s strategic support — apart from their unambiguous objective to introduce Western-type institutions into Serbian society, which made them the target of repeated and fierce Slavophile accusations that they had been indulging themselves in the “poison” of Western individualism.\(^{20}\)

In opposing the “enlightened despotism” during the second reign of Prince Michael Obrenović (1860–1868), the Liberals tied, for the first time in Serbia’s political practice, the need for fundamental internal reform with the successful pursuit of an active national policy, thereby challenging the Prince’s stance that the question of political reform should not be placed on the agenda until after national unification. Thus, the Liberals were the first political generation in Serbia who, following the recipe of the French historian and ideologist of liberalism, Jules Michelet, pointed to the capacity of the “national genius” to transform the country from within and lead it towards national emancipation. The liberal ideological legacy among the Serbs also includes a political motto, launched by a broad liberal movement, the United Serbian Youth (\textit{Ujedinjena omladina srpska}), that only countries with a constitutional and democratic system have the capacity for bringing the mission of national unification to its successful end.\(^{21}\)

Perhaps the deepest imprint left by the Liberals, however, was in the area of education, as the main vehicle for disseminating political ideas. By translating the key writings of liberal ideologists, both French, such as Benjamin Constant, Édouard de Laboulaye and Frédéric Bastiat, and British, such as John Stuart Mill, they made Western ideas accessible to the domestic public, and created and maintained a favourable public climate for critical reflection. Serbian liberals frequently referred to the views of French

---


liberals, most of all Constant and his disciple, Laboulaye. It was not by accident that a “Parisian” of a younger generation, Djordje S. Simić, dedicated his translation of Benjamin Constant to “Serbian statesmen and [National] Assembly members”. Dj. S. Simić expected that the work of the French ideologist would help clarify their occasionally blurred understanding of constitutional powers and rights. Spurred by discrepancies between Serbian constitutional theory and practice, debates over the representative system, parliametarianism and constitutional liberties proved useful for the effort to combine Western doctrines with the distinctive features of rural democratism from which Serbian parliamentarianism arose.²²

In order to offer the Serbian public a “shop window for the tenets of democracy”, an encyclopaedia of contemporary political doctrines which most of the Serbian intelligentsia knew only generally and often understood superficially, Vladimir Jovanović, the main ideologist among Serbian Liberals, set out to put together a political dictionary²³ on the model of the French economist and statistician Maurice Block’s two-volume Dictionnaire générale de la politique published in 1863. Rather than being content to simply reproduce the entries from this widely accepted French handbook, Vladimir Jovanović complemented the French interpretative perspective with his own, which lent a tinge of originality to his work.²⁴ The most prominently featuring in the corpus of ideas taken over by Jovanović are the views of modern French thinkers such as Montesquieu, Condorcet, Auguste Comte, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Girardin, as well as those of British liberal thinkers from John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham to Herbert Spenser.²⁵ Jovanović suggested to his readers that “mankind progresses towards the democratic ideal … Even the still existing monarchies reflect an influence of democratic ideas as they begin to recognize the principles of civil equality, popular vote, universal suffrage and local self-government … This whole dictionary is a shop window for the tenets of democracy.”²⁶


²³ Vladimir Jovanović, Politički rečnik, vols. I–IV (Novi Sad–Belgrade: 1870–73). The published volumes of the Political Dictionary end with the letter “d”, while the rest survives in manuscript (Historical Archives of Belgrade).


The Serbian liberals sought to monopolize educational and scholarly institutions, much like the French did (for instance, the Collège de France). In the 1860s, this should not have been too much of a problem for the professors of liberal persuasion, as there were only two institutions of the kind in Serbia: the Great School (Velika škola) and the Serbian Learned Society (Srpsko učeno društvo), a precursor to the Serbian Royal Academy. Obviously, the institutional activity of Serbian Liberals could not have the impact on a broader public comparable to France, given that Serbia’s cultural level and the number of people educated enough to be receptive to such influences were several times lower. Lacking any significant support for the transmission of the political doctrines among the numerically weak Serbian elites in the 1860s, the Liberals came to be recognized as benevolent conveyors of the doctrines of French democracy only twenty years later, when the institutionalization of political parties led to further polarizations within the more complex political class. Credited for broadening the political horizons of the Serbian intelligentsia, without, however, extending their activities to reach deeper into the lower strata of society, the Liberals came to occupy a position which was not much different from what was termed the juste milieu in France, not without negative connotations.

The Liberals often claimed to represent the genuine will of the people, which, especially after their having been persecuted during the 1860s, strengthened their “belief that their devotion to the national cause had been so thoroughly demonstrated that they had little further obligation to consult the people. Their appeal to the people was rhetorical, not actual; a form of political discourse, not program.”

This ambivalent position of the Liberals towards the peasantry, which they idealized but were unable to mobilize politically, eventually turned against them. Their often opportunistic attitude towards the last rulers of the House of Obrenović, autocratic King Milan (Prince 1868–1882, King 1882–1889) and just as autocratic King Alexander (1889–1903), as well as the absence of more profound ties with the peasantry left them on the periphery of political life, overshadowed by the Radicals. The great popularity of the French-inspired and populist-oriented People’s Radical Party (Narodna radikalna stranka) among the rural population, hindered ambitions of the Liberals (especially Alimpije Vasiljević, Jovan Ristić and Jovan Avakumović) to impose themselves as the only equable intermediary between the conflicting interests of the Crown and the agrarian masses who, led by local priests and provincial teachers, were vigorously stepping into Serbia’s political arena in the early 1880s.

---

The role of the Liberals seems to have been the strongest in the field of education and the developing education system: they exerted a formative, if not decisive, influence on the intellectual horizons of several generations of students of the Great School (Velika Škola) — which in 1905 grew into the University of Belgrade — by encouraging them to seek inspiration in the French revolutionary experience. Furthermore, secondary school textbooks penned by liberal professors, especially after a law of 1881 abolished censorship and relaxed restrictions, had a far-reaching influence on subsequent generations. The general-history textbook written in 1880 by a liberal, Miloš Zečević, echoes the ideas of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Revolution of 1848 and interprets the course of history as an unavoidable conflict between the ruler and the people, a conflict in which the people inevitably prevail because, guided by the principles of liberal democracy, they slowly but surely seize back their usurped political rights one by one. Thus history emerges as a road paved by the French Revolution and inexorably leading to democracy, and the Revolution as an event whose historical significance overshadows even that of Christianity.  

A materialist worldview, nationalism seen as guaranteeing collective rights, and republicanism as guaranteeing individual democratic rights, coalesce into a single picture of contemporary history. The Liberals lost the political battle for the acceptance of their beliefs, but circuitously, through their intellectual influence on the intelligentsia, they succeeded in breeding the spirit of resistance to the usurpation of political liberties, which were understood in the same way as they were in France.

In spite of its attempted ideological renewals, which entailed the espousal of some tenets that had made Serbian Radicalism hugely popular among the agrarian masses, the Liberal Party began to crumble immediately after the multiparty system was established in Serbia in 1881. The Liberals considered themselves upholders of constitutional government, but the Liberal governments often tended to act contrary to their professed principles and resorted to arbitrary decisions which often amounted to mere political repression and did nothing more than help the Radicals win more followers among the frustrated agrarian population. Internal ideological dissent in the middle of the 1880s was a good indicator of the failure of the Liberal conservative wing under the leadership of Jovan Ristić, which tended to operate through personal influence rather than to base its activ-

---


ity on a productive combination of ideas and practical political work. Its distrust of the electorate’s maturity to make independent political decisions proved fatal in the long run. Eventually Ristić, although he himself was an outstanding statesman and diplomat, had to admit, if reluctantly, that his party had lost the entire youth group to the Radicals.

Progressives: Enlightened reforms imposed from above

The conservative tradition in Serbia of the 1860s and 1870s was embodied in Jovan Marinović and Filip Hristić, two “Parisiens” protected by Ilija Garašanin. The Conservative-Liberal cabinet of Jovan Marinović (1873–1874) introduced fundamental laws regarding the freedom of the press, protection of the minimum amount of land owned by a peasant against sequestration, as well as the metric system and a domestic silver currency. Having lost majority Liberal support in the National Assembly in 1874, the Marinović cabinet became the first Serbian government to be toppled in the National Assembly, to call new elections, and resign after the electoral defeat.

The political ideal of the second generation of Serbia’s political class, members of the Progressive Party (Napredna stranka) founded in 1880, the urban intelligentsia with unambiguously pro-Western affinities — originated from Prince Michael’s bureaucratic elite (the Young Conservatives) — was condensed into the belief that European-style modernization was the shortest way to a stable political system. As their organ Videlo (Daylight) shows, the Progressives were fervent supporters of “the law, freedom and progress”. Compared with the Liberals who, upon their return from Western universities, brought back to Serbia “the cult of science and political freedom”, while lacking enthusiasm “for Western customs, in particular for urban life [...] a younger generation with an already over-refined sensibility (the Progressives), accepted from the West not only its science and its free thinking, but its way of life. They felt the pleasure of the material culture of the West, and admired the dignity and comfortable life of its up-

---

30 Jovan Ristić was a German-educated historian, a disciple of Leopold von Ranke, with modest Parisian experience. Twice acting as regent for Serbian rulers, Ristić was considered the best Serbian statesman and diplomat in the second half of the nineteenth century. For more see David MacKenzie, Jovan Ristić. Outstanding Serbian Statesman (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 2006).


per classes. They happily travelled through Europe and many used French words in their speech.”

It was the first Progressive cabinet led by Milan Piroćanac (1880–1883) that formally ushered Serbia into the world of multiparty politics. The Law on the Freedom of Association and Organization passed on 13 April 1881 legalized political organization, while a whole set of other important laws by the same government, regarding free elections, local self-government, and taxation, paved the way for an accelerated modernization of political institutions. The Liberals’ idealized patriarchal democracy of the Serbian countryside was not compatible with the Progressives’ vision of a process of gradual enlightened reforms leading to a modern, European-type political system. The reform process was supposed to be imposed on an unenlightened population frustrated with the ruler’s excessive powers by way of the electoral census system such as had existed under the July Monarchy in France. This censitary system would have excluded from political decision-making most of the rural population, swayed by what the Progressives described as the Radicals’ irresponsible populist demagogy. In fact, intellectually close to the French Doctrinaires François Guizot and P. P. Royer-Collard, the Progressives were perhaps the most distinctly pro-Western and “Parisian” in Serbia (Milan Piroćanac, Milutin Garašanin, the Marinković brothers, Pavle and Vojislav). Perceived as arrogant elitists, however, they soon fell out of public favour in a still egalitarian society, a country described as “the Poor Man’s Paradise” by a British traveller, and the “agrarian sea” by French diplomatic representatives. In order to provide a constitutional framework for their ideas, the Progressives harboured plans to change the 1869 Constitution and introduce an upper chamber of the Assembly. The upper chamber would consist of intellectuals appointed by the King and be able to control the poorly educated Radical deputies of the elected lower chamber, mostly peasants, whom they saw as politically irresponsible and easily manipulated by populist ideas.

The Progressives’ lack of awareness of the condition of the agrarian masses, which made up a vast majority of the population, and their
inability to communicate with them in a simple and immediate manner, resulted from their reluctance to understand and accept the peasants’ often simplistic political aspirations for immediate reform: lower taxes, less bureaucracy and state non-intervention in social life. On the whole, such an attitude estranged them from the rural world, traditionally disinclined to any innovation brought about by state intervention; by contrast, some Progressives in smaller towns managed to gain and maintain the trust of their constituencies by virtue of personal or family authority (Stojan Novaković and Vojislav Marinković, respectively). Those, however, were isolated cases, insufficient to ensure political support as widespread as the one elicited by the People’s Radical Party.

The Progressive Party leadership, like the Liberal, was made up of influential intellectuals (Milan Piroćanac, Stojan Novaković, Milutin Garašanin, Čedomilj Mijatović, Milan Kujundžić Aberdar, Pavle Marinković). Their push for enlightened reform in the country’s political and economic systems was soon met with resistance from the peasantry, still xenophobic, steeped in egalitarianism, and unwilling to accept their long-term economic projects. In the first phase of their activity, the Progressives, together with the Radicals, enthusiastically embarked upon an extensive reform of the political system, virtually at the same time republican laws were passed in France in 1881.

A great similarity between the Serbian Law on the Freedom of Association and Organization of 13 April 1881 and its French counterpart of 13 June 1881 suggests that the Serbian lawmakers kept a keen eye on the debate held in France and drew on the already accepted French draft law.37 The Serbian Law on the Press of 12 March 1881 drew even more closely upon a French legislative solution, in this case not on the final version of the French law passed on 29 July 1881, but on its much more liberal draft submitted to the French National Assembly for debate. In addition to the Serbian Law on Judges of 21 February 1881, stipulating lifetime tenure for the highest judicial offices, the Compulsory Education Law passed in 1882 was also inspired by the practical solutions of the French laws of 16 June and 28 March 1882.

In his capacity as Minister of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Stojan Novaković keenly followed the process of secularization of education in the Third Republic overseen by Jules Ferry.38 Inspired by Ferry’s effort

---

to achieve a balance between order and progress by means of compulsory laicized education, Stojan Novaković expected compulsory education to provide a basis for an accelerated emancipation of the peasantry, “that huge, democratic, hardworking and peaceful mass of people”, without whose support the pursuit of modernization would have been impossible. Moreover, it was amidst the fiercest Radical anti-Progressive campaign that the Compulsory Education Law was passed by an Assembly which, after the exclusion of the legitimately elected Radical representatives, was dominated by Progressives, the so-called “two-vote getters” (dvoglasci), as they often had received no more than two votes in Radical strongholds in the interior of the country.

Even though not all of these liberal laws were endorsed by the electorate, the Progressive governments in the 1880s opened Serbia to foreign capital and significant foreign investment, ushering the country into the circle of modern states with a structured administration, compulsory education and a standing army. Astonished by the effects of their own liberal legislation, however, the Progressives introduced restrictions, which disclosed their unwillingness to give up the limited, censitary, democracy. Lacking support from the electorate, like a “General Staff without an army”, as French diplomatic representatives put it, the Progressives became the pillar of dynastic autocratism of the last Obrenovićs, upholding the “master’s will”, that is, the ruler’s active role in a conservative vision of the system, order and legality.

The Progressives saw the Radicals, their main rivals highly popular among the rural population, as simple “elements of disorder”, and not merely as populist demagogues but dangerous Russophiles in a system that had been perceived as pro-Austrian for decades. As a result, they were vigorously opposed to the “despotism of the masses” epitomized by the Radicals, and saw a bicameral system as the only way to counter thier fast-spreading populist doctrine. Some Progressive leaders, such as Stojan Novaković, tended to invoke the view of a conservative liberal, Laboulaye, that the vicious political cycle of alternate revolutions and coups d’état, constitutional and absolutist regimes — common to the Serbian and French political traditions — could only be broken, indeed, ended once and for all, by introducing an upper chamber, the Senate. In that sense, for Laboulaye and the Serbian


Progressive leaders alike, a bicameral system was not just a matter of political strategy, but fundamentally a matter of freedom. The culminating point of this political conception was the imposed Constitution of 1901 — a brainchild of the Progressives, at the time formally inactive as a party — which for the first time in the history of Serbian parliamentarianism introduced a bicameral system, with the Senate as an upper house. Apart from borrowing from the Belgian and Romanian constitutional practices, it drew visibly upon French constitutionalism: joint sessions of the Senate and the Assembly. Royal powers as stipulated in the final version of the 1901 Constitution were quite similar to the French model of Orléanist parliamentarianism.

Radicals: popular sovereignty and local self-government

The third generation of the political class in Serbia, the Radicals, had undergone a profound ideological transformation in the course of the formative decade of their activity (1870–1880). As students at foreign, mostly Swiss, and only occasionally French universities, Radical leaders shifted from being ardent supporters of the Paris Commune and starry-eyed followers of Svetozar Marković’s populist socialism and his Russian Populist models, to becoming a modern party cleverly combining the experience of local self-government — which had great symbolic and practical significance for the Serbian peasantry — with the ideological tenets of French radicalism. Bidding to limit the prerogatives of the Crown, it was as early as the time of the Timok Rebellion (1883) that they put forth their vision of the role of the monarch as that of a cautious intermediary, and considered it the first and foremost prerequisite for a true parliamentary system. According to the Radicals, the monarch was to offer advice, put forward proposals and spur on his ministers. This was a Serbian version of Thiers’s famous formula: the king rules but does not govern. According to the Radicals, a government can only result from the parliamentary majority because the people alone have the right to decide, through their freely elected representatives, in which political group to put their trust. The Radicals’ transformation from a broad populist movement into a disciplined party with a modern democratic outlook — accomplished in the aftermath of the Timok Rebellion — was marked by their


44 In the Radical party daily Samouprava (Self-Government), Belgrade, 13 (25) January 1883.

45 Ibid.
resolve to gradually pursue their political goals, not by failed uprisings as in the Timok Rebellion, but in conformity with the parliamentary procedure of modern European democracies. Their most popular slogan, from the 1881 party programme was: “The people’s wellbeing and freedom internally [domestic policy], and externally [foreign policy], liberation and unification of the as yet unreedemed portions of Serbdom.”

The Radicals indeed put into practice the theoretical postulates of democracy which the Liberals put forth as an ideal in their writings and public lectures, and which the Progressives tended to confer only upon a narrow circle of the enlightened bureaucratic elite. Democracy, which Alexis de Tocqueville had found in America, and Jules Michelet in Parisian suburbia, the Radicals found in the Serbian countryside. Making it the locus of their political campaigning, they were able to hold sway over about eighty percent of the electorate in the early 1880s.\(^{46}\)

At periods when there was no police or local bureaucratic interference into the parliamentary election process, the Radicals usually managed to win as many as five-sixths of the electorate (in 1883, 1886, 1889, 1890, and especially after 1903, when the Radical Party had already split into two factions), leaving the Liberals and Progressives to share the few remaining seats. It was only at periods marked by abuses and pressures of the bureaucratic and police apparatuses of the last Obrenovićs that the Liberal and Progressive parties could secure the necessary parliamentary majority. However, lacking the mandate entrusted by the people, from the late 1880s both the Liberals and the Progressives remained dependent solely on the “will of the master”.

The Radicals in Serbia belonged to the large family of nineteenth-century European radicalism which, like socialism and communism in the following century, functioned as a mutually supporting international. Even if there was no direct political contact among them, which was the case with the Serbian and French Radicals in the 1880s, radical doctrine spread as a corpus of universally accepted ideas of political liberty relevant to every European society. The original political programme of the Serbian Radicals, adopted in 1881, was a modified version of the *Programme de Belleville*, the 1869 election programme of Léon Gambetta, one of the earliest ideologists of French radicalism. Supplemented with some points taken from Georges Clemenceau’s election programme of 1881, it is considered the ideological basis on which the Serbian Radicals built their political doctrine, adding, of course, some experiences proper to the Serbian political landscape.\(^{47}\)

\(^{46}\) M.A.E., Correspondance politique, Serbie, vol. 16, no 44, Belgrade, 9 juillet 1895.

\(^{47}\) “Depuis l’impôt progressif, idéal obligé de l’école radical en Europe, jusqu’à la milice nationale en passant par l’élection des juges dans le procès civils, par la suppression de
There are no available documents which might elucidate how exactly these French programmes came to be incorporated into the platform of the People’s Radical Party in Serbia, but it has been widely accepted that the credit for embracing the basic ideas of French radicalism should be attributed to the party’s main ideologist in its formative years, Pera Todorović. A Swiss-educated journalist, Pera Todorović, during his short-term stay in Paris, had seen French Radicals in action.\textsuperscript{48} According to Radical newspapers, the party members and its leaders in Belgrade were subscribed to the French press, including French Radical newspapers. It seems logical, therefore, that this was one of the transmission channels through which radical ideas, both in doctrinal and practical aspects, found their way to Serbia.\textsuperscript{49}

Apart from Léon Gambetta and Georges Clemenceau, recent research has pointed to analogies with the 1881 election programme of Camille Pelletan, which is yet another of many indicators of the espousal of the French radical doctrine. Pelletan argued for local self-government where the work of local authorities, police included, would be overseen by the municipality.\textsuperscript{50} As noted above, Clemenceau’s election programme of 1881 was quite close to the demands of the Serbian Radicals, except for the sections specific to the French environment: constitutional reform, a unicameral parliament, universal suffrage, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and association, local self-government, progressive taxation, separation of church and state (the laicized school above all). The Radicals in Serbia expanded Clemenceau’s agenda with a project of local self-government, which had featured among the Serbian peasantry’s political demands ever since the First Serbian Uprising in 1804.

What the Radicals in Serbia shared in common with the French ideologists of radicalism apart from the demands for universal suffrage, the freedom of assembly and association, and the freedom of the press, was a l’Administration préfectorale, par l’organisation des grandes communes et l’instruction ... intégrale à la charge des pouvoirs publics, tout y est, hormis l’idée qu’une race qui portera longtemps encore les traces du joug Turc, puisse vivre et prospérer sous une tel régime.” M.A.E. Correspondance politique, Serbie, vol. 10, no 60, Belgrade, le 9 septembre 1889, with a French translation of the 1881 Programme of the People’s Radical Party enclosed.

\textsuperscript{48} Velizar Ninčić, Pera Todorović (Belgrade: Nolit, 1956), 68–75.


militant insistence on constitutional reform, full legislative power of the Assembly, and judicial independence; they harshly opposed bicameralism and called for generalized decentralization, free and compulsory education, and election by list. Rather than a fundamental political conviction, the concept of a citizen army instead of a standing one, taken over from the ideology of Swiss and French republicanism of the 1860s, was for the Serbian Radicals an act of protest against the military caste which had become the mainstay of Milan Obrenović’s regime after 1883.

Suspected of being supporters of the Russian anarchists and populists, the Serbian Radicals, however, put much effort into providing theoretical instruction for their followers even in the first phase of their activity. It was in the early 1870s that Nastas Petrović set out to translate Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous study *On Democracy in America* into the Serbian language. One of the leading Radicals in the 1880s, Kosta S. Taušanović, translated in 1879 C. Chever’s book on the Swiss Constitution, government and local self-government, which, the same as Tocqueville’s, was anything but anarchist and populist. Another of the translated writings heralding the Radicals’ adherence to the principles of parliamentary democracy was Johann Kaspar Bluntschli’s theoretical essay, previously published in Switzerland, on the character and spirit of political parties. Even though translated in 1883 by a Liberal, Djordje S. Simić, two seminal works of Benjamin Constant, on political principles and on ministerial responsibility, were (or could be), at least for better educated members of the People’s Radical Party, usable as reference works in day-to-day parliamentary practice. Interest in French political thought is also readable from translations published in serial form in Radical newspapers and magazines. The socialist origin of early radicalism in Serbia is recognizable from the translations of Louis Blanc and Karl Marx that appeared in the party daily *Samouprava* (Self-Government) in the first years of its publication.

---

51 *Samouprava* n° 1/8, Belgrade, 8 (20) January 1881.
However, the socialist discourse of some Radical leaders, such as Lazar Paču,\footnote{Lazar Paču, \textit{Gradjansko društvo i njegove društveno-političke partije} (Belgrade: Štamparija Radenika, 1881).} gradually gave way to debates over the Assembly, ministerial responsibility, royal powers in a parliamentary monarchy, constitutional revision projects, or subtleties of relevance to the consistent functioning of the representative system. In the late 1880s, when Milovan Dj. Milovanović, who had obtained his degree of Doctor of Law from Paris University, took charge of the party’s doctrinal discourse and legal interpretation, a French approach in interpreting British parliamentarianism became clearly observable within the already defined Radical ideology.\footnote{M. Dj. Milovanović graduated from Paris Law School in 1884 and received doctoral degree from the same university in 1888, with the thesis \textit{Les Traités de garantie au XIXe siècle}, awarded a golden medal the same year. For a first-rate biography see Dimitrije Djordjević, \textit{Milovan Milovanović} (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1962).}

The draft constitution drawn up by the Radicals in 1882 relied not only on the laws passed by the St Andrew’s Day Assembly in 1858, but also on the French revolutionary constitutions, which in turn had drawn upon the powers of the eighteenth-century Paris Parliament. The draft was placed into a French constitutional frame, with a Grand National Assembly (\textit{Velika narodna skupština}) convoked every seven years to revise the Constitution. The main goal was the same as the one articulated by the French Revolution: the Serbian people were to be sovereign in the Kingdom of Serbia, all power was to proceed from the people, and the people were to be the only source of government power.

In the 1880s, the French Radicals demanded the abolition of the office of the President of the Republic, while their Serbian counterparts, aware of the importance of monarchy in the Serbian tradition, sought to reduce the king to a neutral role. Even the overt republicans among the urban party leaders (Kosta S. Taušanović, Pera Todorović, Svetomir B. Nikolajević)\footnote{For Svetomir B. Nikolajević and Pera Todorović see also their own testimonies: Svetomir B. Nikolajević, \textit{Iz minulih dana. Sećanja i dokumenti}, ed. Božidar S. Nikolajević (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1986); Pera Todorović, \textit{Dnevnik}, ed. Latinka Perović (Belgrade: Šrpska književna zadruga, 1990).} were aware that a state without a king was hardly imaginable for the Serbian peasantry, accustomed to the classical political triad, God–King–householder (\textit{Bog–Kralj–domaćin}).

In the mid 1880s, the Radicals relaxed their hitherto adamant demand for a citizen army and, through skilful political manoeuvres, were pushing their way towards power, forcing the Crown into major concessions. A new constitution, whose draft was agreed upon by a committee
made up of members of all political parties, was the work of a constitutional law expert and a Radical, Milovan Dj. Milovanović.\(^\text{59}\) In order to acquaint themselves with various constitutional solutions and assess their applicability to Serbia, a Serbian constitutional commission had visited not only European parliamentary monarchies such as Belgium, Denmark and Greece, but also France. The final version of the draft constitution creatively combined solutions taken over from British parliamentarianism and the Belgian Constitution of 1831.\(^\text{60}\)

Given that the 1831 Belgian Constitution was a slightly modified version of the French Charte of 1830, French influence remained recognizable in a number of constitutional solutions despite the general framework built on the British model of parliamentarianism. Protection of personal, civil rights against abuse of power by an authority was borrowed from the Belgian Constitution. Grouped into a separate section, twenty-six articles out of a total of 204 emphasized and precisely defined, on the French model, the individual rights of the citizen.\(^\text{61}\) The 1888 Constitution did not formally proclaim the sovereignty of the people, because King Milan Obrenović expressly opposed the principle, but it limited royal powers considerably and, by lowering the electoral census threshold, practically introduced universal suffrage. Endorsed by five-sixths of the Radical votes at the Great National Assembly (Velika narodna skupština), as was usual in France, the 1888 Constitution, despite reservations of some Radical representatives, was seen as providing for a transition to a parliamentary system, which had already been demanded by the St Andrew’s Day Assembly in 1858.\(^\text{62}\)

Once in power (1889–1892), during the minority of King Alexander Obrenović, the Radicals proceeded along the lines established by the practical solutions of French radicalism. Apart from a number of laws marking the implementation of the party’s key doctrines, the Radicals, on the model of Gambetta’s platform, set out to nationalize the railways. While most Radical leaders were Swiss-educated (Nikola Pašić, Petar Velimirović, \(^\text{59}\) See also his theoretical analysis of Serbian constitutional reform, Milovan Dj. Milovanović, \emph{Naša ustavna reforma} (Belgrade: Delo, 1888).


\(^\text{62}\) M.A.E., \emph{Correspondance politique}, vol. 9, no 2, Belgrade, le 15 janvier 1889; \emph{Le Temps}, Paris, le 9 janvier 1889.
Pera Todorović, Lazar Paču) or trained only at Serbian schools (Stojan M. Protić, Aca Stanojević), their ideological core, very influential in matters such as the party structure and the model of the political system in the party programme, was made up of authentic “Parisians”. Aside from the most pronounced Francophile of the first generation of Radicals in Serbia, Pera Todorović, there were among them Jovan Djaja, responsible for foreign policy, Mihailo Vujić, for the economy, and Milovan Dj. Milovanović, for legal and constitutional matters. On the occasion of a markedly solemn celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the proclamation of the French Republic, the diplomatic representative of the Third Republic in Belgrade emphasized that “indeed, most of our friends are among the Radicals”.

Denounced, in the first phase of their political activity, as “Communards”, “internationalists” and “cosmopolitans” lacking national feelings and civic responsibility, the Radicals, however, came up, to a greater extent than their predecessors, with a creative combination of democracy and modern nationalism. Similarly to the first generation of Serbian Liberals, they believed that the process of liberation and unification of the Serbian people should begin by achieving political liberties within Serbia, which then would act as the Serbian “Piedmont” in the prospective national unification process. For the Radical leader, Nikola Pašić, democracy was not simply a fundamental political belief about political liberties coupled with ideally protected civil rights being a prerequisite for a social order tailored to human measure, but a powerful means of achieving the national ideals as well.

The pyramidal party structure, the continuous functioning of its network, smooth communication between the national and local party leaderships, as well as the ability to mobilize and control a large portion of the electorate, and to competently run the affairs of state, favour the assessment that the Radical Party in Serbia was the only European-style party in the Balkans.

Parliamentary democracy under King Peter I Karadjordjević (1903–1914)
The new king of Serbia, Peter I Karadjordjević, grandson of Karageorge and son of a deposed prince, Alexander Karadjordjević (1842–58), had been

---

63 M.A.E., Correspondance politique, vol. 13, n° 80, Belgrade, le 23 septembre 1892.
educated at Saint-Cyr military academy in Paris and spent a good part of his life in exile (1858–1903). He married Montenegrin princess Zorka Petrović-Njegoš at Cetinje, and eventually settled in Switzerland. Prince Peter was famous both for his bravery in battle and for his firm democratic beliefs. While still a young exiled prince, Peter Karadjordjević translated John Stuart Mill’s famous essay *On Liberty* into Serbian and published it at his own expense in 1867. After the reinstatement of the 1888 Constitution which, with some minor modifications, came to be known as the 1903 Constitution, the strict adherence to its role of constitutional monarch made King Peter I Karadjordjević the most popular ruler of Serbia. His reign (from June 1903 to June 1914, when he transferred his royal duties to his second son, Alexander, who served as prince-regent until his father’s death in 1921), became known as the “Golden Age of Serbia”.67

Describing the position of the sovereign and the machinery of government, the British envoy in Belgrade noted that

…the spirit of the nation, once it had attained self-government was, and remains, distinctly democratic. When King Peter came to the throne, therefore, it was evidently considered the wisest course to appease the outraged sentiments of the great majority of the nation, who had no part in the [1903] conspiracy, by reverting to the most liberal constitution, that of 1889, which had been granted by the previous dynasty. Under the Constitution the monarchy is strictly limited, and the Skupshtina is carried on by Ministers who are responsible to the National Assembly (Skupshtina), which consists of a single Chamber … Since the accession of King Peter Karageorgevitch [Petar I Karadjordjevic] to the Servian Throne the two sections of the Radical party, distinguished as Moderate and Independent (also called Old and Young Radicals), have alternated in office, the Liberals (or Nationalists) and the Progressists [Progressives], who had generally been the governing parties in the two previous reigns, dropping into comparative insignificance.68

A subsequent analysis of the level of parliamentary democracy in Serbia clearly showed that the post-1903 period, despite significant problems in foreign policy and internal strife involving ambitious military organiza-

---

66 He served as a volunteer in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, and was a guerrilla leader under the *nom de guerre* Petar Mrkonjić in the Serb uprising against the Ottomans in Bosnia 1876–77.


tions that posed a threat to democracy, was functionally democratic in an exemplary way in comparison to France, Belgium or Great Britain:

The provisions of the [1903] Constitution in so far as they refer to the machinery of Government are briefly as follows: The legislative power is vested in the King and the national representation, each having the rights to initiate legislation, and the consent of both being necessary in Order that a Bill may become law. The executive power belongs to the King, who exercises it through his responsible Ministers. The person of a King is inviolable; he cannot be held responsible for any act of his own or of the Government, nor can any accusation be brought against him. The King sanctions and promulgates laws, appoints the State functionaries, is Commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Kingdom, and possesses all the other usual prerogatives of a Constitutional Sovereign. … The King convokes the Skupshtina, and has the right to prorogue it for not more than two months, and not more than once in each session. If he dissolves the Skupshtina, the act of dissolution must at the same time appoint a date for the new elections within two months, and the new Skupshtina must be convoked within three months. The decree dissolving the Skupshtina must be countersigned by all of the responsible Ministers. No Royal decree dealing with public affairs may be put into execution unless it is countersigned by the Ministers of the Department concerned, who thereby assumes the responsibility for it…

The National Skupshtina or Parliament consists of one Chamber only, and may be either a Grand or an Ordinary Skupshtina. The Grand Skupshtina consists of twice as many Deputies as the Ordinary one, and is convoked (1) if it is necessary to decide the succession to the throne, (2) to nominate a council of Regency, (3) to modify the Constitution, (4) to alienate or exchange national territory, (5) when the King thinks it expedient to consult the Grand Skupshtina. The Ordinary Skupshtina at present counting 160 members, is elected for four years, and must be convoked annually on the 1st (14th) November. The elections are direct and by secret ballot, and every Servian [Serbian] subject of a male sex, whether natural born or naturalized, is an elector, provided that he is over 21 years of age and pays direct taxes to the State amounting at least 15 fr[ancs]. per annum. Officers and the active list of army, soldiers serving with the colours, criminals, bankrupts, etc, are temporary disqualified. The vote is given not for individual candidates but for lists containing as many names as there are Deputies to be elected for the district of borough. The rules of procedure are so liberal as to give the possibility of obstruction to a comparatively small minority, and the present Government are contemplating their amendments. More than one-half of the members must be present to form a quorum. Every Bill must be read and voted upon twice in the same Session in order to become a law, an interval of at least five days intervening between the first and second readings. No law may be promulgated, abrogated, modified, or interpreted without the consent of the National Skupshtina.69

69 PRO, FO 371/328, Annual Report, 1907, No 20. Confidential, Belgrade, April 2, 1908.
It was also observed that:

The King’s executive power is exercised by the Council of Ministers (Council), composed of the Ministers at the head of the several Government Offices and the President of the Council, who may be without portfolio. They are nominated by the King, but, as a matter of fact, the system of party government prevails completely, and the King practically cannot appoint a Ministry which does not enjoy the support of the majority of the Skupština. The Ministers may attend the meeting of the Skupština and address the House, but they can only record their vote if they are themselves elected members of it.70

After 1905, the Independent Radicals, moral puritans in practical politics like the French leftists, demonstrated inflexibility and excessive adherence to principles, which their main rivals, the Old Radicals, led by experienced Nikola Pašić, exploited to their own advantage. Except for one occasion when the Independent Radicals managed to obtain a thin majority, the Old Radicals held the majority in the National Assembly: in October 1906 the distribution of seats in the National Assembly, “as modified by the bye-elections in August is as follows: 91 Old Radicals, 47 Young Radicals, 16 Nationalists [Liberals], 2 Progressists, and 1 Socialist. Unless, therefore, there is a serious split in the Old Radical Party, the Government ought to command a fully sufficient majority. In the above list three seats are not accounted for, as the [Narodna] Skupština has 160 members.”71

The flourishing of the free press under post-1903 constitutional democracy in Serbia was unprecedented in the Balkans. Out of ninety dailies in 1904, seventy-two were published in Belgrade. The leading widely-read dailies were often party organs: Samouprava (Self-Government) of the Old Radicals, semi-official when they were in power, and Odjek (Echo) of the Independent Radicals with a circulation of up to 4,000 copies and the party leader Ljubomir Stojanović frequently appearing as editorial writer. There were also Pravda (Justice) and Videlo (Daylight) of the Progressives, as well as Srpska Zastava (Serbian Flag) of the Liberals (renamed Populists).72

70 Ibid.
72 British reports from Belgrade underscored that “Pravda is remarkable for violent articles in opposition to the Government and the dynasty, and is under the control of M. Paul Marinkovitch [Pavle Marinković]. ... The ‘Videlo’ also supports the same small party [Progressive] and is edited by M. Marinkovitch’s brother. The ‘Mali Žurnal’ (Petit Journal) was, until recently, understood to support the conspiracy party in the army (since the collapse of the Pokret) but, the editor having failed to obtain a Concession for a paper-mill, it now sides with the Independent Radicals in the Opposition. Two Socialist dailies, the ‘Dnevni list’ (Daily News sheet) and the Radničke Novine (Labour
With limited restriction and no political censorship, the Serbian press was considered to be a visible sign of the high level of political liberties. As stressed by the British envoy: “one of best written and widely read daily papers is Politika (circulation 8,000), which is neutral in party politics and criticizes or supports the Government on the merits of each question.”

Politika, as well as party dailies, abounded in articles on French and British parliamentary procedures. The party press was not reduced to fierce attacks on political opponents, but also frequently brought quotations from or free interpretations of parliamentary practice in the most advanced Western democracies.

There were other kinds of newspapers as well, expressing various political opinions: “...another supposed to be subsidized by the Austrian Government is the Štampa; it is more violent in tone, and condemns Government and Opposition alike (circulation 5,000). The Beogradske Novine (Belgrade News) is in general though guarded opposition to the present regime and frankly in favour of the Montenegrin dynasty, the owner M. Tchuritchtich [Čurčić], being a personal friend of Prince Nicholas [Petrović-Njegoš] (circulation 4,000). The Večernje Novosti (Evening News) represents Church interests and is said to be supported by the Metropolitan. [...] Among the periodical the only of worth mentioning is the Bosansko-Hercegovački Glasnik, a weekly paper devoted to the exposure of the alleged Austrian misrule in the occupied provinces. Daily papers are also published at Nish [Niš], Kragujevatz [Kragujevac], Valjevo etc, but the Belgrade papers circulate throughout the country towns and the provincial press is quite insignificant.”

In 1912, out of 302 newspapers and journals published in the Serbian language, 199, with an annual circulation of 50 million copies, were published in Serbia, and 126 of these in Belgrade alone.

News), practically complete the list of the party papers.” PRO, FO, 371/328, Servia, Annual Report, 1907, No 20. Confidential, Belgrade, April 2, 1908.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Jovan Skerlić, Istorija nove srpske književnosti (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1964), 463. The Serbian press in Austria-Hungary included other respected dailies representing various political interests and ideological groups: “The most notable Servian papers published in Austria-Hungary are the ‘Srlobran’ (Servian Guardian) of Agram [Zagreb] and the ‘Zastava’ of Novi Sad. The latter is believed to be subsidized by Russia, but on the whole it may be said that the Servian papers in Croatia and Slavonia represent the interest of their nationality there without disloyalty to the Empire or any pronounced irredentist tendency. The same cannot be said of the Servian papers which from time to time have been published in Bosnia, and whose career is usually cut short by confiscation and the imprisonment of the editors.” PRO, FO, London, 371/328, Servia, Annual Report, 1907, No 20. Confidential, Belgrade, 2 April, 1908.
Independents: radical democracy as a model of accelerated Europeanization

Under the blows struck by the last Obrenovićs, the People’s Radical Party split into two factions in 1901, and eventually, in 1905, a group of younger members created a new party, the Independent Radicals (Samostalni radikal). Unlike the senior group, epitomized by Nikola Pašić and denounced for opportunism and for “fusionism” with the Progressives and the Crown (1901–1903), this new generation of politicians, educated mostly in France and Germany, gave precedence to ideological convictions and principles over political compromise. The Independents called for an uncompromising return to the authentic ideas of radicalism. Their leaders, Ljubomir Stojanović and Ljubomir Živković, educated in Germany, Jovan Žujović and Jovan Skerlić, educated in France, and Ljubomir Davidović and Jaša Prodanović, Francophiles educated in Belgrade, insisted on consistent adherence to the original Radical platform of 1881 instead of its main principles being modified to meet the changing political needs. Before the split in 1901, the Radicals had enjoyed support from as many as five-sixths of the Serbian electorate, which necessarily led to further dissent. Thus the People’s Radical Party engendered a new opposition party which was to establish the political balance of power required by the democratic system established with the return of the House of Karadjordjević to the Serbian throne in 1903.76

After 1903, the Independent Radicals added a recognizable social tinge to their pursuit of the Radical tenets. They took over all basic ideas from the original Radical programme of 1881 (universal suffrage; free and compulsory education; programme of state finance; control of appointments to the public service; foreign policy, with a new emphasis on forging South-Slav unity), underlining that they introduced the principles that “are in tune with the contemporary notion of democratism”.77 An important emphasis in their programme was laid on raising the cultural level of the general public. The Independent Radicals believed the area of education to be intolerably neglected, and the fostering of civic virtue, indispensable for a democratic society, utterly ignored.

According to one of the main ideologists of the Independents, Jovan Skerlić:

There can be no democracy without an elite, because democracy cannot do without genius, science and virtue […] Nowadays the elite comes from all [social] classes, it gets renewed, it rejuvenates itself from that great res-

77 Odjek, Belgrade, 10 (23) June 1905.
ervoir of energy called the people. […] The populace is no more a crowd, it is a people, it is sovereign. The elite, closely tied to the large family of ignorant and common people by origin, should remain in constant communication with people. […] Popular instruction is a logical consequence of universal suffrage. And there can be no true government by the people without the people being reasonable enough to govern themselves. Democracy would betray itself if it gave up on instructing people.78

According to a somewhat schematic view of the French diplomatic representative in Belgrade, there was a clear ideological difference between the two radical parties, and it was reflected in their different attitudes towards Russia and the West:

The accession of the Karadjordjevićs [1903] finally brought the Radical Party to power. […] It was a party of peasants which represented almost the entire Serbian people, predominantly Orthodox [Christian] and Slavophile, very little pro-Western; their leaders were educated in the German part of Switzerland, in touch with Russian nihilists. The unchallenged possession of power divided the Radical Party: it was left by a part of the young intellectual elite, often educated in France, more pro-Western, with a socialist inclination, and with an affinity for German neo-Slavism. Their progressive ideas notwithstanding… these gentlemen have flooded the University, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic missions. […] As for foreign policy, the Young [Independent] Radicals got a clearer conception of the state in the West, attaching much greater importance to the Kingdom of Serbia than the Old Radicals, utterly steeped in ancient Slavophile ideas; today they are Francophiles.79

Less Russophile than the Old Radicals, and more Francophile and pro-Western, the Independents considerably contributed to the spread of French influence in Serbia. At the University of Belgrade, with eighty professors and 1,600 students in 1905, Independent Radical party leaders, from Jovan Zušović and Jovan Skerlić to Jovan Cvijić, held prestigious professorships. Thus, the University of Belgrade was called, and with good reason, the “fortress of Independent Radicals”. The Independents saw themselves as champions of radical democracy, which brought them closer to the radical-socialist left in France. Drawing upon contemporary French solutions, they were halfway between the stance epitomized by Clemenceau among the Radicals, and that by Jean Jaurès among the Socialists. Their ideological closeness to Jean Jaurès’s Socialists is visible in their advocacy of social reform along the lines of maintaining the idealized notion of the common

79 M.A.E., Nouvelle série, Serbie, vol. 5, n° 8, Belgrade, 21 janvier 1909.
man’s social equality, while their closeness to Clemenceau and his Radicals is readable from their advocacy of election system reform, stronger local self-government, moral transformation of society, and “education as one of the state’s noblest tasks”.

An almost religious belief in democracy was the main feature of radical democracy as pursued by the Independent Radical Party. As an influential “Parisian”, Jovan Žujović, said in a programmatic speech on the future task of radical democracy in Serbia:

Since the great French Revolution democracy has been advancing everywhere. All occurrences in the life of a people are taking a turn to its advantage. Not only are those who cherish and wish it working for it, but even the efforts of its opponents go to its favour. It is as if God himself has intervened in the human struggle, helping the just cause of most peoples to prevail by pouring his anger on the enemies of the people. Everywhere, everywhere, my brothers, the spirit of democracy progresses and spreads, and so must it be here, too. […] The strength of the Radical Party must henceforth be spent only on a radical transformation of state government.

In spite of occasional misunderstandings with the traditional Radical electorate, Jovan Skerlić was steadfast in supporting the Independents’ adherence to the proclaimed political principles which he saw as their main asset, and boasted that they brought into Serbian politics “more open-mindedness, more of a European conception of politics”. By contrast, the Old Radicals were, in his view, a political body without a soul, “without a spinal cord, without ideas and principles, a giant standing on feet of clay.” “Unthinkingly open to upstarts and profiteers”, Nikola Pašić’s Old Radical Party was ceasing to be “a resolutely democratic party of the common people.”

The Independents or Young Radicals differed from the Old Radicals — in whose ranks, similarly to those of the Liberals, there were a number of anti-Westerners — in that they resolutely rejected an almost religious faith in the patronage of Russia which after 1903, with a surge of Czech-inspired

---


83 Skerlić, *Skrice, feljtoni, govori*, 95.
Neo-Slavism, made itself felt in Serbia as well. A Pan-Slavist event in Belgrade was an occasion for Skerlić to point to two possible roads — either to adopt Western civilization completely or to stand up against it and end up “overrun like the American redskins”. As a typical Parisian doctrinaire, Skerlić, and his party fellows, had no doubts that the West was “the source of light and the focus of life on earth”, in contrast to the less than appealing “prospect of Slav rivers being lost in the Russian sea”.84

In 1903–1914, Serbia’s “Golden Age”, later on termed the “Age of Pericles for Serbia” by Milan Grol, the Independents, together with the Francophile members of the Old Radicals, Progressives and Liberals, held an exceptional place among the bearers of French influence. Through continuous exchange of ideas, political alliances, cultural radiance and economic ties, French influence was finally consolidated as the overriding foreign influence in Serbian society. On the eve of the Balkan Wars, a correspondent for a Parisian newspaper clearly outlined the extent of French influence in Serbia:

For a traveller arriving in Serbia, the signs of France’s intellectual influence are not readily observable… But if you stop an army officer and ask him to show you the way, you’ll hear him reply in excellent French… despite the affinity between the languages, Russian is little spoken here… But French dominates… All ‘folks’ speak French: students increasingly choose to learn French. … our [French] ‘Literary Society’ has been a great success.85

One of the reasons for this success was the fact that the Société littéraire française counted King Peter I Karadjordjević himself among hundreds of its very active members. The French journalist fully agreed with three distinguished experts on Serbia and the Balkans, André Chéradame, Henry Barby and Victor Bérand, that Serbia was the “most Francophile country in the world.”86

***

French models, recognizable in all institutional solutions for the oft-changing political system in Serbia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, along with similarities in cultural affinities and political mentalities, powerfully influenced the “rural democracy” of Serbian society in the process of achieving political liberties. The protagonists of these aspirations and conveyors of French political doctrines belonged to several generations of

84 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 223.
“Parisians” in the Serbian political elite. The Liberals, in the 1860s, spanned the gap between the patriarchal tradition and the contemporary principles of democracy. The Progressives, in the early 1880s, laid the groundwork for building modern political institutions. The Radicals, in the late 1880s and turbulent 1890s, managed to build the edifice of democratic institutions heralded by the 1888 Constitution. The Independent Radicals, the last generation of “Parisians” in the Kingdom of Serbia, revived the original doctrines of radicalism after 1901, adding a moral and distinctly social dimension to the political struggle and giving a strong impetus to the propagation of the principles of freedom and democracy that originated from the corpus of French political doctrines.

Bibliography and sources


Liberal and Conservative Political Thought in Nineteenth-century Serbia
Vladimir Jovanović and Slobodan Jovanović

Abstract: Two very influential political philosophers and politicians, Vladimir Jovanović and Slobodan Jovanović, differed considerably in political theory. The father, Vladimir, offered an Enlightenment-inspired rationalist critique of the traditional values underpinning his upbringing. The son, Slobodan, having had a non-traditional, liberal upbringing, gradually — through analyzing and criticizing the epoch’s prevailing ideas, scientism, positivism and materialism — came up with his own synthesis of traditional and liberal, state and liberty, general and individual. Unlike Vladimir Jovanović, who advocated popular sovereignty, central to the political thought of his son Slobodan was the concept of the state. On the other hand, Slobodan shared his father’s conviction that a bicameral system was a prerequisite for the protection of individual liberties and for good governance. Political views based on different political philosophies decisively influenced different understandings of parliamentarianism in nineteenth-century Serbia, which in turn had a direct impact on the domestic political scene and the manner of government.

Keywords: political philosophy, state, liberalism, tradition, parliamentary system, bicameralism, political prejudice, morality

Introduction: Father and son

The lives and works of a father and his son, Vladimir Jovanović and Slobodan Jovanović, spanning a period of nearly one hundred and fifty years, are inseparable from the history of Serbia of the period. While their political activity coincided with some of the most important events in the history of modern Serbia and Yugoslavia, some of their most relevant works were first published as late as the 1970s and 1980s.

Vladimir Jovanović (1833–1922) was an economist and political philosopher. He was the leading ideologist of the United Serbian

1 Vladimir Jovanović, born in 1833 in Šabac – a town in what then was the Principality of Serbia, an autonomous province under Ottoman suzerainty — was grandson of a local Serbian notable (vojvoda), Ostoja Spuž (c. 1770–1808), who had moved there from Spuž in modern-day Montenegro. Ostoja is known to have taken part in the First Serbian Uprising (1804–13) against Ottoman rule, notably in the liberation of Šabac in 1804 and of Belgrade in 1806, and later on was member of the Šabac Magistrate. The Jovanović family was related to several distinguished families in nineteenth-century Serbia, including those of Jovan Ristić (1831–1899), twice member of the body
Youth and of Serbia’s Liberal Party. He served as Serbia’s minister of finance, president of her National Audit Office, deputy president of the State Council, senator, and member of Parliament. He was president of the Serbian Learned Society, honorary member of the Royal Serbian Academy, university professor of political economy. He was a politician with many international connections, founder and editor of newspapers, and author of several books, essays and articles in Serbian, English and French.

Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958), his son, was a renowned Serbian scholar and statesman, political philosopher, lawyer, historian, literary critic and writer, professor of public and constitutional law. He was president of the Royal Serbian Academy, rector of Belgrade University, dean of Belgrade University’s Law School, president of the Serbian Cultural Club.


1 A South-Slavic patriotic youth organization inspired by Giuseppe Mazzini and his Young Italy. See S. Jovanović, “Madame, C’est seulement…” [1917], in vol. 3 of *Mazzini’s Letters to an English Family*, ed. E. F. Richards (London and New York: J. Lane Comp. Ltd, 1922), 67.


4 The Serbian Cultural Club was a leading Serbian political and cultural organization in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on the eve of the Second World War. For more detail, see Lj. Dimić, “Srpski kulturni klub između kulture i politike” [The Serbian Cultural Club
He served as prime minister and deputy prime minister of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He died in 1958 in London, where he had acted as prime minister of the Yugoslav government-in-exile during the Second World War. In post-war Yugoslavia, in a political trial held in 1946, he was sentenced to twenty years’ hard labour, confiscation of property and deprivation of civil rights. He was rehabilitated in Serbia in 2007, as a victim of post-war communist judiciary.

Both Vladimir and Slobodan Jovanović considerably influenced the development of political ideas and political institutions in Serbia and Yugoslavia of the time, the father mainly as the ideologist of the Liberal Party and the United Serbian Youth, and the son, through an almost fifty years’ long career as university professor, through his prolific writing, as well as through his presidency of the Serbian Culture Club, and subsequently as a senior member of the Yugoslav government both in the country and in exile in London. Even though both shared a commitment to a parliamentary system and political liberty, the theoretical assumptions underlying their political views and convictions differed considerably.\(^5\)

Theoretical differences in understanding parliamentarianism had their implications for political practices in Serbia, where a parliamentary system was for the first time introduced by the 1888 Constitution.\(^6\) The differences in theoretical positions, of course, were to a greater or lesser extent due to the historical circumstances and to the different needs of political parties. However, what generally distinguished both Vladimir and Slobodan Jovanović was their ability to distinguish between culture and politics, Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije [Cultural Policy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1918–1941] (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996), 506–561.

\(^5\) For a view that the difference between their basic theoretical premises was “unexpected”, see S. Žunjić, Istorija srpske filozofije [The History of Serbian Philosophy] (Belgrade: Plato, 2009), 311.

\(^6\) According to S. Jovanović’s periodization of Serbia’s nineteenth-century political history, the period of constitutionalism (1869–89), when “we had a constitution but no parliamentary system”, was followed by a parliamentary period: in 1888, a year before his abdication, King Milan Obrenović and the Constituent Assembly enacted a new constitution, which was aimed at securing the throne for his minor son and provided for a parliamentary system (1889–93). There followed the “period of reaction” (1893–1903) under King Alexander Obrenović, who in 1894 restored the 1869 Constitution, and after that ensued the “period of the restored parliamentary system” (1903–14) under King Peter I Karadjordjević and a Radical cabinet. See S. Jovanović, “The Development in the Serbian Constitution in the Nineteenth Century”, Yugoslav Documents, (London: Yugoslav Information Department, 1942), 2, 48–54; S. Jovanović, “Periodi srpske ustavne istorije” [Periods of Serbia’s constitutional history] (1929), in vol. 11 of Sabrana dela Slobodana Jovanovića (hereafter SD) [The Collected Works of Slobodan Jovanović], eds. R. Samardžić and Ž. Stojković (Belgrade: BIGZ, Jugoslavijapublik and SKZ, 1991), 468–470.
dan Jovanović from others was the fact that their political philosophies were least dependent upon practical party needs, but rather upon their respective theoretical rationales and political principles. This is not to say that their theoretical positions were rigid and inflexible, but rather that they both, making a distinction between political efficiency and mere pragmatism, believed, each in his own way, that political virtue was inseparable from moral virtue.\(^7\)

1. The liberalism of Vladimir Jovanović

Vladimir Jovanović had been raised in a family holding onto traditional values,\(^8\) which he subsequently, influenced by liberal ideas, came to criticize harshly. He dismissed religiosity as superstition, along the lines of the ideas propagated by the leading Enlightenment figure among the Serbs, Dositej Obradović.\(^9\) As a student in Belgrade, Vladimir Jovanović adopted the liberal political outlook of a relative of his, Dimitrije Matić, professor of public law, later minister of education and justice, who belonged to liberal-minded intellectual circles. What most impressed him in that outlook was the belief that rule by force was unacceptable and that governments should promote and support popular education.\(^10\) While he came to share Matić’s sense of

\(^7\) This may best be seen from S. Jovanović’s portrait of Arthur Balfour (SD 2, 681). In his opinion, Balfour had nothing in common with the typical contemporary politician, who “combines his lack of general culture with a fierce ambition and a quick grasp of the situation in hand. Balfour was a highly educated man who engaged in politics out of a sense of duty rather than ambition, and who thought not only of the situation in hand, but also about what was yet to come”.

\(^8\) Under Ottoman rule (from the late fifteenth until the early nineteenth century), the medieval culture created in the period of Serbia’s independence was mostly perpetuated in a frozen state as it were. The Serbian Orthodox Church acted as the spiritual and political representative of the Serbian people, safeguarding not only the Byzantine-inspired theological, philosophical, literary and artistic legacy of medieval Serbia, but also the idea of the state. See D. Bogdanović, Istorija stari srpskih književnosti [The History of Old Serbian Literature] (Belgrade: SKZ, 1991), 51; B. Miloslavjević, “Basic Philosophical Texts in Medieval Serbia”, Balcanica XXXIX[2008] (2009), 79–101; Žunjić, Istorija, chap. “Filozofija u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji” [Philosophy in medieval Serbia], 27–74.

\(^9\) S. Jovanović, “Vladimir Jovanović” [1948], SD 11, 82.

\(^10\) Dimitrije Matić (1821–1884) studied law and philosophy in Belgrade, and then continued his education in Germany, where he received his doctoral degree in philosophy (Heidelberg, 1847). While in Berlin, he attended the lectures of F. W. J. Schelling, but the most powerful influence was that of K. L. Michelet, a right-wing Hegelian. For more, see Žunjić, Istorija, 123–124; B. S. Marković, Dimitrije Matić, lik jednog pravnika [Dimitrije Matić: The Portrait of a Lawyer] (Belgrade: SANU, 1977); Ustavi i vlade Knjazevine Srbije, Kraljevine Srbije, Kraljevine SHS i Kraljevine Jugoslavije (1835–1941).
patriotism, his liberalism as well as his enthusiasm about Switzerland’s libertarianism and democratic institutions, Hegel’s speculative philosophy that underlay Matić’s ideas of the state and law, had little appeal to him.

Vladimir Jovanović had a positivist faith in the overall progress of human society. Unlike Matić, who relied on the Hegelian synthesis for resolving the earlier dilemmas concerning the foundations of the state, he believed that the state originated from a social contract in order to ensure prosperity and freedom. During his studies in Germany, Vladimir Jovanović embraced the prevailing materialist view of the world and the firm belief in the infallibility of natural sciences. As a positivist, he appreciated Herbert Spencer’s theory of evolution, organic interpretation of society and analogy between the natural and social domains, according to which social sciences should be given a scientific basis. As a liberal, Vladimir Jovanović was a follower of J. S. Mill’s, and he translated his Considerations on Representative Government into Serbian only six years after it was first published in 1861. Under Mazzini’s influence he made a synthesis of liberalism and nationalism, providing an entirely different, liberal, theoretical basis for his traditionalist patriotism. For Vladimir Jovanović, the most respected politician was W. Gladstone. He was left with the best possible impression after their meeting in London: “Gladstone, Jovanović said, spoke with the enthusiasm of a man committed to the freedom, justice and wellbeing of humankind:


11 In this he follows the Hobbesian view of the state of nature, or the state of war, as preceding the formation of the state. The goal of progress is to overcome the distinction between the state and society. Cf. V. Jovanović, Osnovi snage i veličine srpske [The Foundations of Serbian Strength and Greatness] (Novi Sad: Platonova štamparija, 1870), 15; Č. Popov, “Liberalne ideje” [Liberal ideas], in vol. VI-1 of Istorija srpskog naroda [History of the Serbian People] (Belgrade: SKZ, 1983), 314.

12 Vladimir Jovanović completed two-year philosophy studies (1850–1852) and three years of law studies (1852–1854) in Belgrade, as well as two years of economics and natural sciences in Germany (1854–56), where he undertook a Grand Tour of Germany (Westphalia, Hanover, Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Prussia), Holland, Austria (Bohemia, Moravia and Hungary), and Belgium, and visited Paris at the time of the 1855 Universal Exposition. See V. Jovanović, Uspomene, 72.

13 Džon Stjuart Mil, O predstavnikoj vladi (Belgrade 1867). Mill’s On Liberty, first published in 1859, appeared in Serbian in 1868; it was translated by Prince Peter Karadjordjević (1844–1921), who lived in exile in France, Switzerland and Montenegro until his return to Serbia in 1903 and coronation as King of Serbia in 1904.
listening to him, one could not help being convinced of his greatness of mind and nobleness of heart.”

A distinctive feature of Vladimir Jovanović’s biography is that the first half of his life was spent in an incessant political struggle: from St Andrew’s Day Assembly, the founding of the United Serbian Youth, his polemics with Svetozar Marković, his role as editor of journals published at home and abroad and criticizing Prince Michael Obrenović’s government, his unremitting effort to make Serbia’s cause understandable in Britain, France, Switzerland and Italy, to his serving as minister in the government under which Serbia waged war against the Ottoman Empire (1876–78), leading to her independence, internationally recognized at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Apart from his student days in Germany, he often travelled and lived abroad (the longest in Geneva), where he made friends and acquaintances with a number of prominent politicians, scholars and revolutionaries of nineteenth-century Europe. He maintained contacts with Mazzini in particular. In various circumstances and on various occasions, he met a whole range of politicians, statesmen, parliament members, scientists, priests and publishers in Britain (W. Gladstone, Lord John Russell, T. Gibson, Somerset A. Beaumont, R. Cobden, E. Potter, J. Stansfeld, Lord Alfred Hervey, N. E. A. Tait, W. Denton, A. Macmillan), France (J. Barni, E. Quinet, Ch. Floquet, H. Martin, Saint-Marc Girardin, J. Ferry, J. Favre), Switzerland (J. Fazy), Italy (G. Mazzini, M. Minghetti), Hungarian revolutionaries (L.

---

14 S. Jovanović, “Gledston” [Gladstone] SD 11, 39; S. Jovanović, “Vladimir Jovanović”, 113. As can be seen in Mazzini’s Letters, 63–67, the meeting of “Mr. Iovanovitch, a Serbian gentleman and a friend of mine […] instructed by the Liberal Serbian Party to visit Mr Gladstone” was arranged “in the line of introduction” by Mazzini’s friend, cabinet minister Thomas Milner Gibson.

15 On the significance of the meeting of the Assembly held on St Andrew’s Day in December 1858 (Svetoandrejska skupština), see Milićević, Jevrem Grujić.

16 Svetozar Marković (1846–1875), Serbia’s leading socialist and the spiritual father of the Radical Party, exerted a powerful influence on the Serbian intelligentsia in the nineteenth century. He championed an atheist materialist philosophy, but unlike Marxists, who saw industrial labour as the only potential revolutionary force, he subscribed to the Russian socialists’ view that the peasantry might be such a force as well. It was from the circle of Marković’s followers that the Radical Party emerged, relying mainly on the peasantry, in accordance with Marković’s programme. Cf. S. Jovanović, “Vladimir Jovanović”, 105; S. Jovanović, “Pera Todorović”, SD 2, 172; S. Jovanović, “Jovan Skerlić, Svetozar Marković, njegov život, rad i ideje, Beograd, 1910” [Jovan Skerlić, Svetozar Marković, his life, work and ideas, Belgrade 1910] SD 2, 164. On Nikola Pašić, leader of the Radical Party, see S. Jovanović, “Nicholas Pašić, after ten years”, The Slavonic (and East European) Review 15 (1936/37), 368–376.
Kossuth, F. Deak) and Russian emigrants (M. Bakunin, A. Herzen etc). By contrast, he spent the latter part of his ninety years of life quietly with his family, most of the time in the same house in downtown Belgrade.

The unity of science, freedom and nation, viz. positivism, liberalism and nationalism, as well as his belief in two fundamental principles — freedom and justice, were the two lodestars and credo of his entire political work and his view of life. His multivolume *Political Dictionary*, a “system of freedom principles”, may be seen as inspiring and expressing the strivings of Serbian liberal youth. He profoundly believed that “freedom, brotherly equality and mutuality, and science” were the milestones marking the road to the progress of humankind, and thus of the Serbian nation. Slobodan Jovanović suggested that his father’s generation had glued these concepts together by means of rationalist philosophy: “Those people lived in an age of transition. By then, scientific positivism had already begun to spread due to a great success of natural sciences, but the influence of rationalist philosophy could still be felt. The basic yardstick for truth resided more in that philosophy than in science itself. For instance, when the topic of debate was conflict between religion and science, science was recognized as winner for the same reasons as it had been in Voltaire’s times, when everything had been subjected to criticism by our reason, cleared of all prejudice.” Liberal intellectuals derived the human right to freedom from the conception of man as a rational being, which then meant that there could be no freedom unless reason was enlightened, i.e. purged of prejudice. By extending the thus posited concept of individual freedom and the right to freedom to the whole nation, they also posited nationalism. In the mid-nineteenth century, nationalism was associated with the idea of the right of fragmented nations under alien rule to freedom, independence and unification. It was in Germany that Vladimir Jovanović first saw liberalism combined with the idea of a nation’s unification into a single state, and then he embraced Mazzini’s fusion of liberalism and nationalism.

18 Four volumes of the *Politički rečnik [Political Dictionary]*, from ‘A’ to ‘Đ’ [b] were published (1870–72). The entries from ‘T’ [t] to ‘F’ [f] remained in manuscript and are kept in the Istorijotski arhiv Beograda [Historical Archives of Belgrade], 1a, ZPO, k-XVIII/2. See Žunjić, *Istorija*, 172–173.
19 V. Yovanovitch, *The Serbian Nation and the Eastern Question* (London: Bell and Daldy, 1863), 44 (the same year the English text saw two editions in Serbian, in Novi Sad and Belgrade respectively: *Srbski narod i istočno pitanje*); V. Jovanović, *Osnovi snage*, 145.
21 Ibid., 86. Both Vladimir and Slobodan Jovanović were highly critical of the “Bismarckian” type of imperialist nationalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
Vladimir Jovanović believed a republic to be closer to the ideal of freedom and to the mentality of the Serbian people, and saw the monarchy as an alien institution adopted from Byzantium. Judging by the 1859 political programme of the Serbian Liberals, he hailed the constitutional monarchy established by the St Andrew’s Day Assembly.

A liberal in the Millian tradition, Vladimir Jovanović made a distinction between the principle of liberty and that of equality. Hence his consistent advocacy of the rights of the political minority, which could only be exercised by the division of the legislature into two houses: “Vladimir argued for the Upper House, but an Upper House composed of the intelligentsia and independent of the Crown.” To understand the parliamentary system as conceived of by the Liberal Party, whose ideologist Vladimir Jovanović was, one should bear in mind that the Liberals were for liberty, but an “enlightened” rather than unqualified one. According to them, the people should be governed by the intelligentsia, or, more precisely, the intelligentsia should govern the people with the people’s consent: “The Liberals were more liberal than democratic: a genuine, full-fledged democracy, where all, the intelligentsia included, should acknowledge the authority of the current majority no matter how unreasonable the latter might be, such a democracy was not the Liberals’ political ideal.” That is why Vladimir Jovanović advocated a bicameral system, as it ensured not only that the votes were counted but also, as he used to say, that they were “measured”.

2. Slobodan Jovanović’s theory of the state

Slobodan Jovanović lived with his father for almost half a century. It may not be far-fetched to say that all formative influences on him were mediated, in one way or another, by his father. Some of it came as a result of the education programme that Vladimir Jovanović had designed for his children. See Vladimir Yovanovitch, *The Near-Eastern Problem and the Pan-German Peril* (London: Watts & Co, 1909); S. Jovanović, “Bismark” [Bismarck] [1898] SD 12, 209–214.


25 Ibid., 109.

dren, and some was an inadvertent result of their long life together. Just like his father, Slobodan Jovanović began his education in Serbia and then continued it abroad, where he followed his father’s programme and, having graduated in law from the University of Geneva, carried on with his studies at the prestigious École libre des sciences politiques, today popularly known as “Science Po”. His very name, Slobodan (meaning “free”), was a sort of the father’s political message to his son. By choosing that particular name for his son, he appears to have wished to associate him indissolubly with his own deepest belief in liberal ideas. A dedication of 1870, “To my son, Slobodan”, sums up in just a couple of phrases all that Vladimir Jovanović wholeheartedly believed in — “the triad of science, freedom and nation”, which was also the basic tenet of the Serbian Liberals’ ideology.

Slobodan Jovanović embraced some of Vladimir Jovanović’s ideas, and criticized some other. Since he did not share his father’s unqualified faith in positive sciences, or in rationalist philosophy which perpetuated it, he could not accept the underlying idea of the unity of science, freedom and nation either. He acknowledged the obvious fact that scientific achievements had indeed been changing the world, but without sharing his father’s faith in progress as a universal natural process.

---

27 Ibid., 115; Pavković, Slobodan Jovanović, 3–4.

28 The Jovanović family lived abroad for several periods. The son of a political emigrant, Slobodan was born in Novi Sad (then in the Habsburg Monarchy) in 1869, and died as a political emigrant in London in 1958. He made his first steps in 1870 in Italy, in Pompei to be exact! (Ž. Stojković, “Slobodan Jovanović”, in SD 12, 721) His studies abroad were somewhat like a Grand Tour. The family first lived in Munich, then in Zurich and Geneva, where Slobodan Jovanović completed his studies, and from where he moved to Paris. As a student in Geneva, he attended the lectures of professors H. Brocher, F. Gentet, A. Martin, L. Bridel, A. Gautier, M-E. Richard. Full documentation of S. Jovanović’s education in Geneva as a state scholarship holder is kept at the Archives of Serbia (AS), MPS–P 1890, XXVI 100 and XXIX 2.

29 École libre des sciences politiques in Paris was founded in 1872 by E. Boutmy and a group of prominent French intellectuals such as Hippolyte Taine, Ernest Renan, Albert Sorel, Pierre Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and François Guizot.

30 The name ‘Slobodan’ was his father’s invention and it must have sounded strange to contemporaries. Nonetheless, it soon became quite common, unlike the name his father chose for his daughter: Pravda (Justice).


32 V. Jovanović, “Mom sinu Slobodanu” [To my son, Slobodan], Osnovi snage, 1.

33 “It is erroneous to speak of human progress as a natural process. No tendency towards progress is observable in nature. The idea of progress is a human contrivance.” See S. Jovanović, Osnovi pravne teorije o državi [Foundations of the Legal Theory of the State] (Belgrade: D. Obradović, 1906), 44–45.
Analyzing his father’s fundamental views, Slobodan Jovanović emphasizes that Vladimir Jovanović and his contemporaries were convinced of their standpoint being scientifically proven, i.e. that their scientific, political and national convictions were positive science itself. As a result, they tended to reject everything they deemed not to be science. Positivism and materialism, however, were not science, but philosophical movements. Consequently, the triad of science, freedom and nation was not grounded in science, but in philosophy. And without a scientific basis, there could be no empirical science, only philosophical thought.\textsuperscript{34} Slobodan Jovanović suggests that his father’s generation was not aware of the philosophical rather than scientific basis of the “triad of science, freedom and nation”, and adds that: “At the time, the misconception was quite common in Western Europe, too.”\textsuperscript{35}

Slobodan Jovanović was true to his father’s legacy of freedom, and shared his belief in the parliamentary, and bicameral, system as a prerequisite for the protection of individual freedom and good governance. He also shared his father’s inclination for the British political institutions. On the other hand, his patriotism was not grounded in liberalism, i.e. rationalism, but stemmed from his own understanding of history and tradition. In all that, both had an extremely negative opinion of the “realistic” imperialist nationalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.\textsuperscript{36}

The greatest theoretical difference between the two was in that the central concept of Slobodan Jovanović’s political thought was that of the state, to which his father, on the other hand, paid little attention.\textsuperscript{37} Unlike the father’s adherence to the popular sovereignty theory, the son adopted Bluntschlie’s theory of state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{38} Furthermore, the evolution of their thought differed in that the father had been raised with traditional values, which he came to criticize over time, while the son received an un-

\textsuperscript{34} S. Jovanović, “Vladimir Jovanović”, 114.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} On Vladimir Jovanović’s contractualism, see Popov, “Liberalne ideje”, 314.
traditional, liberal upbringing, and then gradually, criticizing and analyzing it, came up with his own views of the relationship between traditional and liberal.

With his theory of the state, Slobodan Jovanović made a sweeping synthesis of the theories of his predecessors. In doing so, he did not simply revisit the main ideas in the history of political philosophy and law, but came up with systematically developed and thoroughly thought-out propositions. During his long-standing concern with the concept and organization of the state, he studied traditions of ancient and modern political philosophy, from Plato, through Hobbes, Bodin, Machiavelli, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Burke, to Kant, Hegel, Tocqueville, Mill and Marx. Of course, he was not content to interpret the basic theoretical tenets of the most prominent political philosophers. The subject of his careful analysis were also their disciples and followers, the most prominent German legal and political philosophers and theoreticians of the state such as J. Bluntschli, P. Laband, G. Jellinek, H. Kelsen and C. Schmitt, the British and American political thinkers and statesmen, such as W. Bagehot, W. E. Gladstone, A. Balfour and W. Wilson, and French philosophers, lawyers and historians such as H. Michel, H. Taine, L. Duguit. As a result, Jovanović’s theory of the state may be said to constitute a synthesis of classical and modern political theories of the state, of the German general theory of the state (Allgemeine Staatslehre) and the British political experience.

39 J. Bluntschli, Lebre vom modernen Stat (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1875–76); P. Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches (Tübingen and Leipzig: JCB Mohr, 1901); G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre [1900] (Berlin: O. Haring, 1914); H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin 1923); C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1928) etc.

40 Just as the German Staatslehre was centred on German institutions, so the English studies on constitutional and parliamentary systems were almost exclusively devoted to the English political and legal tradition. There were few scholars who sought to analyze and synthesize German, British, French, Swiss and American political and legal theories. Jovanović, Osnovi snage, 6, points to an exception, A. Dicey’s comparative analysis of the British and continental constitutions in the latter’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan and Co, 1885), and points to the relevant American authors he drew from: J. W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (Boston and London: Ginn & Company, 1890) and T. W. Wilson, The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics. A Sketch of Institutional History and Administration (Boston: D.C. Heath & Co, 1889), and he also refers to W. W. Willoughby, In Examination of the Nature of the State: A Study in Political Philosophy (New York and London: Macmillan & Co, 1896). On French philosophers and historians, notably Alfred Fouillée, and their recognizable or potential influence on S. Jovanović, see M. Ekmečić, “U potrazi za filozofijom istorije Slobodana Jovanovića” [In Quest of Slobo-
Jovanović’s very cautious use of dialectics amounts to the view that the tension between a thesis and its negation may be resolved in a synthesis or, in other words, that it is preferable not to completely reject the principal points of the negated thesis but, rather, to produce a new unity, which is amenable to further development. Accordingly, changes in government and society should involve carrying over that which makes the cornerstone of the state into the next stage of its existence. For example, a change from absolute monarchy to a different system of government should not entail the utter abolition of the monarchy, but rather what was good in it should be preserved and combined with what is positive and indispensable about the new ideas, such as the imposition of limits on absolute power. In other words, it is not monarchy as such that should be abolished, but only the absolute one. The new unity or synthesis thus generated would be a constitutional monarchy. It would be able to ensure greater strength and stability to the government than the former absolute monarchy, because it would be able to build up cohesiveness in the society by distributing its attention evenly to all of its ranks.

Jovanović’s studies on Plato and Burke offer examples of how to arrive at a synthesis between tradition and individualism, or between the concepts of the state and freedom. In his study on Plato, Jovanović emphasizes that before the advent of democracy in ancient Athens, the individual lived, much like the individual in any other Greek polis, in accordance with the customs and traditions he had been brought up with. However, the rise of individualism and the resulting freedom to criticize social authority, as well as the precedence of self-interest over that of the community, led to a break with ancient Greek culture and customs. Jovanović points out that, until Socrates, Sophist individualism was perilous to the Athenian state, because, in its subjectivism, it proclaimed personal success and pleasure as the highest value, which, if consistently taken further, becomes devastating for the state. Jovanović demonstrates, however, that Socrates “objectivized individualism” and found a basis for reconciling it with the state. He points out


Although Jovanović’s use of dialectics goes beyond the level of formal logic, he applies it very cautiously and does not make it the basis of his entire theory, believing that attempts at totality, such as Hegel’s, are far too ambitious: “Using dialectics, Hegel created a new logic, more supple and dynamic than the ordinary formal logic was — but this logic of his, operating with moving rather than fixed concepts, was a logic nonetheless, and had its permanent laws (thesis, antithesis, synthesis). Hence Hegel believed it possible to predict the course of history by deductive means — or pure reasoning.” See S. Jovanović, “Marks” [Marx], SD 9, 253.

S. Jovanović, “Platon” [Plato], SD 9, 83.
that Socrates used rationalism to provide individualism with a state-building dimension. He thinks of Plato as an individualist in Socratic terms, striving to reconcile the aristocratic notions of tradition and virtue, passed down within the family, with individualism, which proclaimed the freedom of thought and self-determination.

It does not seem difficult to draw an analogy with the situation Slobodan Jovanović found himself in. As we have already said, Vladimir Jovanović was raised with traditional values, but he came to embrace individualism and liberalism during his education abroad. His bond with his nation and tradition was that of patriotism such as he embraced abroad together with liberalism. Just like Socrates had left it to Plato to resolve the tension between freedom and the state, Vladimir Jovanović left his liberalism, an integral part of his ambitious education programme for his children, to his son to reconcile it theoretically with the state and tradition. Slobodan Jovanović passed through his father’s liberal and positivist education programme, but he also had a strong sense of state and tradition. His earliest treatise resonates with individualism. Later on, his *State* (*Država*) gives precedence to the state over individualism, but without letting freedom lose definition and dissolve in the larger state framework. As Plato, through Socrates, had made a synthesis of tradition and liberal individualism from traditionalism, so Slobodan Jovanović, through Vladimir Jovanović, made a synthesis between state and freedom.

There is a certain similarity between Jovanović and Burke, as they both moved, or so it seems at least at first sight, from the initial liberal premise towards a conservative one. According to Jovanović, far from seeking to dismantle the state for the sake of freedom, Burke had simply wanted to hinge the two together where purposeful and necessary. Thus, he had advocated freedom for the sake of a stronger state, not because he had been

---

43 Ibid., 17–18.  
44 Ibid., 21.  
47 S. Jovanović first published the study under the title *Osnovi pravne teorije o državi* [Foundations of a Legal Theory of the State] in 1906, and its revised editions titled *O državi, osnovi jedne pravne teorije* [On the State: Foundations of a Legal Theory] in 1914 and 1922. The final version, titled *Država* [The State], appeared in two volumes in 1936, and it is that version that has been included in vol. 8 of his *Collected Works* published in 1990.
a champion of freedom for all and at all costs. Jovanović uses the example of Burke to demonstrate the meaning of political conservatism, which is to maintain the existing system but to remove its abuses. On the other hand, Jovanović suggests, radical politicians, being inclined to radical changes, as soon as they notice abuse in an institution, they apply themselves to dismantling the whole institution. Criticizing the French Revolution, Burke pointed out that its ideologists and leaders discarded traditions and historical legacies as prejudice, and began to build a state from scratch, following the “metaphysical” ideas of the philosophes. Long-lasting polities extend beyond the lifetimes of individuals, and even beyond their comprehension, which is why it is erroneous to take “the individual with his ‘rights’ and his ‘freedoms’ as the supreme measure of social institutions. The individual must not forget that his ‘rights’ only exist if they can be brought into agreement with the rights of the other members of a society, just as his ‘freedom’ exists only so long as there is a social organization that safeguards it from private abuses.”

Burke held that individuals ought to understand that they were but a part of a higher entity, and that their rights and liberties were only possible if conjoined with their duties and obligations towards the higher entity (state). However, Jovanović raises the question as to why Burke was unwilling to allow that at least the introduction of a constitution, i.e. the limits of royal power, was an acceptable idea of the French Revolution; in other words, why did Burke reject what had already been there in Britain and what he himself consistently advocated? This is why Jovanović finds the French revolutionary leader Mirabeau closer to his own views, as his project envisaged a constitutional monarchy on the model of Britain.

Jovanović emphasizes that Burke was right in claiming that individual rights and liberties provided too narrow a basis for social morality, because democracy, in its further development, had to expand the ideology of personal rights to include that of social duties, which became the basis for the theory of social solidarity. Jovanović shares Burke’s, and generally British, notion of politics, according to which politics, as a technique, is not a mere contrivance of the human mind, because what it needs are our moral qualities rather than intellectual. Jovanović points to utilitarianism as play-

48 S. Jovanović, “Berk” [Burke], SD 9, 182.
52 See S. Jovanović, Vodji francuske revolucije [Leaders of the French Revolution], SD 1, 57, 76.
ing a very important role in the British notion of politics. He emphasizes, however, that Burke’s viewpoint, not altogether free of utilitarianism itself, is typically British. On the other hand, Bentham’s utilitarianism, according to Jovanović, is practical rationalism qualified by the principle of utility, and is not as typically British as Burke’s way of thinking.\textsuperscript{53} For Burke, politics is an empirical science which is not to be learnt \textit{a priori}: “The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught \textit{a priori}. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us in that practical science; because the real effects of moral causes are not always immediate: but that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation: and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces in the beginning. The reverse also happens; and very plausible schemas, with very pleasing commencements, have often shameful and lamentable conclusions.”\textsuperscript{54} Politics needs a special moral discipline that makes man moderate in his use both of his power and of his freedom.\textsuperscript{55} A nation that allows not its government to decline into tyranny, or freedom into disorder, has no need to change its institutions all too often; it is able to progress even with its old institutions, however they may appear to the judgement of pure reason. Jovanović concludes that Burke is a truly British politician, insomuch as the British understanding of politics entails resolving social issues on the basis of experience and customs rather than speculation and theory. He points out that W. Bagehot,\textsuperscript{56} in the nineteenth century, and A. Balfour, in the twentieth

\textsuperscript{53} These strains of thought may be said to have enjoyed greater popularity in continental Europe than English mainstream political thought precisely because they had already been incorporated into the continental Enlightenment and rationalism. Benthamism was “completely concrete and practical” rationalism, but rationalism nonetheless. See S. Jovanović, \textit{Primeri političke sociologije: Engleska, Francuska, Nemačka 1815–1914} [Examples of Political Sociology: England, France, Germany] \textit{[1940]}, SD 10, 28.


\textsuperscript{55} According to S. Jovanović, “Berk”, 212: “This equation of morality with practicality is not specific to Burke, it is common to all of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. This Protestantism has brought together two contradictory things: the ability of self-control, to the point of asceticism, and the need for incessant activity, to the point of greed for material goods.”

\textsuperscript{56} The words of the English poet Arthur Hug Clough quoted by Bagehot appear to condense what may be described as characteristic of English political experience: “Old things need not be therefore true, O brother men, nor yet the new; Ah, still awhile the old thought retain, And yet consider it again.” See W. Bagehot, “Physics and Politics”, in vol. IV of \textit{The Works of Walter Bagehot}, ed. Forrest Morgan (Hartford, Conn.: The
century, base their views on Burke. What is most acceptable to Jovanović is that government decision-making should be experience-based, because the state, longer-lasting than any one individual, relies for its law on its own traditions rather than on the changing will of its members.

Rather than a mere compiler or a skilful eclectic, Slobodan Jovanović was a synthetic thinker capable of arriving at his own conclusions through scrupulous considerations. The result of his entire work, therefore, is a theory of the state which is distinctly his own despite its similarities to the earlier theories: “He resembles some English authors who, embracing the Hegelian conception of the state, suggest that it is within the state that the individual achieves freedom and protection.” Although his state is not a utopian ideal, he does sketch an ideal state envisaged as sustainable and well-balanced. The idea is old, but he elaborates it in a new way. He envisages a mixed government, i.e. parliamentary monarchy, which would introduce universal suffrage and bicameralism in order to combine, on the model of the ancient Greek theories, elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, as well as control mechanisms for maintaining the balance among the real historical forces — tyranny, oligarchy, plutocracy and tyranny of the majority. The state is seen as a complex and insufficiently harmonious group where there is an incessant struggle among different social ranks, parties, etc. This is why the state — as a neutral force that takes care of its interests and whose very organization is a “guarantee of the neutral exercise of power” — has to maintain a balance between the centripetal and centrifugal forces.

3. Vladimir Jovanović and Slobodan Jovanović: two conceptions of parliamentarianism

The major difference between Vladimir and Slobodan Jovanović in the notion of parliamentarianism is based on the different philosophical foundations underlying their political convictions. Vladimir Jovanović’s notion of parliamentarianism, unlike that of his son, is based on the continental reception of the phenomenon, the one mediated by the ideas of Rousseau and the French Revolution. Although he favoured the Westminster system, his liberalism was based on French Enlightenment rationalism, and “he was most susceptible to the French left-wing ideas. According to these ideas,

Travelers Insurance Company, 1891), 568. For a Serbian edition, see Postanak i razvitak naroda, transl. by Dr Drag. T. Mijušković (Belgrade: SKZ, 1903), 171.


59 S. Jovanović, Država, 87.
which the poetry of Victor Hugo’s exile disseminated throughout Europe, it only takes to rid peoples of their kings and to give them education, and everything will be just fine.”

Slobodan Jovanović preferred the British political experience over the continental. His first published theoretical paper is a critique of the widespread political prejudices grounded in Rousseau. He thoroughly analyzes, interprets and criticizes the theory of natural rights, contractualism and the concept of popular sovereignty. In his opinion, continental political philosophies misinterpreted the original English institutions, notably in their understanding the division of powers as the division of sovereignty, which led to the institution of the National Convention, which before long

---

60 S. Jovanović, “Vladimir Jovanović”, 93.
61 S. Jovanović analyzes the political system and experience in Britain in a number of studies: “Les origines du régime parlementaire par Slobodan Jovanovitch”, Revue d’histoire politique et constitutionelle 1 (Janvier–Mars 1937), 153–157; “Engleski parlamentarizam” [English Parliamentarianism] [1902, revised ed. 1933], SD 2, 611–649; “Engleska ustavnost” [English Constitution] [1928], SD 12, 416; “Engleski federalizam” [English Federalism] [1920, 1933], SD 2, 650–654; “Engleski parlamentarizam posle rata” [English Parliamentarianism After the War] [1922], SD 12, 251–254; “Engleski socijalizam” [English Socialism] [1936], SD 12, 317–320; Primeri političke sociologije; “Sidni Lo, Engleski parlamentarizam” [Sidney J. M. Low, English Parliamentarianism] [1929], SD 12, 419–422; “Političke ideje savremene Engleske” [Political Ideas of Contemporary England] [1927, 1935], SD 9, 409–416; “Pluralizam” [Pluralism] [1931], SD 9, 401–408; “Savremeni politički problemi s engleskog gledišta” [Contemporary Political Problems from the English perspective] [1933, 1935], SD 9, 417–424; “Gledston” [Gladstone] [1894] in Nepoznati radovi (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2005), 192–200; “Gledston” [Gladstone] [expanded and amended ed. 1938], SD 12, 17–114; “Džon Morli” [John Morley] [1901, 1933], SD 2, 682–687; “Artur Balfur” [Arthur Balfour] [1903, revised and expanded ed. 1930, 1933], SD 2, 673–681; “Toma Karlaš” [Thomas Carlyle] [1904, 1933], SD 2, 655–672; “Berk” [Burke], SD 9, 151–212, etc.
62 S. Jovanović, “O društvenom ugovoru” [On Social Contract], SD 12, 175, emphasizes that Rousseau’s ideas had the greatest impact on the political education of the public: “In nine cases out of ten, the writing intended for a broader public, especially in newspapers, takes for definitive the truths that the social science has arrived at, as if it were possible for science to ever reach such truths. In Europe, more or less everywhere, the public takes them so much for granted […] that they indeed can be taken as a sort of social prejudice”. He also points out that Rousseau was an inheritor of the classical tradition and that he understood freedom in ancient Greco–Roman terms. V. Stanović, “Apsolutna vladarska vlast”, in Slobodan Jovanović, Ličnost i delo, ed. M. Jovičić (Belgrade: SANU, 1998), 641, points to the fact that at the time of the publication of Jovanović’s O društvenom ugovoru, a Serbian edition was published in Belgrade of Fustel de Coulanges’s book La Cité antique (Paris: Durand, 1864), which “shattered misconceptions harboured by many French revolutionaries of the century, by showing that the so-called free man in ancient Greece at the peak of her democracy was a slave to the state”. 
ended up as the absolutist tyranny of an individual (at first Robespierre and then Napoleon). Slobodan Jovanović believes the English model to be a well-working one. As he deems the original better than its copies, he believes it necessary to understand the original rationale of the Westminster system. His view may thus be described as a call for a return to the original. This, of course, does not mean that one should blindly imitate the original down to the smallest detail, but rather that one should gain a profound understanding of the meaning of political experience as construed from Burke's philosophy, which he demonstrates to be the mainstream of British political thought. This is why Jovanović advocates “integral parliamentarianism”, by which he means a bicameral parliamentary monarchy with the lower house members elected through universal suffrage. He is convinced, and often seeks to demonstrate in his writings, that the absence of these basic principles of parliamentarianism inescapably leads to an anomalous parliamentary life and, at the end of the day, costs dearly.

Slobodan Jovanović's formal education equipped him well with logic as the *organon* or instrument for rational thinking. Therefore, he was well aware that false premises could lead to a true conclusion. Even though he did not accept his father's form of positivism, or of liberalism, or, consequently, his conceptions of patriotism and parliamentarianism based on such liberalism, he was aware that there was little difference between his father's views and his own when it came to their translation into practice. Although greatly attached to the French radical left-wing ideas, Vladimir Jovanović never allowed emotions to blur his profound conviction, based on Mill, that liberty was the right of political dissent the exercise of which must not be blocked out by the ideal of equality, and that it was necessary to ensure political rights for the educated and well-to-do minority, who would be unfailingly outvoted should universal suffrage be understood as a sheer majority rule. Slobodan Jovanović suggested that it was erroneous to treat the majority as the whole, because it was only majority and minority taken together that constituted a whole. This is why both Vladimir and Slobodan Jovanović favoured a bicameral parliament over unlimited majority rule. As for the question of monarchy, Vladimir was a republican in theory, but a monarchist in practice. Both Vladimir and Slobodan Jovanović advocated a parliamentary system for Serbia.

---

63 Criticizing Mill's view that proportional representation makes the upper chamber redundant, Jovanović points out to the position of Leslie Stephen, “Value of Political Machinery”, *Fortnightly Review* (Dec. 1875), that the centre of resistance must be outside the body being resisted to, not within it.

64 In addition to general theoretical and historical reasons, Jovanović, “Sur l'idée yougoslave”, 294, is convinced that a parliamentary system best suits the mentality of the
disappears when compared to the notion of parliamentarianism entertained by the then predominant parliamentary party, the Radicals. The Radical Party was founded by the Socialist disciples of Svetozar Marković, the main opponent of Vladimir Jovanović in the period of the United Serbian Youth, but its theoreticians eventually “came to read Western liberals more than the Russian socialists Chernyshevsky and Pisarev, namely Constant, Bagehot, Bluntschlie, and the socialist Lassalle, who instructed his followers how to carry out their programme through universal suffrage instead of revolution”.65 The Radicals saw parliamentarianism simply as a vehicle for expressing the will of the majority, or Rousseau’s volonté générale. Slobodan Jovanović found such a view particularly debatable, because it tended to nurture the widespread misconception that democracy necessarily meant direct democracy, even though such a form of government was nowhere to be found.66 The Radical notion of parliamentarianism was markedly simplified and reduced to the right of the majority government to run its affairs unimpeded until the next election. Any interference of the Crown and any Opposition’s filibustering was immediately understood as an aberration from the correct form of parliamentarianism. Unlike the Radical understanding of parliamentarianism, the British majority government was limited both by the Upper House and by public opinion. The Radical theoreticians, however, made it seem as if “the majority government in England is completely unlimited, and that therefore our struggle for the constitution should end with replacing the monarch’s omnipotence with the majority government’s omnipotence”.67

Slobodan Jovanović considered the bicameral system, as integrated into his political theory, universally applicable.68 He did take into account Serbs, finding that personal regimes “have never been popular with the Serbs”. Cf. also S. Jovanović, “Serbia Traditionally Land of Democracy”, *The American Serb* 4/1 (Chicago, Nov. 1947), 2.

65 S. Jovanović, “Nikola Pašić”, *SD* 12, 145. Jovanović particularly emphasizes (ibid., 206) that Bagehot’s great impact in the Balkans could be given an entire study.


68 In 1899, Slobodan Jovanović joined the debate over the division of Serbia’s legislative body with a polemic paper, “The bicameral system”, the goal of which was to offer
particular circumstances and customs specific to particular countries, but generally believed that the bicameral system was an essential and integral part of the legislative body. In addition to offering theoretical arguments, he supported his proposition with the fact that unicameral parliaments were rare, unlike the bicameral system, which was only absent in Balkan and Latin American countries. The political parties in Serbia occasionally changed their attitude towards the bicameral system, depending on changing political circumstances, but on the whole, the Liberals and Progressives supported it and the Radicals opposed it. The Liberals and the Progressives shared the same basic political principles: “Neither the Progressives nor Liberals advocated unlimited popular rule, but rather wanted that the intelligentsia should participate in government along with the people.” The Progressives were “more libertarian than the Liberals themselves”, but less democratic. Under the Radical administration, although not without intellectuals in the cabinet, the Radical parliamentary group with peasant spokesmen calling the tune was frequently more powerful than the government itself. What Slobodan Jovanović saw as the main weakness of Serbia’s parliamentary system on the eve of the First World War was not that the monarch practically renounced his constitutional powers, or that the gov-

all general and particular, theoretical and practical, arguments for introducing an upper chamber. The upper house was introduced by the 1901 Constitution and abolished in 1903. See “Dvodomni sistem” [The bicameral system] [1899, 1910, 1932], SD 2, 231–271.

9 Ibid., 249.


71 Ibid.


73 Ibid., 68.

74 Commenting on Ž. Perić’s criticism of the decision of King Peter I Karadjordjević to abstain from his constitutional powers, Jovanović emphasizes that a distinction should be made between monarchs who do not perform their duties because they lack a sense of duty (e.g. Queen Victoria’s widowhood) and those who, exercising their right to free judgement (discretion), decide not to wield their constitutional powers in given circumstances: “His inaction was no less of a political act than his action would have been. It is a political act, because it originates from political motives and may result in incontestable political gain. In politics, inaction is sometimes more useful than action.” See S. Jovanović, “Perić o vladalačkoj vlasti” [Perić on monarchic government] [1938], SD 11, 636.
ernment was run by parties and amateurs, or the fusion, common in parliamentary systems, of legislative and executive powers, i.e. concentration of power in the hands of the leader of the majority party, but rather the almost unlimited power of the parliamentary majority and the government, i.e. prime minister. It was this lack of balance, caused by the implementation of an oversimplified version of parliamentarianism, that accounted for some of the weaknesses of government and political life in the period between 1903 and 1914, which could have been avoided or at least lessened.

Even if the “period of the restored parliamentary system”, with a monarch “who wished to be a strictly parliamentary ruler”, with its political liberties and freedom of speech, was not a “golden age” in Serbian constitutional history, it certainly was a successful one. Had the bicameral system not been abolished by reinstating the 1888 Constitution, the government would have proceeded more cautiously and some outcomes would not have been as damaging as they were. But: “What the development of the Serbian parliamentary system would have looked like, we cannot know, since the constitutional question in the common Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes assumed a completely different perspective and significance.”

Bibliography and sources


75 S. Jovanović, “Periodi”, 470.


This paper results from the project of the Institute for Balkan Studies History of political ideas and institutions in the Balkans in the 19th and 20th centuries (no 177011) funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.
Abstract: Literary work and criticism was a significant aspect of the public activity of the short-lived Young Bosnia movement, but an aspect which has been unjustly neglected in historiography or overshadowed by the political aspect marked by the struggle for national liberation. Much as the movement was unstructured, contradiction-ridden and often uncertain whether to give precedence to the ethical or the aesthetic dimension of literature, its openness to the pace-setting European cultures gave an impetus to laying the literary and intellectual groundwork for the modernization of not only the local literary scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also of the shared cultural space in interwar Yugoslavia.

Keywords: Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna) movement, literary work and criticism, cultural modernization, national liberation, Yugoslav idea

The first certain signs of a literary revival, spurred by the work of members of Young Bosnia in the period between the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908) and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1914), were observable in the new generation’s critical attitude towards literary tradition. At first, the Young Bosnia literati, still lacking sufficient intellectual freedom and literary education, went no further than criticizing the local literary situation. Later on, having left their high-school classrooms and illegal literary clubs for Zagreb, Belgrade, Vienna, Prague, Krakow, Graz, Geneva, Lausanne, Paris and other European universities, they came to feel confident enough to embark upon critical reassessment of the Serbian and Croatian literary heritage. Dissatisfied with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s insular literary regionalism, they required of local writers to meet the standards set by the most distinguished Serbian and Croatian critics of their times. In that way, they put the local literary production, which Serbian literary criticism tended to treat too leniently for national and political reasons, on an equal footing with the work of other Serbian and Croatian writers.

Aware that some tidying needed to be done from the outset, they approached the task of reassessing the literary situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina almost in unison, as if following a defined programme. “To put together a synthetic overview would make sense and whoever embarks upon providing a reliable overview of the kind will have to be an enterprising man, because there will be difficulties to overcome along the way. Something ought to be said about our reading public, their needs and demands — i.e. if amidst...
this state of affairs and strife in social and political life there is such a thing as our reading public at all. Regrettably, we do not operate in a centralized way in our literary work; the question of magazines needs to be thrashed out: what we need there, and what we do not; finally, one should identify our Serbian national imprint in our literary products and then detect the influence of the milieu and find a distinctly Bosno-Herzegovinan imprint, a reflection of our pitiful political and educational situation.” What the Young Bosnia writers saw as a distinctive feature of the Bosno-Herzegovinan milieu in Serbian literature was primarily the moral strength of the enslaved and destitute people. One of their fundamental critical demands in assessing the literary situation therefore was for literature to turn to life itself with more audacity and immediacy and to portray the state of society, social relations and people’s misery as they really were.

Initially, not even Petar Kočić’s literary work was radical enough to them. “Without the intention to suggest recipes,” Dimitrije Mitrinović writes in his first widely noticed article published in Bosanska vila in 1907, “I assert that we haven’t got a strong realist narrator capable of creating an artistic synthesis of our life and milieu.”2 Another prominent member of Young Bosnia, Vladimir Gaćinović, articulates this demand even more explicitly in his first ever published text (late 1907). In his view, only this consistently realist orientation can help resuscitate literature, until recently contenting itself with national pathos and shallow folklorism permeated with naïve didacticism. “Witnessing the transitional stage of our dumb-founded society, emphasizing a surge of modern ideas, discerning a wide-ranging evolution of our life, sensing the depatriarchalization of the common man, we can see that our short story is blinkered and stunted, that not even amidst so many publications do we have portrayal of social misery and destitution, of the complicated struggle of social elements and groups, of the wretched husbandman squealing and crying amidst his misery and poverty.”3

In elucidating the causes of that spiritual and artistic sluggishness, the young tended to rely on what then were very modern aesthetic theories launched by European positivists and social determinists. Seventeen-year old Gaćinović, even as a high-school student familiar with, say, H. T. Buckle’s History of Civilization in England, embraced early on the deterministic view that “work towards civilization is determined by the economic position.”4 It

---

1 Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Nas književni rad”, Bosanska vila XXII (1907), No. 8, 120–122; No. 9, 138–139; No. 10, 153–154; No. 11, 169–170.
2 Ibid.
3 Vladimir Gaćinović, “Pripovjetke Petra Kočića”, Ogledi i pisma (Sarajevo 1956), 23.
is from this simplified standpoint that he explains the shortcomings of earlier Bosno-Herzegovinan writers: “In the old times there prevailed among our critics the misconception that our society was undeveloped, primitive, our social organization simple, unvaried, that we lived poky, puny, petty lives, that none of that could provide material for a broader portrayal of the feverish nervousness of our age. But nothing is closer to romanticism than that unfounded and dishevelled claim. The reason for the shortage of such literary work should be looked for in the lack of more generous, broader-minded talents, which is determined by the fertility and composition of the soil. That is where lies the root of the unrealness of our short story (in Bosnia), of the absence of modern-day nervousness and restlessness, of the dread and mistrust of novelty. There is no gradation of passions in it, no evolution of a more active life, no decomposition of the sacrosanct dogmas that for centuries have stifled free, unhindered development, repugnant, criticizing any change in views, notions or ways of life. There are no complicated problems in it, social, political, economic, no exhaustive account of the shifting understanding of truth, above all there is no imprint of an agitated land [...] there lack images of that beastly wolfish struggle where moral considerations give in to basic self-interest, where altruism is a fairytale and the ought to moral principle is being trampled upon. There is no power of understanding and drawing character, and that most of all reflects the dilettantism of most our story writers.”

With the exception of Petar Kočić, “predisposed to becoming a broad, open, steady poet and analyst of the soul of his miserable and dejected characters”, Gaćinović expresses strong disapproval of superficiality, primitivism, folklorism, crude observation, sentimentality and pathos, hollow phraseology, lack of mastery of the literary craft, flawed composition, inflexible narrative and an excess of patriotic rhetoric, sweet dreams and airy ideas, and does not hesitate to use the example of the most prominent and most popular local writers of his time to demonstrate his dissatisfaction and strictness. Thus Svetozar Ćorović, “in spite of all his artistry and subtle observation”, unforgivably “fails to produce exhaustive, incontestable analyses of his many heroes’ social torments and predicaments”.7 Radovan Tunguz Perović Nevesinjski, on the other hand, is harshly criticized for his lifeless and unconvincing writing, the kind of literature “born out of those nervous years of our national romanticism when, with raw, crude enthusiasm, amidst slushy, painful dissection and chatter, poetic declamation and national ‘awakening’, ‘a certain hour’ was awaited with eager impatience,

---

5 Ibid., 32–33.
6 Ibid., 34.
7 Ibid., 33.
amidst the inebriated, quite fanciful, expectation of the imminent fulfilment of the Serbian pledge.”

Trueness to life was Gaćinović’s ultimate criterion, but even as a beginner in literary criticism, he formulates quite clearly and precisely the demand that a literary work, much as it contains a sum of realistic elements, ought to be art, whereby he unambiguously condemns the dilettantism and primitivism in shaping a literary work typical of many earlier prose writers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Nevesinjski, for example, he observes “countless errors, syntactic and punctuational, logical absurdities, folkloric observations, misperceptions, deficient knowledge. The few full and polished descriptions cannot make up for superficiality, for the shortcomings coming from a lack of artistic quality, finesse, composition. The tendency of the story is clear and not really off-putting, but its substance, sap, essence, is on a very low artistic level”. While allowing for the possibility that some objective circumstances and financial difficulties may have compelled the writer to publish unfinished and unpolished works, Gaćinović believes that the effort towards a cultural revival cannot bear fruit until literary works become truly artistic; that only soundly, maturely and masterly written works can fulfil the task that life itself assigns to the new Bosno-Herzegovinan literature.

Mitrinović, an accurate and astute observer even at the age of twenty, very perceptive in spotting new and promising literary trends and suggestive in writing about them, goes further than Gaćinović in his reappraisal of the cultural legacy. Unlike Gaćinović, he is unwilling to excuse even Petar Kočić, otherwise enthusiastically received by Young Bosnia, for his excessive tendentiousness which, in Mitrinović’s view, tends to disrupt the smooth flow of Kočić’s narrative.

Aware that Kočić’s bold insight into the living reality of society has the potential to enrich Bosno-Herzegovinan prose with a consistently realist creative strain, he finds that this type of authors have no trouble finding subject matter for their writing. “There is much more dire material for a story, if not for a novel, and there is no doubt that Mr. Kočić will be able to give it a literary shape in his powerful and impressive stories set in Bosanska Krajina. My only fear is that he might lose himself in politics and publicistic, an activity that will certainly be detrimental to his writing.” His fear was justified, as two years later Jovan Skerlić felt compelled to suggest to Kočić: “Give up politics, it’s something anyone can do, and do literature

---

8 Ibid., 35
9 Ibid.
10 Mitrinović, “Naš književni rad”.
instead, at which you are second to none in our country," a piece of advice Kočić was not willing to take, though. Predicting the dwindling of Kočić’s narrative powers at the time the latter was engaged in starting the magazine Otadžbina (Fatherland), Mitrinović, with the self-confidence of a natural critic, spotted a nascent trend which soon became reality in Bosno-Herzegovinian literature in the first decade of the twentieth century. Briefly, even in his early literary critiques Mitrinović showed the ability to catch the drift of what was going on in modern literature, which makes his assessment of the literary situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the eve of the Annexation published in Bosanska vila an exceptionally important document not only for understanding the attitude of the Young Bosnia writers towards literary tradition but also for understanding the role of Mitrinović’s criticism in the youth-led literary action on the eve of the First World War.

Mitrinović’s text in Bosanska vila offers not only a general picture of the literary trends and developments, but also succinct evaluations of the production of some writers. Apart from Kočić, for whom he has much sympathy in spite of all reservations and doubts, Mitrinović sketches literary portraits of Svetozar Ćorović, Radovan Tunguz Perović Nevesinjki, Aleksa Šantić and Jovan Dučić, and offers terse evaluations of the work of Avdo Karabegović Hasanbegov and Osman Djikić, Muslim writers self-declared as belonging to Serbian literature. Setting his aesthetic criteria relatively high, Mitrinović makes no concessions, as opposed to politically more mature, determined and practical Gaćinović.

It is a fact that Mitrinović’s judgments authoritatively put forth in the first ever critical overview of Serbian literature in Bosnia-Herzegovina have generally stood the test of time. In his view, Svetozar Ćorović “lacked self-criticism, taste and keen observation: through writing, he has built himself up, found his style and his way. He has not attained literary finesse yet, but he has certainly accomplished all that is required of a good narrative writer and largely deserves the favour he enjoys among critics and the outside public.” Nevesinjki, on the other hand, “has no taste for realistic portrayal of contemporary life and prefers motives where he can allow free rein to his imagination.” Šantić is “not as rich, sumptuous and emotional as Mr. Dučić, nor is he as elegant and balanced as Mr. Rakić. […] Many of his poems do not possess real value, some do not possess any value at all, and almost none is balanced, rounded-off, perfect. […] Mr. Šantić is not an artist in the narrow sense of the word; he shows little resemblance to Vojislav [Ilić], who has been his inspiration, and has almost nothing in common with the pure art of poetry, such as, for example, Mr. Milan Begović; he is not a master, nor

---

is he purely aware of his poetic creation. Hence come two things. To polish, balance, perfect is what Mr. Šantić cannot do, because he lacks the necessary self-criticism and spiritual culture, and will not do, because that contradicts his own poetic nature and his principles of creation. On the other hand, his poetry has a very likeable intimacy to it, a sincerity, openness of the soul; it appears obvious that most of his poems are born out of necessity and the unconscious, that their creator is a poet.”

Mitrinović’s sober appraisal of Jovan Dučić, although put forth in the casual manner typical of impressionist criticism, contains many elements of an objective interpretation of the poetry whose impeccable style even then received an enthusiastic response from critics and the reading public alike. “Nowadays Mr. Dučić is a poet of finesse and elegance, a graceful artist, authentic, a fully conscious mind; so, all desirable qualities are there. But nowadays there is not enough soul or impression in his conscious pieces; the conscious mind is too visible, […] nor is there the profound emotion and spontaneity of the earlier Dučić. To me, there are two Dučićs in one person; I love the earlier, and respect the later. Susceptible to Western influences to an incredibly large extent, Mr. Dučić has over the years become French, and it looks nothing like a Herzegovinan Serb ennobled by the Romanic spirit. By his nature Mr. Dučić is a passionate man, a hot-blooded Southerner; he is flamboyant, intense, wild, a fantasist, almost always in a state of heightened emotion. Originally, he was a romantic. At first strongly influenced by Vojislav’s poetry, albeit without much harm to his own poetry, he found his way, only to lose it again when he went off to the West. There came parnassists, decadents, symbolists, and changed the man, a metamorphosis that did him neither much good nor much bad. There is in our present-day poetry preciousness, insincerity and absurdity, but there is also careful wording, concern with technique and form; there is a striving for art, the repertoire of motifs is expanding; there is a striving for something new, something freer! We are beginning to modernize, and that is good.”

Mitrinović’s critical perceptivity is obvious both from his disapproval of Dučić’s affected elegance as being unsuited to the poet’s Mediterranean temper, and his acknowledgment that Dučić’s lyric poetry nonetheless expands the field and possibilities of poetic expression. He further develops and concretizes Skerlić’s judgement, modifying it so to suit the notions and ideas of the youth who saw Dučić primarily as a bridge towards the pace-setting cultures.

This emphasis on Dučić’s credit for modernizing Serbian poetry in the early twentieth century foreshadows the bold creative steps that the Young Bosnia literati were about to take. Indeed, within a short span of less than ten years they left behind them Dučić’s parnassist models and
turned to more modern poetic achievements. Gaćinović’s text “A Serbian modernist” testifies to that perhaps even more clearly than the judgment Mitrinović cursorily passed upon Dučić. Sterner and more rational than Mitrinović, a practitioner, revolutionary and organizer of clandestine youth groups, a conspirator whose literary ideas were basically pragmatic and who saw art primarily as an instrument of political action, never failing to emphasize how important for a literary work was to have a social and national tendency, Gaćinović assesses in his own way the far-reachingness of Dučić’s getting closer to the spirit of the European poetic imagination and hails his modernism as a chance for a national literary revival.

Gaćinović’s emphasis on aesthetic value in his interpretation of Dučić’s work is in fact a call in support of the spiritual revival concept, a concept that Young Bosnia was soon to adopt and develop as one of the fundamental literary and intellectual principles of their vitality. “While the generations of the previous literary epoch contented themselves with ethereal and empty figures, this generation, under the influence of French, English, Italian, Russian and German cultures, comes up with more complex and more artistic stuff, at moments equalling those of civilized nations in strength and height. [...] Literary conservatives point their finger at the young people’s departure from tradition. The new poetry might just as well be considered a curse and denationalization. [...] But this generation will not give another Mr. Košutić, which means the triumph of modernity and sound writing. Revitalizing their people morally and aesthetically, removing all darkness and coldness from present-day society would be a direct result of these young people’s triumph. That would be the fulfilment of the moral and social reform of our society.”

Interpreting Dučić’s poetry as the materialization of the temperamental poet’s emotional and intellectual potentials, Gaćinović sees in his rhythmical verse imbued with the classical, pagan, spirit, not only “the sparkling of a rich intellect, the sensual and spontaneous pulsation of the nerve of a strong and living man”, but also an attempt at democratization by a “delicate temperament that can sense melody and harmony even in the dullest and crudest little thing” and “in his tragicness emerges proud and tall in these petty times”.

The belief that, by following Dučić’s example of ennobling the national spirit by the achievements of modern culture and civilization, a small and contradiction-ridden literature would more easily and more quickly become able to catch up with larger and more fortunate cultures was the driving force of the Young Bosnia literary endeavour. A good part of the movement’s literary work transcended its epoch and environment. Amidst

---

13 Gaćinović, *Ogledi i pisma*, 38–42.
14 Ibid.
the deep darkness of provincial bigotry, spiritual and material poverty, largely isolated from major literary and cultural centres, it nonetheless made an outstanding effort to catch up with the trends and achievements of modern literary thought and in that way paved the way for the introduction of fresh ideas in twentieth-century Serbian and Croatian literatures. By breaking up with literary tradition and promoting modern views of literature, the Young Bosnia literary movement pioneered progressive literary thought. They struggled to widen the narrow door to let in the light they craved, and in their wake, new generations, neither knowing nor acknowledging the pioneers, were able to create a new and emancipatory tradition in Serbian literature.

***

Young Bosnia’s critical reassessment of the regional literary tradition and its attempt to introduce some new evaluation criteria for a literature which often tended to compensate for its artistic unevenness by overemphasizing the national tendency was the beginning of a creative and critical ferment of ideas on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s literary scene. In opposition to the obsolete concepts of outmoded insular nationalism, conservative patriarchal dogmatism and primitive populism, which, in the art of literature, were reflected in the older generation’s stubborn insistence on local colour, ethnographic ornament and the lexical treasure of a “pure” vernacular, the younger advocated spiritual emancipation, European standards and the creation of a new intellectual climate on the premises of civic liberalism. Their interest is not confined to local literature; they increasingly and more specifically take a stand on literary developments in Belgrade and Zagreb as the centres of Serbian and Croatian literatures, and demand that our literature venture beyond the narrow confines of overemphasized romantic nationalism and to grow attuned to the progressive, democratic spirit of free artistic creation entirely focused on man and the human condition. This identification with Western literary and intellectual movements and the espousal of a modern perspective on creative practice could not, however, neutralize the national character of Serbian literature, because the principle of modernity was not at odds with the basic conceptual orientation of Serbian and Croatian literatures. On the contrary, it was their new, promising and as yet unexploited possibility, a possibility that was to be embraced and exploited. The national criterion, therefore, could not be a criterion for universal literary value; the individual and subjective was to be emancipated, because the notion had become definitively accepted of art as having not only a historical, cultural and national significance, but also an aesthetic one, hitherto largely neglected.

The loudest and most persistent champion of such conceptions from among the Young Bosnia writers was Dimitrije Mitrinović, one of the most
important, most dynamic and most influential figures of the youth movement before the First World War, a critic and poet rightfully considered by the Young Bosnia writers as a reliable authority on literature and art, a man whom Skerlić described as “one of the leading ideologists and best writers of our young generation”. 15 “There is a view,” Mitrinović wrote in 1908, “that the modernization of our society and our literature brings defeat upon our people, our individuality and our national ideals, but the view is incorrect. We can modernize and cultivate ourselves and yet, thank God, remain alive and well; our literature can open to a strong influence of modern Western literatures, and yet remain our, Serbian, literature; a work can bear a full imprint of the individuality of the people in whose midst it has originated and yet be perfectly modern. […] Our epoch is marked by individualism and liberalism, this is the age of craving the vigour and fullness of one’s own individual life, our art is essentially the art of self, personality, subjectivity. And that must not be ignored. Small and weak as we are, we must fight versatilely and persistently for our survival in the organism of nations, using all means in the process; we are allowed to borrow. We must not be insensitive to the lush and versatile life of the modern and strong West because, if uncultured and unmodern, we shall be overrun by the force of that strong and lush West’s culture. But in looking up to and borrowing from the West, we should not become denationalized; we should become fertilized. Foreign influences should be nationalized, modified to conform to our capacities and circumstances, and only that in the foreign which is cosmopolitan and universal enough should be embraced in order that it might blend well and naturally with our national soul.”16

Taking into account potential resistance to his outlook and aware that it might be maliciously misinterpreted as a form of the very unpopular national and cultural policy of Austria-Hungary which justified its presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina by its civilizatory role, Mitrinović sets out to define what national literature and its nature are. Using a reasoned and documented critique of primitive nationalism and interpreting the basic humanist tenets of modern art, he seeks to divert the course of literary development and encourage the acceptance of new aesthetic and moral values.

According to his views put forth in the article “National soil and modernity”, predicated on a deliberately simplified positivist aesthetics, literature is “national only if it is a sincere, genuine, expression of the national soul; the expression may take whatever form, but it must be sincere. And

if a literary product, whatever its form, is sincere, it is national. Hence, any trend in art is national if its starting point is in the soul of the people and in its own times. And since differentiated individuals, as an organized whole, constitute a nation, the sincere desires, sincere joys and sincere, genuine, heartfelt woes of those individuals constitute the material for the national literature of the nation. [...] And any product of art that is created sincerely and inspired by the spirit of the times is not only national, it is modern as well.”

Taking the short story as a typical example of outmoded and inappropriate folklorism, Mitrinović correctly observes that its tendentiousness has an adverse effect on its literary value, the same as the perpetuation of hackneyed poetic conventions stifles all freer breath and all personal touch. “A good part of the contemporary and a vast part of the earlier short story has little to do with art! A vast majority of our story writers are not artists, but ethnographers of an odd sort, collectors of folk traditions, and the exact portrayal of what is specific, local, unessential is the best they can do. [...] Our short story features people from all Serbian lands, and yet, almost no man from any part of Serbdom famed, perhaps even overfamed, for its folk poetry and artistic instinct. Enumerating and quoting examples of this misfortune of ours is of no use, nor is it a pleasant thing to do. Is there any person of taste and culture who could say that most of our short stories have literary value and that this disaster is not a disaster at all, but rather our pride and joy? To add to misery, the same goes for most of our poetry as well. It is not ethnographic, that is true, but then again, it is too unfree and clichéd; it lacks soul and freedom, and has too many poor verses and a diluted objectivity. It is only our modern poetry, the one since 1900, that offers in its products a sense of self, soul, freedom, art. Our good Zmaj [Jovan Jovanović], who stood unswervingly on the national soil, [...] which, however, was too national, too political and too belligerent, could not create the work which his gift undoubtedly allowed him to create. He may be labelled our and Serbian great poet, that is true, only that the our and Serbian is not a universal value criterion, the only criterion that matters. Unfree and untrue to himself, Zmaj has a historical, cultural and national importance. But this dragon nightingale can tell us little about himself and his soul, about his inner being and his worldview.”

Mitrinović’s emphasis on the poet’s freer expression of his inner self indicates what the new nature of national literature should be: the more ethically motivated, more present and more involved in its own times and environment, the more responsive to the requirements of art and artistic cre-

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.
ation it is, the more contemporary and progressive it becomes. This emancipation from conventionalities and dogmatism will help it become attuned to modern literature and to the spiritual climate of its times and boost the cultural advancement of the nation. “Modernity is not stagnant or absolute or one, just as morality is not absolute and one; it is relative and subject to all manner of change. He who takes part in the spiritual ferment of an age, who can feel its mood and is living in it, can rightfully claim the label of modern man. And, since being contemporary means being able to make life’s deals and to have a life, being modern does not mean being godless, insolent, aloof and exotic. Being unmodern is being uncontemporary, and whoever is outside his times is unable to provide for his living conditions and to live his life to the full. […] Today, modern is the one who feels all this chaotic effervescence of most contradictory and most paradoxical outlooks and systems, all this nervous, quivering, disorderly and hazy atmosphere of our transitional and, perhaps, outstandingly important epoch. Being unconcerned with the current issues of science and social life, staying unmoved and unexcited by the new aspirations of the liberated and confused human spirit means being unmodern and uncontemporary; moreover, unworthy of life. […] Man in all places and times — that is the subject matter of art, its foremost and eternal subject matter; man with his mysterious, indecipherable, and essentially unchanged, psychic constitution, with his small and great joys and sorrows, love and hate, madness and despair, his angelical and divine goodness and beastly and diabolic wickedness, with his lies, deviousness, countless most diverse and weirdest states of mind. What is essential and eternal in man, what makes man human is the subject matter of true and great art. Everlasting works of art are those that depict that which is essentially human, from happiness and sorrow that are to happiness and sorrow that are not, that dwell in human dreams and hopes. That which is specific to a people and a person is irrelevant. And the art that depicts only, or predominantly, that which is specific to a single man, without showing what that particular man has in common with all other men is a miserable art or not art at all.”

The humanist principles, which Mitrinović formulates as essential properties of modern art, largely explain the ethical nature of his aesthetics. Activism, dynamism, sincerity, sensibleness, humanity and full awareness of the interconnection and interaction among spiritual movements and cultures are the essential qualities of modern art, which can accomplish its mission and fulfil its ethic and aesthetic purpose only if it is free and independent. Mitrinović’s text “National soil and modernity” was the first more serious literary and critical programme of the young generation of Bosno–Herze-

19 Ibid.
govinan intellectuals. Boldly embracing many progressive literary ideas of their times, they challenged the established mindset of their patriarchal, nationally oversensitive and conservative environment. Even the earliest stage of their activity, in opposition to their fathers and their moral standards, in opposition to the established literary values, foreshadowed their revolutionary mindset, resolve and consistent radicalism.

Although their aesthetic outlook was largely dependent on radical individualism and on civic liberalism, which had been gaining momentum in European culture, paving the way for the avant-garde movements that were to arise during and after the First World War, the Young Bosnia writers did not fail to notice certain developments within national literature. Fully aware of the already obvious outcomes of the literary rebellion fomented by the Croatian modern movement, whose aesthetic interventions had helped legitimize the merciless criticism of outdated views and values, they embraced the idea of fruitful contact with Europe and the principle of creative freedom, boldness and individualism. On the other hand, they kept close track of what was going on in Serbian literary criticism, borrowing all that was compatible with their radical standpoint. Nedić’s critique of the dilettantism and spiritual poverty of widely celebrated Serbian poets,\(^\text{20}\) elements of Bogdan Popović’s aesthetic doctrine of literary style and taste,\(^\text{21}\) immediate echoes of Jovan Skerlić’s democratism based on a positivist interpretation of art,\(^\text{22}\) all that blended in the texts of Young Bosnia writers, notably Mitrinović, to produce a quite aptly articulated eclectic interpretation of the modern aesthetic and critical tenets on which Young Bosnia was to build its literary activity.

***

As it was easier for members of Young Bosnia to maintain cultural ties with Zagreb than with Belgrade, the latter being outside Austria-Hungary, many cultural trends reached Bosnia-Herzegovina by the very same route that took the young people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to European colleges and universities. The first larger station on that route was Zagreb, long perceived as a link between West-European culture and the oriental Balkan backwaters, an outpost of civilization through which passed, more or less belatedly,


\(^{22}\) Jovan Skerlić, “Uništenje estetike i demokratizacija umetnosti”, *Pisci i knjige*, vol. VIII (Belgrade 1926), 86–123.
almost all cultural movements and creative ideas that left any mark in the regional literary production. Having arrived in Zagreb to study philosophy, literature and aesthetics, the author of “National soil and modernity” for the first time came more directly in contact with a culture that, drawn through the filter of a defiant nationalism and adjusted to the views and strivings of the liberally- and democratically-minded young intelligentsia, could give an impetus to the growth, maturation and intellectual emancipation of a conservative and primitive environment replete with as yet unfreed but powerful creative forces. The guiding ideas of Croatian modernism, as articulated some ten years earlier by Milivoj Dežman Ivanov, best matched the rebellious mood of the young Bosno-Herzegovinan writers, prompted by their very first contact with modern European literature to call for a sweeping revision of the existing literary situation.

Dissatisfied with the persistence of simplified and hackneyed literary forms utterly uncongenial to the spirit of the times, the Croatian modern movement voiced, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a demand for a revival and modernization of literature, describing the modern movement as “the struggle of individuals for freedom. The modern artist belongs not to any school. Modernism hates epigonism — it wants people to live in the present, to rely on their soul, to leave their personal mark on their work. Everyone should live one’s own life. Realism undoubtedly paved the way for this belief, it taught us to look at the world; moreover, it laid down the real foundation of the artistic method. […] Modernism seeks to encompass man in his entirety, it strives for a synthesis of idealism and realism, it wants to find a means by which man can best and most beautifully express his inner self and fulfil his vocation. […] We want freedom; we want to live in the present, to listen out to the spirit of the times and to build on our own, not to merely stand guard at the gates of old fortresses.”

It was from this programme that Young Bosnia adopted the fighting vanguard spirit of modernism, while taking a resolutely critical stance towards the emphatic, sugary and naïve sentimentalism of literary fashionableness which, giving legitimacy to pretentious, pompous and rather bookish verbalism, encouraged the promotion of mediocre or utterly impotent writers. Lack of a national imprint, creative dependence, dilettantism, fragmentariness, inaptitude for synthesis and momentous moves, were much too obvious weaknesses of Croatian modernism to be forgiven, let alone accepted, by the more vigorous and more militant Young Bosnia literary

---

23 M. Dežman Ivanov, “Naše težnje”, Hrvatski salon 1 (1898), 8–9; Milan Marjanović, Hrvatska moderna I (Zagreb 1951), 91–94.

24 Ibid.

25 Milan Marjanović, Savremena Hrvatska (Belgrade 1913), 309.
movement even if its literary achievement fell short of that of Croatian modernism.

The critique exposing the shortcomings of Croatian modernism was a quite notable proof of Young Bosnia’s refined critical sensibility: they were up to doing a critical appraisal even of literary movements that they drew from. Their criticism of the pseudo-artistic work of literarily and creatively sterile “modernists”, linked with the authentically modern strivings only on paper, was an expression of what then was a more progressive aesthetic outlook. Starting from the premise that literature ought to act directly and must not content itself with empty ornamentation, cheap symbolism and mechanical compilation, the criticism of false modernism and poetic mannerism by means of which the literary Young Bosnia sought to go beyond the Croatian modern movement was ultimately a clash of two literary generations, young and old, students and teachers, a dispute in which Young Bosnia asserted its aesthetic maturity and its independence from the outdated Sezession-style understanding of the nature and purpose of literature. This seems to be the only key to understanding a less-than-flattering comment about the Croatian modern movement Mitrinović made in passing: “In the ‘Sturm und Drang’ phase of Croatian modernism, being rumpled and diabolically ‘sensitive’, noncompliant with the logic of language and violent against the poetic material was the order of the day; thus out of imitation of the Viennese ‘sezession’ style was born the dishevelled style of ‘sketches’, ‘fragments’, ‘instants’, a sin against the logic of language just as the impressionist modelling technique in sculpture is a sin against the nature of stone. After all these ‘instants’ of emphatic, feignedly sick and garishly perfumed eroticism, the ‘modernists’ themselves returned to the simple motifs of countryside idyll but, unfortunately, yet again with the emphatics which is even less appropriate there than it is in the poetry of tense nervous atrophy.”

Embracing only the revolutionary spirit of the literary and artistic programme of Croatian modernism, which laid down four basic principles of the modernist movement: creative freedom, simplification of form and expression, enrichment of content, and democratization of art, Young Bosnia revived a significant, albeit by then quite weakened, trend in the development of modern art, adding to their aesthetics the determinist and pragmatist view of the role and effects of literature, as well as a strong conviction that the process of emancipation of national values should begin by raising the cultural level of society and by educating the masses.

26 Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Pod bićem života”, Bosanska vila XXVI (1911), No. 19, 302–303.
The incipient idea of the democratization of culture and art can be found in the Young Bosnia writers soon after their first contact with the Masarykian concept of step-by-step progress through small-scale work, embraced and propagated by the progressively-minded university youth in Prague, Vienna and Zagreb. Even as high-school students, members of Young Bosnia stood up against the harmful, empty and sensationalist literature that flooded the book market and choked off access for good, useful and edifying reading. At first, carried away by the romantic dream of intellectualizing and philosophically educating the mentally inert and spiritually somnolent middle classes, they preach that the philosophical spirit should permeate the masses and thus improve the public and cultural life that suffers from lack of thought, superficiality and frivolity, and has no taste for synthetic thinking which alone can give rise to steadfast and clear convictions necessary to all societies that strive for progress and general prosperity.

Later on, however, realizing that the process of raising the general level of education is a long and laborious one, and dependent on the possibility of mobilizing all spiritual and material resources, a possibility completely beyond their power, they somewhat revise their utopian youthful beliefs and reformulate the demand for democratization in a more mature and more realistic way. “Calling for honesty and good sense is a far cry from believing that the enlightening of the people and the democratization of science are a basis for mending our troubles, and that everything is all right if there are enough good, popular books. What is most important there are political and economic factors; still, nothing can dissuade us from believing that attention should be paid to the moral and intellectual aspect of the people’s life.” Divulging the class character of their democratism, they believed that special attention should be paid to the uplifting of the middle classes, on whose support they counted. Moral stratification, unprincipled partisanship and an almost general political immaturity were, in their view, the severest consequences of the uneducatedness and intellectual indolence of the middle classes on whose moral and spiritual soundness largely depended the progress of the entire society. “A vast majority of our actions, especially in intra-party politics, proceed from spite, envy, selfishness, hate and other disgraceful motives rather than from sound and principled beliefs. It often is a matter of whim rather than of principle. But we shall not be able to move forward in any fundamental way until most our actions

---

28 Borivoje Jevtić, Sarajevski atentat (Sarajevo 1924), 4.
29 Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Razmišljanja”, Bosanska vila XXII (1907), No. 13–14, 221–222.
30 Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Demokratizacija nauke i filosofije”, Bosanska vila XXII (1907), No. 2, 2; No. 3, 40.
are motivated by more serious and more honest intentions. [...] Struggles for self-interest and over minor, trivial, programmatic or tactical differences have been taken to absurdity, and the sacred ambition to have a conscience and intellectual honesty has dwindled to near nil. [...] Everything is being done in a makeshift, offhand, sort of way, from day to day; our thinking is disorderly, agitated and stratified. But the state we are in is not caused only by our unthinkingness, our lack of principles, views and good sense; rather, this unthinkingness is the consequence of our state, which is an unavoidable moment, a transitional phase, in our national development. [...] It is a disgrace that a man who calls himself educated spends his whole life only and exclusively satisfying his basic, physical, needs, without ever even thinking of satisfying higher, finer needs of the spirit and mind! And with a vast majority of that middle public being so small in their spiritual needs, so thoughtless and all but indifferent to truth and morality, can our environment as a whole be other than foul and unhealthy, can our actions be caused by other motives than petty ambition, petty whims, petty considerations and narrow-minded morality?"  

On the other hand, the populist outlook inspired by the realistic Masarykian concept of small-scale work, influenced by Kočić’s rebellious realism and prompted by the economic and social situation in rural areas, led the youth to promote an intensive and systematic educational effort as one of the basic goals of their action. “To educate the uneducated, to raise the fallen and to prepare the people for a better life is the duty of every conscious member of the people, of the youth in particular. There they can give their best. That is something that our youth know and should be aware of, and they certainly should be doing the same as any youth of more advanced peoples. All the more so as our people’s bad material situation is well known, as are its tremendous illiteracy, woes, incompetence and its lagging behind others. Our educated youth should know that it is their duty to put every effort into changing that bad situation. They should be national and, being aware of the woes and needs of their people, work towards elevating, educating and strengthening the people in all areas of life and work.”  

The debate about evolution versus revolution going on in high-school clubs in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1907 engendered a programme of small-scale work. “Going into the people — small-scale work, getting closer together and education” was the basis of the programme, because “only the

31 Ibid.  
32 “Omladina i društveno prosvećivanje”, Srpska omladina I (1913), No. 5, 92–94.  
33 Pero Slijepčević, Mlada Bosna. Napori Bosne i Hercegovine (Sarajevo 1929), 191.  
economically and nationally well educated peoples are able to endure this cultural struggle, only those who are very strong, who have their culture and great faith in themselves can endure and win. It is true that a people's problems can be solved by using weapons, that the strength and power of a people is judged by its military power, [...] but to solve problems using weapons requires preliminary preparatory work with the masses.”

Educating the masses on a national scale, elevating and channelling people's energy, explaining the current economic and social situation, struggling against illiteracy, idleness, lethargy and oriental fatalism were the key elements of the small-scale work programme to be carried out in face-to-face communication with the common people.

The young intelligentsia, on the model of the Russian populists, set out on foot to reach people, conceiving of their small-scale work as a sort of popular university. The educational programme included lecturing on the economy (tenant-peasants question, agricultural cooperatives, position of Bosnia-Herzegovina in relation to Austria-Hungary), hygiene (alcoholism, syphilis, tuberculosis, health standards, food, clothing etc.), the history of the South-Slavic peoples and topical social issues. Seeing themselves as a generation belonging to the future and reshaping tradition by introducing new and progressive concepts, members of Young Bosnia were precise in outlining the framework and guidelines for their work. “Instead of looking back at graves, at the past, the Serbian young generation ought to get rid of all influence of chivalrous romance and embark boldly upon the noble and beneficial small-scale work that brings about a national revival. Only a materially well-situated people can and must win its freedom, must destroy all vestiges of the old and outdated, and create the new, contemporary, and modern instead.”

Therefore, small-scale work and cultural action were the most important forms of youth activism in the period between the Annexation and the Balkan Wars. Their activism was supported by nationalistic circles in Serbia, notably by the Narodna odbrana (People's Defence): “small-scale and minute work, the humble, unnoticeable and unnoticed work of individuals on the small and minute, when added together, give a great achievement.”

Much later, Lev Trotsky, under the pseudonym Oto Antid, published in the Kiev-based paper Thought an interesting testimony of Vladi-

36 Drago Ljubibratić, Gavrilo Princip (Belgrade 1959), 144–148.
37 “Omladina i društveno prosjećivanje”, 93.
38 Gaćinović, “Bilješka o sitnom radu”, Ogledi i pisma, 303.
39 Narodna odbrana (Belgrade 1911), 27.
mir Gaćinović about the youth movement and small-scale work in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the eve of the First World War, reportedly given at the Parisian café La Rotonde, a wartime venue for many émigrés, artists, writers and intellectuals from all parts of Europe. “This new generation,” Gaćinović recollects his comrades, “constitutes the intelligentsia of the Serbo-Croatian countryside and, led by the school youth, they set up large rural societies: cooperative, anti-alcoholic, gymnastic, and introduce all of them to broad national and social ideas. […] The school youth, of rural origin for the most part, hasten to impart their knowledge to peasants, start courses, found reading-rooms and popular newspapers. During the summer holidays, the university and high-school youth organize scientific-propagandistic excursions. In the villages and towns of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia and Slovenia, they lecture on medicine, geography and political economy. All the year round special groups collect the material for the lectures, which they then publish in newspapers and brochures and spread among the masses. Each Yugoslav province used to have its periodicals devoted to the people, their needs and problems, and gathered round itself the intelligentsia under the slogan ‘Repay a debt to the people.’ […] Of course, our publications were directed against Austrian policies, but that was the voice of an awakened love for the people, rather than of conscious political thought. And yet, as the movement evolved, political thought also began to awake.”

However, Young Bosnia’s small-scale work was soon thwarted. The youths accused in the Pjanić-Ljubibratić trial were charged with, inter alia, delivering speeches to villagers while touring the rural areas of Herzegovina. After the trial before the District Court in Sarajevo ended in April 1913, small-scale work virtually died out, one of the additional reasons being its poor organization. The young intelligentsia’s educational and propagandistic action on the ground, among the people, was an expression of their noble intention to sensitize the masses to the common cause rather than an organized ideological and political preparation. Such preparation was beyond their power, because they had not developed political guidelines

---

40 Nikola Trišić, Sarajevski atentat u svjetlu bibliografskih podataka (Sarajevo 1960), 94.
42 L[T]rotsky], Sarajevski atentat (Belgrade 1922), 6–7.
43 Ljubibratić, Gavrilo Princip, 146.
44 Bogićević, Mlada Bosna, 467–468.
45 Jevtić, Sarajevski atentat, 18.
just as they were unable, in spite of all efforts, to define and prop up a jointly shared set of aesthetic criteria.

On the eve of the First World War, imbued with a strong Yugoslav feeling manifested in militant national-liberation activism rather than in patient educational effort, Young Bosnia even openly renounced small-scale work as an inadequately efficient, far too slow and, ultimately, opportunistic method of revolutionary action. Instead, it avowed the principle of open and determined struggle. The evolution or revolution dilemma seems to have been resolved. “To the gurgling stomach we prefer the unrestrainable palpitation of the national heart, and to gelded satiation, the peril in the struggle for the nation and its soul’s sacred demands. Nor does the bastardly and fattened Czech wisdom about the Only-saving and Only-possible, complete with ‘small-scale work’ — unbelievably small and useless — satisfy the most profound demand of the national being, national honour; nor is the ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ work of endless and phlegmatic evolution enough to us […] What we want now is not a state-building ‘culture’, but life, and we do not believe that a wise progress will give us a state, but we have the will to believe that only a worthy redeemed and worthy-of-us state will create a Culture worthy of us. […] It is unnational to beg for mercy: justice is only attainable with courage. […] Doubt not and despair not; by believing in our resolve, we believe in our purpose, our salvation: let us follow our manly ancestors, with courage to justice.”46

The road travelled from small isolated groups and debate clubs absorbed in lengthy discussion about the tactics and methods of struggle to a fervent and vigorous liberation youth movement marked the genesis of Young Bosnia which, lacking a common and firm ideological orientation and sufficient understanding of the social structure, adopted the idea of militant Yugoslavism as the most suitable form of revolutionary action.

The democratism of Young Bosnia, which was reflected in, among other things, the demand for literary revival and modernization as well as in the adoption and propagation of the concept of mass education and cultural edification, was largely an echo of the democratic spirit of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe. Moreover, from Serbia, nostalgically dreamt of by all progressive-minded youth as being “the road of South-Slavic national and social salvation”, on which Belgrade shone as the “magical light of a Piedmontese beacon on the island of Utopia”,47 came the clear sound of Skerlić’s tribunic words, awakening and enflaming the feeling of national pride and inaugurating the cult of healthiness, strength and

---

46 Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Za Jugoslaviju!”, Vihor I (1914), No. 5, 81–83.
energy. The lesson the Bosnian youth believed they learnt was that all vital issues and problems, which they themselves intuited or recognized, would be resolved if national liberation should come first and social revolution in its wake. By its ideological constitution and orientation, the Young Bosnia movement as a whole was neither the political nor social expression of any one class or any one social layer. As it represented neither the peasantry, nor the middle classes, neither the working class nor even the intelligentsia, its position in the social and economic structure of Bosnia–Herzegovina in the period under study ensured it the possibility of pursuing revolutionary activities in almost all areas of public life.

The revolt against primitivism, folklorism, sentimentality and unproductive pathetic rhetoric in literature; the criticism of intellectual indolence, inertia, conservatism, narrow-mindedness, biased nationalism and petty partisanship; the demand for the democratization of science and art, and, especially, educational action at a grassroots level, were forms of Young Bosnia's cultural action. They had sympathies for the woes and aspirations of the nationally and socially jeopardized social classes because they largely felt them themselves, but lacking a clear-cut platform and firm point of support in revolutionary struggle, they failed, in spite of all their efforts, spontaneous rather than conscious, to attain a higher level of intellectual and conceptual maturity.

Viewed in that light, Young Bosnia's literary activity may be seen as a form of their political action. Torn between ethics and aesthetics, between the political and the artistic, Young Bosnia failed to lay down a consistent literary programme and to define clear-cut literary criteria. Instead, it tended to adjust to the times, circumstances, moment’s needs and often contradictory influences. Notwithstanding its many mistaken beliefs, disagreements and vacillations, it indeed marked many important moments in the development of our literary thought. Venturing beyond the narrow boundaries of a regional and in many respects provincial literacy, the Young Bosnia writers were among the first in our literature to embrace and apply modern European criteria and to champion the principles of democratism and creative freedom, spiritual progress, active humanism and artistic truth.

***

The social position of Young Bosnia had a direct effect on its critical attitude towards political groups and parties, which in turn enabled, in a certain way and to a certain extent, its critical autonomy in the field of art and literature. Criticizing the literary situation in Bosnia–Herzegovina, the Young Bosnia

---

48 Veselin Masleša, *Mlada Bosna* (Sarajevo 1945), 131.
writers in fact stood up against the unwholesome relations in the society to which they belonged and which they expected to invest its spiritual and moral resources into smoothing the process of national revival. Moreover, many of them may be said to have used literary issues as an excuse for divulging their political and conceptual standpoint, for expressing their dissatisfaction and articulating their demands.

In a text about Milutin Uskoković's short stories, for example, Vladiimir Gaćinović develops the ideas of militancy, energy and optimism, thereby putting forth his political and social programme rather than his literary criteria. “Youth literature has never before produced an impression of such devastation, gloom, decay, such dejection and hopelessness, and such dark ideology as it does now. Its life manifestations have never before been as scrunched, uncertain and confused, and all that in a vigorous, flamboyant and strong race. Nothing is as painful and tragic for a generation that is on the threshold of life, when the world is supposed to be too small for its soul, as anaemia, anguish and doubt. Perhaps the generation of tomorrow will bring with it a piece of soul and sun so indispensable to our tormented society.”

There was little difference between his understanding of the young generation's literary role and the political programme of the high-school youth in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The latter, too, highly valued the task of nurturing and boosting moral, physical and intellectual strength, convinced that only a healthy, strong and dynamic youth was capable of reshaping the established social and political relations. “Amidst our overall captivity, we should be the new blood, new outlook, new morality, new race, because only we can bring about the creation of the new, […] which we shall make in ourselves while still at school, in our small school chapters, where we debate, read, speak, create and think. We have to refresh our faith, to keep up our physical and enhance our moral and intellectual strength, and thus become able to carry out a true transformation of society.”

Unhesitant to openly criticize social relations, members of Young Bosnia believed that there was only one way out of the stale backwaters of political and party life: a struggle against pessimism, downheartedness and low spirits, against guile, slander, allegations and counter-allegations, against all that they saw as characterizing the public life of an environment immersed in politicking, opportunism, moral distortion and an unproductive and unwholesome atmosphere.

---

49 Vladimir Gaćinović, “Vitae fragmenta”, Bosanska vila XXIV (1909), No. 5, 238.
50 “Nacrt jednog predavanja”, in Božo Cerović, Bosanski omladinci i sarajevski atentat (Sarajevo 1930), 185–186.
51 Bogdan Žerajić according to Gaćinović, Ogledi i pisma, 67.
52 Mitrinović, “Demokratizacija”.
It was only Petar Kočić and his political group that the youth considered worthy of some support. Having espoused the belief that national liberation would clear the way for the triumph of social justice, they enthusiastically adopted the militant principle of Kočić’s *Otadžbina*: stand on your own two feet and speak up about all woes and troubles of the people. Many forms of Young Bosnia’s activity were contained in Kočić’s programme of the renewed *Otadžbina*, restarted with the intention to disturb the “grave-like peace”, break the spine-chilling silence and let “the manly and clear voice be heard, unpleasant to the ear of power-holders and crawlers, but pleasant to the ear of the depressed and humiliated in village and town alike.”

Although they had never stopped contributing to Serbian nationalistically oriented political papers, *Srpska riječ* and *Narod*, run by prominent national activists, publicists and writers, such as Vasilj Grdjić, Veljko Petrović, Jef-to Dedijer and Risto Radulović, the Young Bosnia writers increasingly shifted, especially after the Balkan Wars, towards the revolutionary youth movement and, eventually, just before the First World War, switched to direct and close collaboration with the progressive Yugoslav youth, while politically supporting Jovan Skerlić, primarily as a national worker, as well as more progressive portions of the Serbo-Croatian coalition, liberal progressivists and democrats, and not only those in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in other Austro-Hungarian South-Slavic lands, Slovenia, Croatia and Dalmatia.

Having asserted themselves in the cultural as well as political struggle, the young generation of Croatian, Dalmatian, Slovene, Bosnian and Herzegovinian intellectuals assumed at the beginning of the century the position of radical democratism which, despite its quite strong national orientation, contained echoes of socialist ideas observable mostly in their approach to the peasantry and agrarian questions. Their activity gained momentum especially after the downfall of the Kuhen regime in Croatia and the unpopular Kállay administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is in a period marked by significant political events, such as the Rijeka (Fiume) and Zadar (Zara) resolutions (3/17 October 1905) and the formation of the Serbo-Croatian coalition. Championing democratic principles, such as universal suffrage, freedom of assembly and association, labour rights protection and taxation

---

54 Djordje Pejanović, *Štampa Bosne i Hercegovine* (Sarajevo 1949), 58 and 62.
55 Branko Čubrilović, *Petar Kočić* (Sarajevo 1953), 214.
system reforms, the Serbo-Croatian coalition initially seemed to offer new potentials for collaboration on a national basis, which gave a boost to the Yugoslav idea round which the progressive youth gathered. After the Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially after the Balkan Wars, the Yugoslav idea became pivotal to the revolutionary-minded youth who, by putting in the demand for national liberation, sought to overcome the situation caused by the opportunism of the part of society that complied with the Austro-Hungarian administration. Young Bosnia’s participation in the youth movement was just one of many trends among the pre-war university and high-school youth, the trend of pronounced militancy manifested in cultural and political action alike.

An important form of national struggle, widely spoken and written of with excitement and romantic pathos, especially in the youth press, was an insistence on the affinity between and unity of Serbian and Croatian literatures. Taking the advantage of its position halfway between Zagreb and Belgrade, the literary Young Bosnia embraced and pursued the action of bringing the two literatures of one language closer to one another. Although it took some of Young Bosnia’s writers quite a while to overcome the Serbian overemphasized national complex, Young Bosnia’s literary Yugoslavism was an expression of their genuine belief that the unity of Serbian and Croatian cultures would best exemplify the two peoples’ brotherhood and be the firmest pledge of their future.

Trained at Austrian schools with many distinguished Croat intellectuals among their teachers, and largely dependent on the Zagreb book market, which was much easier to get to than Belgrade and Serbia, the Young Bosnia writers, despite their oft-stated affiliation to Serbian literature, made virtually no distinction between Serbian and Croatian authors; they would accept every good book of a Croatian author as their own, just as they would reject every bad book of a Serbian author. The possibility of gaining recognition in Belgrade as well as in Zagreb led them to develop and nurture an even-handed attitude towards the two centres, genuinely believing that they were doing a good and useful thing, the more so as such literary policy matched up with their national action and their strong national feeling.

Literary criticism was assigned by some of Young Bosnia’s literary workers a notable role in fostering the idea of Serbo-Croatian unity. Hence they called upon prominent Serbian critics, such as Jovan Skerlić, Bogdan Popović, Pavle Popović or Branko Lazarević, to pay greater attention to Croatian literature, particularly to younger writers, and not only in order

---

58 Masleša, Mlada Bosna, 124.
that these might be introduced to the Serbian reading public, but also in order that, in a roundabout but efficient way, the unity of two literatures might be achieved. Motivated by such ideas, they became more seriously and more systematically engaged in literary criticism, making no distinction between Serb and Croat authors. Given that the youth’s carefully cultivated critical activity in fact marked the beginning of literary criticism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is by no means an accident that criticism, as one of the most important achievements of the Young Bosnia literary movement, was predicated upon the concept of Serbo-Croatian cultural unity. Later on, as critical thought in Bosnia-Herzegovina grew stronger, this fact played a remarkably helpful role in the process of developing objective evaluation criteria for both Serbian and Croatian authors. Young Bosnia’s Yugoslavism set up the tradition of championing the unity of two literatures, a tradition that remained a virtue of not only the criticism written in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also of most critics for whom Bosnia-Herzegovina was a formative setting.

What the Young Bosnia writers saw as their foremost duty and a prerequisite for national action in literature was the obliteration of all borders and a closer acquaintance of a broad reading public with the work of Serbian and Croatian authors. “It is embarrassing to say, but it is a sad fact that we Serbs know incredibly little about Croatian literature. That Croats know perhaps even less about ours is not an excuse. It is high time to realize that cultural rapprochement and unity is needed and necessary, and to work, with that conviction, towards our people’s complete national and cultural togetherness. If the element of our people called Croat were more interested in our life, […] then Croats would be able to say that apart from their own cultural workers they have ours as well; likewise, if the element of our people called Serb were more interested in Croat life, then the number of Serbian cultural workers would double. And the number of cultural treasures would also double. The work of Bukovac, Meštrović, Lisinski, Šenoa, Marković, Dyalski, Kranjčević, Tresić, Begović, Nazor, Nikolić, Kosor, Vidrić and others would be as much Serbian as the work of Jovanović, Mokranjac, Marinković, Ćorić, Lazarević, Knežević, Petronijević, Matavulj, Dučić, Šantić, Rakić, Stefanović, Stanković, Pribićević and Budisavljević would be Croatian. There is today a differentiation in art and literary trends, and nothing would be more productive than crossbreeding between these two slightly differentiated spirits of a single people. A Kranjčević would certainly be a significant and good influence on our younger literati, just as Kozarac, Leskovar, Nazor, Tresić, Begović, Vidrić and Domjanić could

---

59 Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Pjesnik Mihovil Nikolić”, *Bosanska vila* XXIII (1908), No. 29, 450–452.
bring many good and new things. Likewise, Croatian literature would un-
doubtedly use the tone or language of our Dučić, Rakić, Kočić; the critical
spirit of Nedić, the good taste of Sl. Jovanović, the style of Skerlić, Popović
and many others.”

In addition to applying an even-handed critical approach and criteria
to Serbian and Croatian literatures as a method of bringing the two closer
together, the Young Bosnia writers proposed concrete forms of collabora-
tion. Thus, Croatian literary magazines, notably Hrvatsko kolo, the organ
of Matica hrvatska, were supposed to publish exhaustive annual reports on
Serbian literary developments and trends; Letopis Matice srpske was to do
the same thing for the Serbian public. Furthermore, regular exchange of
magazines, journals and books, publication of the finest works of Croatian
authors in the Serbian literary press and vice versa, opening of a Serbian
bookshop in Zagreb and a Croatian one in Belgrade, reform of the high-
school literature curriculum, joint publication of collections and antholo-
gies, were considered a highly helpful tool for establishing closer ties be-
tween Serbian and Croatian literatures. Given that both were written in
the same, and common, Serbo-Croatian literary language, their unity was
to be the ultimate ideal of all writers, and the fulfilment of that ideal their
ultimate national duty.

Aware that language might play a cohesive role, the Young Bosnia
writers paid particular attention to the problems of style and language.
Coming from the areas known for their uncorrupted vernacular speech,
where a refined sense of language was acquired in early childhood, they were
unsympathetic to the pretentiousness and bookishness of poetic language,
arguing that syntactic, grammatical and stylistic errors spoiled the enjoy-
ment even of the best poets. Mitrinović harshly criticized linguistic errors
even in the prose and poetry writers whom he, for one reason or another,
held in high esteem and to whom he devoted extensive analytical essays. In
spite of his positive appraisal of Dvorniković’s essays on psychological peda-
gogy, he criticized the author for using an otherwise nonexistent linguistic
mishmash instead of the pure and correct Croatian language. The liter-
ary merit of Vladimir Vidrić’s poetry, which Mitrinović appreciated for its
chiselled style and formal beauty and in which he saw amazing vitality and

60 Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Pjesma Marina Sabića”, Bosanska vila XXIII (1908), No. 23,
366–368.

290.

62 Ibid.

63 Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Eseji iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike”, Bosanska
vila XXVI (1911), No. 6, 94–95; No. 7–8, 123–124.
murky passion, would in his view have been incomparably greater had the poet shown greater stylistic responsibility and sense of linguistic purity.\textsuperscript{64} Dragutin Domjanić’s lyric poetry, whose merit Mitrinović acknowledged albeit criticizing its colourless affectation and overly decorative phrase, was subjected to a very careful language analysis which shows not only the young critic’s grammatical and stylistic rigour but also his orthodoxy and stubborn belief that the eastern or southern dialect is more suited to poetry than the western one\textsuperscript{65} — a thesis which, in a somewhat modified form, could be heard again a few years later, even from some Croatian authors,\textsuperscript{66} in a poll conducted by the \textit{Srpski književni glasnik} (Serbian Literary Herald). Finding that Domjanić uses Serbo-Croatian as if he were an advanced foreign learner, Mitrinović interprets this shortcoming by the poet’s uncritical concessions to the kajkavian dialect, concessions often “greater than the necessary, unquestioning abidance by the grammar, syntax and style of our language.”\textsuperscript{67}

Even at its toughest, the linguistic purism of the Young Bosnia writers and critics was nothing other than a well-intentioned attempt to remove all obstacles in an area vitally important to national literature in order to clear the way for promising and progressive trends. Considering that members of Young Bosnia were among the first to support and elaborate the idea of literary language unity as a prerequisite for Serbo-Croatian cultural integration, as testified by their incidental language analyses, it is no wonder that linguistic purism became an essential ingredient of their criticism. The idea was even a subject of separate grammatical analyses where members of Young Bosnia, even before the abovementioned poll of \textit{Srpski književni glasnik}, argued for the adoption of ekavian for both Serbian and Croatian literatures, seeing literary language unification as the first step towards cultural integration, and believing that it was the duty of the progressive young Bosno-Herzegovinan writers to get the action going.\textsuperscript{68} Notwithstanding their major or minor misconceptions, their attempt to call writers’ attention to the problems of linguistic expression, syntax and style, should therefore be seen primarily as a striving for pulling together all cultural and spiri-

\textsuperscript{64} Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Pjesme Vladimira Vidrića”, \textit{Bosanska vila} XXIV (1909), No. 10, 157–159.

\textsuperscript{65} Dimitrije Mitrinović, “Hrvatski pjesnik Dragutin Domjanić”, \textit{Bosanska vila} XXVI (1911), No. 11–12, 175–178; No. 13–14, 208–209; No. 18, 283–284; No. 19, 296–297.

\textsuperscript{66} Milan Marjanović, “Odgovor na anketu o južnom ili istočnom narečju u srpsko-hrvatskoj književnosti”, \textit{Srpski književni glasnik} XXXII (1914), No. 4, 285–287.

\textsuperscript{67} Mitrinović, “Dragutin Domjanić”, 175.

\textsuperscript{68} Pero Slijepčević, “Stil, dijalekat, interpunkcija”, \textit{Srpska omladina} I (1912), No. 1, 7–12.
tual resources of the people because, in their view, only if old and insigni-
cant differences and divisions are overcome will the people be able to keep
pace with modern European civilization. In 1913 Jovan Skerlić argued that
Young Bosnia, with its attitude and its language policy, led the way in bring-
ing Serbs and Croats together.69

Much as they were fond of writing about language and language unity,
especially in their texts on Croatian authors, members of the Young Bosnia
literary movement did not let syntactic and grammatical divergences severe
their ties with Croatian literature and writers. Almost a regular contributor
to *Bosanska vila* between 1907 and 1913, Mitrinović paid equal attention to
Serbian and Croatian literary developments. Among his noticed critiques
are those of Mihovil Nikolić, Antun Tresić Pavičić, Vladimir Nazor, Vladi-
mir Vidrić and Dragutin Domjanić, all prominent representatives of Croa-
tian poetry in the first decade of the twentieth century. As Mitrinović in-
creasingly shifted his focus from criticism of the current literary production
to more general aesthetic and philosophic issues, his role as Young Bosnia’s
leading critic was taken by Miloš Vidaković, a more sophisticated, poised
and balanced observer. Vidaković was not as loud about nationalism and
cultural integration. Contributing to Risto Radulović’s *Narod* (People) for a
while, he wrote simply and naturally about books as they came to his hands,
whether Serbian, Croatian, German, French, Russian or Italian, placing the
criterion of aesthetic merit above any tendentiousness. Vidaković’s stan-
dards were quite high and applied consistently to all literature, domestic
and foreign alike.

Young Bosnia thus managed to promote the spirit of Yugoslavism
and Serbo-Croatian cultural unity as a force to which even the older, na-
tionally oversensitive and conservative, generation of writers and cultur-
al workers of Bosnia-Herzegovina began to yield. In 1910 *Bosanska vila*
marked its twenty-fifth anniversary by devoting several issues to the litera-
tures of Serbia, Vojvodina, Croatia, Dalmatia, Montenegro and Macedonia.
The Croatian issue, contributed to by Vatroslav Jagić, Milan Marjanović,
Milan Begović, Tugomir Alaupović, Dragutin Domjanić, Vladimir Nazor,
Ljubo Vizner, Josip Kosor, Rikard Katalinić Jeretov, Antun Tresić Pavičić,
Janko Polić Kamov and others, was edited jointly by Dr Milan Prelog and
twenty-three-year old Dimitrije Mitrinović who, furthermore, laid down
the magazine’s new literary and political programme attuned to the artistic
and nationalistic outlooks of the youth.

Arguing for *Bosanska vila* as a combative, brisk and modern liter-
ary magazine, he sees its modernity in a new attitude towards the national

69 Jovan Skerlić, “Istočno ili južno narečje: razlozi za južno narečje”, *Srpski književni
glasnik* XXXI (1913), No. 11-12, 862–873.
question. “Abandoning its nationalistic exclusiveness, until recently needed and understandable, it should see the Croatian people not as kindred but as its own people and Croatian literature as its own literature. That brings new tasks: to break down the chauvinistic bias against Serbo-Croatian national unity which, apart from political and historical factors, obstructs the unity of our literature; secondly, to introduce Croatian authors and literary work to the Serbian public. *Bosanska vila* has been working in that sense lately, but not systematically and intensive enough; from now on, it is going to perform this duty with utmost seriousness, convinced that in that way it not only helps our literary advancement, but also fulfils its Yugoslav duty, which is indispensable to Bosnia. At some point in the future, if it gets a good response and enough understanding from the public, *Bosanska vila* might also approach Slovene, and even Bulgarian, literature and thus create a small and nice Yugoslavdom in Sarajevo. That is my genuine desire. It is my profound belief that Bosnia should become the land of a most brotherly and most vigorous Yugoslav work. And I believe that in it *Bosanska vila* should play its honourable part.”

Opting for cultural action on a Yugoslav level, Young Bosnia took the road to its full literary affirmation and took the Yugoslav idea beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The idea attracted the youth gathered round clubs and magazines that mushroomed in all Austro-Hungarian provinces, not for the sake of tradition or on the basis of propaganda, but “for the sake of the future and on the basis of spiritual civilization”. Seeking to make their small, backward-looking, discordant and stratified native land into a pivot of a modern national and cultural movement, the Young Bosnia writers took the lead in objectivity and consistency, among other things because their Yugoslavism was an exceptionally suitable and rewarding construct by means of which they hoped to “intensify and expand the struggle against Austria-Hungary and overcome the obstacles in their way”. Notwithstanding their often fatal misconceptions, such as the belief that a predominantly national cultural action could mobilize the socially oppressed masses, they enriched the literary life of Bosnia-Herzegovina with fresh and vital ideas which put a hitherto regional literature on an equal footing with the literatures of the other Yugoslav peoples and at the head of a movement for cultural revival and modernization.

---


72 Masleša, *Mlada Bosna*, 125.
Bibliography and sources

Dežman Ivanov, M. “Naše težnje”. Hrvatski salon 1 (1898).
— Ogledi i pisma. Sarajevo 1956.
— “Odgovor na anketu o južnom ili istočnom narećju u srpsko-hrvatskoj književnosti”. Srpski književni glasnik XXXII, No. 4 (1914).
Mitrinović, Dimitrije. “Naš književni rad”. Bosanska vila XXIII, Nos. 8–11 (1907).
— “Razmišljanja”. Bosanska vila XXII, Nos. 13 and 14 (1907).
— “Demokratizacija nauke i filozofije”. Bosanska vila XXIII, Nos. 2 and 3 (1907).
— “Nacionalno tlo i modernost”. Bosanska vila XXIII, Nos. 19 and 20 (1908).
— “Pjesnik Mihovil Nikolić”. Bosanska vila XXIII, No. 29 (1908).
— “Pjesma Marina Sabića”. Bosanska vila XXIII, No. 23 (1908).
— “Pjesme Vladimira Vidrića”, Bosanska vila XXIV, No. 10 (1909).
— “Za naš književni rad”. Bosanska vila XXV, Nos. 1 and 2 (1910).
— “Eseji iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike”. Bosanska vila XXVI, Nos. 6–8 (1911).
— “Hrvatski pjesnik Dragutin Domjanić”. Bosanska vila XXVI, Nos. 11–14, 18 and 19 (1911).
— “Pod bićem života”, Bosanska vila XXVI, No. 19 (1911).
— “Za Jugoslaviju!”. Vihor I, No. 5 (1914).
Narodna odrhana. Belgrade 1911.
— Noviji srpski pisci. Belgrade 1901.
Pejanović, Djordje. Štampa Bosne i Hercegovine. Sarajevo 1949.
— “Novi omladinski listovi i novi naraštaj”. Srpski književni glasnik XXX, No. 3 (1913).
— *Pisci i knjige*. Belgrade 1926.


— “Mlada Bosna.” In *Napor Bosne i Hercegovine*. Sarajevo 1929.


— *Ljudi za vratima gostionice*. Zagreb 1938.
Serbs in Croatia (1918–1929): Between the Myth of “Greater-Serbian Hegemony” and Social Reality

Abstract: The situation of the Serbian community in Croatia in the years following the 1918 unification has been analyzed in order to test whether the clichéd view of Croatia and Croats as having been endangered and exploited had any impact on the status of the Serbian community and, if it did, in what way. Although the topic is far from being exhausted in this contribution, the examples given suggest that the two nations in Croatia were deeply divided. The sources studied cast quite a different light on the thesis that Croats were “oppressed” by Serbs, a thesis that has for quite a long time been passing as a valid historical interpretation in historiography. These sources suggest that the perception of Serbs as hegemony-minded resulted from propaganda rather than from the actual state of affairs. Besides, they show that the Serbs — systematically portrayed to the Croatian public as invaders and enslavers, while, by contrast, they saw themselves as being “third-rate citizens” — lived their daily lives under strain, surrounded by intolerance, subjected to various forms of pressure and violence, often fearing for their livelihoods, even for their lives. The inexorable logic of facts leads to the conclusion that members of the Serbian community in Croatia felt discriminated against and not quite safe.

Key words: Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia, Serbs, Croatia, ethnic relations, political ideologies, society

The relationship between Serbs and Croats in the common Yugoslav state was from the very beginning a tension-ridden one. The opponents of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS)/Yugoslavia from the ranks of the Croatian political elite systematically implanted a negative stereotype of Serbs (as hegemonist conquerors, enslavers and exploiters) into the conscious and subconscious minds of their co-ethnics, thereby instigating Serbophobia in Croatian society. The motives behind this demonization of Serbs and the Yugoslav state have already been the object of study by historians and other scholars. The question remains open, however, as to whether the cliché about Croatia and Croats having been endangered and exploited — still persisting in Croatian historiography: the Serbs “sought to

1 See e.g. Vasilije Krestić, Srbija i Hrvatska – uzroci sukoba [Serbia and Croatia—Causes of Conflict] (Čačak 1997); idem, Genocidom do velike Hrvatske [By Genocide to Greater Croatia] (Novi Sad–Belgrade 1998); idem, Iz istorije Srba i srpsko-hrvatskih odnosa [From the History of Serbo-Croatian Relations] (Belgrade 1994).
impose domination on other nations from day one” — had any impact on the situation of the Serbs in Croatia and, if it did, in what ways.

The kind of welcome extended to the Serbian Army in the regions across the Sava and Danube rivers in the days of the creation of the Kingdom of SCS is a well-known fact: festive public receptions were organized in many places in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, and the local population expressed their enthusiasm about the Serbian army entering towns and villages in the territory of the former Habsburg Monarchy. Contemporaries suggest that in the second half of 1918 Serbophilia came into vogue in Zagreb and other Croatian towns. Prominent Serbs responded likewise. Seeking to infuse the Serbian community with positive feelings for Croats, they called for them to leave the ordeal they had been put through during the Great War behind, not to let themselves be overcome by unchristian hatred and vengeful feelings, but to choose the road of love, concord and unity with their Roman Catholic brothers. Pro-Yugoslav Serbs believed forgiveness to be the only way to begin a new life in the common state, just as they believed respect for individual and “tribal” freedoms to be the road to winning over those hesitant or opposed. The most distinguished of the Serb politicians who tried to allay the strong feelings of the Serb population in Croatia was Milan Pribićević. He tirelessly spread among the Serb peasantry the idea of equality between Croats and Serbs, which in turn stemmed from his view of their being one and the same people simply divided by religion. Earlier strife and disagreement — seen mainly as the result of “enemy intrigues” — should be left behind: “It does not matter, my Serbian brethren, if some Croats did us wrong. If they made mistakes in the past, we shall not make mistakes today. Their mistakes brought them no benefit; indeed they brought them a lot of harm. ... We shall not make mistakes. We shall

---


3 It should be noted that those Serbian forces were quite small and unable to cope with potential social unrest or armed revolts against the unification project. They in fact only “assisted” local authorities in disarming the population, functioning more as a "psychological and political factor in stabilizing what basically was the old system". Cf. Mile Bjelajac, Vojsa Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918–1921 [The Army of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1918–1920] (Belgrade 1988), 216; Djordje Stanković, Izazov nove istorije, 2 vols. [The Challenge of New History] (Belgrade 1994), vol. 2, 87–90.

4 Pavle Janković, Velikobrezati protiv naše države [Croatian Nationalists against our State] (Novi Sad 1922), 4.

5 “Narodna propovjed o jedinstvu”, Pučke novine No. 3 (Zagreb), 21 Jan. 1919, 1–3.
not become proud in good times, as we did not humiliate ourselves in evil times. We have always lived for justice. For justice we shall always live.”

Although the Serbian side did not fail to call for tolerance and respect for the other, national reconciliation was not substantial. Josip Horvat argued that at the time of unification and during the first post-war years “a serious sign of hatred was impossible to detect in the masses” (although there was no affection either), but only two months after the birth of the new state some contemporaries believed that the Serbs and Croats in Lika were worlds apart, that distrust, intolerance, even hate between the two nations were “in full bloom”. Dr Djordje Branković, MP, acquainted the Parliament with what he had experienced in Lika in 1918: the volunteers returning home from the war were given “sullen” looks and called “derogatory names”, and by the anti-state element that had fought on the Austro-Hungarian side until the very end. A certain Miškulić, priest from Gornji Kosin, overtly demanded that Serbs be expelled. The 4th Military District Command put down the tension among the people and their discontent with the state to the lenient attitude of authorities towards serious offences and to inconsistent law enforcement practices. A report to the General Headquarters described “an inauspicious situation in Lika due to campaigning by the untrustworthy element ill-disposed towards the present situation and to the passivity of officials and gendarmerie”.

The same claim came from the commander of Otočac. Warning that a “clique” of “bigoted” supporters of Josip Frank’s faction (Frankovci), intent on breaking up the state, “scold the Serbs, the Serbian army and the king”, he blamed this “waywardness” on the police’s failure to respond, “either out of fear, out of generosity, or for party reasons”.

---

7 Josip Horvat, Živjeti u Hrvatskoj 1900–1941 (Zapisci iz nepovrata) (Zagreb 1984), 302.
8 Dr Mile Miškulin, “Lička politika”, Riječ Srba-Hrvata-Slovenaca No. 51 (Zagreb), 1 Feb. 1919, 1.
How tolerant the Serbs must have been becomes obvious from articles brought out in Straža, a newspaper published in Osijek, Slavonia. They show that the office of state prosecutor in Osijek was still held by Hinko Vuković, notorious for having prosecuted the eminent Serbian literary critic Jovan Skerlić over his article “Serbia of Tomorrow” in Srpski književni glasnik (Serbian Literary Journal) which offered his vision of twenty-first-century Belgrade as a flourishing modern city; for having persecuting Serbs during the war; and for having banned in 1918 the Croatian Press in Osijek from publishing a literary-philosophical study by Miloš Djurić. Vuković was not the only public servant hostile towards Serbs who kept his office, to mention but the public notary Tucaković, or “director” Sokolić, who was even promoted to the office of governor of Varaždin County, or Anton Hrzić, town captain and chief of police during the war, now head of the Osijek economic office. Many other examples show that there was little change in Osijek as compared to the pre-war period. The police, for example, banned men from wearing the traditional Serbian peasant cap (šajkača), but the Austro-Hungarian army cap was freely worn in the streets. As the Orthodox, in other words Šerbs, kept being termed “Eastern-Greek” in the judicial and schooling systems, Straža made a rightful objection: “Messrs. judges and school principals still cannot get accustomed to this being a kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, where everyone has the right to have their faith called the way their church calls it, and no longer an Austrian province where Vienna, for its political reasons, assigns names and ranks even to faiths.” In 1920 on the Old Style Christmas Day (7th January) observed by the Orthodox Serbs, all Roman Catholic and Jewish
 owners in Osijek opened their shops.\textsuperscript{17} Cyrillic script was the object of aversion to the extent that not even a year after the war did Serbian merchants dare remount their Cyrillic shop signs.\textsuperscript{18} When Cyrillic advertisements appeared on tramcars, \textit{Hrvatski list}, the local organ\textsuperscript{19} of the Croatian Union, promptly launched an attack on local authorities for having allowed such a thing.\textsuperscript{20} While the Croats of Osijek found Cyrillic script unacceptable, they did not mind that a square in their town retained its old name: Franz Joseph Square.\textsuperscript{21} Writing on the robbery of the Popović & Veselinović shop, located in the immediate vicinity of the police station, \textit{Straža} suspected that the police had deliberately chosen not to act because it was a Serb-owned shop.\textsuperscript{22} According to \textit{Straža}, the portrait of King Peter I Karadjordjević was only mounted in a small number of public offices, and the Serbian national anthem and flag were a rare occurrence.\textsuperscript{23} Croatian national associations, which freely resumed their activities in the new state, tended to distance themselves from whatever sounded Serbian. Most members of Kuhač Croatian Singing Society in Osijek, for instance, refused to sing the Serbian anthem in church, which led to an internal dissent and the Yu-

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., No. 3, 10 Jan. 1920, 3.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., No. 6, 21 Jan. 1920, 3.
\textsuperscript{19} A daily paper edited by Slavko Tomislav Diklić of Nin; contributors were Ljubomir Maštrović, Mirko Dečak, Djuro Oršić and Josip Pavišić (AJ, 14-96-235). As its initial circulation of 6,000 grew over the years, reaching 10,000 in 1924, an editorial concluded that the paper had at least 40 to 50 thousand readers, and that “the entire bourgeois and artisan classes of Slavonian towns, and even villages, generously back this paper as their own, finding there an outlet for their patriotic feeling...” Cf. “Hrvatsko novinstvo”, \textit{Hrvatski list} No. 14 (Zagreb), spec. issue, 15–17 Aug. 1924, 9–10.
\textsuperscript{20} “Vesti iz mesta i sa strane”, \textit{Straža} No. 120, 5 Oct. 1920, 2. The paper \textit{Dubrovnik}, in its issue of 7 June 1922, warned about a public campaign being run against Cyrillic script on the pretext that its use was an expression of Serbian hegemony. In contrast to Croatian papers, where not a single Cyrillic letter could be seen, the Serbian papers published in Croatia used both scripts. Moreover, \textit{Srpsko kolo} argued for the parallel use of Latin script on the grounds of its being a world alphabet, and hence not only Croatian but Serbian as well, the official script alongside the Cyrillic, and that knowledge as such, and thus the knowledge of another script, had always ensured progress and prosperity. \textit{Srpsko kolo} assured its readers that the use of Latin script could not threaten national identity: the Serbs from America and even Croatia who did not know the Cyrillic script had nonetheless volunteered for the Serbian army during the world war. Cf. “Zašto donosimo i latinicu” [Why we also print in Latin script], \textit{Srpsko kolo} Nos. 10 and 11, 1 April 1920, 6.
\textsuperscript{21} “Vesti iz mesta i sa strane” [Local and external news], \textit{Straža} No. 6, 21 Jan. 1920, 3.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Straža} No. 14, 18 Feb. 1920, 3.
goslav-oriented choir members eventually left the Society. The rallies of the Croatian Union in Osijek did not have a good word to say about the Serbs and union with them. Their recurring theme was that of “breaking up” with Serbia, creating an independent Croatian army, independent Croatian finances and so on. Hrvatski list ran a systematic anti-government and anti-Serbian propaganda campaign, which did not seem to be countered adequately. As a result, the governor of Osijek County felt compelled to request from the chief state prosecutor in Zagreb to take legal action against “the destructive activity of the press”. According to him, texts whose goal was to “disturb public peace and order”, to “provoke and create disquietude among people”, slandering texts against the government and state institutions and officials, were published in the Croatian press almost on a daily basis, but their authors faced no consequences. “The Serbs of Osijek are being provoked and their feelings offended daily, and nothing?” — was Straža’s terse editorial comment expressing concern over the discriminatory attitude towards the Serbs of Osijek.

In Petrinja, the local elections held on 15 March 1920 were followed by the Frankoveč’s open attacks on Serbs. Later that night a “mob” of people,

---

25 “Vesti iz mesta i sa strane” [Local and external news], Straža No. 133, 31 Oct. 1920, 3. In spite of such an attitude towards the Serbs in Osijek, some Yugoslav Army officers, e.g. General Živan Mitrović, took a very reconciliatory stance. He showed respect for prominent Croat representatives, was well-disposed towards anti-government Croat officers and acknowledged Stjepan Radić as the legitimate leader of the Croatian people. However, the good intentions of General Mitrović, who probably “believed that the power of personal example would help popularize the Army in the Croatian environment and win the favour of Croat officers, and of all those who were unsympathetic to the new system following unification”, bore no fruit; namely, it brought no “positive change in the behaviour of an environment”. Cf. Mile Bjelajac and Predrag Trifunović, Između vojske i politike: biografija generala Dušana Trifunovića (1880–1942) [Between Army and Politics: Biography of General Dušan Trifunović] (Beograd–Kruševac 1997), 159–166.


27 “Mahnitanje gradskog zastupnika šustera Belića” [Frenzy of councilor Belić], Straža No. 42, 2 June 1921, 2.
including some local notables, took to the streets and eventually stopped in front of the Serbian printing house to protest for half an hour, shouting out various slogans, including: “Down with Serbs!”

In Zagreb, two Serbs were killed (Milić Martinović and Ilija Radović). Emigrants from Lika to America, they had returned to Europe to join the Serbian Army as volunteers and fought on the Salonica front. In a Zagreb bakery they tried to buy bread using dinars, the new state’s official currency. The seller demanded Austro-Hungarian crowns instead and poured scorn on the newly-formed state. After a short argument, Martinović pulled his gun and killed the baker with one shot. This act of violence received an immediate response from a group of Zagreb citizens. The police intervened, but the two men, badly beaten and trampled over by the infuriated crowd, died before long. Instead of being tried in a court of law for their crime, the two Serbs were punished by the lynch mob. Belgrade’s Politika commented: “Had the baker been assaulted, robbed and killed by two hoodlums, no hand in Zagreb would have been raised to them. But two veterans trying to defend the dinar in Zagreb had to pay with their lives.”

The Serbs of Križ and its environs were upset and intimidated by anti-Serbian campaigners, such as the priest Juraj Tomac, a Frankovac, and his associates, the teacher Avgust Petrović, Josip Djurina and Ivan Rukavina. Tomac used his pulpit for political speeches, calling the congregation to stand up against the supporters of the common state with Serbia and to back the creation of a Croatian republic. Rukavina, who held the office of “provost” in Križ, refused to swear the oath of allegiance to King Peter I, threatened “to cut down with an axe” anyone who should swear the oath, and mocked St Sava, the first archbishop of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church, as “donkey-headed”. Tomac also launched threats: “Serbs are yet to get what’s coming to them.” The terrified Serbian community was compelled to plead with the Army and Navy Minister for protection. Describing themselves as subjected to harassment and utterly unprotected, they ended their pleading in a very emotional way: “Do not forget us!” The Serbs of Veliki Grdjevac were overwhelmed with fear. Every evening they locked themselves in their homes with their only weapons, axes and hay forks, at hand in case of attack.

---


29 “Linci u Zagrebu” [Lynch in Zagreb], Politika (Belgrade), 16 March 1920.


31 Srpsko kolo No. 13, 31 March 1921, 5.
The end of the war obviously did not relieve tensions between Serbs and Croats, as shown by a case which involved a group of Dubrovnik’s Catholic Serbs. Before the impending collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, soldiers of the defeated Austro-Hungarian army had flooded into Dubrovnik, bringing with them military equipment, tools, money and valuables, either looted during the retreat or their own. All of that was seized and handed over to the National Council of Dubrovnik without having been inventoried. Rumours soon began to circulate that millions of crowns had been embezzled in the process. No later than 5 January 1919, Dr Bogdanović, District Commissioner, submitted a report to the Split-seated regional government for Dalmatia headed by Dr Ivan Krstelj, advising that criminal proceedings be instituted against the suspects. However, it was not until Jova Todorović, Commissioner for Refugees, a Serb from Serbia, intervened, that the Dalmatian regional government took action, and the apprehension of the suspects in the middle of May 1919 marked the beginning of the so-called Dubrovnik Millionaire Affair. Incidentally, all of the twenty-nine arrested were Catholic Serbs (Marquis Luko Bona, Božo Hope, Kristo Dominković, Djildo Job etc). Malicious comments in Dubrovnik were that they had it coming, as a gift from Serbia and King Peter I, alluding to their pre-war loyalty and commitment to the Serbian national idea. The ex-members of the National Council were held in custody for three months without being heard. The hearing of Marquis Luko Bona, Vice-president of the National Council, was conducted only after seventy-six days in custody. Meanwhile, the Serbs of Dubrovnik did not just sit by and watch. Antun Pugliesi and priest Sava Barbić went to Belgrade to demand that their fellow-citizens be given a lawful treatment. Pugliesi and Barbić even succeeded in getting an audience with the Crown Prince Alexander (21 July 1919). The effort of the two distinguished citizens of Dubrovnik bore fruit: the Ministry of Justice sent its representative (Dr Drljević) to Dubrovnik, and in mid-August the detained were released from custody. The decree of 28 February 1921 put an end to the Dubrovnik Affair and the prosecution dropped the case.

What the ex-members of the National Council wanted, however, was not abolition, but the opportunity to prove their innocence in court and

---

32 Shortly before their arrest, Kristo Dominković and Djildo Job were received in audience by Crown Prince Alexander (on 30 April 1919), presumably in connection with the suspicions that fell on the National Council members. Cf. “Dnevnik kraljevog adjutanta” [Diary of the King’s aide-de-camp], AJ-74, knj. [book] 516.
33 Dubrovačka milijunaška afera [Dubrovnik Millionaire Affair] (Dubrovnik 1921), 2.
34 “Dnevnik kraljevog adjutanta”.
35 “Ostavka Dra A Pugliesi-a” [Dr A. Pugliesi resigns], Rad No. 3 (Dubrovnik), 6 Dec. 1919, 4.
thus clear their names. They believed they were purposely targeted because they were Serbs, and Serbs of Catholic faith. Smeared as criminals, they would have been stripped of all influence in the new state’s society and politics. Struggling to prove their innocence to the public, they addressed the embezzlement topic openly and quite sharply in the brochure *Dubrovnik Millionaire Affair* published shortly after their release. But that was not the end of their troubles. The brochure copies were seized and the publishers brought to trial. The state prosecutor, Dr Ucović, sought to disprove the claim stated in the brochure that the affair had been instigated by the Croat officials from the regional government in order to discredit Dubrovnik’s Catholic Serbs. He based his argument on the fact that their arrest had been initiated by a Serb, Jova Todorović; on the other hand, Stojan Protić, who stood up in their defence, saw Todorović’s involvement as the best proof that the whole thing was rigged. According to Protić, the adversaries of the Serbian Catholic community of Dubrovnik had used a Serb from Serbia as a cover for their premeditated scheme. To complicate matters further, all of the arrested Serbs were members of the Radical Party. Therefore the whole affair could also be interpreted in terms of inter-party rivalries, as

---

36 “What is particularly striking about this process is that the only members of the National Council subjected to investigative detention and publicly stigmatized by the press as perpetrators of most shameful deeds are Catholic Serbs, which may make it look as if the intention was to stigmatize only them in the public eye, and thus exclude them from having any say in the new state. This is a fact which coincides with the belief of some members of the Regional Government in Split and their humble wishes — which they have purportedly expressed — that they accept that there are Orthodox Serbs but refuse to recognize Catholic Serbs and consider that these must be destroyed.” Cf. *Dubrovačka milijunaška afera*, 50. The brochure pointed to the unlawfulness of the Catholic Serbs’ arrest, because there had never been any official suspicion or probe into their work to find out whether there was any irregularity at all. They discredited the prosecution witnesses as non-credible and malevolent, and produced strong evidence in support of their innocence. What the accused Catholic Serbs were particularly bitter about was that they were put through an ordeal (utterly unjustly, they argued) in the new state, the one for the creation of which they had made great sacrifices (pp. 15–16): “The National Council was composed of distinguished and honourable citizens, most of them men who had suffered severely under Austrian tyranny, and were persecuted by foreign masters all their lives. There are among them men who barely survived imprisonment, men who were at death’s door with gallows being mounted for them, men who gave all they had, spent their properties and ruined their health while their families starved under Austrian persecution ... those men are in the dock today!”

37 “Milijunaška afera pred sudom” [Millionaire Affair before court], *Rad* No. 102, 5 Nov. 1921, 2.

38 Stoj. M. Protić, “Demokratija i dubrovačka afera” [Democracy and Dubrovnik Affair], *Radikal* No. 169 (Belgrade), 9 May 1922, 2.
a Democratic attempt to put the Radicals out of the way. At any rate, the ugly affair had long-lasting effects for all implicated persons, even for their children (e.g. Luce Hope could not find employment in her native town because her father, Božo Hope, had been one of the twenty-nine Serbs arrested). 39

Tensions in relations between Serbs and Croats during the Provisional Period (1918–1921) heightened also as a result of vigorous anti-Serbian campaigning by Stjepan Radić and his associates from the Croatian Peasant Party. Systematically spreading falsehoods and half-truths about Serbs, Serbian (un)culture, Serbian politicians, they sought to make the Croatian community believe that they were victims of a primitive, barbarous and backward people who had occupied their lands. The allegations even reached the ears of foreign tourists, such as, for example, Dr Dolton, a politician and professor of the London School of Economics who spent the August and September of 1923 holidaying in Dalmatia. Having realized how badly Serbs were spoken of, and for no obvious reason, Dr Dolton concluded: “Back in Dalmatia I heard so many allegations against the government and the Serbs that I unknowingly concluded that the protests were tendentious and I instinctively began to feel sympathy for the Serbs, even more so as I had no opportunity to hear their side.” A later conversation with Stjepan Radić in London only strengthened his view: “Radić’s endless vilification of everything Serbian has definitely made me side with the Serbs [...].” While in Dalmatia, Dr Dolton was told that Croats paid much higher taxes than Serbs. Astonished to hear that, he made a few enquiries and, naturally, learnt that taxes were the same for the whole country: “This and similar examples have led me to unknowingly distrust the allegations against Serbs I’ve heard from Croats.” 40

But if Radić’s anti-Serbian propaganda had no effect on a foreigner, it had success among Croats. The royal family was increasingly often an object of ridicule and insult. According to reports to the Ministry of Interior: “In every quarrel and drinking bout scorn is poured on the late King Peter and other members of the dynasty.” 41 In 1922, of the fifty-six com-

---

39 Marko Murat to Milorad Pavlović, s.1., s. a, NBS RO, R756/8; Marko Murat to Milorad Pavlović, 1920 or 1921, NBS RO, R756/9; Marko Murat to Milan Grol, Dubrovnik, 27 Sept. 1928, Arhiv Srpske Akademije nauka i umetnosti [Archives of the Serbian Academy of Art and Sciences] (hereafter ASANU), Milan Grol Fonds, 14575/1-45.

40 Mih. Gavrilović to Minister, London, 6 Nov. 1923, ASANU, Fedor Nikić Fonds, Documents on Stjepan Radić, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Records, 14530/XIX.

plaints over insulting the royalty the prosecutor’s office in Osijek filed with
the higher office in Zagreb, proceedings were instituted only in three cases,
and of the thirty-four filed in 1923 a single one reached the court. Nor
was there much sympathy for Serbian politicians: a wall calendar with
the portrait of Nikola Pašić, placed by a policeman of Serbian nationality, was
torn and Pašić’s eyes gouged out. On the other hand, there were attempts
at promoting Croatian figures prominent for their anti-Serbian attitude in
a recent political past, such as Ante Starčević. The proposal to name one
of the main streets in Osijek after this instigator of hatred between the
two peoples was understood as a provocation and resolutely rejected by the
Serbs of Osijek.

That the anti-Serbian propaganda had effect is also shown by the
report of a certain Z. Bogoiević travelling in mid 1921 through Croatia,
Slavonia, Srem, Lička and Dalmatia. He observed “great hate against Serbs
on the part of the followers of Radić and Frank”, thus confirming the
writing of Osijek’s Straža that “a Serb in Virovitica County is as persecuted
and maltreated today as he was in war times, under Austria-Hungary.”
At the same time, the head of the Knin District reported that in the pre-
dominantly Catholic-inhabited parts of the district, notably in Miljevačka
Krajina (Drniš Municipality), Radić’s ideology had taken root and that the
political attitude was “exclusionary towards the other two tribes of our na-
tion, especially towards its Serbian part”. And indeed, it was in the Ro-
man-Catholic village of Miljevac that on 29 June 1921 followers of Stjepan
Radić attacked the minstrel and teacher Petar Perunović who toured Dal-
matia, singing and promoting the idea of national unity. The sound of his
gusle attracted an audience, but Radić’s fanatical followers tried to disrupt
the performance using sticks and stones, and shouting “Down with Serbia!”
and “Long live the Croatian peasant republic!” Perunović threatened to use
a revolver to defend himself. The incident, which threatened to become an
epic fight such as those described in the folk songs performed by Perunović,

43 “Oči g. Pašića” [The eyes of Mr Pašić], Straža No. 7, 1 Feb. 1921, 2.
44 “Odbijeno izazivanje Srba u gr. zastupstvu” [Provocation of Serbs Rejected in Town
Council], Straža No. 7, 1 Feb. 1921, 2.
45 Ž. Bogoiević Report, Belgrade, 28 July 1921, AJ, 14-179-663. The appendix to the
report says: “In general, Serbs are hated by the Frankovci, Pravosl [Croatian Party of
Rights], Zajedničari [Croatian Union], Radičevci [Radić’s followers] and Commu-
nists.”
46 “Srpska krv” [Serbian blood], Straža No. 34, 11 May 1921, 1.
ended with the arrest of the attackers, and the minstrel left Miljevac uninjured.  

Besides the Serbian folk songs that provoked such an angry response, the very name “Serbian” was an object of controversy. There was a trend among the Croatian intellectual elite to replace the term “Serbs” with “Vlasi” (Vlachs), most prominently by the historian and university professor Vjekoslav Klaić. Professor Aleka Ivčić criticized Klaić, basing his critique on the scholarly proven fact that the population referred to in various sources as Vlasi were in fact Serb. The influential papers Obzor and Hrvat stood in the Croatian historian’s defence.  

That it was not easy being a Serb in Croatia was what even Serbs from other parts of the Kingdom of SCS experienced. The local Osijek press registered that an academic drama company from Belgrade, touring the Kingdom to raise funds for a hospital for ill students, was boycotted in Osijek. With as few as 150 visitors, an exhibition of Belgrade painters in Zagreb in 1922 was as good as boycotted. Maga Magazinović, the woman who established modern ballet in Serbia, wrote in her memoirs years later of her train trip to the Croatian coast in 1922 and how she had been ridiculed for being Serbian by a group of Croats headed by a school mistress. An observation made by Božidar Kovačević, a leader of the Republican Youth at Belgrade University who attended Radić’s rallies as his party’s representative, was that Serbs in Croatia used to lock themselves in their homes at night and did not venture out. Risto Grđić returned from his four-year studies in Zagreb with unpleasant impressions. He perceived Zagreb as a town lacking the openness, ease of communication and warmth typical of Belgrade and Serbian environments in general. Grđić found the capital of Croatia to be “closed and reserved” towards outsiders and foreigners, notably Serbs. During his student’s days, he was admitted into a single Croatian family, and one that rented rooms to students. But even in that family, whose

---


50 “Jedna sramota” [A shame], Jug No. 176 (Osijek), 6 Aug. 1921, 4. We have not been able to find information for other Croatian towns. Osijek may have been an exception.

51 “U Zagrebu nikad Srba nema” [There are no Serbs in Zagreb, ever], Privrednik No. 7 (Zagreb), July 1922, 114.


livelihood depended “on rents paid by Serbs”, he felt “that they do not like us and consider themselves superior”. They never missed an opportunity to make the young man feel less worthy. The victory scored by a Croatian football team was as good a reason as any to talk about the superiority of Zagreb over Belgrade. Briefly: “A phoney, empty, puffed-up ‘millennium-long’ culture lurking every corner.”

Croatian culture was also seen as phoney or, more precisely, as non-existent, by Ljubomir Micić, editor of Zenit. In his harshly-toned article “The parrot and the ‘Croatian culture’ monopoly”, Micić ridiculed the Croatian self-image of superiority, and harked back to the stand Croatian intellectuals had taken during the First World War. Instead of raising their voices in protest, they had “subserviently” written “panegyrics to Austro-Hungarian generals and military leaders”. Micić reproached them for their support to the “leader of the people” (Stjepan Radić) and his politics which was “based solely on uncultured insults and affronts to the most cultural people in the Balkans — the creative Serbian people”. Micić argued “that Serbs culturally surpass Croats by fifty Zagreb cathedrals”. In line with his basic thesis about “the Balkan barbarogenius” that was to reinvigorate the Western spirit, he reminded that the Greek miracle that modern Europe rested on had occurred in the Balkans. Therefore “constructive Serbian Balkanism” could rightfully challenge ‘destructive Croatian ‘Europeanism’.”

This article caused the editor of Zenit a lot of problems. He was fired, received threats from Stjepan Radić, there was even a plan for his assassination. Micić eventually moved to Belgrade and thus escaped the fate of Milan Crevar, a high school student killed in a fight between the Serbian and Croatian nationalistic youths in Gospić.

It should be noted that the situation of the Croatian Serb community in the new, Yugoslav, state was (as it had been in Austro-Hungary) closely connected with the understanding of Croatian politicians that only a political nation was entitled to self-determination. As the institute of political nation was seen as resulting from the historical state right, the Croatian political leadership recognized the status of a political nation only to Croats who, it was argued, had a millennium of political, national and cultural distinctiveness behind them. It was already at the convention of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (CRPS) of 8 December 1920, and then in

---

54 Risto Grdjić, Uspomene [Memories], ed. Miloš Spajić (Valjevo–Belgrade 2002), 150.
55 Zenit No. 24, April 1923.
56 Micić was one of 9.2% of intellectuals born in Croatia who moved to Serbia between the two world wars. By contrast, persons born in Serbia accounted for only 0.8% of the Croatian intelligentsia in the same period. Cf. Milosav Janićijević, Stvaralačka inteligencija medjuratne Jugoslavije (Belgrade 1984), 62.
the “Constitution of the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia” adopted on 1 April 1921, that the stance was taken about Croatia being entitled to self-determination.\textsuperscript{57} Relying on the CRPS “Constitution”, the Croatian block (CRPS, Croatian Union, Croatian Party of Rights, Croatian Workers’ Alliance) insisted in its Memorandum on “Croatia’s true sovereignty”, on recognition of a “Croatian state within the borders of the international union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”.\textsuperscript{58} As the concept of political nation also had a national meaning, Serbs were not even mentioned in the CRPS “Constitution”. They in fact were considered political Croats. As such, they had no right to self-determination, but were to enjoy national minority status, as is obvious from the CRPS constitutional programme written by Dr Rudolf Horvat, one of the party leaders. In a confederal association between Croatia and Serbia, the Serbs in Croatia were to be guaranteed, according to Horvat, the following rights: church autonomy, the use of Cyrillic script in municipalities with a Serbian majority, the use of the Serbian flag as a national symbol, the proportionate number of Serbian teachers in lower schools attended by Serbian pupils, the right to the district head in districts with a Serbian majority. There was also a promise that the career of Serbian civil servants would not be hampered because of their nationality, and that the appellation “Serbian” will be completely equal to “Croatian”.\textsuperscript{59} Horvat’s interpretation suggests that the Serbs in Croatia were denied the possibility of territorial self-organization based on the national principle, and that they were not guaranteed a genuine cultural and educational autonomy, such as the one they had enjoyed under Habsburg rule in the form of ecclesiastical and school autonomy.\textsuperscript{60}

Was there a Serbian reaction to the position of the leading Croatian political forces that Croatia, by the decision of the Croatian Diet of 29 October 1918, was an independent state with the right to its separate existence within the existing union or, to put it differently, did the idea arise of forming a separate territorial unit to encompass the Serbian ethnic space in Croatia?

The issue of the Kingdom’s internal borders became topical immediately after the unification, as it became vital to address the problem of


\textsuperscript{59} Prof. Dr Rudolf Horvat, \textit{Hrvatsko pitanje} [The Croatian Question] (Zagreb 1923), 48–50.

\textsuperscript{60} Mirjana Stefanovski, \textit{Idea hrvatskog državnog prava i stvaranje Jugoslavije} [The Concept of Croatian State Rights and the Creation of Yugoslavia] (Belgrade 1995), 189.
growing “tribal” particularisms. Colonel Milan Pribićević advocated the abolition of historic provinces and of all borders that “Austria had built between us”. Through Peasant Councils he sought to raise popular awareness of the necessity to preserve the newly-formed state not only because Serbs and Croats were so intermingled that peaceful demarcation between them was impossible, but also because he believed that Serbia and Croatia as two separate states would fall easy prey to neighbouring powers. But Colonel Pribićević had to confront the Croatian political force’s view of Croatia as a sovereign state. One of his associates wondered: “If they can demand Croatia’s separation from the State based on ‘the principle of self-determination’, why can’t our Serbian part separate from them according to the same principle and remain in the State? Are they blind not to see that hundreds of thousands of peasants are on our side and do not want their republic. How can they despise the feelings of so many peasants on our side and act as if they were the only household head in Croatia?”

That the Serbian population really was against Croatia’s autonomy or independence became obvious when the Serbs of Lika came out with the demand that Lika, as well as Bosnia, Kordun and Banija, unite with Serbia in case of Croatia’s separation. Concerned for the wellbeing of the Serbian community in Croatia and its national survival in case of Croatia’s separation even Milan Pribićević felt it appropriate to warn: “Those who are creating a Croatian Ireland in Yugoslavia should know that they are also creating a Serbian Ireland in Croatia, because without the will of half a million Serbian peasants being taken into account there cannot be peace in Croatia.”

When the question of the country’s administrative division was placed on the agenda and the state leadership eventually agreed that a larger number of smaller units should be established in order to avoid any one “tribe” being encompassed within a large region which it then could come to consider as a state of its own, the question of Serbs in Croatia became an agenda item as well. According to Dr Ivan Ribar, Svetozar Pribićević insisted upon the Serbs of Lika, Kordun and Banija being encompassed within one subdivi-

---

61 Milan Pribićević, “Pismo bratu rataru. Pripazimo na one što hoče autonomije”, Srpsko kolo No. 22, 10 June 1920, 1.
63 Srpsko kolo No. 47, 2 Dec. 1920.
64 “Ličani protiv separatista”, Demokratija No. 494 (Belgrade), 20 Feb. 1921, 3.
65 Milan Pribićević, “U odbranu seljačkih veća u Hrvatskoj”, Srpski književni glasnik IV/2, 16 Sept. 1921, 156.
sion to counterbalance Radić’s Croats.67 Milan Pribićević, on the other hand, advocated the abolition of the border between Croatia and Bosnia to create a new province (Unska oblast) by uniting Krajina on the Croatian side with Krajina on the Bosnian side.68 According to him, Banija and the districts of Bihać and Banjaluka (where Serbs were a majority) formed a geographical, economic and cultural whole, and it was logical therefore to unite them administratively as well. He claimed that the idea to create the Province of Una was the authentic desire of the peasantry from his native Banija.69 And while the idea of Colonel Pribićević did not materialize, that of his brother Svetozar did: such heterogeneous regions as Lika, Primorje and Banija were united to form Primorsko-krajiška oblast with its seat in Karlovac, no more than forty kilometres away from the seat of another province in Zagreb.

Let us see what contemporary sources had to say about the life of Serbs in Croatian environments.

The divide between Serbs and Croats seems to have been readily observable. Mileta Matović, a native of Užice serving an apprenticeship in the small town of Otočac in 1923, observed that the shop signs of all Serb-owned shops were written in both scripts, Cyrillic and Latin, while those of Croat owners had their signs only in Latin.70 While Serbs seemed to embrace the idea of national unity,71 Croats insisted on their singularity and their distinction from Serbs. Official reports increasingly suggest that the natural desire of Croats to preserve national individuality was turning into a strong intolerance of Serbs, Serbia and the Yugoslav state. A letter of Colonel Milorad Radovanović dated 22 May 1923 may be indicative: “… what I can clearly see and positively know is the fact that we, Serbs, are considered here as despicable intruders; that our King is detested and

71 The new state’s indulgent attitude towards Croats went so far as to issue a decree (24 January 1923) exempting the children of all faiths other than Orthodox from the obligation to celebrate St Sava’s Day in schools, while another one (1 February 1923) imposed on Orthodox children the celebration of Bishop Strossmayer. The Serb MPs from Croatia condemned the decrees as introducing inequality at Serbian expense and called for the celebration of both great historical figures by the children of all faiths. Cf. Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine: redovni saziv za 1922. godinu, vol. I (Belgrade 1923), 361 (4th Regular Session of 5 June 1923, discussion by Svetozar Pribićević).
that our common state is seen as a bloodsucker sucking the blood of this people for the benefit of Serbs and Serbia!” Radovanović noted that the attitude of Croats had not been as radical only a year earlier. The villagers from the Petrinja area had used to greet him politely, gladly conversed, and even expressed sympathies for Serbs and the common state. As a result of Radić’s propaganda, however, everything changed: “Today rarely does anyone greet me upon meeting, I get sulky and resentful responses even to my most polite address, and whenever a company of two or three people passes by, they make political comments loudly, and always at the expense of Serbs and Belgrade, or they shout in an insolent and provocative manner: Long live the republic! Long live Radić!” That Radić was not to blame for everything after all, and that Serbs had been at risk even before the unification, Colonel Radovanović illustrated by the acts of vandalism on the Serbian cemetery committed by inhabitants of Petrinja in 1914. Five years after the war, the cemetery offered the same sight: knocked-down crosses, broken gravestones, headstone portraits with the eyes gauged out; the grave of Field Marshal Borojević’s parents had also been vandalized, even though Borojević had been an Austrian officer.\footnote{AJ, 335-15.}

Some suggested that the Serbs, persecuted even before the war, had been more resilient and tougher. A railway police officer in Slavonski Brod was therefore led to conclude that the local Serbs had lost their edge after the fulfilment of their national goal and fell into a state of “ambiguity, unable to orientate themselves according to a fixed point or direction, which puts them in a disadvantageous position in relation to Croats”.\footnote{This disorientation was especially observable in religious matters. In mixed environments it was customary for Orthodox children to pray silently during joint prayer at the beginning and end of the school day, while Catholic children, being a majority, were allowed to pray aloud; even though this practice was introduced only to avoid vocal confusion caused by saying two differently worded prayers aloud, the result was that the Serbian children, listening to Roman-Catholic prayers over and over again, eventually began to repeat them, thus becoming estranged from their own faith and indifferent to it. Cf. Prosvetni inspektor Sremske oblasti Ministru prosvete [Srem District School Inspector to Minister of Education], Vukovar, 6 March 1925, AJ, 66-1251-1497.} In the decades before the war Slavonski Brod “had emanated hatred for Serbs”, and when the war broke out it “was overenthusiastic about the former monarchy’s war against the ‘detested Vlachs’”. The Frankovci and clericalists, at first dismayed by the defeat of the Habsburg Monarchy, resurfaced as early as 1919 encouraged by the fact that the crimes committed against Serbs went unpunished.\footnote{The question of civil servants unable to put up with the fall of the Habsburgs and remaining loyal to the old regime was even raised in Parliament. Dr Žarko Miladinović...} Moreover, high-ranking posts in Slavonski Brod...
were held by adversaries of the Serbs: Josip Rupčić, a sympathizer of the Frankovci, was chief of police; Mato Žuvičić, “a Serbophobe like no other under heaven”, was head of the court, and his deputy, judge Vladoje Hok, was also a Serbophobe. Žuvičić is known for his statements about the Serbs as balkanesers, about barbed wires that should be laid out along the Drina, about too many Serb employees at the Slavonski Brod Court, and for those he had made during the war, such as: “There is going to be no peace and order in Croatia until the Vlach heads are hanging all over the town park”.

The local Serbs also complained about the ethnically biased rulings by judge Marijan Laksar. “The great protector” of the three judges was the lawyer and public notary Dr Nikola Nikić, chair of the Slavonski Brod district branch of the CRPP.75

The courtrooms were not the only place where the Serbs were reminded, and in a variety of ways, of their place. Delko Bogdanić, the roommate of Gojko Nikoliš, a high-school student at Karlovac, would let it drop that “you, Serbs, should be expelled to Serbia, then there will be peace and order in Croatia”.76 That he did not mean it as a joke, for which young Nikoliš took it at the time, was seen during the Second World War, when his roommate became a prominent Ustasha commander. That dead Serbs were no less at risk, their graves being vandalized both before and after the Great War, is shown by the desecration of the Lubarda family tomb at the Orthodox cemetery in Sinj reported by a newspaper.77

An incident that occurred on 25 July 1926 illustrates perfectly the anti-Serbian mood in Croatia. The final match for the National Football Championship was to be played between Jugoslavija, a Belgrade club, and Gradjanski from Zagreb. According to press reports, about 1500 Belgrade fans arrived in Zagreb by train. The Jugoslavija players were upset by the appointment of Anton Felver as referee, suspecting that he, being a member of a Croatian nationalistic organization, might favour the home team. That the atmosphere was far from friendly is shown by the police force equipped with rubber batons deployed round the football field, and six mounted police officers behind one of the goals. Gradjanski played very rough and, as warned that the government’s reconciliatory attitude encouraged its enemies: “Our handling things with gloves is taken for our weakness and our opponents feel encouraged to do things they would not dare do if we were just a little more energetic and determined.”

Cf. Stenografske beleške Privremenog narodnog predstavništva [Minutes, Provisional Popular Representative Body], 30th Regular Meeting of 2 July 1919, 805–806.


a result, two Jugoslavija players, Jovanović and Djurić, were seriously injured. It turned out that the visiting team’s suspicions were not unfounded: the referee was turning a blind eye to Gradjanski’s violations of rules, and at the score 1:1, which would have made Jugoslavija the champion, he awarded a highly dubious penalty shot against the guests. Gradjanski won 2:1 and took the title. Even though their team won, local fans breached the police cordon and rushed onto the field, throwing stones at Jugoslavija players and shouting “Down with Belgrade!”, “Vlach pigs!”, “Down with Vlachs!” The Belgraders showed restraint. The rampage did not end there. The train with Jugoslavija fans departed from the railway station in Zagreb amidst curses and exclamations of disgust. On their trip back home, the fans were attacked in Sisak, and one of them sustained a knife injury. Belgrade fans saw the final game as a sporting event, and Zagreb fans saw it as a battle between Serbs and Croats, and Gradjanski’s victory as a victory of Croateness. Belgrade fans only carried their red club banners. Zagreb fans carried their blue team banners, but also their national red, white and blue flags. A sporting event thus degenerated into a typically Frankovci anti-Serbian demonstration, such as those organized at the beginning of the Great War. The Politika correspondent rightfully wondered: “Imagine what would have happened if the Belgrade team had won?”

Observable in larger towns, the divide between Serbs and Croats was perhaps even more conspicuous in smaller ones. In Knin, for example, only Croats visited the “Croatian” reading-room, and the Sokol Society was only attended by Serbs; the two communities did not even mix in pubs, one basically being attended by Serbs, another by Croats. In order not to confuse potential customers, Serb and Croat merchants and craftsmen mounted

---

78 Dragan Jovanović nicknamed Žena (1904–1936), a Jugoslavija player and ten-time member of the national team, had the strongest kick in his generation. He played in both Jugoslavija teams that won the national championship. He was killed in a car crash. As for Djurić, we have not been able to ascertain whether that was Damjan Djurić nicknamed Dača (?–1958), a Jugoslavija first-team player from 1922, or Vladeta Djurić nicknamed Era (1905–1976), the club’s first-team player from 1924. The two players were not related.

79 In Zagreb, the colloquial term for penalty shot was elver, so after this event the referee was nicknamed “Felver-elver”. Cf. Prof. Dr Mihailo Andrejević Andrejka, Dugo putovanje kroz fudbal i medicinu (doživljaji, sećanja, uspomene) [Long Journey through Football and Medicine (Experiences, Events, Memories)] (Gornji Milanovac 1989), 25.

their shop signs in Cyrillic and Latin scripts respectively. In rural environments strife could be caused even over the introduction of modern devices which facilitated everyday life and enabled more efficient communication with distant parts of the country and the world: in the Nova Gradiška area, the Croat village of Dragalić and the Serbian village of Medare were in dispute over the location of the post office, as both communities laid claim on it.

Croatian antagonism was additionally fuelled after the shooting in June 1929 at the National Assembly by Puniša Račić, a Serb from Montenegro, at Croatian MPs, and especially by the death of Stjepan Radić as a result of it. From then on, the inequality of Serbs compared to the Croatian majority was becoming more visible. In Zagreb, as Privrednik wrote, Croats refused to use Cyrillic script and discouraged Serbs from using it: Cyrillic doorplates were torn down or smeared, Cyrillic signs on Serb-owned shops and offices were broken or painted over. The Serbs of Zagreb were boycotted and had trouble finding employment. The appointment of Petar Panjković, a “Serb from Serbia”, to a clerical post in the Croatian Archives provoked a storm of protests. Officers and soldiers of the Yugoslav Army were increasingly often subjected to insults or even attacked. The British ambassador in Belgrade was informed about terrorist attacks on Serbs in Croatian villages in the environs of Split. Dubrovnik saw demonstrations against the performance of a freshly-restored Serbian musical company.

---

82 “Borba sela Medare i Dragalić za poštu” [Post-office fight between villages Medare and Dragalić], Novosti No. 98 (Zagreb), 8 Feb. 1927, 6.
83 The testimony of Dejan Medaković shows what kind of fear took hold of the Serbs in Zagreb upon hearing the news of Stjepan Radić’s death: “I remember my father’s panic and excitement when he woke me in the middle of the night, shouting: ‘Quickly, quickly, get up quickly, we’re leaving.’ It was when Stjepan Radić died and large-scale anti-Serbian demonstrations broke out in Zagreb. He took us to Laško, to a hotel, and I’ll never forget that nocturnal car race of his, as if he had been chased.” Cf. Dejan Medaković, Efimeris: kronika jedne porodice, vol. II, 2nd ed. [Ephemeris: Chronicle of a Family] (Belgrade 1991), 259.
84 “Beleške” [Notes], Privrednik No. 11, Nov. 1928, 171.
85 Aj, 66-462-727; “Srbijanski žandari u hrvatskom arhivu” [Serbian gendarmes in Croatian Archives], Hrvat No. 2619 (Zagreb), 29 Nov. 1928, 1.
86 Bjelajac, Vojška Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 257.
Physical clashes in some parts of the town required police intervention. A new incident occurred at a football match in Split, between a Belgrade club, Jugoslavija, and the local team of Hajduk. Belgrade normally received Croatian sportsmen with due respect. By contrast, the Jugoslavija players in Split suffered abuse “every step of the way”, and at the end of the match were attacked by the crowd intent on settling the score both with the visiting players and with the objective referee Segedinski, who was hit in the chest with a stone. On police advice, the Jugoslavija players were compelled to stay hidden in the locker room for a whole hour before the fuming Hajduk fans dispersed. They were additionally appalled by the fact that they were attacked not only by the crowd, but also by home team players, including the captain Kaliterna. As a result, Jugoslavija Football Club took the decision to boycott Hajduk for the next two years. As Jugoslavija players passed along the Hajduk players’ message to Belgrade’s B.S.K. not to come to Split or else they would be given a very unfriendly welcome, B.S.K. decided to officially request that the scheduled match be played on neutral turf.

Not only did sportsmen encounter unpleasantness in Croatia. The popular film actor Svetislav Petrović was greeted by hoots of scorn when he arrived in Zagreb. But thanks to the female part of the awaiting crowd who greeted the celebrity with cheers and stood in his defence, the protesters eventually withdrew. That politics did not discourage Petrović’s fans is shown by the ovations the actor received on the opening night in a Zagreb cinema. Yet, it seems that the protesters left a stronger impression on the actor: he left Zagreb the very next day on the pretext of having urgent obligations.

That relations between Serbs and Croats were extremely strained is shown by the tragic end of a Belgrade journalist, Vladimir Ristović, editor of the sensationalist newspaper Jedinstvo where he, in course language, attacked the leaders of the Croatian opposition, Radić and Pribićević. Upon arriving in Zagreb he was attacked several times and lightly injured. Even-

88 “Demonstracije protiv Srba u Dubrovniku” [Demonstrations against Serbs in Dubrovnik], Politika No. 7256, 14 July 1928, 10.
89 “Zašto tako Splicani?” [Why like that, Split?!], Reč No. 1300 (Belgrade), 2 Aug. 1928, 7; “Jugoslavija bojkotuje Hajduk” [Jugoslavija boycotts Hajduk], Reč No. 1301, 3 Aug. 1928, 6.
90 “Dva dočeka Svetislava Petrovića u Zagrebu” [Two kinds of reception for Svetislav Petrović in Zagreb], Riječ No. 214, 16 Sept. 1928, 6.
91 “Sv. Pribićević ubio je noćas u Zagrebu Vladu Ristovića, našeg urednika i osnivača” [Sv. Pribićević killed Vlada Ristović, our editor and founder, last night in Zagreb], Jedinstvo No. 19 (Belgrade), spec. issue, 5 Aug. 1928, 1.
tually, in the night between 4 and 5 August he was killed by a railroad worker (Josip Hunić).

***

Although the topic is far from being exhausted in this contribution, the examples given suggest that the two nations in Croatia were deeply divided. The sources studied cast quite a different light on the thesis that Croats were “oppressed” by Serbs, a thesis that has for quite a long time been passing as a valid historical interpretation. These sources suggest that the perception of Serbs as hegemonist resulted from propaganda rather than from the actual state of affairs. Besides, they show that the Serbs — systematically portrayed to the Croatian public as invaders and enslavers, while, by contrast, they saw themselves as being “third-rate citizens” — lived their daily lives under strain, surrounded by intolerance, subjected to various forms of pressure and violence, often fearing for their livelihoods, even for their lives. The inexorable logic of facts leads to the conclusion that members of the Serbian community in Croatia felt discriminated against and not quite safe.

Bibliography and sources


Arhiv Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti (ASANU) [Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts], Belgrade. Milan Grol Fonds, 14575/I-45; Fedor Nikić Fonds, Documents on Stjepan Radić, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Records, 14575/I-45.


Demokratija (Belgrade), No. 494, 1921.


Dubrovačka milijunaška afera. Dubrovnik 1921.


*Hrvatski list* (Zagreb), No. 2619, 1928.

*Hrvatski list* (Zagreb), No. 14 spec. issue, 1924.


*Jedinstvo* (Belgrade), No. 19, spec. issue, 1928.

*Jug* (Osijek), No. 176, 1921.


Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Rukopisno odeljenje (NBS, RO) [National Library of Serbia, Manuscript Department], Belgrade. R706/50; R756/8; R756/9.


*Novo doba* (Split) No. 11, 1925.

*Novosti* (Zagreb), No. 98, 1927.


*Politika* (Belgrade) 1920; No. 6556, 1926; No. 7256, 1928.

*Privrednik* (Zagreb), No. 7 1922.

*Pučke novine* (Zagreb) No. , 1919.

*Rad* (Dubrovnik), No. 1919; No. 102, 1921.


*Radikal* (Belgrade), Nos. 165, 166, 169, 1922.

*Reć* (Belgrade), Nos. 1300, 1301, 1928.


Riječ Srba–Hrvata–Slovenaca (Zagreb) No. 51, 1919; No. 176, 1926; No. 214, 1928.

Srpski književni glasnik (Belgrade) IV/2, 1921.

Srpsko kolo (Zagreb), No. 36, 1919; No. 37, 1919; No. 23, 1920; Nos. 10 and 11, 1920; No. 22, 1920; No. 34, 1920; No. 47, 1920; No. 13, 1921.

*Stenografske beleške Narodne skupitine* [Proceedings of the National Assembly], 1922, 1923–24

*Stenografske beleške Privremenog narodnog predstavništva* [Minutes of the Provisional Popular Representative Body], 1919

*Straža* (Osijek), Nos. 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 23, 1919; Nos. 3, 6, 14, 120, 133, 1920; Nos 7, 43, 42, 1921.

*Zenit* (Zagreb) No. 24, 1923.

This paper results from the project *Serbs and Serbia in the Yugoslav and international contexts* (no 42027) funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.
The Ideal of Balkan Unity from a European Perspective (1789–1945)

Abstract: The federal movement in the Balkans is especially interesting, not because it was an ideological trend based on distinctive local characteristics, but precisely because it emerged concurrently with similar political and ideological trends on the rest of the continent, thus reflecting the close connection and mutual dependence between the various regions of Europe. The article approaches the different attempts for Balkan cooperation between the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the Cold War in reference to the corresponding movements for the European reconciliation and unification, using comparatively the relevant bibliography.

Key words: Alliance, Balkans, Conferences, cooperation, Entente, Europe, federation, nationalism, radicalism, socialism, unity

Introduction

Balkan federalism is, without a doubt, one of the most unfairly dealt with questions in modern European history. Very few studies have addressed it, and those that have treated it as a peripheral issue, making no attempt at a comprehensive presentation or a theoretical analysis. Tellingly, the most complete and comprehensive monograph on the subject, Stavrianos’s Balkan Federation, was written in the 1940s and has been the main point of reference for subsequent studies that have examined its specific aspects.¹

The lack of interest may be partially due to the fact that the relevant sources are both inadequate and scattered; but it has mainly to do with ideological factors: the fact that the subject has been ignored by Balkan national historiographies, which have tended to focus on developments in individual countries, and the final renunciation of the ideal of Balkan unification in the 1940s. In contrast, the study of European federalism developed more after the Second World War, presumably spurred by the momentum created by the birth of the European Economic Community and its subsequent development into today’s European Union. On the other hand, the very concept of Balkan unity is probably a contradiction in terms as regards the prevailing perception of the region, which sees its peoples as beyond the pale of European civilization, perpetually spoiling for a pitiless internecine fight.

The federal movement in the Balkans is especially interesting, not because it was an ideological trend based on distinctive local characteristics, which is highly questionable; but precisely because it emerged concurrently with similar political and ideological trends in the rest of the continent, thus reflecting the close connection and mutual dependence between various regions of Europe.

του 19ου αιώνα [“The Eastern Federation”: two Greek federal movements of the nineteenth century] (Thessaloniki 2001).


For the West’s traditional approach to the Balkans, see M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York 1997).
The French Revolution and Balkan radicalism

During most of the eighteenth century, the dreams of the south-east European Christians (or at least of their intellectual elites) about political emancipation from Ottoman rule were based on their liberation by an enlightened despot, such as the Habsburg Joseph II or Catherine the Great of Russia. This hope was not necessarily a local characteristic: it followed the conviction of European Enlightenment figures, such as Voltaire, who based their hopes for the modernisation of their nations and of Europe as a whole on enlightened absolute monarchy. As in the rest of Europe, so too in the Balkans it was the French Revolution that radicalised the thinking and the activity of the intelligentsia, because it showed that political emancipation could result from the action of the people themselves. The Declaration of Human Rights, the revolutionary constitutions of 1791 and 1793, and the ideological and political ferment in revolutionary France, were a source of inspiration for the rising bourgeoisies of south-eastern Europe, who sought to break away from the Ottoman and, secondarily, the Habsburg regime. Napoleon’s occupation of the Ionian Islands and the Dalmatian coast in 1809 had immediate and long-lasting effects on the development of intellectual life and political thought in the Balkans, and also on the emergence of local national and social radical movements.

Possibly the supreme exponent of Balkan radicalism, during its early phase at least — i.e. until the Congress of Vienna (1814) — was Rigas Velesinlis (or Pheraios). He was active in the last decade of the eighteenth century, with Vienna as his base and within a wider circle of Balkan revolutionaries, publishing in Greek a number of works that conveyed to his readers the revolutionary fervour and the expectations that the French Revolution had spawned all over Europe. Rigas’s proclamation for a unified political organisation of the Balkans was the first such proposal to come from within the peninsula and was more comprehensively elucidated in the most political of his works, the New political administration of the inhabitants of Roumeli, Asia Minor, the Mediterranean islands, and Wallachia–Moldavia.

Rigas called upon the peoples of the Ottoman Empire to rise up together to overthrow the sultan’s regime and to found in its place a “Hellenic Republic”, which would be “unified and indivisible”: Greek would be

---

its official language, and all its subjects would be recognised as equal citizens regardless of their religion or racial origin. The posterity has looked at the proposal with considerable scepticism, mainly as regards the new state’s national orientation as reflected in its title and the choice of Greek as the official language. Was this in fact a reflection of budding Greek nationalism intent on establishing a Greek state over the entire territory of the European Ottoman Empire and much of Anatolia? Or was it a sincere proposal seeking to unify the Balkan peoples? At all events it would be pointless to judge Rigas on the basis of later patterns of thought, i.e. outside the tradition of the Enlightenment and the perception of the nation introduced by the French Revolution.6

Rigas’s declaration was clearly influenced by the Jacobin model of state organisation and national identity. In the Charter of Human Rights Rigas faithfully followed the French declaration that preceded the French constitution of 1793; the choice of the more radical constitution of the French Revolution, which was to become the model for the die-hard French and European republicans, was no accident: it accurately reflected the preference of the Balkan radicalism of the time for a democratic system of governance, universal suffrage, and social cohesion over the more conservative demands subsequently adopted by European liberalism. The rationale of the federation was rejected or ignored either on the grounds of Jacobin centralisation, which looked at federal structures with suspicion as remnants of feudalism that helped perpetuate aristocratic power, or on the grounds that it corresponded with the ailing central Ottoman authority. The citizens of the “Hellenic Republic” could be Christians, Moslems, or Jews, of Greek, Slavonic, Turkish, or any other origin, but the sovereign people would be one and indivisible and the political institutions would have to underscore this unity. The diversity of the collective identity was thus recognised as one of the dimensions of the new state. True to the rationalism and Enlightenment of his age, Rigas regarded distinctions based on language, religion, or racial origin as artificial, asserting that it was possible for different ethnic groups to coexist as long as all citizens were recognised as equal regardless of their specific collective identities. This perception obviously could not stand up to the contradictions that emerged out of the developing national question, but at the time it was articulated the romantic concept of the nation had not yet been formulated, nor had Greek national identity been

fully clarified, nor were the national rivalries that subsequently characterised European political life yet taken for granted.

Rigas’s initiative and the other Jacobin-type movements in the Habsburg Empire were vigorously and harshly persecuted by the Austrian police. The suppression of the radical movements by the police forces of the ancien régime, which after Napoleon’s defeat and the establishment of the Holy Alliance seemed to be reaffirming its established position on the continent, meant that the only outlet for active opposition was the “conspiratorialism” of secret societies. The best-known conspiratorial organisation in south-eastern Europe at the time was Filiki Etaíria (Friendly Society), established in Odessa in 1814. The new circumstances in Europe also changed the organisation’s priorities compared to those of Rigas and his sympathisers. Whereas for Rigas the liberation of the subjugated peoples of the Ottoman Empire was inseparably linked with the prospect of political and social change, for Filiki Etaíria a prerequisite of social reform was national independence. All the same, the notion of Balkan unity was embodied within the plans of Filiki Etaíria’s members and collaborators: in the “General Plan”, which Filiki Etaíria unsuccessfully promoted mainly to the Serbian leaders Karageorge Petrović and Miloš Obrenović with the aim of a Pan-Balkan uprising against the sultan; in the Russian Decembrist Pavel Pestel’s “Greek Plan” for a Hellenic federation patterned after the American model; and, later — after unsuccessful attempts to foment a general uprising of the Balkan peoples — in Ioannis Kapodistrias’s plan to create a confederation of Christian principalities in south-eastern Europe, headed by princes from various European royal houses and with its centre at Constantinople.7

During the first wave of insurrections in south-eastern Europe immediately after the Treaty of Vienna, the proposals for some kind of common political organisation of the Ottoman Empire’s European territories bore no fruit, either because they were unrealistic or because they had limited support either from the local rebels or from the great powers. The Greek War of Independence failed to spread over the entire peninsula and was eventually confined to its southern tip, where the Hellenic kingdom was formed in 1830 with clear national characteristics. The Serbian uprisings (1804–15) that led to the creation of an autonomous Serbian principality met the same fate. The new states (like those that were to be formed in the next few decades of the nineteenth century, namely Montenegro, Romania,

and Bulgaria) were shaped on the nation-state model. Their governments and rulers never seriously considered the arguments for unification or for forming a confederation except at times of crisis and usually out of sheer opportunism. Throughout the century the policy of the Balkan nation-states was based on the rationale of expansionism and of unifying all their co-religionists and ethnic kinfolk under their aegis.

"The East by and for the East": Federalisation as a solution to the national rehabilitation of the peoples of south-eastern Europe

The existence of the two old multi-ethnic — Habsburg and Ottoman — empires in south-eastern Europe and the Concert of Europe’s support for their integrity in the nineteenth century influenced the character of the federal movements in the region. Thus local federalism developed as a variant of the subject nations’ struggle for national rehabilitation: after the birth of the Hellenic kingdom irredentist organisations in Athens continued to base their plans on a general uprising of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire and to seek collaboration with Bulgarian, Serbian, and Albanian revolutionaries. Similar initiatives were under way in the Danubian principalities and in Belgrade, with Balkan-wide participation. The slogan “The East by and for the East”, which was adopted by various political and intellectual groups in Greece in the 1860s as a paraphrase of the Risorgimento slogan “Italia farà da se”, like its variants in other Balkan countries, reflected a belief in the political and cultural self-reliance of the Orthodox East, a critical attitude towards the great powers, recognition of the national rights of all the Balkan peoples, and an inclination towards some kind of confederation among them. It did not, however, reflect any kind of unified approach, nor did its use necessarily signify espousal of all these principles. It frequently veiled purely national aspirations with the aim of winning over allies among the neighbouring peoples, without at the same time precluding notions of intellectual supremacy, political hegemony, or leadership. For many of its Greek users, the slogan meant that the Greeks would acculturate the East, which would unite under their hegemony in order to free itself from Ottoman authoritarianism, follow in the footsteps of the west-European nations, and become a force to be reckoned with, capable of standing up to the pressures of the great powers. For Ilija carašanin, the Serbian official and architect

of the Serbian Načertanje irredentist plan, it meant the expansion of Serbia through a Balkan or south Slavonic alliance centring on Belgrade.9

The association of nationalism and federalism was clearly influenced by the struggle for Italian unification, and specifically by Giuseppe Mazzini, who was actively involved in the plans for the federal reform of south-eastern Europe by way of his European revolutionary activities. Mazzini’s ideas were a mixture of Jacobin liberalism, religious sentiment, and universality; they were characterised by the contradictions of the early – liberal – period of nationalism: the linking of the principle of nationality and the solidarity of peoples did not address the destructive effects of aggressive nationalism. Although he himself disputed conservative theories about the “natural order”, his views included a strong dose of organic convictions, as is apparent, for instance, in his plan for the territorial reorganisation of Europe, which involved the creation of fourteen national groups divided according to history, tradition, geography, and language.10

According to the same theory, a prerequisite for the accomplishment of the south-European nations’ mission was the collapse of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. The local nations would subsequently form two confederations, the Danubian and the Helleno-Slavonic. Mazzini initially espoused the view that Greece had an acculturating role to play in the East, placing it at the head of a federation extending from Albania to Cilicia and Cyprus, and with Constantinople as its capital. Later on, discouraged by the limited capabilities of the Greek state and by its reluctance to cooperate with its neighbours, he upheld more balanced plans, though always inclining towards the creation of a local confederation, built according to democratic principles on the ruins of the multiethnic empires that would act as a barrier to Russian expansionism. Mazzini’s political views and his geopolitical proposals continued to influence democrats and federalists in the Balkans in the decades that followed, for the question arose every time the Eastern Question flared up.11

One of the best-known federalist organisations in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Democratic Eastern Federation, which was founded in 1865 and had members and associates in Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, and Constantinople, was considerably influenced by Mazzini’s political theory: it was strongly antimonarchist, upheld solidarity among the peoples of the peninsula in their struggle for national liberation, and worked towards their organisation as a federation based on equality. Some mem-

---

9 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 51, 52.
11 Hassiotis, «Η Ανατολική Ομοσπονδία», 14–16.
bers, like Andreas Rigopoulos, had sat on the European Democratic Central Committee founded by Mazzini in 1850. The head of the organisation in Athens, Panayotis Panas, was one of the most prominent figures in the Greek radical republican movement in the nineteenth century. Panas believed that the unity of the Balkan peoples could be achieved only by changing the local regimes and the nationalist policies they were following, and he was also very critical of the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which he held responsible for the Slavs' hostility towards the Greeks. During the Eastern Crisis of 1875–8 the Democratic Eastern Federation supported the joint rising of all the Balkan peoples against the Ottomans, though to no avail. In the end, this, like other federalist initiatives that appeared later on, was short-lived and had no decisive effect on inter-Balkan relations.12

The notion of the Danubian federation consistently featured in the geopolitical plans for central and eastern Europe for about a century — from the time of the rebellions of 1848 to just after Germany’s defeat in the Second World War. It was based on the need to replace the Habsburg Empire with some other form of state construct that would satisfy the Habsburgs’ disaffected subjects and at the same time maintain stability and the balance of power in the region.

The idea first appeared at the time of the Hungarian uprising of 1848–9, but the Magyar nationalists refused to discuss the possibility of a federal Hungary, thus attracting the hostility of the other local ethnic groups, who did not want to see the Habsburg administration replaced by the government of a centralised Hungarian nation-state. Later on, the leader of the rebellion, Louis Kossuth realised that the Hungarian national goals could not be attained without the support of the other nationalities in the region, and he therefore accepted the solution of the Danubian federation, which could include Hungary, Serbia, and Romania. The plan was kept alive in the years that followed by many of the most prominent political figures of the nations concerned, and was encouraged throughout this period by Mazzini, or by the prime minister of Piedmont, Camillo di Cavour, who were prepared to take part in any movement aimed at destabilising the Austrian Empire. Kossuth’s proposal echoed the desires of the liberal leaders of the Danubian countries, who were anxious to introduce a constitutional monarchy. But it held very little appeal for the local peasantry, whose social problems were of little concern to the national leaders negotiating the formation of the Danubian federation. Furthermore, the local national movements did not proved receptive to the possibility of the federation until the prospect of separate national emancipation had receded. This latter

12 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 150; Todorov, Greek Federalism, 83–139; Hassiotis, «Η Ανατολική Ομοσπονδία», 21ff.
observation relates especially to the Magyar nationalists, who proved very reluctant to make any concessions to other nationalities and who eventually rejected the idea of the Danubian federation when the circumstances arising out of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 enabled them to achieve their basic demands, reaching a compromise with the Habsburg Monarchy through the Ausgleich of 1867.\textsuperscript{13}

The early Balkan socialists and their federal proposals

In south-eastern Europe the socialist movements emerged in the 1860s and 1870s, influenced by the republican revolutionary tradition, Saint-Simonism, anarchism, and the Russian narodniks, while Marxism began to gain ground at the end of the century. In each case they were movements that were active on the fringes of political life, with no major influence on society, apart from some purely local phenomena, which, however, came to nothing.

One of the first socialists to support the issue of the Balkan federation was the Serb Svetozar Marković, who attended the meetings of the League of Peace and Freedom that was founded in Switzerland in 1867. At the League’s conference in 1869, when the Eastern Question was also discussed, Marković supported the creation of a Federal Republic of Free Nations of south-eastern Europe. Though Marković and his comrades were not anarchists, they were influenced by Bakunin’s ideas about a free Europe that would be a confederation of free communities. He was more strongly influenced by the Russian narodnik Nikolai Chernyshevsky, who asserted that his country could attain socialism without first passing through capitalism, by means of the confederal organisation of the traditional Russian peasant community, the obshchina. Marković similarly believed that the new society should rest upon the democratic and patriarchal character of the village, the union of the communities, and organised cooperative production. His theory was modelled on the traditional south Slavonic community, the zadruga, which was to constitute the nucleus of the political reshaping of Serbia and the entire peninsula; the Balkan federation would consist of such communities bound together in a confederation.\textsuperscript{14} The Bulgarian socialist Khrislo Botev’s theories went in a similar direction. While in exile in Russia, he had met Russian nihilists and narodniks, and believed that Bulgaria


\textsuperscript{14} W. D. McClellan, Svetozar Marković and the Origins of Balkan Socialism (Princeton 1964), 103, 122, 184–186.
could win independence from the Ottoman Empire only through a peasant rebellion that would also target the Bulgarian notables. He also supported the idea of the Balkan federation, which he thought ought to be the result of a social revolution of the Balkan peoples, not of negotiations between governments.\footnote{Stavrianos, \textit{Balkan Federation}, 115–119; A. Živković and D. Plavšić, eds., \textit{The Balkan Socialist Tradition: Balkan Socialism and the Balkan Federation, 1871–1915}, vol. 8 no. 3 of \textit{Revolutionary Review} (2003), 13–18.}

Another source of federalist proposals for the Balkans was socialist exiles and émigrés in western and central Europe who were active in the interconnected left-wing and pacifist circles there, such as the Society of Friends of Peace, the International Peace Conference, the \textit{Comité des Orientalistes}, and the League of Peace and Freedom. They included Pavlos Argyriades, a Greek from Macedonia who had settled in Paris shortly after the suppression of the Commune in 1871. Argyriades became a prominent figure in the French socialist movement. He supported the idea of Balkan unity both in the pages of his newspapers \textit{La Question Sociale} and \textit{Almanach de la Question Sociale (et de la Libre Pensée)} and through the League for the Balkan Federation, in the founding of which he had played a leading part in 1894. The League’s ideological characteristics are fairly hazy, but there was a distinct tendency to link demands for political and economic emancipation with the demand for self-determination, as well as a strong criticism of the policy of the local governments and the European powers. Argyriades thought that the biggest obstacle to the confederation — apart from Ottoman domination, which anyway would soon collapse — was the conflict over the Macedonian Question, which had already divided the new nation-states and the peoples of the region. In his view, the problem could be resolved by creating an autonomous Albano-Macedonian state within the confederation. This was an alternative proposal to the demands for Macedonian autonomy supported by many, mainly Bulgarian, federalists — demands which, however, met with little response in Serbia and in Greece, due to the fear that the Slav majority in the province would one day lead to its being incorporated into Bulgaria.\footnote{P. Argyriades and P. Lagarde, \textit{Solution de la question d’Orient. La Confédération balkanique et la Macédoine} (Paris 1896), 1–15. Cf. Stavrianos, \textit{Balkan Federation}, 151.}

These initiatives, needless to say, remained peripheral, although they did create a tradition which was subsequently followed by the more organised socialist movements of south-eastern Europe that appeared in the last decade of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century, usually in the form of social democratic parties that shared the ideology of the Second International. The more important of these were the social democratic
parties of Bulgaria (1891), of Serbia (1903), and of Romania (1906), and the Socialist Workers’ Federation (better known as the Federación) of the still Ottoman Thessaloniki, which was dominated by the city’s Jewish element. These parties included the idea of the federal organisation of the Balkans in their manifestos and consistently opposed the nationalist policies of their states, as well as the intervention of the great powers in the region. However, their views on the national question in the Balkans diverged, probably reflecting the more general contradictions inherent in the International’s position on the problem of nationalities. In particular, the Austrian Marxists’ proposal for national autonomy within the framework of multiethnic states — which related to the ethnic problems of the Habsburg Empire and had a rather pro-German and anti-Russian stance — was ill-received by the Serbian and Bulgarian social democrats, who supported the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and the reorganisation of the region into a federal republic, but approved of by the Romanian social democrats, who harboured similar fears as the like-minded Germans regarding the threat posed by Russian absolutism to the freedoms of the peoples of south-eastern Europe. All the same, these differences did not prevent the organisation of pan-Balkan socialist congresses (in 1910, 1911, and 1912), at which the participants pledged to promote the idea of solidarity among the nations of south-eastern Europe and to struggle “against the policy of conquest of European capitalism”. Furthermore, most of the socialists in the region opposed the military alliance of the Balkan nations against the Ottoman Empire (1912–13), arguing that it served the interests of the local bourgeoisies and dynasties and that an attempt to achieve national unity by dividing the peninsula would lead to more wars — as was borne out by the Second Balkan War, when the former allies fought among themselves over the division of Turkey’s European territories.  

The socialists’ inability to influence their governments’ choices became even more obvious in 1914. Following the divisions within the Second International, when the European socialists split into those who supported their country’s war effort and those who, headed by Lenin, opposed it and demanded that the war be turned into a class war, the socialist factions in the Balkans became divided into those who supported participation in the war and those who favoured neutrality. Both groups, however, remained loyal to the ideal of the Balkan federation. Thus in Greece, Platon Drakoullis, who supported Eleftherios Venizelos’s policy in favour of Greece’s joining the war on the side of the Entente, published in 1915 his proposal for a democratic Balkan federation — in which, in any case, the

federal Greek state would include all the territories that Greece was laying claim to. Drakoulis’s proposal was replied by the Bulgarian A. Shopov of the “broad” socialists (who supported their government’s military aims) with the counterproposal of a federation based on the Bulgarian national arguments. On the other side, the “narrow” Bulgarian socialists who, led by Dimitůr Blagoev, were opposed to the war, called for “uncompromising class war” against the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and the monarchy and for the establishment of a Balkan federal republic as the only means of averting the horror of war. More or less the same position was taken by the pro-neutrality Greek and Jewish socialists of the Federación, which maintained a strictly anti-war stance.

The local governments might not have made their choices on the basis of these declarations, but they did not ignore them either. Furthermore, after the October Revolution, the Balkan governments — like the rest of the European administrations — could not ignore the anti-war proclamations and the growing appeal of the left in the local communities. So, although in practice it remained an unattainable goal, the call for a Balkan federation, or at least for close cooperation among the nations on the peninsula, continued to be an active scenario for the reorganisation of the region and, possibly for the first time, resonated widely among those who had been disappointed with their governments’ hitherto expansionist policies.

The federal idea between the Wars: Europe and the Balkans

Anyway, for most of the Balkan states, their process of national integration was almost complete and irredentism was no longer at the heart of their policy. So the preconditions existed for seeking ways to cooperate at a national level. At the same time, however, there was also the cleavage, which was seen in the rest of Europe and was fixed by the post-war peace treaties, between the “revisionist” states and those that preferred to maintain the status quo. Thus Bulgaria never concealed its desire to change the borders, while Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Turkey based their post-war foreign policies on consolidating the borders. There was also the question of minorities, something of a new problem for the Balkan nation-states, which

---

19 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 199–201; Živković and Plavšić, eds., Balkan Socialist Tradition, 226–232. For the Greek socialists’ stance during the War, see G. V. Leontaritis, Το ελληνικό σοσιαλιστικό κίνημα κατά τον πρώτο παγκόσμιο πόλεμο [The Greek socialist movement in the First World War] (Athens 1978).
inevitably determined relations between them. And then, there were refugees — numerous in Greece and Bulgaria — who formed irredentist and nationalist pressure groups to influence their governments’ foreign policy (especially in the former case).

These issues proved crucial to the debate on the Balkan federation, but they were also an important consideration for the initiatives regarding European unification. Franco-German reconciliation was obviously a prerequisite for any European rapprochement, since relations between these two powers affected the security system of the entire continent. But it was not the only one: the east-European countries, like the Balkan countries, too, had to address not only the problems created in the relations between them by the minorities and the contesting of the borders, but also the revisionism of Hungary, Nazi Germany and the USSR; furthermore, all the European countries had to address the dilemma of transnational cooperation and the concomitant restriction of their national sovereignty — something which the new states of central and eastern Europe would not countenance.

The Balkan countries initially seemed reluctant to address these issues, either because they were not yet ready to renounce their traditional policies, or because they gave priority to their urgent political, social, and economic problems on the post-war domestic front, or because their interest had shifted to other forms of cooperation, such as the Little Entente formed by Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. In the same period the idea of a federal or a customs union burgeoned in the rest of Europe: from Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ‘Paneuropean’ movement in 1923 to Aristide Briand’s in 1929, there were many initiatives for economic and political unions at a European or regional level. At the same time the Depression reinforced the idea of a “common market”, which was considered more realistic in west-European official circles. After a slight delay, this trend also

---


reached south-eastern Europe; and it was no accident that Briand’s proposal was supported by almost all Balkan capitals, at a time when most of the European governments seemed rather to disparage it.\textsuperscript{24}

The stage was set by the transnational agreements, which resolved at least some of the local disputes, most notably the friendship agreement between Greece and Turkey in 1930. Over the next five years a number of trade and cultural agreements were signed between the Balkan states, which considerably broadened relations between them. This climate of rapprochement gave birth to the idea of the Balkan Conferences, which started at the initiative of the Greek republican statesman and former prime minister Alexandros Papanastasiou. The initiative was accepted by all six Balkan states, and they put together national delegations made up of MPs, diplomats, academics, and representatives of pacifist and professional organisations. At the first conference, in Athens in October 1930, it was decided to create a permanent organisation for the Balkan Conferences with the aim of promoting Balkan cooperation in the political, economic, social, and cultural sectors, with Balkan unification as the stated ultimate aim. The instruments of the Conferences would be the general meeting, the council, the secretariat and the national delegations. They in fact constituted a semi-official entity, for the resolutions of the Conferences had no binding effect on government policy. The role of the national delegations was to disseminate the idea of the unity of, and cooperation among, the Balkan peoples, and to press for the implementation of the conference resolutions. The organisation modelled itself on the League of Nations and Briand’s memorandum for the European federation.\textsuperscript{25}

The Balkan Conferences continued until 1934 and, despite the noted progress in a number of secondary, largely non-political issues, they showed that the countries involved were not yet in a position to find mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding minority and border questions. At the meetings the national delegations reiterated the official views of their governments, essentially confirming the divide between the supporters and the revisionists of the \textit{status quo} in the region. The confirmation became official in 1934, when the countries which supported the \textit{status quo} formed the Balkan Entente, an official alliance with a far narrower range of aims than the Balkan Conferences and which included neither the revisionist Bulgaria nor the Italian-influenced Albania. In actuality it was a defensive alliance, focusing exclusively on countering the revisionist tendencies of Bulgaria. This


development was strongly criticised at the time by the visionaries of Balkan unity, as also by those who favoured the revision of the post-war borders in Europe, namely Germany and Italy; whereas the Entente was discreetly supported by Britain, France, and the USSR (which after 1933 aligned itself with the supporters of the status quo) as an initiative that might reinforce stability and peace in south-eastern Europe. The Entente was also criticised by later historians, because of the non-participation of Bulgaria and Albania and because of its anti-Bulgarian character. However, in view of the smaller countries’ incapacity to contend with the great powers’ aspirations in the region, the creation of a purely anti-revisionist alliance seems to have been the only way for the four participants to pursue an independent policy. At all events, it seems to have reflected the limits of intra-Balkan cooperation at the time. After all, the gradual domination of authoritarian regimes in most of the Balkan states, together with the general political and economic developments in Europe, which reinforced nationalist tendencies and a policy of autarky, hindered the efforts towards the political and economic unification of the peninsula.  

For the rest of the 1930s the Balkan states managed to remain outside the crisis caused by Hitler’s rise to power and the subsequent explosion of revisionism in Europe — save for Albania, which was forcibly annexed by Italy in 1939. They could not avoid their economic subjugation to Nazi Germany, of course, which considerably boosted Hitler’s endeavour. But the responsibility for this was due more to Britain’s and France’s failure, first, to promote intra-European economic cooperation and, then, to successfully counter German economic and political influence in eastern Europe. This failure was also reflected in the western powers’ reluctance to support, officially and right from the start, the Balkan Entente, the members of which sustained their pro-western orientation in their foreign policy until France fell in June 1940; at this time, Italy entered the War and Romania was forced to cede much of its territory to the USSR, Hungary, and Bulgaria, which pushed Bucharest once and for all into the Axis. This was the end of the Balkan Entente, though not the end of the gestures of solidarity and

---


27 Stavrianos, Balkans, 740–749; Stirk, European Integration, 42–44.
cooperation among the Balkan nations, as became apparent in the years that followed.

The federal idea in the 1940s

During the early phase of the War’s expansion into south-eastern Europe only Greece was involved, after the Italian invasion in October 1940. Although the Balkan Entente had essentially collapsed, both Yugoslavia and Turkey were quick to offer Greece indirect help, the former secretly supplying munitions and the latter shifting troops to Thrace to avert any intervention by Bulgaria. The following year, however, Greece and Yugoslavia failed to coordinate their forces against the German invasion, and as a result both countries were speedily overrun by Wehrmacht troops. For the next four years south-eastern Europe shared the same fate as the rest of the continent under Axis domination.38

The Nazi conquest of Europe initially created expectations of a new European order that would replace the confusion of the national rivalries and economically unite the continent. These expectations were fostered both by high-ranking Nazis and German diplomats, who adopted a number of ambitious scenarios for reshaping the ‘New Europe’ under German leadership, and by the Germans’ collaborators in the occupied West, who were hoping that their small countries would be more highly valued in the New Order. The reality was different, however: German occupation soon made it clear that Berlin’s policy was focused on looting and exploiting the European countries to serve Germany’s war needs. The Nazis’ European rhetoric was rekindled by the campaign against the USSR and the ‘crusade against Bolshevism’; but it never evolved into an integrated European programme, nor was it sufficiently convincing other than for the fanatical anti-Communist collaborators who were recruited into the SS.39

When the War began, Britain and France intended only to restore international law, but it soon became clear that this was not enough and that an alternative was required both to the Nazis’ New Order and to the interwar situation. It was in this context that the pro-federal trend developed, which flourished especially during the War and was articulated both by unofficial bodies and resistance organisations in occupied Europe and by

the official allied nations. All the same, Winston Churchill did not want to make any official commitment regarding the post-war structure of Europe while the end of the War was not yet in sight, and also to avoid giving the United States—on which he was relying for the War to continue—the impression that plans were being made that it might regard as antagonistic. To the contrary, he systematically encouraged federalist initiatives by the East European and Balkan governments in exile. In January 1942 the governments in exile of Poland and Czechoslovakia concluded an initial agreement for a federal union between them, while the governments in exile of Greece and Yugoslavia signed a similar pact in the same month. These were, of course, meaningless declarations, for they presupposed that the occupied countries would be liberated and their exiled political leaders would return to power. The Polish–Czechoslovakian agreement soon collapsed, owing to the two sides’ differing attitudes to the USSR. The latter anyway would not accept federal structures that might restrict its influence in Eastern Europe. The Greek–Yugoslav agreement fared no better: from the start the Greek side seemed less keen to adopt it and when it eventually did so it was only at the urging of British diplomacy. Furthermore the two governments had very little influence in their occupied countries, not only because of the occupation, but also owing to the growth of the pro-communist national liberation fronts, which made it uncertain that they would return to power. Among the resistance organisations patriotism remained stronger than federalism at a Europe-wide level. And if some liberals and social democrats in the resistance in the West worked actively to promote the idea of European unity, in the East and the Balkans, where the pro-communist movements predominated, the resistance movements were above all pursuing the national rehabilitation of their occupied or fragmented countries, which after all were suffering more from the German occupation and had been broken up because of it. Having adopted a patriotic rather than an internationalist discourse in order to gain wider popular support, and given the negative stance of the Soviet Union, the Balkan national liberation fronts of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania insisted more on their national character, though they maintained contact with one another throughout the War.  

With the end of the War things changed once more. The advance of the Red Army into Eastern Europe and the northern Balkans confirmed Soviet influence in the region. In Yugoslavia Tito’s (Josip Broz’s) national liberation front prevailed totally over its opponents and felt strong enough both at home and abroad to pursue an ambitious initiative for Balkan unification. Tito’s initiative was based on Yugoslavia’s bilateral agreements with

---

30 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 261–271; Tchoubarian, European Idea, 140–142; Stirk, European Integration, 58–70; Mazower, Dark Continent, 185–186, 202–206.
Albania and Bulgaria and seemed at first to have some prospect of being implemented: all three countries were now under ‘fraternal’ pro-communist regimes with ideologically similar manifestos and with the support of the USSR. In 1946 Yugoslavia and Albania concluded a treaty of friendship, co-operation, and mutual assistance and also established jointly run financial enterprises to exploit Albania’s resources. The following year a similar agreement was signed by Belgrade and Sofia and both sides agreed to collaborate closely on the Macedonian Question in the hope that the Greek communists would prevail and all the Macedonian territories would be united in the framework of a future local federation. However, these initiatives of Tito’s were not necessarily welcomed by the Albanian and the Bulgarian leadership, who were suspicious of the growing Yugoslav influence in their countries: Albania realised that Yugoslav ‘support’ was in fact replacing Italian ‘protection’; while Bulgaria, which was forced to accept Yugoslav cultural propaganda in the Pirin area, saw that the establishment of the autonomous Republic of Macedonia within the framework of the Yugoslav federation was turning the Macedonian Question against it. As long as Tito continued to enjoy the respect of Stalin and the Cominform, Sofia and Tirana could only follow Belgrade’s initiatives. But after the rift between Stalin and Tito in 1948, the two countries promptly severed their relations with Yugoslavia and rescinded the agreements they had signed with it. The last federalist movement in the Balkans was thus more or less nipped in the bud, owing to Moscow’s refusal to accept Belgrade’s independent actions and also because of Sofia’s and Tirana’s unwillingness to sacrifice their own independence for the sake of a federation centring on Belgrade.\(^{11}\)

**Conclusion**

Throughout the period under examination the idea of Balkan unity was in most cases a secondary consideration in the local countries’ diplomacy. The federalist proposals usually came from non-governmental representatives, more specifically from those who challenged not only their governments’ foreign policy but also those governments’ very legitimacy; for which reason the federalists in south-eastern Europe almost always belonged to opposition groups, initially among the radical democrats and then among the socialists. All the same, whenever the prevailing nationalist ideology was undergoing a crisis federalism seemed to appeal more strongly to popular opinion, while even the governments themselves appeared willing to follow the trend, at least insofar as they believed it served national interests. The

---

idea of a united Europe followed a similar course in Europe as a whole. Until the interwar period mainly intellectuals and theoreticians on the left articulated it, but subsequently, under the dramatic impact of the First World War on the European communities, it seemed to attract the interest of official diplomacy — but again temporarily. It took another global crisis, again centring on Europe, the long separation of the continent into two opposing camps, and the collapse of European hegemony at a global level to change the situation: the weakening of the west European great powers was the decisive factor that prompted them to take the initiative to form an, initially regional, economic union, which is now developing into a wager for wider European unity. The continent’s south-eastern extremity, of course, had neither the economic nor the political basis for such a venture. And this is why the only chance of accomplishing it is for the entire region to participate in European integration.

Bibliography


Hassiotis, I. K. Αναζητώντας την ενότητα στην πολυμορφία. Οι απαρχές της Ευρωπαϊκής ενότητας από το τέλος του μεσαίωνα ως τη Γαλλική Επανάσταση [Seeking Unity in Diversity: The Beginnings of European Unity from the End of the Middle Ages to the French Revolution]. Thessaloniki 2000.


— Η γαλλική Επανάσταση και η Νοτιοανατολική Ευρώπη [The French Revolution and South-eastern Europe]. Athens 2000.


Eglise – société – Etat
L’Église orthodoxe serbe à la fin du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle

Abstrait: Au cours du dernier tiers du XXe siècle les institutions religieuses ont parcouru subrepticement le chemin entre marginalisation et passage au premier plan de la scène publique des pays en transition. La fin des idéologies s’est soldée par la mise en place des identités communautaristes. Alors que dans les démocraties libérales le fait religieux est caractérisé par la formule believing without belonging, les choses sont diamétralement opposées dans les sociétés en transition. Minoritaire avant la fin des années quatre-vingts, l’appartenance confessionnelle atteint ainsi 94% lors du recensement de 2003 en Serbie-Monténégro. L’appartenance à la confession majoritaire se situe autour de 50% d’une population dans un pays comme la France, le point commun avec la Serbie étant que quelques 4% seulement se déclarent pratiquants. La spécificité des pays en transition tardive comme la Serbie, où le catéchisme a été introduit en 2000, dix ans après la Croatie et la Bosnie-Herzégovine, soulève la question de la cléricalisation rapide de la société en contrepartie de la sécularisation et de la politisation des communautés confessionnelles. À défaut d’un projet de société, en moins de temps que dans les autres pays en transition, les institutions religieuses se sont muées en supports idéologiques des autorités politiques affaiblies, en générateurs des restructurations des identités ethno-confessionnelles, en piliers des cohésions communautaires, en institutions pilotes de consensus sociaux. Cela explique qu’une analyse de ce processus d’histoire de société n’est pas seulement à même de nous éclaire sur notre passé le plus récent, mais encore sur le devenir du présent qui est le nôtre à l’horizon de nouveaux élargissements européens.

Mots clef : communauté confessionnelle, communauté liturgique, authenticité, conformité, appartenance ethno-confessionnelle, traditionalisme, société civile, société ouverte, émancipation, processus de modernisation

Terre d’élection de recompositions ethno-confessionnelles et laboratoire d’ingénierie identitaire, en lieu et place des idéologies désormais obsolètes, la majeure partie du Sud-est européen, et en particulier l’espace de l’ex-Yougoslavie, est à la charnière du millénaire un observatoire privilégié des dérives du processus de transition.

A l’issue de la période communiste, l’impact des Églises dans les pays du sud-est européen est un fait de société que les structures politiques doivent prendre en compte. Il ne s’agit pas seulement ici de pratique religieuse publique : à l’exception de la Grèce et aussi, dans une moindre mesure, de la Roumanie, la pratique religieuse, traditionnellement aléatoire, était devenue particulièrement faible. Ce n’est que peu d’années avant l’effondrement des démocraties populaires que l’on a pu constater un accroissement significatif
des manifestations de religiosité, notamment dans les régions de populations et, surtout, de confessions mixtes. Phénomène corollaire à l'échec de l'idéologie dominante, le retour des Églises sur le devant de la scène publique, bien que de forte ampleur, relève d'une constante dans cette partie de l'Europe, où la faible structuration de la société dotée d'une mince élite est compensée par l'effet de cohésion en provenance des structures ecclésiastiques.

Le cas de l'ex-Yougoslavie est particulièrement significatif à cet égard. Alors que les conflits armés se sont tous déroulés dans un triangle interconfessionnel, les tensions intercommunautaires s’intensifient périodiquement au sein de la même confession. Ces tensions entre hiérarchies ecclésiastiques sont issues d’un conflit d’ordre canonique entre l’Église autoproclamée, dans les années soixante, de la Macédoine et l’Église serbe. Depuis quelques années le phénomène s’étend au Monténégro, même si dans ce cas il présente un caractère presque caricatural, du fait de la très faible adhésion du public, d’une certaine ambiguïté de l’attitude du pouvoir politique, ainsi que du manque de représentativité de la petite poignée d’ecclésiastiques qui s’efforce de créer une Église nationale.¹

Le cas monténégrin présente l’intérêt de révéler nombre de contradictions dans cette région connue par sa singulière sensibilité tectonique. La petite république est actuellement partagée en deux parties pratiquement égales sur la question de l’indépendance que prône le pouvoir en place. Aux prises avec une suite impressionnante de scandales hérités du système Milošević, ce régime est en passe de perdre tout crédit auprès de la population. Faible, divisée, manquant de cohérence, l’opposition ne semble pas être en mesure de mettre à son profit cette situation de fin de règne. C’est dans ce climat de résignation désabusée que le diocèse monténégrin du patriarcat de Belgrade recueille une confiance record, qui selon les sondages les plus récents se situe autour de 80 % d’opinions favorables. En deuxième position on trouve une simple ONG, « Alliance pour les changements », devançant tous les partis politiques, ce qui en dit long sur l’état d’esprit de la population.

Ethnicité et confessionnalité – approche historique

Les recoupements entre ethnicités et confessions renvoient à une conjoncture identitaire dans la spécificité balkanique. Ce qui est surtout le cas des pays actuellement désignés par les termes « Balkans occidentaux ». Après avoir signalé le retard accumulé dans cette partie des Balkans par rapport

¹ Radmila Radić, « Crkva u politici i politika u Crkvi » [L’Église dans la politique et politique dans l’Église], in Srpška elita, Helsinške sveske 1 (Belgrade 2001), 71–75.
aux processus d'intégration européens, il est nécessaire d'aborder l'aspect confessionnel des questions identitaires dans cette partie de la région carac térisée tant par la multiculturalité que par des solidarités multiples et anti nomiques à la fois.

Les trois grandes confessions monothéistes traditionnellement implantées dans le Sud-Est européen situent les clivages locaux sur un plan universel et intercontinental. Ces grandes religions et confessions historiques assurent en principe un facteur de cohésion transcendant les fractures ethniques et identitaires. Les conflits de la fin du siècle passé se situaient essentiellement à l'intérieur de ce triangle confessionnel. La spécificité balkanique réside néanmoins dans les subdivisions au sein de ces ensembles confessionnels que sont les Églises et autres communautés ethno-confessionnelles héritées de l'histoire mouvementée de cette partie de l'Europe.

N'ayant pratiquement aucune incidence sur un plan doctrinal, la question du calendrier (Julien et Grégorien) divise les Églises orthodoxes, tout en signifiant leur rapport à la modernité. Les Églises de Grèce, de Roumanie et de Bulgarie, ainsi que le Patriarcat œcuménique, ont adhéré depuis le début du XXe siècle au « Nouveau calendrier » (Grégorien), alors que celles de Serbie et de Macédoine, ainsi que le Mont-Athos demeurent dans « l'Ancien calendrier » (Julien), avec 13 jours d'écart. C'est ainsi que dans le Sud-Est européen cette différenciation recoupe la dynamique des processus d'intégration européenne. Il est à noter que la réforme du calendrier a suscité des schismes, notamment au sein de l'Église grecque, où les Paléohimérologistes (Vieux-calendaristes), regroupent les courants les plus conservateurs. L'intégrisme religieux est difficile à définir au sein de l'Église orthodoxe, mais il apparaît que les courants les plus conservateurs (notamment le zélotisme), qui regroupent les couches moins instruites de la population, s'articule essentiellement autour du dénominateur commun vieux-calendariste.

Afin de mieux comprendre l'évolution des sociétés sud-est européennes à travers leur communauté et confessionnel, il est nécessaire de faire intervenir la variable de l'antériorité temporelle, autrement dit, la dimension historique.

« Jésus en Serbie »

Lorsqu'au début des années soixante-dix, le périodique catholique de Zagreb « La voix du Concile » dépêche en Serbie un reporter qui publiera un texte remarqué, intitulé « Jésus en Šumadija » (Serbie centrale), il ne devait guère être mû par un souci de réconciliation interconfessionnelle et

---

de rapprochement œcuméniste. En bons connaisseurs de la vie religieuse chez leurs voisins orientaux, cherchant à déceler les premières failles de ce qu’ils considéraient comme une domination serbo-communiste, les clercs croates montrèrent une certaine acuité de vues et un pressentiment symptomatique de l’avenir. Le phénomène visé était le renouveau de la pratique religieuse chez les orthodoxes serbes liés au mouvement des Bogomoljci (littéralement, les Priant-Dieu), mouvement qui accusait un certain nombre de ressemblances avec un mouvement charismatique, mais qui était présent essentiellement chez les populations rurales.

Intrigué d’« avoir découvert l’un de ces ‘groupes spontanés’ dont on parle tant en Occident actuellement », le journaliste de la revue officielle de l’Archevêché catholique de Zagreb, le R.P. Živko Kustić semble avoir été réellement ému par cette pastorale d’allure biblique dont il fut témoin lors de sa « rencontre avec l’une de ces communautés des temps apostoliques, à l’image de celles qu’aurait dû faire l’apôtre Paul à Corinthe ou à Thessalonique », en Serbie. L’auteur de l’article découvre, non sans une certaine surprise, que malgré l’absence de tout catéchisme (supprimé par les autorités depuis 1948), les prières étaient dites, y compris par les enfants, en langue vulgaire et non pas en slavon d’Église.

**Les Priant-Dieu (Bogomoljci)**

en soi, ce mouvement piétiste des Bogomoljci se répandit de manière considérable, surtout dans les populations rurales, ce en quoi il diffère des mouvements liés à l’influence occidentale et protestante en Grèce, Zoï (fondé en 1907) et Satir, qui touchèrent essentiellement les couches de population urbaines. À l’occasion des nombreuses fêtes du calendrier orthodoxe, les Bogomoljci organisèrent d’importants rassemblements populaires, notamment dans les grands couvents de Serbie, ce en quoi ils ne faisaient que perpétuer les pèlerinages et rassemblements populaires autour des foyers de religiosité traditionnels des Balkans et du monde orthodoxe. Leur piétisme s’exprimait au quotidien par une pratique cultuelle considérablement renforcée, surtout par rapport à une pratique religieuse très moyennement appliquée par ailleurs, par de longues prières collectives, des jeunes sévères, par la pratique de la communion fréquente et parfois, par des confessions collectives, néanmoins repoussées par le clergé. Alors que ce mouvement à consonance charismatique menaçait d’échapper au contrôle de l’EOS (Église Orthodoxe Serbe), l’engagement missionnaire de l’évêque Nikolaï Velimirović permit de le canaliser en l’articulant autour des pratiques cultuelles traditionnelles. Avec ses poésies pieuses, ses vies de saints brèves, ses prédications et ses nombreux ouvrages distribués sous le manteau à l’époque communiste, l’évêque Nikolaï laissa sur le mouvement une empreinte durable et visible bien longtemps après son internement par les nazis et sa mort en exil. En 1930 la « Communauté chrétienne » des Bogomoljci compte 153 « fraternités », avec 1 142 membres en titre, 83 prêtres prennent officiellement part au mouvement, d’autres officieusement, mais un certain nombre de clercs lui restent réfractaires. En 1939 le nombre de « fraternités » est de 450 et


les principaux périodiques de la « Communauté » sont imprimés à plus de 15 000 exemplaires.8

Sous le titre officiel de « Communauté chrétienne », les Bogomoljci organisaient leurs réunions de prières et de pèlerinage autour des grands monastères, essentiellement en Serbie. Un certain regain de leur activité put être observé dans les années soixante-dix : la communauté de Krnjevo, village de quelque 7 000 habitants au bord de l’autoroute à cent kilomètres au sud de Belgrade, se distinguait par la construction d’une église richement ornée, alors que l’édification d’une église était devenue rare. Les autorités ne voyaient pas d’un très bon œil de telles initiatives. L’instigateur de cette entreprise, le jeune « frère » Dragi, perdit la vie dans un accident de circulation avant la fin des travaux. Alors que l’urbanisation accélérée vidait les campagnes en y laissant une population de plus en plus vieille, on pouvait s’interroger sur l’avenir de ce mouvement.

Avec ses nombreux écrits, chansons de style populaire faciles à retenir, ses discours, ses lettres pastorales, ses livres qu’on se passait sous le manteau, son recueil de vies des saints abrégiées, l’évêque exilé Nikolai Velimirović9 était la référence incontournable de la « Communauté chrétienne ».10 Avec son esprit patriarcal, son conservatisme et sa nostalgie d’un monde révolu, il risquait peu de toucher les populations urbaines et surtout les jeunes générations. Si, avec leur conservatisme naturel, les campagnes gardaient un souvenir vivace de cet évêque missionnaire et ouvertement anticommuniste, les jeunes citadins ignoraient jusqu’à son existence, d’autant que ses écrits publiés en Allemagne étaient interdits d’importation.11 Touché, entre autres, par le dépeuplement des campagnes, le mouvement semble connaître une nouvelle recrudescence depuis la fin des années quatre-vingt-dix.

10 « Narodna Pravoslavna Hrišćanska zajednica » (Communauté chrétienne orthodoxe populaire), fondée le 23 octobre 1921 à Kragujevac (Serbie), avec la bénédiction du patriarche Dimitrije et la participation de plus de 300 délégués ; Jevtić, Jevandjelski neimar, 21 ; Subotić, Episkop Nikolaj i Pravoslavni bogomoljački pokret, 33–34.
11 Mgr Laurent, alors évêque en Europe occidentale, entreprit la publication de l’œuvre de Nikolai Velimirović (canonisé par l’EOS en 2003), en une vingtaine de volumes (imprimés par l’imprimerie diocésaine de Düsseldorf à partir de 1976). Cette publication ne put être importée légalement qu’à partir de la fin des années quatre-vingt. Publié par les soins du Patriarcat de Belgrade, Ohridski Prolog « le Prologue d’Ohrid » (Recueil de vies de saints synaxaires, avec poésies et commentaires homiletiques), parut néanmoins en 1961 à Belgrade, avec la bénédiction du patriarche Germain, mais sans nom d’auteur.
Assigné à résidence (à perpétuité) par les autorités communistes dès la fin de la guerre, l’archimandrite Justin Popović était le deuxième théologien et prédicateur serbe qui ait marqué cette époque. Si l’évêque Nikolaï, par la nature de son engagement et de son œuvre, peut être situé dans un cadre national serbe, Justin Popović en revanche doit plutôt être situé dans une mouvance néo-patristique et supranationale. Issu d’une très longue lignée de prêtres de paroisses urbaines de la région de Vranje, au sud de la Serbie, formé à Oxford, à Kiev et à Athènes, professeur à la Faculté de Théologie de Belgrade avant la guerre, il se distingua, bien qu’il ne fût qu’un jeune moine, par une indépendance d’esprit et un sens critique qui ne manquèrent pas de heurter la hiérarchie. Alors qu’il dirigeait « La vie chrétienne », revue d’intellectuels orthodoxes qui se singularisa par ses prises de positions sans concessions à l’égard de l’Église officielle, il fut envoyé par mesure disciplinaire à Bitolj, à l’extrême sud de la Macédoine. Plus tard, il alla jusqu’à refuser d’être élu à la dignité d’évêque, ce qui ne fit que confirmer son aura d’intégrité et de conscience vivante de l’Église, en Yougoslavie et dans d’autres pays. Du fait des fortes réticences des autorités communistes à son égard, de la surveillance de ses allers et venues, du contrôle de ceux qui lui rendaient visite au monastère de Ćelije, à une centaine de kilomètres au sud-ouest de Belgrade, il était peu connu en-dehors d’un public d’intellectuels et ecclésiastiques qui avaient l’audace de braver l’attitude des autorités, y compris ecclésiastiques, à son encontre.

Par ses écrits théologiques et polémiques, notamment sur le mouvement œcuménique, la papauté, etc., il avait acquis un public notamment en Grèce et dans la diaspora orthodoxe en Occident.

Bien que Justin Popović n’eût jamais une audience comparable à celle de Mgr Nikolaï, son œuvre exerça une influence considérable, surtout après sa mort, non pas tant par sa Dogmatique et autres œuvres théologiques, exé-

12 Lorsque le patriarche de Russie, Pimen, fit une visite en Yougoslavie, le chef de la délégation officielle qui alla l’accueillir à l’aéroport, l’entendit lui poser la question : « ce Justin, vous cause-t-il toujours autant d’ennuis » ? (propos recueillis par l’évêque Jean de Šabac-Valjevo en juin 1978). En 1976, lors de sa visite à Belgrade, l’archevêque Séraphin, chef de l’Église grecque, demanda à son hôte, le patriarche Germain, de rencontrer Justin Popović, bien qu’il fût fort mal disposé à son égard ; le patriarche dut aller chercher le théologien assigné à résidence.

gétiques ou encore philosophiques, ni même par ses monumentales *Vies des saints*, mais avant tout par sa réforme liturgique. En traduisant en langue vulgaire la liturgie orthodoxe, de même que bien d'autres offices religieux, y compris le slavon d’Église, il rendit accessible au plus grand nombre un important héritage de spiritualité orthodoxe. Confiné à vie dans un petit monastère éloigné des grands accès routiers, ce fut la dernière génération de ses disciples qui devait mettre à profit son héritage, dans un contexte socioculturel et politique fort différent.


À la fin des années soixante-dix, les jours de la veille du Noël orthodoxe, des attroupements spontanés de jeunes se constituèrent entre la cathédrale et le Patriarcat de Belgrade. Le fait que la police avait procédé à des « conversations informatives » dans un but de dissuasion ne put qu’augmenter l’attrait d’un tabou à transgresser. Il était de bon ton auparavant, dans la jeunesse « tendance » de Belgrade, d’aller à la veille du Noël catholique écouter les orgues dans les églises catholiques. Après deux ou

---


14 Restés longtemps à l’état de manuscrit, parce que le patriarche Germain avait proposé de le publier à condition que le nom de l’auteur n’y figure pas. La publication de ces 12 importants volumes s’étale néanmoins entre 1972 et 1977 et fut suivie d’autres éditions. Ce fut la première parution d’un ménologe aussi exhaustif en serbo-croate.

15 Justin Popović entreprit ses traductions de textes liturgiques à partir de 1921.

trois attroupements toujours plus importants devant le Patriarcat de l’Église orthodoxe,\(^{17}\) les autorités ecclésiastiques décidèrent d’ouvrir l’église pour un office de minuit, chose qui n’avait jamais été pratiquée auparavant, mais qui entra aussitôt dans les habitudes.

Voulant se démarquer du conformisme ambiant et voyant dans l’hypocrisie des parents des anti-modèles qu’il importait de désavouer, la jeunesse découvrait la mode religieuse.\(^{18}\) Alors même que le phénomène ne touchait en un premier temps que quelques milieux de jeunes issus des élites de la capitale, il s’étendit avec les années. Dans le même temps, les historiographies, littératures et modèles culturels commencèrent à favoriser les thèmes nationaux, souvent indissociables des colorations confessionnelles.\(^{19}\)

Ayant grandi trop vite, Belgrade était parmi les capitales européennes, sans doute celle qui avait le moins d’édifices religieux, pas plus d’une vingtaine d’églises orthodoxes, plusieurs églises catholiques, une église vieille-catholique, une mosquée, etc., mais en cela, elle ne présentait pas de différence notable avec les autres villes de la partie orthodoxe du pays. La pratique religieuse, sous forme de fréquentation des églises et des services religieux, n’y avait jamais été très développée. Il n’en était pas de même au niveau de certaines coutumes populaires tolérées ou même favorisées par l’EOS, comme la célébration de Noël, et surtout le réveillon (ce réveillon est une spécificité serbe parmi les traditions orthodoxes) avec des coutumes et des rites archaïques, notamment la bûche du réveillon dont les Serbes sont très fiers et à laquelle ils sont fort attachés.\(^{20}\) Parmi ces coutumes héritées de la société patriarcale, la **Slava** (fête du saint patron de la lignée), tient une

\(^{17}\) Sur le coup de minuit, en 1983, alors que des jeunes éméchés faisaient du tapage en frappant à la porte du Patriarcat, demandant qu’on réveillât le patriarche, la plupart des assistants demeuraient silencieux et certains avaient même apporté des sièges.

\(^{18}\) Au cours des années soixante, les enfants des diplomates yougoslaves à Pékin improvisèrent un autel dans les locaux de l’ambassade. À l’école des enfants du corps diplomatique, les religieuses avaient inculqué aux élèves quelques notions de « solidarité » occidentale face aux Chinois qu’ils voyaient morts « sans foi ni loi » après un tremblement de terre (propos tenus en 1971 par Smiljka Bogunović, fille du diplomate Branko Bogunović).

\(^{19}\) C’est ainsi qu’un groupe d’universitaires publie en quatre volumes **Srbljak** (Belgrade 1970) (premières éditions, Rimnik 1761 et Venise 1765), un recueil de textes liturgiques dédiés aux saints serbes (essentiellement du Moyen-Âge), traduits en serbe moderne avec le texte original en regard.

\(^{20}\) La bibliographie sur ces pratiques culturelles étant fort abondante, voir l’étude récente, Vesna Vučinić-Nešković, « Nalaganje Badnjaka u Grblju : primer hijerarhizovane pros-lave Božića u Boki Kotskoj [La Bûche de Noël à Grbalj : un exemple de célébration hiérarchisée de Noël dans les Bouches de Kotor au Monténégro], in Problemi kulturnog
place toute particulière. Alors que l’Église orthodoxe grecque et, davantage encore, l’Église catholique avaient tout fait pour éradiquer ce genre de coutumes, les Serbes et leur Église y voyaient un signe distinctif et un patrimoine ancestral. Au plus fort des campagnes antireligieuses, il arrivait que les communistes les plus endurcis eux-mêmes pratiquaient la Slava, sous une forme sécurisée, en y voyant un signe de respect envers leurs parents et ancêtres. Les soldats au front ou les familles les plus pauvres étaient prêts à subir bien des privations afin de pouvoir fêter dignement leur saint patron, le plus souvent saint Nicolas, saint Georges, saint Jean-Baptiste, etc.

Après de longues années d’études et de séjours pastoraux, surtout en Grèce, mais aussi en France, en Italie ou en Suisse, les disciples de Justin Popović reviennent au début des années soixante-dix et ce retour coïncide avec l’apparition d’un regain d’intérêt pour la pratique religieuse. Cet intérêt, qui concernait en premier des jeunes mais aussi des intellectuels, se manifestait de manière fort différente : alors que les jeunes se convertissaient et adhéraient pleinement à une pratique renouvelée, approfondie et libérée des coutumes superflues, les intellectuels n’avaient en majorité d’autre souci que d’instrumentaliser le fait religieux à des fins politiques et médiatiques.

Les évêques les plus en vue de l’EOS étaient issus de la dernière génération des disciples de Justin Popović, celle qui allait porter l’essentiel du renouveau religieux. À la fin des années soixante et au début des années soixante-dix, ces ecclésiastiques achèvent leurs études doctorales à l’Université d’Athènes, tout en prenant une part éminente au mouvement néo-patristique en Grèce. Les deux premiers de ces disciples font successivement un séjour à Paris où ils enseignent à l’Institut de théologie orthodoxe (russe) de Saint-Serge et nouent des liens avec la diaspora orthodoxe et serbe en Europe occidentale.

Mal reçus et marginalisés à leur retour par l’Église officielle, surveillés et malmenées par la police politique, ils organisent néanmoins des conférences de catéchèse pour jeunes et adultes qui rencontrent une audience croissante. C’est au niveau de la pratique religieuse et de l’adhésion des jeunes que leur activité montre le plus d’effets dans un premier temps.

La mise en œuvre du renouveau néo-patristique et l’adaptation de la pratique liturgique aux traductions d’un grand nombre de textes hymnographiques réalisées par Justin Popović eurent pour conséquence une vê-

*identiteta stanovništva savremene Srbije* [Problèmes d’identité culturelle de la population en Serbie contemporaine] (Belgrade 2005), 123–148 (résumé en anglais).

ritable réforme liturgique. Avec la systématisation de la communion, le renforcement de sa préparation, la dissociation de la confession et de la communion, et surtout la diffusion des confessions longues et fréquentes devant le père spirituel, les jeunes affluèrent dans les églises et les monastères aux pratiques ainsi renouvelées.

En absence de statistiques impossibles à établir, il semble que ce mouvement, qui concernait essentiellement les jeunes issus des élites et de la classe moyenne des grands centres urbains, était peu important en chiffres absolus mais eut un effet non négligeable, et ceci bien avant les ruptures dramatiques de la fin des années quatre-vingt.

L’adhésion des intellectuels peu soucieux de pratiques cultuelles, rompus aux joutes idéologiques et identitaires, constitue l’autre volet du retour du religieux. Disciples de Justin Popović, les jeunes hiéromones cosmopolites rentrés des pays occidentaux, instruits et polyglottes, étaient de plus en plus sollicités dans la vie publique. Marginalisés par l’Église officielle, ils pouvaient acquérir de la popularité grâce à la promotion médiatique grâcement offerte par leurs nouveaux amis, intellectuels de renom. Les conférences de catéchèse se transformèrent en meetings dans les plus grandes salles, en interviews dans la grande presse puis dans les médias électroniques. Devenus professeurs à la Faculté de théologie de Belgrade, les disciples de Justin Popović prirent part aux échanges œcuméniques, notamment sous forme de Symposiums organisés, tous les deux ans, conjointement par les Facultés de théologie catholique de Zagreb et de Ljubljana et par la Faculté orthodoxe de Belgrade.

Au fur et à mesure que l’idéologie officielle perdait son monopole, les particularismes ethniques et surtout confessionnels s’imposaient. Représentant le peuple fédérateur sans doute le plus attaché à l’État commun, le nationalisme serbe était particulièrement proscrit. Devant les risques encourus en cas de manifestations ostentatoires, et même modérées, de leur appartenance ethnique, les élites trouvèrent une échappatoire dans les pratiques et les manifestations religieuses. S’exerçant parallèlement à l’éveil religieux des jeunes, mais pas toujours compatible avec lui, cette implication des élites ne pouvait rester sans effet et le prestige ascendant des jeunes moines s’en trouvait renforcé. Lorsque deux d’entre eux furent invités à faire

partie de la prestigieuse *Union des écrivains de Serbie*, ce fut un précédent fort significatif. Cependant que les relations suivies avec les Académiciens de l’Académie des Sciences et des Arts de Serbie impliquaient ces jeunes moines dans la vie publique de la capitale, leur activité pastorale décroissait au profit d’engagements idéologiques. Malgré des réticences d’une partie de l’épiscopat, dans les années quatre-vingt, ils seront tous élus évêques.

La structure de l’EOS étant essentiellement épiscopale, bien plus décentralisée que celle de la plupart des Églises orthodoxes, mais plus conforme en cela à la tradition canonique de l’Église, le rôle du patriarche, *primus inter pares*, est surtout celui d’interlocuteur du pouvoir religieux central. Si, par exemple, le patriarche souhaite célébrer un office religieux dans l’église d’un autre diocèse de l’EOS, il doit impérativement solliciter la permission de l’évêque concerné. Le patriarche préside les conciles, le synode et les autres conférences épiscopales, il a le droit de proposer un pouvoir décisionnel en-dehors de son diocèse mais ne peut aucunement en disposer. Les orientations politiques et ecclésiologiques des évêques peuvent ainsi être fort disparates : certains d’entre eux ont pu être classés en tant que favorables au Vatican (tels que Laurent de Šabac–Valjevo, Irénée de Novi Sad), d’autres comme démocrates (Athanase Jevtić, sic !), pro-occidentaux, patriotes, etc. Le pouvoir de l’évêque (*despotes* en grec, *vladika*, c’est-à-dire monseigneur, etc.).

Chaque république et région autonome avait son Union des écrivains nationale (genre d’association corporative créée sur le modèle soviétique), de même que les partis communistes des unités fédérales de territoriales et administratives devinrent ethno-centrées et aussi d’un nationalisme ascendant. « Jusqu’à maintenant nous étions des pharisiens, nous voici désormais aussi écrivains », fut le commentaire désabusé d’Athanase Jevtić (professeur à la Faculté de théologie de Belgrade, évêque de Vršac depuis 1991 ; les membres de l’Union des écrivains faisaient partie des privilégiés sous régime communiste, statut incompatibile avec le fait d’être un ecclésiastique).

Au début des années 1990, le patriarche Paul, le patriarche Irénée, le patriarche Ignac, Nikolaï (de Sarajevo), Chrysostome (Banja Luka), les principaux adversaires étant Amphiloque, Jean (de Šumadija), Artémios (Kosovo), Amphiloque (Ziça), les autres étaient neutres ou ne se prononçaient pas, Z. Milošević, *Tranzicija i Srpska crkva* [La transition et l’Église serbe] (Belgrade 2004), 25, 28–31.


C’est ainsi que, parmi les évêques actuellement les plus en vue, Athanase serait favorable à la démocratie libérale (sic !) ; Amphiloque (de Monténégro) à la théo-démocratie ; Danilo de Budim, à la monarchie, cf. Z. Milošević, *Crkva i politika. Pravoslavlje i društvene reforme* [Église et politique. L’Orthodoxie et les réformes] (Belgrade 2002), p. 20 n. 46.
Église orthodoxe et société dans la Serbie-Monténégro en transition

Alors que les hiérarchies avaient été jusqu'alors malmenées dans leur ministère, alors que la liberté de culte était étroitement limitée, alors que les Églises avaient été séparées de l'État et leurs dignitaires marginalisés, l'effondrement de l'idéologie dominante dans les pays communistes se traduisit par un tournant radical dans le rôle des communautés confessionnelles par rapport à l'État et à la société. Longtemps reléguées en marge de la vie publique et mal préparées à leur nouveau rôle, ces hiérarchies religieuses se retrouvèrent placées sur le devant de la scène publique au moment de l'effondrement du régime communiste, ce qui se traduisit le plus souvent par une instrumentalisation politique, médiatique et idéologique des Églises, notamment au profit des constructions identitaires. Ainsi, l'affaiblissement de l'État se traduisait dans les pays en transition par le renforcement des institutions religieuses.

Le cas de l'Église orthodoxe serbe ne déroge pas à la règle. Signes avant-coureurs des temps post-socialistes, les premières manifestations sur la scène publique de l'autorité ascendante du ministère religieux s'annoncent à la fin des années quatre-vingt. Ce fut notamment le cas lors d'une représentation théâtrale s'articulant autour d'un sujet relatif au patrimoine historique et religieux. L'affaire éclata à l'occasion de la présentation, le 11 mai 1990, dans le prestigieux Théâtre dramatique Yougoslave de Belgrade, d'une pièce intitulée « Saint Sava », jouée par la troupe du Théâtre municipal d'une petite ville de Bosnie, Zenica. Jugée insultante, sinon blasphématoire, pour la mémoire nationale et orthodoxe, la représentation fut empêchée par un groupe de nationalistes serbes dont certains se disaient étudiants de la Faculté de théologie. Organisé en réalité par les partisans de Vojislav Šešelj, plus

---


[28] Le recensement fait en Serbie en 2001 révèle que 95% des habitants appartiennent à une confession, que 4,5% ne se prononcent pas et que seulement 0,5% sont athées. Dans une enquête faite en Vojvodine (province septentrionale de Serbie, ethniquement hétérogène, plus urbanisée et économiquement développée que le reste du pays), 60% d'enquêtés se disent croyants.
tard chef du Parti radical serbe (d'extrême droite), l'incident fut à l'origine de la première scission dans la droite nationaliste en Serbie. L'Église orthodoxe serbe prit part à cet incident en la personne du prêtre controversé Gavrilović : d'un militantisme exacerbé, la plupart du temps à la limite de la destitution, politiquement marginal, cet ecclésiastique extrémiste avait vainement tenté de créer un parti politique clérical ; rejeté par sa hiérarchie, il fut rapidement oublié. La réaction de l'Église orthodoxe en la personne de l'évêque Amphiloque (réaction officieuse puisque le Saint-Synode et la Conférence épiscopale étaient seuls habilités à prendre des positions officielles), ne se fit pas attendre : dans une déclaration au quotidien « Ekspres Politika », l'évêque fustigea plusieurs cas de figure de ce qu'il considérerait comme des brimades envers les croyances religieuses de la part de publicistes et d'écrivains de l'époque communiste. Susceptibilité religieuse et identitaire d'un côté, liberté d'expression de l'autre, le débat est loin d'être clos, ainsi qu'on peut le voir de nos jours. Datant d'une vingtaine d'années, le cas évoqué n'en est que plus significatif.\footnote{Même si cet incident ne semble pas avoir été aussi significatif comme il est souligné dans ce rapport (même si cette contestation mettait en cause la liberté d'expression artistique), tel que mis en exergue du rapport, « The Serbian Orthodox Church and the New Serbian Identity », présenté par le Comité Helsinki des droits de l'homme en Serbie, http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/reports/eng/Studija-Kupres-eng.pdf}

Survenu au milieu des années quatre-vingt-dix, bien plus explicite, et surtout plus symptomatique de la conjonction identité-religion, est le cas du testament attribué au fondateur historique de l'État serbe, le Grand Joupan Stefan Nemanja (1165–1186).\footnote{http://www.snd-us.com/archive/1767/lat/snemanja_jezik_L.html En anglais (extract), www.spcobern.ch/PagesStrane/English/SvetiSavaE/SvetiSavaFezikE.htm} Construction littéraire de la fin du XX\textsuperscript{e} siècle,\footnote{M. Medić, Zavještanj Stefana Nemanje, 3\textsuperscript{e} éd. (Belgrade 2001).} ce texte pathétique qui avait été peu remarqué lors de sa première parution, devient une sorte de credo nationaliste après sa publication dans la revue diocésaine de l'Église serbe au Canada. Le parti d'extrême droite de Šešelj s'empara de cette abbaine de national-romantisme en en faisant une sorte de manifeste identitaire. Bien que parfaitement et ostensiblement étranger à l'esprit et à la lettre de la littérature médiévale, le testament apocryphe fut publié à d'innombrables reprises et, comble de ridicule, présenté au Congrès d'études slaves à Varsovie par le doyen de la Faculté de Philologie de Belgrade\footnote{Placé à la tête de cette prestigieuse faculté en 1999, Marojević, un russisant membre du parti ultranationaliste de Šešelj (actuellement jugé par le TPI), provoqua le départ d’un certain nombre d’universitaires et représenta le comble de l’humiliation de l’Université de Belgrade par le régime Milošević, alors en fin de règne. Sur ce processus de discrédit, voir O. Savić, « Destrukcija Univerziteta u Srbiji » [La destruction de l'Uni-}. Grâce à la publication d’un article érudit de la plume...
de l'historien de tout premier ordre, l'Académicien Sima Ćirković, qui leva toute ambiguïté en la matière, l'historiographie serbe sauva la mise. On ne peut en dire autant de l'EOS : parce qu'elle se prétendait dépositaire de l'héritage spirituel et culturel némanide — Stefan Nemanja avait en effet été canonisé au XIIIe siècle — l'EOS ne s'est toujours pas désolidarisée à ce jour de cette manipulation xénophobe et populiste. Lorsqu'on tient compte de tout le travail de tri et de critique que l'historiographie moderne, forgée à la fin du XVIIIe et surtout au milieu du XIXe siècles par des ecclésiastiques érudits, a su opérer sur l'analyse du romantisme national, on peut avoir une idée de l'exculturation des milieux ecclésiastiques de l'époque post-socialiste.

En tant qu'Église orthodoxe, historiquement configurée davantage comme Église nationale qu'universelle et par voie de conséquence plus ou moins intimement liée à l'État, l'attitude de l'EOS est définie par sa nature propre, ainsi que par le contexte politique et social donné.33 La Yougoslavie constituait un État hautement hétérogène, notamment sur le plan confessionnel ; la Serbie est un État moyennement hétérogène, dont l'évolution est entravée par un héritage historique difficile ; peu préparée aux changements de société, l'Église orthodoxe y est fortement sollicitée dans le contexte post-socialiste : son attitude ambiguë à l'égard du régime autoritaire de Milošević se résumait à un impératif national et le soutien tacite des premières années se transforme à partir de 1991 en une désapprobation de plus en plus manifeste,34 jusqu'à une collusion entre l'opposition démocratique et le Parti Démocratique de Serbie de Koštunica en particulier. Au fil des changements de régimes depuis la fin du système du parti unique, l'EOS n'a cessé de gagner en influence dans une société désabusée par les politiques et laissée pour compte par un État, toutes institutions confondues, en érosion constante.

33 Loin d'être une bonne chose en soi, la tutelle abusive de l'État, avait néanmoins eu pour effet secondaire d'écarter, jusqu'à un certain point, l'Église orthodoxe des dérives d'un cléricalisme autoritaire. Sur le rôle socioculturel et politique de l'Église orthodoxe, notamment en Serbie, voir Zlatiborka Popov, « Pravoslavlje i izazovi demokratizacije, multikulturalizma i tolerancije » [L'orthodoxie face aux défis de la démocratisation, du multiculturalisme et de la tolérance], Religion and Tolerance. Journal of the Center for Empirical Researches of Religion 4 (Novi Sad 2005), 95–109 (résumé. angl.).

La foi des campagnes

Réalisée peu avant 1995 avec une centaine d’interviewés d’une trentaine de villages répartis dans toute la Serbie, une enquête de l’ethnologue Dušan Bandić sur la représentation et la foi en Dieu révèle des résultats significatifs. L’extrême rareté de telles recherches en Serbie, surtout à une époque que l’auteur qualifie de « revitalisation de l’orthodoxie chrétienne », justifie qu’on s’attarde sur ses résultats.

Neuf paysans orthodoxes serbes sur dix se prononcent affirmativement sur la question de la croyance en Dieu. La nature de cette foi est cependant fort disparate, voire ambiguë puisque certains disent croire et ne pas croire. L’enquêteur conclut en affirmant que cette religiosité est superficielle, mêlée aussi de scepticisme et d’un certain pragmatisme. La réponse-type à un questionnement plus insistant serait « je crois en Dieu, mais je ne sais pas s’il existe ».

Sur le pourquoi de leur croyance, les réponses les plus fréquentes sont d’ordre « empirique », issues d’expérience de vie et éthiques, du genre « Dieu protège les justes et punit les injustes », qui évoquent une justice supérieure, cosmique et intrinsèque. En deuxième position viennent les réponses de type sociétal et traditionnel : « je crois en Dieu car tout le monde y croit », ainsi que « j’y crois parce que nos ancêtres y ont cru ».

Sur l’idée qu’ils se font de Dieu les réponses sont les plus difficiles à obtenir, du genre « Dieu est quelque chose d’invisible », mais surtout « puissance invisible », avec néanmoins une nette prédominance pour une conception personnelle exprimée par « le Créateur », « le Seigneur Tout Puissant », avec une nette préférence pour une représentation anthropomorphique exprimée parfois par « comme un homme », « père de tous les saints », ou « le plus ancien des hommes ».

Jésus Christ est assimilé le plus souvent au « premier des saints », la notion de la Sainte Vierge est encore plus floue et celle de la Sainte Trinité particulièrement réduite. L’idée que les paysans serbes se font des saints est intéressante, ce sont les modèles de l’humanité dans le meilleur sens du terme.

La relation à Dieu s’exprime sous la forme d’une prière, fréquente ou occasionnelle, mais rarement dans un lieu de prière, l’église. Les prières « Notre Père » et « Ave Maria », sont fort peu usitées ; « donne-moi la santé », « que mon enfant guérisse », « que la pluie tombe », les adresses à Dieu sont peu révérencieuses, on s’adresse à lui comme à un proche.

Le rapport de Dieu à l’homme est placé sous le signe d’une justice équitable envers tous sans distinction. Il est le garant de l’ordre des choses et des valeurs. Ainsi c’est l’homme lui-même qui est le maître de son sort, puisqu’il reçoit la rétribution de ses actes.

Il n’en est pas de même en ce qui concerne les communautés humaines. Sans être majoritaire, la croyance que Dieu protège les Serbes plus que les autres peuples est assez répandue. La contradiction avec la précédente croyance est située sur un plan messianique d’« élection » de « peuple de Dieu »,37 de ce que l’« orthodoxie est la foi la plus proche de Dieu », du fait du grand nombre de saints serbes, ce qui se rapporte à la notion d’intercession préférentielle favorisée par les Églises nationales. La punition de la collectivité nationale est perçue le plus souvent comme justifiée. Ce Dieu « national » n’est forcément pas le même pour les autres, notamment pour les Croates (catholiques) ou pour les musulmans.

L’auteur conclut son enquête sur « l’interaction entre l’Église orthodoxe et sa population rurale », en y voyant un processus en pleine mutation de confuse re-christianisation, à l’issue d’un demi-siècle de déchristianisation ; il établit un constat de différence qu’il place essentiellement sur deux points : la manière dont les ruraux orthodoxes serbes croient en Dieu et la manière dont ils se Le représentent.

Pour le premier point, ce ne serait pas vraiment un Dieu dont la croyance serait issue de la Bible et de l’enseignement de l’Église, mais plutôt
de l’expérience individuelle et collective. En ce qui concerne le second, leur représentation de Dieu est plus proche de l’homme que des conceptions théologiques, ils ne lui vouent pas une grande ferveur et ont plutôt tendance à se l’approprier en faisant de lui un Dieu communautaire et national.

L’auteur conclut son enquête en s’interrogeant sur l’avenir du « dialogue entre l’Église orthodoxe et la population rurale serbe », un dialogue « qui dure depuis des siècles » mais dont l’avenir suscite bien des questions.

Étant donné que la Serbie actuelle a une structure majoritairement urbaine, on regrette que de telles enquêtes soient trop peu organisées en milieu urbain.

La religion en milieu urbain

Les recherches sociologiques révèlent un retour de religiosité en Serbie à partir de la fin des années 1980. En ces années-là, moins de 20% de population se disaient croyants, mais dix ans plus tard, ce chiffre varie entre 60% et 70%. Cette revitalisation spectaculaire s’appliquerait aux trois critères pris en compte : conscience religieuse, comportement religieux et croyance religieuse.38

Organisée par l’Institut de recherches sociologiques de la Faculté de philosophie de Belgrade, une enquête réalisée en 1999 sur 1201 sujets fait état de 60% de croyants, alors que moins de 26% se déclarent non-croyants.39

Les recherches organisées entre 1997 et 2002 montrent un intérêt croissant pour la religion d’origine, mais aussi pour les religions en général, surtout parmi les jeunes générations.40

Selon un sondage d’opinion fait en 2004 par l’agence onusienne UNDP (*Human Development Report for Serbia*), 75% de jeunes déclarent appartenir à une confession, 46% se prononcent contre la proximité d’une mosquée à leur domicile, 41% sont contre un mariage avec un Albanais, 31% avec un musulman, 30% n’accepteraient pas un athée comme conjoint, 27% comme éducateur de leurs enfants, 17% comme associé, 43% rejettent un athée, 57% l’acceptent.

**Le catéchisme**


Une enquête faite auprès de la population scolaire dans les grandes villes en Serbie et au Monténégro, fait état de 81% d’élèves se prononçant pour l’éducation religieuse, dont 64% se prononcent pour une catéchèse facultative, alors que 19% se déclarent contre. Faite en 2002 sur 635 sujets, une autre enquête donne des résultats similaires, avec aussi 20% se déclarant en faveur d’un catéchisme obligatoire pour tous, 10% estimant qu’il devrait être dispensé uniquement dans les institutions religieuses et 5% se prononçant contre tout enseignement religieux.41

Réalisée en 2003, après un an d’enseignement religieux dans les écoles publiques, l’enquête auprès de 566 parents et élèves ayant opté pour cet enseignement donne des résultats significatifs.42


### Attitude envers la religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parents N=297 en %</th>
<th>Élèves du Secondaire N=269 en %</th>
<th>Total N=566 en %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croyant – adhère à l’ensemble de l’enseignement</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croyant – n’adhère pas à l’ensemble de l’ens.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indécis entre croire ou non</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non croyant</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sans réponse</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### La motivation du choix de la catéchète est un autre volet de l’enquête.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raisons du choix du catéchisme</th>
<th>Parents N=297 en %</th>
<th>Élèves N=269 en %</th>
<th>Total N=566 en %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition de nouvelles connaissances</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intérêt pour ce domaine</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convictions religieuses</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Préférence de l’élève</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence d’autre(s) élève(s)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Par hasard</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autre</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sans réponse</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Les résultats d’une enquête organisée en 1997–1998 par la Faculté de Théologie (orthodoxe) de Belgrade sont complémentaires des données dont on dispose sur le regain de l’identité confessionnelle. Réalisée auprès de la population orthodoxe sur la plus grande partie du territoire serbo-monténégrin, ainsi que sur la République serbe en Bosnie-Herzégovine, l’enquête révèle un pourcentage de 1% de participation à la liturgie dominicale et de 1,9% aux offices à l’occasion de grandes fêtes religieuses orthodoxes. Le pourcentage écrasant, de l’ordre de 97%, classés comme « nominalement chrétiens » (orthodoxes), expliquerait en partie ce taux très bas de pratique régulière. Moins de 50% des enquêtés acceptent la visite annuelle d’un prêtre.

Une grande disparité dans l’appréciation du catéchisme est constatée sur le plan régional, mais surtout entre milieu rural et milieu urbain, et en faveur de ce dernier, ce qui signifie que l’éducation religieuse est donc mieux
perçue en ville qu’en campagne. Obligatoire dans l’éducation nationale en République serbe, mais fortement représenté en milieu rural, le catéchisme est relativement répandu en milieu urbain.

La communion quatre fois par an (à l’issue des grands jeûnes) révèle plus le retour à une pratique traditionnelle que la mise en application du renouveau néopatristique qui ne s’applique qu’à une mince couche d’élites urbaines.

Les conclusions de l’enquête consacrent une grande part à l’acculturation des « Chrétiens » (sic !), y compris à celle des pratiquants. Ainsi, la notion de Dieu chez le (pseudo ?) « chrétiens » est classée en trois catégories : 1) Notions païennes ; 2) Déistes ; 3) Islamisants.

S’appliquant aux couches les moins instruites de la population qui conservent des manifestations superstitionnaires d’occultisme folklorique, la première catégorie est assimilable au panthéisme. Les populations urbaines et leurs couches instruites sont concernées par la deuxième catégorie, caractérisée par une sorte de syncrétisme religieux, fait de rationalisme et d’influence des religions orientales. Désignée par un caractère juridique dans la pratique religieuse, la plus originale est la troisième catégorie dite islamisante. Elle s’applique à une sorte de bigotisme formaliste, à l’ombre d’un Dieu, juge sévère et tatillon.

La notion, même sécularisée, de l’Église chez les enquêtés est plus que significative : « bâtisse religieuse », « maison de prière », « de paix », « du repentir », ayant à sa tête le patriarche, sont les réponses les plus fréquentes.

Quant aux motivations des pratiques, elles ne sont pas moins révélatrices. À commencer par une motivation utilitaire : après avoir épuisé tous les autres moyens allant de la médecine classique ou alternative à la divination et autres tours de magie, ce type de pratique s’adresse en fin de course au prêtre qui se prête souvent à des jeux de superstition consistant, par exemple, à donner au « client » la clef de l’église afin qu’il puisse, en déverrouillant la porte, se défaire de ses maux.

Le patriotisme militant concerne une catégorie à la une de l’actualité en ces années quatre-vingt-dix. « Afin de souligner leurs différences par rapport aux concitoyens et voisins d’origine slave, l’appartenance à l’Église orthodoxe est promue en pierre de voûte de l’identité nationale » pour

ces pratiquants qui s’alignent généralement sur les consignes de leur parti d’élection.

Les pénitents désignent une catégorie piétiste de pratiquants ; les traditionalistes, quant à eux, suivent une pratique coutumière par respect envers leurs aïeux.

Ceux qui vont à l’église poussés par un désir de détente, de relaxation, d’affinité esthétique et sensuelle (chants, encens, couleurs, icônes), cherchant à y trouver un havre de paix à l’écart des soucis quotidiens sont considérés comme une catégorie en plein essor.

L’enquête fait état néanmoins de ceux qui fréquentent l’église par amour du Christ dans la vénération du Dieu trinitaire et qui fréquentent l’église par quête spirituelle, avec une préparation appropriée.

Il va sans dire que de telles enquêtes ont peu de caractère scientifique et ne présentent d’intérêt que par la quasi-absence de recherches de valeur sociométrique. Une idée plus précise des processus socio-culturels dans les sociétés en transition du Sud-est européen pourrait être obtenue au prix de recherches appropriées sur le terrain, ce qui a peu de chances d’être réalisé en raison du manque de spécialistes dûment formés et intégrés dans des programmes ciblés, dirigés et synchronisés.

En attendant, on ne peut que conclure à une instrumentalisation inattendue et à un détournement involontaire du religieux dans un contexte de vacance de sens, de désenchantement idéologique, d’érosion institutionnelle, de carences de la société civile et d’errements du système éducatif.

**L’Église orthodoxe serbe dans une période transitoire**

Le Calendrier de l’Église, annuaire officiel de l’Église orthodoxe serbe, publie tous les dix ans une sorte de recensement de ses effectifs humains et immobiliers. Ces chiffres que nous avons pu systématiser dans les deux tableaux présentés ci-dessous, font état d’une évolution significative même si elle se révèle sensiblement inférieure à ce qu’on aurait pu attendre eu égard à la place éminente de l’Église dans cette société en transition tardive. La mise en regard de ces différents tableaux qui couvrent les trente dernières années illustre aussi la disproportion entre la demande et l’offre dans une relation étroitement interdépendante entre une institution religieuse et une société en pleine mutation.
Recensement de l’Eglise orthodoxe serbe en 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diocèses</th>
<th>Prêtres</th>
<th>Moines</th>
<th>Moines</th>
<th>Églises</th>
<th>Monastères</th>
<th>Sémi- naires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beogradsko-karlovačka</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banat – Vršac</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banja Luka</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bačka – Novi Sad</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braničevska – Požarevac</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vranje</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gornjokarlovačka – Karlovac</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Đabro-bosanska – Sarajevo</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Đalmate – Šibenik</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Žička – Kraljevo</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagreb</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahumsko-hercegovačka – Mostar</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvorničko-tuzlanska – Tuzla</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niška – Niš</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raško-prizrenska – Prizren</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavonska – Pakrac</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sremska – Sremski Karlovci</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timočka – Zaječar</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crnogorsko-primorska – Cetinje</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šabačko-valjevska – Šabac</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šumadijska – Kragujevac</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australie-Nouvelle Zélande</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budimska – Budapest</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Est-Américain et Canadien</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest-Américain – Alhambra Californie</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest-Européen – Londres</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Ouest Américain</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timisoara</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2090</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>2190</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>(216)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recensement de l’Église orthodoxe serbe en 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diocèses</th>
<th>Prêtres</th>
<th>Moines</th>
<th>Moinesales</th>
<th>Eglises</th>
<th>Monastères</th>
<th>Séminaliers</th>
<th>Ordinations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beogradskokarlovačka</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banat – Vršac</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banja Luka</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bačka – Novi Sad</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihačko-petrovačka – Bosanski Petrovac</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braničevska – Požarevac</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budimljansko-nikšićka – Nikšić</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vranjska</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gornjokarlovačka – Karlovac</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dabro-bosanska – Sarajevo</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalmate – Šibenik</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Žička – Kraljevo</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagreb</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahumsko-hercegovačka – Mostar</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvorničko-tuzlanska – Tuzla</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mileševska – Prijepolje</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niška – Niš</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osečkopoljska i Baranjska – Osijek</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raško-prizrenska – Prizren</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavonska – Pakrac</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sremska – Sremski Karlovci</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timočka – Zaječar</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crnogorsko-primorska – Cetinje</td>
<td>Šabačko-valjevska – Šabac</td>
<td>Šumadijska – Kragujevac</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>520 en.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>219</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2244</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>298</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Américano-Canadien Nova Gračanica</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australie-Nouvelle Zélande</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australie-Nouvelle Zélande Novogračanička</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britannique-Scandinave – Londres</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budimska – Budapest</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Est-Américain</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe Centrale – Himmelsthür</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadien</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest-Américain – Alhambra Californie</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest-Européen – Paris</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Ouest Américain</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temisoara</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archevêché d’Ohrid – Bitola FYROM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2620</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>3694</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\*Et 96 en 1975. Il convient de signaler que le recensement des ordinations de prêtres dans cette publication officielle de l’EOS est peu fiable et sensiblement sous-quantifié.
Les données présentées dans ces tableaux sont issues de la statistique (šematizam) de l’Église orthodoxe serbe qui paraît sous cette forme détaillée tous les dix ans dans l’Annuaire *Kalendar Crkva* (Calendrier de l’Église). Ce recensement détaillé comprend les données essentielles sur les lieux et les monastères de culte orthodoxe, les prêtres, les moines et les moniales, ainsi que les ordinations des prêtres.

Classées par diocèses, ces données sont souvent présentées de manière fort inégale, plus ou moins détaillées, avec des critères sensiblement différents. Les difficultés de classement s’appliquent avant tout aux lieux de culte. Les critères de différenciation entre église résidentielle (paroissiale), affiliée (qui apparaît sous cette dénomination seulement dans certains diocèses) et les chapelles sont parfois inadéquats et difficiles à saisir. Outre le statut canonique, l’état matériel du bâtiment est souvent sujet à caution : c’est notamment le cas des églises qui ont subi des dégâts ou ont été totalement détruites lors de la IIe guerre mondiale, ou surtout au cours des conflits de la fin du XXe siècle. Leur état de destruction et de reconstruction est souvent imprécis, ainsi que leur statut fonctionnel, et parfois ces informations sont totalement défaut.

Dans les régions méditerranéennes, notamment au Monténégro, la plupart des villages ont plusieurs petites églises où l’on célèbre souvent une fois par an, et la différence entre église paroissiale et ces lieux de culte utilisés occasionnellement n’est pas toujours précisée. Souvent désaffectés, à l’abandon ou en état de délabrement, beaucoup de ces lieux de culte n’ont été restaurés que récemment. Ce qui fait qu’un grand nombre d’églises apparaissent dans les dernières années, soit pour certaines parce qu’elles n’avaient pas été recensées auparavant, soit, pour beaucoup d’autres, parce qu’elles attendent leur réouverture au culte. La notion d’église nouvellement construite n’est pas toujours facile à déterminer et une rubrique à part devrait être créée pour ces nouveaux bâtiments de culte de plus en plus nombreux ces dernières années.

Pour le nombre de prêtres nous nous sommes orientés exclusivement sur le critère de curé paroissial, c’est-à-dire du prêtre ayant en charge une paroisse. Ainsi les prêtres retraités ne sont pas pris en compte, sauf dans le cas où ils ont en charge une paroisse à titre honoraire ou autre. La difficulté de ce décompte vient du fait que les prêtres qui desservent plusieurs paroisses ne sont pas toujours spécifiés dans ce sens. Ce qui peut induire en erreur, notamment dans les longues listes des grands diocèses. De même que les prêtres retraités, les diacres ne sont pas non plus pris en compte dans nos tableaux.

Le statut des moines et des moniales n’est pas toujours clairement spécifié. Comme le monachisme orthodoxe n’assume presque jamais de ministère et n’a pratiquement pas de dimension caritative, presque tous ces ecclésiastiques demeurent dans les monastères, le plus souvent à l’écart
des agglomérations. Il existe bien quelques communautés de moniales qui s'occupent d'enfants handicapés notamment, mais c'est une exception. Moines et moniales orthodoxes assurent leur subsistance par des travaux artisanaux, de la peinture d'icônes et surtout par des activités agricoles, le monachisme traditionnel de l'Église de Serbie étant prioritairement d'extraction rurale.

La quantification des lieux de culte étant trop peu précise dans l'état actuel de notre recherche, nous nous limitons à la prise en compte de l'évolution quantitative du clergé. Avec une croissance globale de quelques 600 prêtres en 30 ans, cette progression peut être considérée comme moyenne. Très supérieur en nombre à son homologue masculin presque tout au long du XXe siècle, le monachisme féminin est en stagnation, et même en léger recul. Le monachisme masculin est par contre en forte progression, mais de manière très inégale selon les diocèses. Cette progression importante doit néanmoins être mise en regard du nombre fort limité de moines, il y a une trentaine d’années.

Le renouvellement du clergé paroissial, qui a donc été de l'ordre de 2% par an au cours des trente dernières années, peut être considéré comme moyen, ce qui nous conduit à une conclusion plus nuancée que catégorique. Il ressort notamment que le rôle actuel de l'Église dans la société, sa position relativement privilégiée par rapport à l'État, son prestige considérable dans la population, ne sont pas forcément liés à des critères quantitatifs, ni même à l’activité des ecclésiastiques dans leur ensemble. Il s’agit plutôt d’un phénomène lié à la transition et aux réinterprétations identitaires qu’il conviendrait d’étudier de manière plus systématique.

***

Au fil de notre enquête on discerne plus clairement la nature de la montée en flèche de la religiosité au cours des années quatre-vingt-dix en Serbie-Monténégro. De même que dans bien d’autres pays en transition, notam-

44 Il serait sans doute intéressant d’avoir quelques éléments de réponse sur la prétendue coupure actuelle qui traverse l’Église orthodoxe de Serbie avec d’un côté les traditionalistes/prorusses, qui réprouvent tout qui vient de l’Occident et aussi la théologie et des théologiens grecs modernes (comme Zizioulas) et avec, de l’autre côté, la tendance inverse, représentée surtout par les évêques Irinée Bulović et Ignatius Midić, qui prône le dialogue et voit en Zizioulas un théologien de dialogue et découverture. Nous manquons présentement d’informations sur ces assertions qui nous paraissent néanmoins par trop schématiques.

ment ceux issus de l’ex-Yougoslavie, ce retour en force est essentiellement de nature identitaire. La déroute du système sociopolitique et de l’idéologie communiste a eu des effets pervers particuliers à un pays multiconfessionnel pour lequel il est intéressant de constater que l’essentiel des conflits de la fin du siècle se sont déroulés dans un triangle confessionnel établi sur la base d’une langue commune, le serbo-croate. Les deux petites républiques yougoslaves pourvues d’une langue propre, à savoir la Slovénie et la Macédoine, sont restées en marge de ces conflits sanglants. Les soixante-dix ans de vie commune des populations en grande partie imbriquées, ainsi que les effets de l’idéologie communiste accompagnée d’une sécularisation militante avaient élaboré une part d’identité commune. À l’issue de cette période tout se passe comme si la singularisation par voie confessionnelle était une fuite en avant dans la construction d’une identité retrouvée par-delà les générations passées.

Le cas de l’Église orthodoxe serbe en Serbie-Monténégro n’en est que plus significatif. Les Serbes occupent une place spécifique en rapport avec les frustrations qu’ils ont subies et subissent encore : leur pays a éclaté, leur classe politique a fait des choix dont les effets désastreux se sont traduits par des guerres successives, difficiles à oublier ne serait-ce que par les centaines de milliers de réfugiés, les nombreux bombardements de l’OTAN, l’embargo de longue durée, les procès de dirigeants politiques et militaires devant le TPI, la régression économique, sociale, institutionnelle et culturelle sans précédent, la criminalisation extrême de la société, l’assassinat d’un Premier ministre en exercice, le retard accumulé dans le processus d’intégration européenne, l’enclavement géopolitique et la ghettoïsation du pays, jadis le plus ouvert du camp socialiste. Ces motifs de frustration forment les éléments constitutifs d’une dévastatrice crise de société dont on ne voit pas encore clairement l’issue et qui génère un repli identitaire et une anxiété existentielle propulsant sur le devant de la vie publique une Église orthodoxe qui était peu préparée à un défi aussi considérable.

À l’issue de plus d’un demi-siècle de déchristianisation, l’identité confessionnelle retrouvée, accompagnant l’urbanisation accélérée et la déstructuration socioculturelle, a pour vocation de combler un vide de sens et de rendre plus cohérente une société en pleine érosion structurelle. On peut s’interroger sur les capacités de l’Église orthodoxe à répondre à la demande de combler le vide de sens laissé par la mort des idéologies communautaristes ; surtout lorsqu’on tient compte de la faiblesse relative des pratiques religieuses et du renouvellement modeste des cadres religieux que révèlent les enquêtes dont nous avons fait état. Même s’il fut introduit avec dix ans de retard sur les voisins et ex-compatriotes Croates et musulmans (Bosniaques), le catéchisme est un élément de réponse, sans doute décisif, pour l’avenir de ce qui pourrait s’avérer être une resocialisation future sur un
dénominateur confessionnel. Le fait que les élèves se montrent plus demandeurs, plus ouverts et plus réceptifs que leurs parents, plaide en faveur d’un retour effectif à une pratique et à une connotation rechristianisées de la vie.

Quant à la nature et au contenu de la pratique religieuse elle-même telle qu’elle se manifestait dès le début des années 1970 par la pratique liturgique, par des formes d’expression culturelle comme le pèlerinage, la conversion, l’éducation, le renouveau conceptuel, le renouvellement des vocations, la reconstruction des lieux de culte, par des œuvres et fondations pieuses, elle suscite pour l’instant plus de questions que de réponses et reste dans l’attente d’enquêtes à mener.

En l’absence de tout projet de société, en proie à une déstructuration économique, sociale, morale, plongées dans une crise de conscience majeure, les populations se tournent vers les Églises, tout en aspirant à un véritable changement, par opposition à une pseudo-laïcité aux traits totalitaires qui a conditionné tous les secteurs de la vie durant un demi-siècle. Marginalisées et refoulées sans ménagement loin de la vie publique durant cette période, soudainement propulsées sur le devant de la scène publique, les hiérarchies des Églises étaient peu préparées à ce bouleversement. Consciemment ou non, elles ont dû assumer une fonction de logistique idéologique des régimes populistes des années quatre-vingt-dix et du régime plus ou moins pseudo-démocratique actuel. C’est ainsi que dans certains pays en transition s’orientant vers une sorte de capitalisme d’État, on assiste, sous couvert de rhétorique démocratique, à une cléricalisation de la société sous la forme d’une sécularisation de l’Église.

Issus de processus de longue durée (ethnarchie de l’époque ottomane, romantisme national du XIXe s.), le détournement de la religion à des fins idéologiques et le jumelage de l’Église et de l’État ont revêtu au XXe siècle des formes avancées aboutissant au paroxysme de la période postcommuniste avec une cléricalisation populistes de sociétés déchristianisées et désislamisées.

La plus grande partie de l’histoire de cette partie de l’Europe s’est déroulée dans le cadre d’États multinationaux. L’État-nation y est une institution relativement récente qui explique le décalage avec lequel la plupart des pays balkaniques accèdent aux processus d’intégration de l’époque actuelle. Les faiblesses des institutions démocratiques, les balbutiements de la

société civile et de l’économie de marché ainsi que le vide juridique qui accompagne la privatisation font que ces pays en transition accusent un retard notable dans les processus de modernisation.

L’émergence d’une société civile se traduit néanmoins par un début de critique et de contestation du conformisme ambiant, au sein même de l’Église nationale, comme c’est le cas pour l’Église orthodoxe de Grèce. Cette évolution significative se produit dans un contexte de différenciation dans lequel l’on assiste aussi à l’alliance des structures les plus conservatrices. Même si de tels frémissements ne touchent actuellement que les pays les plus engagés dans l’évolution vers un type de société ouverte, des signes avant-coureurs laissent supposer une prochaine mutation similaire dans le reste de cette partie de l’Europe.

La complexité des sociétés sud-est européennes tient de la conjonction des appartenances ethniques et confessionnelles dont la construction et la reconstruction se sont opérées dans un passé lointain mais aussi au cours de l’histoire récente. Située sur la ligne de partage traditionnelle des deux


parties de la chrétienté médiévale, cette région a connu une longue période de domination ottomane qui y a introduit une importante composante de culture islamique. La proportion actuelle des catholiques, à peu près égale à celle des musulmans, se situe aux environs de 15%, le reste étant réparti entre populations et pays à majorité orthodoxe et les autres confessions qui sont fortement minoritaires. Si l'on tient compte, en fonction du critère purement géographique, de la Turquie d'Europe, dont la population estimée à 18 millions de personnes, dépasse celle de chacun les pays balkaniques pris séparément, la situation est tout autre.

La conjonction traditionnelle entre confession et ethnicité est actuellement un puissant facteur de cohésion communautaire et identitaire : le fait confessionnel constitue le dénominateur communautaire dominant en raison de l'effondrement des idéologies de classe, de la faiblesse des institutions civiles et des traditions démocratiques, de l'ambiguïté des frontières et des institutions étatiques issues principalement des grandes guerres du XXe siècle, en raison aussi de l'imbrication des populations représentent l'héritage des grands systèmes globalisateurs et fédérateurs des époques passées. C'est ainsi que, confrontés aux différences ethniques et confessionnelles, les empires ottoman et autrichien ont favorisé, chacun à sa manière, les recouplages intégrateurs selon des critères confessionnels, tout en favorisant les confessions officielles pour des raisons politiques et idéologiques. Le système du millet ottoman subordonnait le critère ethnique à l'appartenance confessionnelle et créait ainsi une hiérarchie de communautés confessionnelles où les musulmans formaient la communauté dominante, suivie des communautés orthodoxe, arménienne, juive et enfin catholique.

Corollaire de la longue agonie de l'Empire ottoman, la création des premiers États-nations au XIXe siècle s'articule autour de la restauration des droits historiques et des appartenances ethniques et confessionnelles. Les États ethno-confessionnellement homogènes se construisirent relativement facilement, comme ce fut le cas pour la Serbie, la Grèce, puis la Bulgarie au cours du XIXe siècle. Ceux qui avaient moins d'homogénéité confessionnelle et ethnique ne se formèrent que vers le début du XXe siècle, comme ce fut le cas pour l'Albanie (1912) et pour la Yougoslavie (1918) qui priv-


51 C'est ainsi que put avoir lieu la tentative de Naim Frashëri (1846–1900), nationaliste albanais qui entreprit à la fin du XIXe s. de faire de l'ordre musulman de Bektachis (environ 15% de la population de l'Albanie au recensement de 1942), caractérisé par son éclectisme religieux, une religion d'État en vue de l'indépendance de l’Albanie,
ilégièrent telle ou telle forme de laïcité. Issue d’empires multiethniques et confessionnellement hétérogènes, l’Albanie adopta en 1967 un athéisme exclusif et militant dans sa période d’isolement communiste, alors que la Yougoslavie avait adopté une forme de jacobinisme relativement laïciste dès sa fondation, à l’issue de la Première guerre mondiale. Si l’intégration des populations de cette monarchie constitutionnelle n’a pas pu présenter une cohésion suffisante dans une Europe gangrenée par les idéologies totalitaires de l’entre-deux-guerres, ce fut en raison de la faiblesse des institutions démocratiques, ainsi qu’en raison du caractère ethnique, traditionnel ou rénové par l’artifice Sud-slave, et valorisé au détriment d’un contrat social et d’un État citoyen. Constat largement applicable à la Yougoslavie fédérale et communiste, mais aussi à une grande partie des États qui en sont issus, même si des nuances plus ou moins importantes et des degrés différents s’y manifestent.

Le communautarisme et l’ethnicté qui caractérisent les sociétés sud-est européennes font que les pays de la région ont toujours eu beaucoup de difficultés à mettre en œuvre les processus de modernisation. La conjonction entre communautarismes religieux et ethnique y a engendré des fractures et des frictions identitaires particulièrement difficiles à gérer. Réfractaires à toute évolution vers une société civile et libérale, les nomenclatures communistes ont su surexploiter les archétypes ethnocentriques, particulièrement au cours de la période de déclin de l’idéologie marxiste. La fin des idéologies a en revanche propulsé sur le devant de la scène le phénomène religieux. L’ampleur, voire l’impétuosité, de la résurgence des confessions et des Églises dans les sociétés en transition est telle qu’il convient de lui accorder la signification d’une « affinité électorale » sur le plan politique, et même d’une resocialisation communautaire à échelle ethno-confessionnelle. Le crédit dont disposent les autorités religieuses étant inversement proportionnel à celui dont jouissent les politiques post-communistes, on assiste à une idéologisation de la religion ayant pour effet la création d’un consensus social


qui s'établit parallèlement à la déstructuration des institutions héritées de la période communiste.

C'est ainsi que l'affaiblissement de l'État apparaît comme facteur de montée en puissance des Églises et autres communautarismes confessionnels : alors que la contrainte étatique avait réussi à faire contre-poids à l'influence des institutions religieuses, la faiblesse de l'État postcommuniste le pousse à se raccrocher à la caution confessionnelle.

Bibliographie


— « Religijske promene u postkomunizmu – slučaj pravoslavlja na primjeru tranzitnih društava Srbije i Crne Gore i Rusije ». http://www.vidovdanc.org/topic436.html#top


— « Pravoslavlje i savremeni grčki identitet ». *Indiktos* 17 (2003), 44–94 (en grec)


Cette contribution émane du projet de l’Institut des Etudes balkaniques *L’histoire des idées et institutions dans les Balkans aux XIXe et XXe siècle* (no 177011) financé par le Ministère d’Éducation et Science de la République de la Serbie.
REVIEWS


Reviewed by Annemarie Sorescu Marinković*

Originally published in France in 2009, and translated into Romanian a year later, the book of Ștefan Lemny, a Romanian-born French historian specialized in eighteenth-century cultural history, follows the unusual destiny of a family who gave European culture two remarkable figures: Dimitrie Cantemir and his son, Antioh, intermediaries between East and West, between the Christian, Catholic, West and the Islamic Ottoman Empire.

Dimitrie Cantemir (1673–1723) was a prolific man of letters — philosopher, historian, composer, musicologist, linguist, ethnographer, and geographer. He learned Greek and Latin at home, and, living in forced exile in Istanbul between 1687 and 1710, he mastered Turkish and studied the history of the Ottoman Empire at the Patriarchal Academy. Twice Prince of Moldavia (in 1693 and in 1710–11), he was eventually defeated by the Turks and sought refuge in Russia, where he finally settled with his family. Peter the Great granted him the title of knyaz (Prince) of the Russian Empire and made him his secret advisor. Dimitrie Cantemir was a member of the Royal Academy in Berlin. He was known as one of the greatest linguists of his time. He spoke and wrote eleven different languages, and was well-versed in Oriental scholarship. His work is voluminous, diverse, and original; despite unverified theories and inaccuracies contained in some of his scholarly writings, his expertise, sagacity, and groundbreaking research are widely acknowledged. In 1714, at the request of the Royal Academy in Berlin, Cantemir wrote Descriptio Moldaviae, the first geographical, ethnographical and economic account of Moldavia. He became famous in Europe for his History of the Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire, which remained a seminal work on the Ottoman Empire until the middle of the nineteenth century. The book, which circulated throughout Europe in manuscript for a number of years, was finally printed in 1734 in London, by his son, Antioh. Antioh Cantemir (1709–1744) was educated at the Saint Petersburg Academy. In 1731 he was appointed Russian ambassador in London. From 1736 until his death, he served as Russian minister plenipotentiary in Paris. He was a noted figure in Parisian intellectual circles and a close friend of Montesquieu’s and Voltaire’s. Antioh is known for his translations of De Fontenelle into Russian. In 1742, he published his own philosophical work, On Nature and Man. His work, reflecting the

* Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade
scope and purpose of Peter the Great’s European-style reforms, stands out as a contribution to the integration of Russian culture into contemporary European trends. Writing about Dimitrie Cantemir, Voltaire suggested that he “combined the talent of Ancient Greeks with the science of letters and of arms”, while Montesquieu said, after Antioh’s death, that “Russia will not easily find an ambassador of such excellence”.

Ștefan Lemny is not interested in these two exceptional men of culture only from the perspective of their valuable work; he also takes a look at their private and sentimental life. He takes the reader to a tour of Moldavia, the “cradle” of the Cantemirs, the country where they were born and ruled, and proceeds all the way to Constantinople, Saint Petersburg, London and Paris, places they visited or lived in. This long European journey, which took place in two separate phases, deserves special attention. The first phase, epitomized by Dimitrie, belongs to the east of the continent, which was not even considered Europe by some, especially when it comes to its part incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. The road travelled by the Moldavian prince was impressive: he crossed two different worlds — the Ottoman Empire (Moldavia was part of it) and Russia — which fought for supremacy in the region. Antioh’s diplomatic role in London and Paris epitomizes a different stage, one of laborious diplomatic efforts aimed at aligning Russia with the influential European capitals. The strength and singularity of the Cantemirs resides in the fact that father and son shared the same intellectual approach, the underlying idea of which was to establish the relationship of mutual acquaintance between societies and cultures of their time. Even if their objectives and initiatives, occurring within two different national cultures, Romanian and Russian, diverged, they shared the same passionate desire to bridge the gaps between the worlds they crossed and came to know.

This marvellously written and well documented book has several merits. So far, it is the only extensive study which, depicting the life and work of the two Cantemirs in one place, seeks, without resorting to a mere biographical analysis, to re-establish continuity between them, since, ironically, Dimitrie is well known and studied in Romania, while Antioh is an object of academic interest in Russia. Lemny’s study uses biography as a means to highlight those aspects of the two men’s life and activity which are important from the perspective of cultural proximity between the countries in which they lived (Moldavia, the Ottoman and Russian empires), as well as for the intellectual Europe of the eighteenth century. Their contribution is just a link in a vast communication network, but it is a significant component in searching for the so-called European idea, where the Oriental Europe and the Enlightened Europe are shaking hands with one another. From this perspective, the Cantemirs’ adventure is more than a mere shift in space: it is a splendid intellectual adventure, which played a vital role in the construction of a modern, cosmopolitan identity for eighteenth-century Europe.


Présenté par Veljko Stanić*


*Mihailović (1893-1946) Héros trahi par les Alliés* par Jean-Christophe Buisson est une biographie où un intérêt particulier pour la Serbie et son histoire. Ce livre suscite d'abord un vif intérêt par son sujet : la biographie d'un général serbe, qui fut le chef du premier mouvement de résistance en Europe lors de la Première Guerre mondiale. Ecrin du mythe, il s'est emparé du mythe. Ce livre veut donc relever un certain défi et réhabiliter le leader du mouvement de la résistance serbe et yougoslave dans la Patrie pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ecrivain de son temps, il s'est emparé du mythe. Ce livre constitue un important ouvrage au moins par trois aspects de sa facture. Il aborde aussi bien le parcours individuel de Mihailović que la dimension politique et idéologique de la Seconde Guerre mondiale en Yougoslavie. Finalement, le contexte européen n'échappe pas à la loupe de l'auteur.

Jean-Christophe Buisson s'occupe d'abord du portrait de Mihailović : soldat, militaire, nourri dans une tradition libérale de la Serbie, un jeune homme qui se forme à l'aube du XXe siècle, l'époque qui ouvre de nouvelles perspectives pour la Serbie et pour les Balkans. On retrace les traits intimes de sa vie : son éducation, sa vie familiale, ses goûts personnels, sa carrière professionnelle. Sa jeune vocation s'inscrit d'ailleurs en tant que trait central de son personnage. Combattant résolu pendant les guerres balkaniques et la Première Guerre mondiale, Mihailović
reste fidèle à cette vocation de militaire traversant la Yougoslavie dans différentes garnisons de l’Armée yougoslave pendant l’entre-deux-guerres. Dans la deuxième moitié des années 1930 il s’engage dans le service diplomatique en tant qu’attaché militaire de la Yougoslavie à Sofia et Prague. Cependant, le moment décisif de sa vie, son année du destin, arrive au moment de l’occupation de son pays. Jean-Christophe Buisson y place la décision de Mihailović de prendre les risques nécessaires et de répondre à la tradition qui l’a formé. En refusant la capitulation de l’Armée yougoslave en avril 1941, il lance son mouvement de résistance fidèle au gouvernement yougoslave à Londres et à la préservation de la monarchie en Yougoslavie. Prise dans son ensemble, la vie de Mihailović racontée dans ce livre aide à mieux percer dans ses comportements pendant la Guerre, dans ses choix militaires et politiques. L’auteur le rend visible dans les nuances de ce riche portrait afin que se produise une image plus objective de l’homme et de son oeuvre.

Le deuxième aspect ouvert par ce livre oppose le fameux couple de dirigeants des deux mouvements de résistance en Yougoslavie : Draža Mihailović et Josip Broz Tito. Il accentue le niveau politique de la Seconde Guerre mondiale en Yougoslavie. C’est précisément sur le terrain politique que sont confrontées les visions « nationale » et « internationale », les stratégies opposées de résistance, royaliste et communiste. Devant une coopération impossible, ces stratégies ne peuvent échapper à une recomposition politique et idéologique de cette partie de l’Europe. L’auteur s’attache à l’école de pensée qui voit dans le jeu des Alliés le destin tragique du général Mihailović. Dans ce processus, Mihailović semble dépassé par les événements politiques, enfermé dans sa vision un peu immobile de la situation en Yougoslavie. Il ne trouve pas facilement la capacité de métamorphose. De nombreuses citations de différents acteurs des années 1940 évoquées dans le livre expliquent les enjeux géopolitiques et les clivages idéologiques en Europe que Mihailović ne savait pas toujours résoudre. Soutenu puis abandonné, son combat est décrit par Jean-Christophe Buisson comme une lutte pour « une certaine idée de la Yougoslavie : antinazie, anticommuniste, libre, royale » restée inachevée. Dans cette perspective, ce livre ouvre d’importantes questions. Est-ce que c’est finalement le militaire qui l’emporte sur l’homme politique? Est-ce que la tradition l’encercle « entre restauration et révolution » ?

La Seconde Guerre mondiale introduit Dragoljub Mihailović dans une autre dimension signalée par le livre de Jean-Christophe Buisson. C’est sa place et son importance à l’échelle européenne, internationale. Mihailović émerge de la plume de l’auteur dans la vision un peu romantique du premier résistant. Le parallèle qui s’impose d’emblée est celui qui l’unit avec le général De Gaulle. Ils ne se sont jamais rencontrés - c’est le moment historique de la Guerre, de l’occupation de leurs pays et de la résistance qui les a rapprochés dans l’optique de l'historien. Qui plus est, dans les années 1930 ils furent tous les deux défenseurs ardents de la modernisation de leurs armées devant la menace nazie, souvent en conflit avec leurs officiers supérieurs. Le résultat : des liens amicaux et un respect réciproque, qui s’inscrit dans la postérité dans le refus du général De Gaulle de rencontrer Tito dans les décennies qui suivent.

Appuyé sur une riche documentation en plusieurs langues, l’auteur a réussi à brosser un portrait vif de Dragoljub Mihailović, de reconstituer une image vivante et claire de l’homme et du militaire et de nuancer la complexité de son mouvement dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale. On regrettera parfois son ton moralisateur. Pourtant, en plaidant pour la redécouverte d’un personnage oublié il a proposé la bio-
No more than ten years after the death of Kemal Pasha Atatürk (1881–1938), his life’s work, the Turkish secular nation state of the West-European type, has begun to be eroded through a slow but persistent and calculated revaluation of the doctrinal and ideological legacy of the former Ottoman Empire, involving the re-Islamization of Turkish society as its major ingredient. As the thin shell of orthodox Kemalism eroded, a basis was created for building a different social and political conjuncture in modern Turkey. In that way, according to many researchers concerned with contemporary geopolitical developments in the Near East and the Balkans, the stage was set for a neo-Ottomanist doctrine, unmistakably present in both the foreign and domestic policies of post-WWII Turkey. Because of its quite elusive features, the doctrine has not always been easy to pinpoint in Turkish politics. During the Cold War, neo-Ottomanism, being overshadowed by the prevailing ideological dichotomy marking international relations in divided Europe in the mid-twentieth century, was a marginal and almost unrecognizable phenomenon.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Communist bloc, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and communist Yugoslavia, neo-Ottomanism has assumed a clearer ideological profile, which manifests itself differently, depending on the situation, but always along the lines of the same political agenda: strengthening of Turkey’s political, economic and military influence on the countries in her “broader neighbourhood”, in fact those that once formed part of the Ottoman Empire, most of all those in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, the Near East and the Balkans. This political orientation of post-Cold War Turkey was as clearly observable under the presidency of Turgut Özal (1989–93) and Süleyman Demirel (1993–2000) as it is under Abdullah Gül (since 2007). Shaped and honed gradually, this political platform of Turkey’s contains some covert components (pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism), even though Turkish statesmen generally tend to deny the presence of any trace of neo-Ottomanism in it. Yet, the facts say differently.

Neo-Ottomanism is strongly present in Turkish politics (foreign and domestic), which has recently become observable in the Balkans as well. Darko Tanasković, an eminent Serbian Orientalist and diplomat, is among the first in Serbia to offer a more comprehensive and a more sophisticated interpretation of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism and Turkish foreign policy, presented in a recently published study symbolically titled Neo-Ottomanism. Turkey’s Return to the Balkans. In a well-argued and convincing manner his study elucidates the strategy of Turkish diplomacy for the twenty-first century and, consequently, the roots of its current political dynamism. The study is all the more worthy of attention and care-

* Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade
ful reading as the Turkish influence on Serbia’s domestic and foreign policies has become quite visible lately. It should be established, therefore, what is understood by the concept of neo-Ottomanism, what its ideological and political source is, and, finally, what the area of its impact is.

Darko Tanasković sees neo-Ottomanism as a distinctive ideological project of gradual re-Islamization of Turkish secular society and of dismantling the underlying premises of Kemalism, coupled with the marked strengthening of Turkey’s international position, which is manifested in various ways, depending on the changing historical and political circumstances after the Second World War. What he recognizes as key determinants of the neo-Ottomanist doctrine are: Islamism (but also pan-Turkism), pragmatism, and the use of double standards in Turkey’s foreign policy. Almost imperceptibly, but persistently and surely, they erode the country’s secular system, leaving behind mere façades of the Kemalist institutions, forms devoid of substance.

Tanasković suggests that the re-Islamization of Turkish society forms an integral, and important, part of neo-Ottomanism. Turkey is fertile ground for the process, because the secular system functioning there for several decades lacks the necessary and widespread social support and legitimacy. This has been strongly felt in this part of the Balkans, notably in the project of radical Islamization of Bosnian Muslims presented in Alija Izetbegović’s Islamic Declaration of 1971, which, among other things, harshly criticizes Kemal Pasha’s secular system as a “European plagiarism” which turned Turkey into a second-rate country with little authority on the international scene.

As the Kemalist system in fact does not mirror Turkish political reality, the legal and political position of the armed forces is markedly emphasized insofar as they are authorized to intervene should they assess that the government is violating the secular character of the state. Islam, however, is so deeply rooted that it has never ceased being a key factor of personal and collective identity among the masses, and providing the guidelines for social life. Tanasković goes on to analyze the other two elements of neo-Ottomanism, and finds that the doctrine is increasingly reflected in everyday life and forms the backbone of Turkish diplomacy.

Political practice in Turkey (and in some other Muslim countries) has shown that the implementation of the Western notion of parliamentary democracy sooner or later leads to (pro)Islamist forces coming to power in spite of the country’s constitutional secularism, a high level of secularization in public life and the powerful position of the army as the only reliable keeper of Kemalism. This means that the achievements of Kemalism are in fact quite fragile and that the secular system can only be maintained through some kind of dictatorship under the guise of parliamentarianism and modernity. But, even as they dismantle secularism, Turkish politicians will never admit it publicly, nor will they renounce Kemal Pasha Atatürk and his achievements. Even less so before Western politicians, in whose eyes Turkey (as a NATO member) remains the most dependable partner among Muslim nations and the best example that the West-European ideas of modern democracy are implementable in a Muslim state. But, Tanasković suggests, the greater the number of Atatürk’s pictures hanging in Turkish offices, the less Kemalism in Turkish public life.

Finally, the neo-Ottomanist doctrine in Turkey’s foreign policy is characterized by the use of double standards, which depends on concrete political interests. For instance, Turkey invaded northern Cyprus, an internationally recognized country, and recognized the self-proclaimed state of Kosovo.
The slowly crystallizing neo-Ottomanist political doctrine was given its theoretical grounds and coherence by the incumbent head of Turkish diplomacy, Ahmet Davutoglu, in his book *Depth Strategy: International Position of Turkey*, published in 2001, practically the manifesto of Turkish foreign policy at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

Tanasković suggests that Davutoglu’s concept of *strategic depth* is introduced as a key concept of his neo-Ottomanist theoretical paradigm. The concept implies the *historical and geographical depth*. As the only legitimate successor to the history and geography of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey possesses a huge political potential. She sits at the heart of the Eurasian geopolitical space, and as such has for centuries been a factor in all major developments spilling over from the Near East into the Balkans and beyond, into the Catholic and Protestant regions of Europe. Accordingly, Davutoglu (and other proponents of the doctrine) refuses to put up with the clichéd description of Turkey, especially popular in Western scholarship and publicist writing, as a “bridge between Europe and the Near East”. In his view, rather than a “bridge”, Turkey is the “heart” of Euroasia, its natural centre which, owing to her great historical and geographical depth, is going to play a pivotal role in stabilizing the political and economic situation in a vast area from the “Adriatic Sea to Central Asia”, as Suleiman Denirel used to put it. Turkey, Davutoglu goes on to say, possesses all necessary social potentials for playing such a role on a fundamentally changed international scene: a democratic system, a young and dynamic population, a formed civil society, stable middle classes, a market economy, and a very respectable scientific and technological infrastructure. These potentials oblige Turkey to abandon her passive foreign policy and become instead the architect of a new political and economic conjuncture, reappraising her cultural and historical heritage and the advantages of her geographical position.

In other words, Davutoglu believes that Turkey should no longer be a peripheral nation whose political role amounts to being a “bridge” between civilizations. Rather she should pursue an active foreign policy and become a centre of political decision-making. In order to achieve that, she needs to construct a new identity, suited to her new and ambitious role in the vast space of Eurasia. Breaking with the foreign policy of Kemalist Turkey, Davutoglu proposes partnership with the major powers (USA, EU, Russia, China) and the renewal of her sphere of influence, which happens to coincide territorially with the major provinces of the former Ottoman Empire. In that context, the domicile Muslim population of certain regions will serve as the “building material” for constructing Turkey as a new regional and global power.

It has already been said that the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Near East and the Balkans are the regions where contemporary Turkey is interested in renewing her political, economic and even military influence. Especially important among these is the Balkans, as it has always been the oft-questioned basis of “Turkish Euroeuranism”. In his analysis of this aspect of the neo-Ottomanist doctrine, Tanasković takes a look at a very important essay of the Turkish political scholar Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, “We already are Europeans”. The essay suggests that the war in Bosnia in the 1990s was not triggered by strife between Christians and Muslims, nor was it a war of civilizations in Huntingtonian terms, but that it in fact was the most serious attempt in modern history to drive Turkey out of Europe and into the East, to which she has never belonged and which she has always considered irrelevant. The essay makes plain that the neo-Ottomanists are in the process of constructing a new
identity for Turkey, mostly along the political and cultural lines of the former Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. For them, the Balkans is the primary sphere of influence, and their activities will be largely devoted to settling Balkan political issues, of course, in accordance with the interests of modern Turkey. It is indicative in that sense that official Turkey sees Serbia as a “neighbouring country”.

Reminding his readers of the fact that the post-Ottoman period saw systematic obliteration of the Ottoman cultural legacy in the Balkan countries, which Turkey, weak as she was at the time, was unable to counter, Davutoglu emphasizes that the process was the most vigorous in Greece and Bulgaria. That is why — the “Turkish Kissinger” goes on to say — it is necessary for Turkey to focus on two vital and traditional linchpins of the Turkish Ottomanist or pan-Turkist Balkan policy: the Bosniaks and Albanians. As they form the human basis for Turkey’s regenerated political and economic power, she should do whatever it takes to satisfy their political appetites. A strong Albania and a centralized Bosnia-Herzegovina, to which now an independent Kosovo should be added, are a priority of the Turkish agenda, because that is the only way for her to curb the influence of other powers in the region: Russia (through the Serbs and, possibly, Bulgarians) and Germany (through the Slovenes and Croats). The arc stretching from Bihać in the west, across central and eastern Bosnia, Stara Raška (Sandžak), Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia and Kardzhali to Thrace is, for Davutoglu, a vitally important corridor to Turkey. Assuming that the Serbian goal in the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo was to sever that corridor, Davutoglu believes that it is vital to renew it. Otherwise, he argues, the Bosnian Muslims will be left exposed to the assimilatory influence of Croatia, while those in Sandžak and the Albanians in Kosovo will be left exposed to the influence of Serbia.

How carefully designed Turkey’s long-term foreign-policy approach to the Balkans is may be seen from the section of Davutoglu’s book elaborating on the three concentric geopolitical circles within which Turkish influence of different depths and intensities is supposed to be exerted. The first is the so-called Inner Circle, which encompasses Kosovo and Metohija (and thus Serbia), Albania and Macedonia; the second is the Middle Circle, encompassing Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the third, Outer Circle, encompasses Croatia, Hungary and Romania, and is not of primary interest to Ankara.

What is of central importance to Turkey is that Albania and the entire Albanian ethnic corpus should be as strong as possible. Albania must not be allowed to remain a weak and undeveloped country because, in that case, Italian and Greek presence would grow stronger, thereby countering Turkish political ambitions and interests in the region. Davutoglu is acutely aware of the complexities and contradictions involved in Albanian-Macedonian relations, and of the risk that their straining might open the way to Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian influences on a politically divided and, effectively partitioned, country such as Macedonia. Therefore, he argues, Turkey should give a boost to the shared state and help create the conditions for the Albanians to be able to fully exercise their human rights in order that the integrity of this unstable country should be preserved.

Tactical priority in Turkey’s approach to the second geopolitical circle is to respond actively and timely to any intention of these nations to establish closer mutual cooperation and agreements, and by initiating counter-agreements to ensure that the balance of power is not disturbed to the detriment of Turkey and her Balkan protégés. It should be noted that Davutoglu does not question the alliance be-
tween Belgrade and Athens, but rather takes it as a political fact which is not susceptible to political influence. What is politically feasible, however, is to ensure that Sofia remains outside of that alliance. He fears the possibility and overtly suggests a proactive approach aimed at binding Bulgaria to Turkey as closely as possible. How successful Turkey has been in this may be seen from the fact that all unsettled disputes between Bulgaria and Turkey (and they are not few) were somehow pushed aside to help Bulgaria join the European Union in 2007, with the generous help of the Turkish minority party in Bulgaria, whose leader, Ahmet Dogan, was almost unfailingly a desirable political partner for all Bulgarian parties. Moreover, Bulgaria recognized independent Kosovo, her representative “bravely” defended Kosovo’s right to independence before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, and her political leaders keep encouraging Albanian-Macedonian cooperation. It seems self-evident that Bulgaria’s motive in all that is to profit, at least partially, from the current geopolitical situation in the Balkans, notably in eastern Macedonia.

It may be added in conclusion that major powers, most of all the USA, Great Britain, France and Germany, do not appear to have anything against this turn in Turkey’s foreign policy. Nor does Russia seem to mind, while China appears to ignore it altogether. The view is often heard that Turkey (as a NATO member) is merely a regional instrument in the hands of the USA and Great Britain, doing nothing else but fulfilling their political demands, while being permitted in return to “impose peace and order in her own backyard”. The view is a far cry from the truth. It is true that Turkey acknowledges the interests and demands of the Anglo-Saxon nations. At the same time, however, she is ready to confront them if that is what her own strategic political interests require. Turkey will never sacrifice them to please her patron overseas. It is in that context that some interesting political moves of the Turkish government, which came as an unpleasant surprise for the USA, should be looked at: the recall of the Turkish ambassador to the USA “for consultation” after US Congress passed the resolution terming the persecution of the Armenians during the First World War as a genocide; the straining of relations with Israel over the position of the Palestinians in Gaza; support extended to the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (overtly hostile to the USA); and joining Russia’s project for a southern gas pipeline. All this shows that Turkey strives for an independent foreign policy and that such a trend should be expected in the future.

This is the central question for Serbia’s national policy and diplomacy at this point. Concluding his analysis of Davitoglu’s depth strategy, Tanasković stresses that the neo-Ottomanist aspect of Turkish foreign policy should not be looked at from a moralizing perspective, which is only prone to obscure what lies at the core of things. Neo-Ottomanism is neither good nor bad in itself. It may even have some degree of legitimacy. If it is all right for Germany to protect the interests of the Croats and Slovenes, and for Russia those of the Serbs, then why, Tanasković reasonably asks, would it not be all right for Turkey to claim the right to protect the interests of the Bosniaks and Albanians? This is a legitimate analogy to draw. Neo-Ottomanism, therefore, should not be denounced ahead of time. Serbia needs to take it into account as a political fact, and to strive for the maximum possible gain at the minimum possible loss in her relations with the new Turkey. Whether she will be successful depends most of all on her ability to recognize her own vital interests as well as the limits of her own strength. This requires a tremendous amount of
political realism and pragmatism. Should she be successful in coping with realities, she might achieve significant benefits. Should she fail, she will have no other to blame but herself, given that the picture of relations among major powers in the Balkans is completely clear. It is Serbia's call now, and we can only hope that she will act prudently and timely. The complexities of the modern world made plain in Tanasković’s remarkably inspiring book invite the reader to further and profound reflection.
Alex N. Dragnich was born 22 February 1912 on his parents’ homestead outside Republic, Washington, a small town based on mining and logging industries. Born into a family of Serbian immigrants from Old Herzegovina (village of Morakovo near Nikšić, present-day Montenegro), young Dragnich did not begin his education until he was nine, after a truant officer showed up at his family cabin in the mountains and explained to his father that education was obligatory in USA. Although he initially did not know a word of English and despite interruptions to his education caused by the difficult times during the Great Depression, Dragnich graduated from the University of Washington in 1938, completed work on his Ph.D. thesis in 1942 and eventually received the degree in political sciences from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1945. After the war, he taught at Western Reserve University in Cleveland (1945–47). He joined Vanderbilt University in 1950, where he stayed until retirement in 1978, having served as Chairman of the Department of Political Sciences in 1964–69, and having received the Thomas Jefferson Award for “distinguished service to Vanderbilt” in 1970. Dragnich also held the Chester W. Nimitz Chair at the Naval War College (1959–60) in Newport, was a research fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, California (1978–81), and taught at Washington University and Lee University (1982). During the 1960s he served as President of the Southern Political Science Association and Vice-President of the American Political Science Association. After retirement in 1978 Dragnich became Professor Emeritus of Vanderbilt University.

During the Second World War Dragnich served as a foreign affairs analyst for the Department of Justice and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS – a predecessor of the CIA). From 1947 to 1950 he joined the US Foreign Service and served as Public Affair Officer at the US Embassy in Belgrade. It was during his service in communist Yugoslavia that Dragnich first found out about the Tito-Stalin split of 1948.

Alex N. Dragnich wrote several outstanding books, including his best-known textbook Major European Governments (1961), which is still in use worldwide. A very important book, Tito’s Promised Land: Yugoslavia (1954), which harshly criticized the Yugoslav communist system, was published after he ended his service in Belgrade. The appearance of this book was met with a sharp reaction from the Yugoslav communist government, which declared him persona non grata. His next important book was International Communism in Yugoslavia. The Myth of “Titoism” (1958). It complemented the previous one and further denounced Tito’s version of a communist regime. The book entitled Nikola Pašić, Serbia and Yugoslavia (1974) is especially important for Serbian historiography, because it was, and still is, the first complete biography of Nikola Pašić in English. The book entitled Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia in the 19th Century (1978) discusses the beginnings of the parliamentary system

* Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade
in nineteenth-century Serbia. His other books are devoted to the political history of the Yugoslav state: from the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia in 1918 and its collapse in 1941 to its postwar restoration on a communist basis and its disintegration in 1991. These books include explanation of the Serbo-Croatian relations in Yugoslavia and especially Serbo-Albanian relations in Kosovo and Metohija. Dragnich’s retirement from academia did not mean retirement from scholarly work and research. He published several books, such as The First Yugoslavia. Search for a Viable Political System (1983), Saga of Kosovo (1984), Serbs and Croats. The Struggle in Yugoslavia (1992), Serbia’s Historical Heritage (1994), Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and the Struggle for Truth (1995), Serbia and Yugoslavia (1998). The last book Alex Dragnich wrote, Serbia through the Ages (2004), is devoted to the history of Serbia. This outstanding work symbolically rounds off the impressive scholarly oeuvre of Alex Dragnich.

Alex N. Dragnich was a founding member and first president of the Society for Serbian Studies, dedicated to promoting and enhancing knowledge of Serbian culture and society throughout the North American continent, and to fostering and supporting scholarly research in a variety of fields. The Society publishes the journal Serbian Studies, where Serbian scholars and writers from the Serbian diaspora, and authors from Serbia and other Serb-populated lands occupy a special place.

Dragnich was a foreign member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts from 1997, member of the Privy Council of the Royal Family of Serbia, and recipient of the Grand Cross of the Order of White Eagle conferred by the Crown. In 2002 he was awarded a special medal by the Yugoslav post-Milošević and democratic government for merit in improving the image of Serbs and Serbia in the United States.

Alex N. Dragnich passed away in 2009 in Bowie, Maryland, at age of ninety-seven.

Aleksandar Jovanović (1947–2009)

by Vladimir P. Petrović and Sanja Pilipović*

Aleksandar Jovanović was born in 1947 in Belgrade. Having graduated from the University of Belgrade in 1970, he left for Niš to join the local museum. Five years later, he returned to his native town to embark upon a university career as a teaching assistant at the School of Philosophy. He received his MA degree in 1976, and in 1982 defended his doctoral thesis devoted to the Roman-period burial practices in the territory of Yugoslavia. He climbed the university ladder to full professorship at the departments of Classical Studies and of Archaeology of the Belgrade University School of Philosophy, and he also taught at the School of Philosophy of Novi Sad University.

The bibliography of Aleksandar Jovanović includes numerous studies, contributions and monographs. The important monographic volumes such as Jewellery in Roman Dardania (1978), Forms of Burial in the Territory of Yugoslavia at the Time of the Roman Empire (1984) and two bilingual, Serbian and English, books Serbia – Homeland of Roman Emperors (2006) and Essays on Antiquity (2007) reflect just some aspects of his

*Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade
rich scholarly work. One of the last two monographs looks at the lives of sixteen Roman emperors born in what is now Serbia (Trajan Decius, Claudius II Gothicus, Aurelian, Probus, Maximianus Herculius, Constantius, Chlorus, Galerius, Maximinus Daia, Flavius Severus, Constantine the Great, Licinius, Constantius II, Vetranio, Jovian, Gratian and Constantius III), while the other is conceived as a selection of smoothly written and carefully worded problem-oriented essays addressing a variety of research topics.

A significant area of Professor Jovanović’s interest was the iconography of the Greco-Roman world, to mention but his texts on a pottery vessel decorated in relief from Singidunum (1997), on the silver emblems from Tekija (1990), his contribution to the iconographic studies of the Augustan golden age (2001), or archaeological notes on the sacral monuments from Macedonia (2005), or his contribution to the study of Roman-period iconography in Upper Moesia (2007). Ancient cults constituted another area of his scholarly focus, as best exemplified by the text on a 4th-century-BC syncretistic monument from Vinik near Niš (1977) or the one on the cult of Venus Funeraria in Upper Moesia (2000). To be mentioned are also the texts devoted to the late Roman villa at Mediana near Niš, but also the fact that Aleksandar Jovanović was not at all reluctant to address the delicate problem of archaeological counterfeits, as evidenced by the texts “Falsifikate im archäologischen material—eine warnende aktualität” (2002) and “On an assemblage of forged Roman rings” (2005).

Apart from his work of a scholar and researcher, Aleksandar Jovanović left an indelible mark on generations of archaeology and art history students through a series of his lovingly and carefully prepared undergraduate and postgraduate courses and tutorials at two universities, Belgrade and Novi Sad. But the tremendous influence he exerted on young people was not only that of a teacher passionate about his subject, classical civilization, but also of an exceptional person whose warmth, infinite kindness, generosity and sensitivity will remain his everlasting gift not only to his family and friends but also to his students and colleagues.

Professor Aleksandar Jovanović had the ability to impart his tremendous knowledge in an unassuming way, and to understand, reassure and respect his collocutors. Conversations with him filled us, his students, with a feeling of joy and satisfaction, and we remain deeply grateful to Professor Jovanović for his almost parental support which was our encouragement and which made us better people.